Chapter VI: Part 6

The Doctor imputed this conduct to the moderation of the Minister, and to his desire of removing every obstacle to speedy negotiations for peace. He observed, that this Court had hitherto treated us very fairly, and that suspicions to their disadvantage should not be readily entertained. He also mentioned our instructions, as further reasons for our acquiescence in the advice and opinion of the Minister. A day or two afterwards I paid a visit to Mr Oswald, and had a long conversation with him respecting his commission. On the resignation of Mr Fox, many reports to the prejudice of Lord Shelburne's sincerity, on the subject of American independence, had spread through France as well as through Great Britain. His Lordship, fearful of their effect on the confidence with which he wished to inspire the American commissioners, conveyed by Mr Benjamin Vaughan to Dr Franklin an extract of certain instructions to Sir Guy Carleton, of which the following is a copy, viz.

"_June 25th, 1782._ It has been said, that 'great effects might be obtained by something being done _spontaneously_ from England.' Upon this and other considerations, his Majesty has been induced to give a striking proof of his royal magnanimity and disinterested wish for the restoration of peace, by commanding his Majesty's Ministers to direct Mr Grenville, _that the independence of America should be proposed by him in the first instance, instead of making it the condition of a general peace_.

"I have given a confidential information to you of these particulars, that you may take such measures as shall appear to you most advisable for making a direct communication of the substance of the same, either immediately to Congress, or through the medium of General Washington, or in any other manner, which you may think most likely to impress the well disposed parts of America with the fairness and liberality of his Majesty's proceedings in such great and spontaneous concessions.

"The advantages, which we may expect from such concessions are, that America, once apprised of the King's disposition to acknowledge the independence of the thirteen States, and of the disinclination in the French Court to terminate the war, must see that it is from this moment to be carried on with a view of negotiating points, in which she can have no concern, whether they regard France, or Spain and Holland at the desire of France; but some of which, on the contrary, may be in future manifestly injurious to the interests of America herself.

"That if the negotiation is broken off, it will undoubtedly be for the sake of those powers, and not America, whose object is accomplished the instant she accepts of an independence, which is not merely held out to her in the way of negotiation by the executive power, but a distinct unconditional offer, arising out of the resolutions of Parliament, and therefore warranted by the sense of the nation at large.

"These facts being made notorious, it is scarce conceivable that America, composed as she is, will continue efforts under French direction, and protract the distresses and calamities, which it is well known that war has subjected her to. It is to be presumed, that from that moment she will look with jealousy on the French troops in that country, who may from allies become dangerous enemies.

"If, however, any particular States, men, or description of men, should continue against the general inclination of the Continent devoted to France, this communication will surely detect their views, expose their motives, and deprive them of their influence in all matters of general concern and exertion. You will, however, take particular care in your manner of conducting yourselves, not only that there should not be the smallest room for suspicions of our good faith and sincerity, but that we have no view in it of causing dissensions among the colonies, or even of separating America from France upon terms inconsistent with her own honor. You must therefore convince them, that the great object of this country is, not merely peace, but reconciliation with America on the noblest terms and by the noblest means."

In the course of the beforementioned conversation with Mr Oswald, I reminded him, that the judgment and opinion of America respecting the disposition and views of Britain towards her, must be determined by facts and not by professions. That the Enabling Act, and the Commission granted to him in pursuance of it, by no means harmonised with the language of these instructions to Sir Guy Carleton. That unless the offers and promises contained in the latter were realised, by an immediate declaration of our independence, America would naturally consider them as specious appearances of magnanimity, calculated to deceive and disunite them, and, instead of conciliating, would tend to irritate the States. I also urged, in the strongest terms, the great impropriety, and consequently the utter impossibility of our ever treating with Great Britain on any other than an equal footing, and told him plainly, that I would have no concern in any negotiation, in which we were not considered as an independent people.

Mr Oswald upon this, as upon every other occasion, behaved in a candid and proper manner. He saw and confessed the propriety of these remarks; he wished his commission had been otherwise, but was at a loss how to reconcile it to the King's dignity, to make _such_ a declaration, immediately after having issued _such_ a commission. I pointed out the manner in which I conceived it might be done; he liked the thought, and desired me to reduce it to writing. I did so, and communicated it to Dr Franklin, and, as we corrected it, is as follows, viz.

"George III, &c. to Richard Oswald, greeting. Whereas by a certain act, &c. (here follows the Enabling Act.)

"And whereas, in pursuance of the true intent and meaning of the said act, and to remove all doubts and jealousies, which might otherwise retard the execution of the same, we did, on the ---- day of ---- instruct Sir Guy Carleton, &c. our General, &c. to make known to the people of the said Colonies, in Congress assembled, our royal disposition and intention to recognise the said Colonies as independent States, and as such, to enter with them into such a treaty of peace as might be honorable and convenient to both countries.

"And whereas further, in pursuance of the said act, we did on the ---- day of ---- authorise and commission you, the said Richard Oswald, (here follows the commission.) Now, therefore, to the end that a period may be put to the calamities of war, and peace, commerce, and mutual intercourse the more speedily restored, we do hereby, in pursuance of our royal word, for ourselves and our successors, recognise the said thirteen Colonies as free and independent States. And it is our will and pleasure, that you do forthwith proceed to treat with the Commissioner or Commissioners already appointed, or to be appointed for that purpose by the Congress of the said States, and, with him or them only, of and concerning the objects of your said commission, which we do hereby confirm, and that this declaration be considered by you as a preliminary article to the proposed treaty, and be in substance or in the whole inserted therein, or incorporated therewith. And it is our further will and pleasure, that, on receiving these presents, which we have caused to be made patent, and our great seal to be hereunto affixed, you do deliver the same to the said Commissioner or Commissioners, to be by him or them transmitted to the Congress of the United States of America, as an earnest of the friendship and good will, which we are disposed to extend to them. Witness, &c. 15th of August, 1782."

Mr Oswald approved of the draft, and said he would recommend the measure to the Minister. The next day, however, he told me that he had an instruction, which he thought enabled him to make the declaration; but that it would be necessary to obtain the previous consent of the Minister for that purpose. He then read to me the fourth article of his instructions, of which the following is a copy, viz.

"In case you find the American Commissioners are not at liberty to treat on any terms short of independence, you are to declare to them that you have our authority to make that cession; our ardent wish for peace disposing us to purchase it at the price of acceding to the complete independence of the thirteen colonies."

He said he would immediately despatch a courier to London, and would press the Ministry for permission to acknowledge our independence without further delay, which he accordingly did.

At this time the commission under the great seal had arrived, and Dr Franklin and myself went to Versailles to communicate that circumstance to the Count de Vergennes, and (agreeably to our instructions) to inform him of what had passed between Mr Oswald and us.

The Count and myself again discussed the propriety of insisting, that our independence should be acknowledged previous to a treaty. He repeated, that it was expecting the effect before the cause, and many other similar remarks, which did not appear to me to be well founded. I told the Count, that a declaration of our independence was in my opinion, a matter of very little consequence; that I did not consider our independence as requiring any aid or validity from British acts; and provided, that nation treated us as she treated other nations, viz. on a footing of equality, it was all that I desired. He differed with me also in this opinion. He thought an explicit acknowledgment of our independence in treaty very necessary, in order to prevent our being exposed to further claims. I told him we should always have arms in our hands to answer those claims, that I considered mere paper fortifications as of but little consequence; and that we should take care to insert an article in the treaty, whereby the King of Great Britain should renounce all claims of every kind to the countries within our limits.

The Count informed us, he had delayed doing business with Mr Fitzherbert, until we should be ready to proceed with Mr Oswald, and that he expected to see him the next day or the day after.

Mr Fitzherbert went the next day to Versailles, and immediately despatched a courier to London.

The answer of the British Ministry to Mr Oswald is contained in the following extract of a letter to him from Mr Townshend, dated Whitehall, September 1st, 1782.

"Sir,

"I have received and laid before the King your letters of the 17th, 18th, and 21st ultimo, and I am commanded to signify to you, his Majesty's approbation of your conduct, in communicating to the American Commissioners the fourth article of your instructions; which could not but convince them, that the negotiation for peace, and the cession of independence to the Thirteen United Colonies, were intended to be carried on and concluded with the Commissioners in Europe.

"Those gentlemen, having expressed their satisfaction concerning that article, it is hoped they will not entertain a doubt of his Majesty's determination to exercise in the fullest extent the powers with which the act of Parliament has invested him, by granting to America, full, complete, and unconditional independence, in the most explicit manner, as an article of treaty."

When Mr Oswald communicated this letter to me, I did not hesitate to tell him, that his Court was misled by this, for that the language of Mr Townshend corresponded so exactly with that of the Count de Vergennes, and was at the same time so contrary to that of the instructions to Sir Guy Carleton, as to be inexplicable on any other principle. I also told him I suspected, that the courier despatched by Mr Fitzherbert on his return from Versailles had been the means of infusing these ideas. He smiled, and after a little pause said; why, Count de Vergennes told Mr Fitzherbert, that my commission was come and that he thought it would do, and therefore they might now go on, and accordingly they did go on to discuss certain points, and particularly that of Newfoundland.

Mr Oswald did not deny or contradict the inference I drew from this, viz. that Mr Fitzherbert, struck by this conduct of Count de Vergennes, and finding that the commission given to Mr Oswald was deemed sufficient by him, thought it his duty directly to inform his Court of it, and thereby prevent their being embarrassed by our scruples and demands on a point, on which there was so much reason to think, that our allies were very moderate.

For my own part I was not only persuaded that this was the case, but also that the ill success of Mr Oswald's application was owing to it.

These considerations induced me to explain to him, what I supposed to be the natural policy of this Court on the subject, and to show him that it was the interest of Britain to render us as independent on France, as we were resolved to be on her. He soon adopted the same opinion, but was at a loss to see in what manner Great Britain, considering what had just past, could consistently take further steps at present. I told him, that nothing was more easy, for that the issuing of another commission would do it. He asked me if he might write that to the Ministry; I told him he might; he then desired, in order to avoid mistakes, that I would give it to him in writing, which I did as follows, viz.

"A commission (in the usual form) to Richard Oswald to treat of peace or truce with Commissioners, vested with equal powers by and on the part of the United States of America, would remove the objections to which his present one is liable, and render it proper for the American Commissioners to proceed to treat with him on the subject of preliminaries."

I then reminded him of the several resolutions of Congress, passed at different periods, not to treat with British Commissioners on any other footing than that of absolute independence, and also intimated, that I thought it would be best to give him our final and decided determination not to treat otherwise in writing, in the form of a letter. He preferred this to a verbal answer, and the next day I prepared the following draft of such a letter.

"Sir,

"It is with regret, that we find ourselves obliged by our duty to our country, to object to entering with you into negotiations for peace on the plan proposed. One nation can treat with another nation only on terms of equality; and it cannot be expected, that we should be the first and only servants of Congress, who would admit doubts of their independence.

"The tenor of your commission affords matter for a variety of objections, which your good sense will save us the pain of enumerating. The journals of Congress present to you unequivocal and uniform evidence of the sentiments and resolutions of Congress on the subject, and their positive instructions to us to speak the same language.

"The manner of removing these obstacles is obvious, and in our opinion no less consistent with the dignity than the interest of Great Britain. If the Parliament meant to enable the King to conclude a peace with us on terms of independence, they necessarily meant to enable him to do it in a manner compatible with his dignity; and consequently that he should previously regard us in a point of view, that would render it proper for him to negotiate with us. What this point of view is you need not be informed.

"We also take the liberty of submitting to your consideration, how far his Majesty's now declining to take this step would comport with the assurances lately given on that subject, and whether hesitation and delay would not tend to lessen the confidence, which those assurances were calculated to inspire.

"As to referring an acknowledgment of our independence to the first article of a treaty, permit us to remark, that this implies, that we are not to be considered in that light until after the conclusion of the treaty, and our acquiescing would be to admit the propriety of our being considered in another light during that interval. Had this circumstance been attended to, we presume that the Court of Great Britain would not have pressed a measure, which certainly is not delicate, and which cannot be reconciled with the received ideas of national honor.

"You may rest assured, Sir, of our disposition to peace on reasonable terms, and of our readiness to enter seriously into negotiations for it, as soon as we shall have an opportunity of doing it in the only manner in which it is possible for one nation to treat with another, viz. on an equal footing.

"Had you been commissioned in the usual manner, we might have proceeded; and as we can perceive no legal or other objection to this, or some other such like expedient, it is to be wished that his Majesty will not permit an obstacle so very unimportant to Great Britain, but so essential and insuperable with respect to us, to delay the re-establishment of peace especially, and in case the business could be but once begun, the confidence we have in your candor and integrity would probably render the settling all our articles only the work of a few hours.

"We are, &c."

I submitted this draft to Dr Franklin's consideration. He thought it rather too positive, and therefore rather imprudent, for that in case Britain should remain firm, and future circumstances should compel us to submit to their mode of treating, we should do it with an ill grace after such a decided and peremptory refusal. Besides, the Doctor seemed to be much perplexed and fettered by our instructions to be guided by the advice of this Court. Neither of these considerations had weight with me; for as to the first, I could not conceive of any event, which would render it proper and therefore possible for America to treat in any other character than as an independent nation; and, as to the second, I could not believe, that Congress intended we should follow any advice, which might be repugnant to their dignity and interest.

On returning to town, Mr Oswald spoke to me about this letter. I told him that I had prepared a draft of one, but that on further consideration, and consulting with Dr Franklin, we thought it best not to take the liberty of troubling his Court with any arguments or reasonings, which without our aid must be very evident to them.

He appeared disappointed, and desired me to let him see the draft. I did. He liked it. He requested a copy of it; but as I doubted the propriety of such a step, I told him I would consider of it, and give him an answer the next day.

It appeared to me on further reflection, that no bad consequences would arise from giving him a copy of this paper; that, though unsigned, it would nevertheless convey to the Ministry the sentiments and opinions I wished to impress, and that if finally they should not be content to treat with us as independent, they were not yet ripe for peace or treaty with us; besides, I could not be persuaded, that Great Britain, after what the House of Commons had declared, after what Mr Grenville had said, and Sir Guy Carleton been instructed to do, would persist in refusing to admit our independence, provided they really believed, that we had firmly resolved not to treat on more humble terms.

I gave him a copy, and also copies of the various resolutions of Congress, which evince their adherence to their independence. These papers he sent by express to London, and warmly recommended the issuing a new commission to remove all further delay. This matter was not communicated to the Count de Vergennes, at least to my knowledge or belief, by either of us.

I might now enumerate the various expedients proposed by the Count de Vergennes and the Marquis de Lafayette to reconcile our difficulties. Such as Mr Oswald's writing a letter to us, signifying that he treated with us as independent, &c. &c. But as our independence was indivisible, there could not easily be contrived a half way mode of acknowledging it, and therefore any method of doing it short of the true and proper one could not bear examination.

Being convinced, that the objections to our following the advice of the Count de Vergennes were unanswerable, I proposed to Dr Franklin, that we should state them in a letter to him, and request his answer in writing, because, as we were instructed to ask and to follow his advice on these occasions, we ought always to be able to show what his advice was.

The Doctor approved of the measure, and I undertook to prepare a draft of such a letter.

I must now remind you of what some of my former letters informed you, viz. the propositions made to me by the Count d'Aranda on the part of Spain. It is necessary that I should in this place go into that detail, because they will be found in the sequel to be strongly connected with the subject more immediately under consideration.

On my arrival at Paris in June last, it being doubtful whether if I made a visit to Count d'Aranda he would return it, I thought it most advisable to avoid that risk, and to write him the following letter.

TO COUNT D'ARANDA.

"Paris, June 25th, 1782.

"Sir,

"On leaving Madrid his Excellency, the Count de Florida Blanca, informed me, that the papers relative to the objects of my mission there had been transmitted to your Excellency, with authority and instructions to treat with me on the subject of them.

"I arrived here the day before yesterday, and have the honor to acquaint your Excellency of my being ready to commence the necessary conferences at such time and place as your Excellency may think proper to name.

"Your Excellency's character gives me reason to hope, that the negotiation in question will be conducted in a manner agreeable to both our countries; and permit me to assure you, that nothing on my part shall be wanting to manifest the respect and consideration, with which I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY."

The following is a copy of the Count's answer.

Translation.

"Paris, June 27th, 1782.

"Sir,

"I have the honor to reply to your note of the 25th, informing me of your happy arrival at this Court. I shall also have the honor to receive you, when you shall intimate that it is proper, and whenever you will inform me of your intention, so that I may expect you at whatever hour shall be most convenient to you.

"I shall be pleased to make your acquaintance, and to assure you of the respect with which I have the honor, &c.

THE COUNT D'ARANDA."

It having been intimated to Dr Franklin, that if we paid a visit to Count d'Aranda, it would be returned, we waited on him on the 29th of June. He received us in a friendly manner, and expressed his wishes, that closer connexion might be formed between our countries on terms agreeable to both.

He returned our visit the next day, and gave us an invitation to dine with him a few days afterwards. On that day I was taken sick, and continued so for many weeks, nor, indeed, am I yet perfectly recovered from the effects of that illness, having a constant pain in my breast, and frequently a little fever.

Hence it happened, that I did not meet Count d'Aranda on business till a month afterwards, when agreeably to a previous appointment I waited upon him.

He began the conference by various remarks on the general principles on which contracting nations should form treaties, on the magnanimity of his sovereign, and on his own disposition to disregard trifling considerations in great matters. Then opening Michell's large Map of North America, he asked me what were our boundaries; I told him that the boundary between us and the Spanish dominions was a line drawn from the head of Mississippi, down the middle thereof to the thirtyfirst degree of north latitude, and from thence by the line between Florida and Georgia.

He entered into a long discussion of our right to such an extent, and insisted principally on two objections to it. 1st. That the western country had never belonged to, or been claimed as belonging to the ancient Colonies. That previous to the last war it had belonged to France, and after its cession to Britain remained a distinct part of her dominions, until by the conquest of West Florida and certain posts on the Mississippi and Illinois, it became vested in Spain. 2dly. That supposing the Spanish right of conquest did not extend over _all_ that country, still that it was possessed by free and independent nations of Indians, whose lands we could not with any propriety consider as belonging to us. He therefore proposed to run a longitudinal line on the east side of the river, for our western boundary; and said, that he did not mean to dispute about a few acres or miles, but wished to run it in a manner that would be convenient to us; for though he could never admit the extent we claimed, yet he did not desire to crowd us up to our exact limits.

As it did not appear to me expedient to enter fully into the discussion of these objections, until after he had marked the line he proposed, I told him I would forbear troubling him with any remarks on the subject until the points in controversy should be reduced to a certainty; and, therefore, I desired him to mark on the map the line he proposed, and to place it as far to the west as his instructions would possibly admit of. He promised to do it, and to send me the map with his proposed line marked on it in a day or two.

I then gave him a copy of my commission, and showed him the original. He returned it to me with expressions of satisfaction, and then changed the subject, by desiring me, if after receiving his map and examining his lines, I should find it in any respect inconvenient, that I would mark such other line on it as would, in my opinion, be more agreeable to America; assuring me, that he had nothing more at heart, than to fix such a boundary between us as might be satisfactory to both parties. I told him, that on receiving his map, I would take all that he had said into consideration, and take the earliest opportunity of acquainting him with my sentiments respecting it. I then observed, that I hoped his powers to treat were equal with mine. He replied, that he had ample powers to confer, but not to sign anything without previously communicating it to his Court, and receiving their orders for the purpose; but to my surprise, he did not offer to show me any powers of any kind.[5]

A few days afterwards he sent me the same map, with his proposed line marked on it in red ink. He ran it from a lake near the confines of Georgia, but east of the Flint River, to the confluence of the Kanawa with the Ohio, thence round the western shores of lakes Erie and Huron, and thence round lake Michigan to lake Superior.

On the 10th of August I carried this map to the Count de Vergennes and left it with him. Dr Franklin joined with me in pointing out the extravagance of this line; and I must do him the justice to say, that in all his letters to me, and in all his conversations with me respecting our western extent, he has invariably declared it to be his opinion, that we should insist upon the Mississippi as our western boundary, and that we ought not, by any means, to part with our right to the free navigation of it.

The Count de Vergennes was very cautious and reserved; but M. Rayneval, his principal Secretary, who was present, thought we claimed more than we had a right to.

Having thus clearly discovered the views of Spain, and that they were utterly inadmissible, I had little hope of our ever agreeing; especially as the Mississippi was, and ought to be, our _ultimatum_.

It was not long before I had another interview with M. Rayneval. He asked me whether I had made any progress in my negotiations with the Count d'Aranda. I told him, that the Count had not yet shown me any powers from his Court to treat. He expressed surprise that I should have any difficulties on that head; especially considering the public as well as private character of that nobleman. I replied, that I was very sensible of the respectability, both of his public and private character; but, that neither the one nor the other authorised him to negotiate treaties with the United States of America; and consequently, that his Court would be at liberty to disavow all his proceedings in such business. That it was my duty to adhere to the forms usual in such cases, and that those forms rendered it proper for Ministers to exchange copies of their commissions, before they proceeded on the business, which was the object of them.

The Count d'Aranda was very urgent, that I should mark on his map some line or other to the eastward of the Mississippi, to which we could agree; and on the 26th of August we had another conference on these subjects. I told him frankly, that we were bound by the Mississippi, and that I had no authority to cede any territories east of it to his Catholic Majesty, and that all I could do relative to it, was to transmit his proposition to Congress for their consideration.

He affected to be much surprised, that I should have no discretionary authority on that subject, and observed, that he had supposed I was a Minister Plenipotentiary. I told him, that few Ministers Plenipotentiary had discretionary power to transfer and cede to others the countries of their sovereigns. He denied, that the countries in question were our countries, and asked what right we had to territories, which manifestly belong to free and independent nations of Indians. I answered that those were points to be discussed and settled between us and them; that we claimed the right of preemption with respect to them, and the sovereignty with respect to all other nations. I reminded him, that Mexico and Peru had been in the same predicament, and yet that his Catholic Majesty had had no doubts of his right to the sovereignty of those countries.

He then desired me to write him a letter on the subject, in order that he might with the greater accuracy convey my sentiments to his Court.

On the 4th of September, I received the following letter from M. de Rayneval.

Translation.

"Versailles, September 4th, 1782.

"Sir,

"I should be glad to have a conversation with you on the subject of the boundaries in regard to Spain, but it is impossible for me to go to Paris for this purpose. You would oblige me, if you would have the goodness to come to Versailles tomorrow morning. It will give me great pleasure to see you at dinner. Meanwhile I have the honor, &c.

RAYNEVAL."

I accordingly waited upon M. de Rayneval. He entered into a long disquisition of our claims to the western country. It is unnecessary to repeat in this place what he said on those subjects, because I shall insert in this letter a copy of a paper, which at my request he wrote to me on them. That paper will speak for itself. You will be at no loss to form a judgment of the mode in which he proposed to reconcile us, by what he called a conciliatory line. We discussed very freely the propriety of my objecting to proceed with the Count d'Aranda; and among other reasons, which induced him to think I ought to go on, was my having already conferred with him on those subjects. My answer to this was obvious, viz. that though I had heard Count d'Aranda's propositions, yet that I had offered none of any kind whatever.

On the 6th of September, M. de Rayneval wrote me the following letter.

M. DE RAYNEVAL TO JOHN JAY.

Translation.

"Versailles, September 6th, 1782.

"I have the honor, Sir, to send you as you desired me, my personal ideas on the manner of terminating your discussions about limits with Spain. I hope they will appear to you worthy to be taken into consideration.

"I have reflected, Sir, on what you said to me yesterday of the Spanish Ambassador's want of powers. You cannot in my opinion urge that reason to dispense treating with that Ambassador, without offending him, and without contradicting the first step you have taken towards him. This reflection leads me to advise you again to see the Count d'Aranda, and to make him a proposition of some sort or other on the object in question. That which results from my memoir appears to me the most proper to effect a reasonable conciliation; but it is for you to judge whether I am mistaken, because you alone have a knowledge of the title, which the United States can have to extend their possessions at the expense of nations, whom England herself has acknowledged to be independent.

"As to the rest, Sir, whatever use you may think proper to make of my memoir, I pray you to regard it at least as a proof of my zeal, and of my desire to be useful to the cause of your country.

"I have the honor to be, with perfect consideration, yours, &c. &c.

RAYNEVAL.

"_P. S._ As I shall be absent for some days, I pray you to address your answer to M. Stenin, Secretary to the Council of State, at Versailles.

"I must desire you not to let the perusal of the following memoir make you forget the postscript of the above letter, for in the sequel you will find it of some importance."

_M. de Rayneval's Memoir respecting the Right of the United States to
the Navigation of the Mississippi._

Translation.

"The question between Spain and the United States of North America is, how to regulate their respective limits towards the Ohio and the Mississippi. The Americans pretend, that their dominion extends as far as the Mississippi, and Spain maintains the contrary.

"It is evident, that the Americans can only borrow from England the right they pretend to have to extend as far as the Mississippi; therefore, to determine this right, it is proper to examine what the Court of London has thought and done on this head.

"It is known, that before the treaty of Paris, France possessed Louisiana and Canada, and that she considered the savage people, situated to the east of the Mississippi, either as independent, or as under her protection.

"This pretension caused no dispute; England never thought of making any, except as to the lands situated towards the source of the Ohio, in that part where she had given the name of Alleghany to that river.

"A discussion about limits at that time took place between the Courts of Versailles and London, but it would be superfluous to follow the particulars; it will suffice to observe, that England proposed in 1755 the following boundary. It set out from the point where the River de Boeuf falls into the Ohio, at the place called Venango; it went up this river towards lake Erie as far as twenty leagues, and setting off again from the same place, Venango, a right line was drawn as far as the last mountains of Virginia, which descend towards the ocean. As to the savage tribes situated between the aforesaid line and the Mississippi, the English Minister considers them as independent; from whence it follows, that according to the very propositions of the Court of London, almost the whole course of the Ohio belonged to France, and that the countries situated to the westward of the mountains were considered as having nothing in common with the Colonies.

"When peace was negotiated in 1761, France offered to make a cession of Canada to England. The regulation of the limits of this Colony and Louisiana was in question. France pretended that almost the whole course of the Ohio made a part of Louisiana, and the Court of London, to prove that this river belonged to Canada, produced several authentic papers; among others, the chart which M. Vaudreuil delivered to the English commandant when he abandoned Canada. The Minister of London maintained at the same time, that a part of the savages situated to the eastward of the Mississippi were independent, another part under its protection, and that England had purchased a part from the five Irequois nations. The misfortunes of France cut these discussions short; the treaty of Paris assigned the Mississippi for the boundary between the possessions of France and Great Britain.

"Let us see the dispositions, which the Court of London has made in consequence of the treaty of Paris.

"If they had considered the vast territories situated to the eastward of the Mississippi as forming part of their ancient Colonies, they would have declared so, and have made their dispositions accordingly. So far from any such thing, the King of England, in a proclamation of the month of October, 1763, declares in a precise and positive manner that the lands in question are situated between the Mississippi and the ancient _English establishments_. It is, therefore, clearly evident, that the Court of London itself, when it was as yet sovereign of the Thirteen Colonies, did not consider the aforementioned lands as forming part of these same Colonies; and it results from this in the most demonstrative manner, that they have not at this time any right over these lands. To maintain the contrary, every principle of the laws of nature and nations must be subverted.

"The principles now established are as applicable to Spain as to the United States. This power cannot extend its claims beyond the bounds of its conquests. She cannot, therefore, pass beyond the Natchez, situated towards the thirtyfirst degree of latitude; her rights are, therefore, confined to this degree; what is beyond, is either independent or belonging to England; neither Spain nor the Americans can have any pretensions thereto. The future treaty of peace can alone regulate the respective rights.

"The consequence of all that has been said is, that neither Spain nor the United States has the least right of sovereignty over the savages in question, and that the transactions they may carry on as to this country would be to no purpose.

"But the future may bring forth new circumstances, and this reflection leads one to suppose, that it would be of use that the Court of Madrid and the United States should make an eventual arrangement.

"This arrangement may be made in the following manner. A right line should be drawn from the eastern angle of the Gulf of Mexico, which makes the section between the two Floridas, to Fort Toulouse, situated in the country of the Alabamas; from thence the river Loneshatchi should be ascended, from the mouth of which a right line should be drawn to the Fort or Factory Quenassee; from this last place, the course of the river Euphasee is to be followed till it joins the Cherokee; the course of this last river is to be pursued to the place where it receives the Pelisippi; this last to be followed to its source, from whence a right line is to be drawn to Cumberland river, whose course is to be followed until it falls into the Ohio. The savages to the westward of the line described should be free under the protection of Spain; those to the eastward should be free, and under the protection of the United States; or rather, the Americans may make such arrangements with them, as is most convenient to themselves. The trade should be free to both parties.

"By looking over the chart we shall find, that Spain would lose almost the whole course of the Ohio, and that the establishments, which the Americans may have on this river, would remain untouched, and that even a very extensive space remains to form new ones.

"As to the course and navigation of the Mississippi, they follow with the property, and they will belong, therefore, to the nation to which the two banks belong. If then, by the future treaty of peace, Spain preserves West Florida, she alone will be the proprietor of the course of the Mississippi from the thirtyfirst degree of latitude to the mouth of this river. Whatever may be the case with that part, which is beyond this point to the north, the United States of America can have no pretensions to it, not being masters of either border of this river.

"As to what respects the lands situated to the northward of the Ohio, there is reason to presume that Spain can form no pretensions thereto. Their fate must be regulated with the Court of London."

I did not return M. Rayneval any answer to his letter, nor any remarks on his memoir, but the first time I saw him afterwards I told him, I had received his letter and memoir he had done me the honor to write, and that I should send a copy of it to our Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

As both the letter and memoir were _ostensibly_ written by him in a private character, it did not appear to me expedient or necessary to enter into any formal discussions with him on those subjects.

The perusal of this memoir convinced me,

1st. That this Court would, at a peace, oppose our extension to the Mississippi.

2dly. That they would oppose our claim to the free navigation of that river.

3dly. That they would _probably_ support the _British_ claims to all the country above the 31st degree of latitude, and _certainly_ to all the country north of the Ohio.

4thly. That in case we should not agree to divide with Spain in the manner proposed, that then this Court would aid Spain in negotiating with Britain for the territory she wanted, and would agree that the residue should remain to Britain.

In my opinion, it was not to be believed that the first and confidential Secretary of the Count de Vergennes would, without his knowledge and consent, declare such sentiments, and offer such propositions, and that, too, in writing. I therefore considered M. Rayneval as speaking the sentiments of the Minister, and I confess they alarmed me, especially as they seemed naturally to make a part of that system of policy, which I believed induced him rather to postpone the acknowledgment of our independence by Britain to the conclusion of a general peace, than aid us in procuring it at present.

You will now be pleased to recollect the postscript to M. Rayneval's letter.

On the 9th of September I received certain information that on the 7th M. Rayneval had left Versailles, and was gone to England; that it was pretended he was gone into the country, and that several precautions had been taken to keep his real destination a secret.

A former page in this letter informs you, that a little before this, Mr Oswald had despatched a courier with letters, recommending it to his Court to issue a new commission, styling us _United States_, and that I had agreed to prepare a letter to the Count de Vergennes, stating our objections to treat with Mr Oswald under his present one.

This, therefore, was a period of uncertainty and suspense, and whatever part Britain might take, must necessarily be followed by very important consequences. No time was, therefore, to be lost in counteracting what I supposed to be the object of M. Rayneval's journey. But before I enter into that detail, I must here insert a copy of the letter, which I wrote to the Count d'Aranda, agreeably to his request herein beforementioned.

TO THE COUNT D'ARANDA.

"Paris, September 10th, 1782.

"Sir,

"Agreeably to your Excellency's request, I have now the honor of repeating in writing, that I am not authorised by Congress to make any cession of any counties belonging to the United States, and that I can do nothing more respecting the line mentioned by your Excellency, than to wait for and to follow such instructions as Congress, on receiving that information, may think proper to give me on that subject.

"Permit me, nevertheless, to remind your Excellency that I have full power to confer, treat, agree, and conclude with the Ambassador or Plenipotentiary of his Catholic Majesty, _vested with equal powers_, of and concerning a treaty of amity and commerce and of alliance, on principles of equality, reciprocity, and mutual advantage.

"I can only regret, that my overtures to his Excellency, the Count de Florida Blanca, who was _ex officio_ authorised to confer with me on such subjects, have been fruitless.

"It would give me pleasure to see this business begun, and I cannot omit this opportunity of assuring your Excellency of my wish and desire to enter upon it as soon as your Excellency shall be pleased to inform me, that you are authorised and find it convenient to proceed.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY."

To this letter, the Count returned the following answer.

COUNT D'ARANDA TO JOHN JAY.

Translation.

"Sir,

"I have the honor to reply to your note of yesterday, that I am furnished with ample instructions from my Court, and am authorised by it to confer and treat with you on all points on which you may be instructed and authorised to treat by your constituents.

"As soon as you communicate your propositions, they will be examined, and I will submit to you my observations on them, in order that we may be able to agree on both sides.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

THE COUNT D'ARANDA."

On the same day, viz. the 10th of September, a copy of a translation of a letter from M. Marbois to the Count de Vergennes, against our sharing in the fishery, was put into my hands. Copies of it were transmitted to you, enclosed with my letter of the 18th of September, of which a duplicate was also forwarded.

I also learned from good authority, that on the morning of M. Rayneval's departure the Count d'Aranda had, contrary to his usual practice, gone with _post horses_ to Versailles, and was two or three hours in conference with the Count de Vergennes and M. Rayneval before the latter set out.

All these facts taken together led me to conjecture, that M. Rayneval was sent to England for the following purposes.

1st. To let Lord Shelburne know that the demands of America, to be treated by Britain as independent previous to a treaty, were not approved or countenanced by this Court, and that the offer of Britain to make that acknowledgment in an article of the proposed treaty was in the Count's opinion sufficient.

2dly. To sound Lord Shelburne on the subject of the fishery, and to discover whether Britain would agree to divide it with France to the exclusion of all others.

3dly. To impress Lord Shelburne with the determination of Spain to possess the exclusive navigation of the Gulf of Mexico, and of their desire to keep us from the Mississippi; and also, to hint the propriety of such a line as on the one hand would satisfy Spain, and on the other, leave to Britain all the country north of the Ohio.

4thly. To make such other verbal overtures to Lord Shelburne, as it might not be advisable to reduce to writing, and to judge from the general tenor of his lordship's answers and conversation, whether it was probable that a general peace, on terms agreeable to France, could be effected, in order that if that was not the case an immediate stop might be put to the negotiation.

Having after much consideration become persuaded, that these were M. Rayneval's objects, I mentioned his journey to Mr Oswald, and after stating to him the first three of these objects, I said everything respecting them, that appeared to me necessary; but at the same time with a greater degree of caution than I could have wished, because I well knew it would become the subject of a long letter to the Ministry. On reflecting, however, how necessary it was, that Lord Shelburne should know our sentiments and resolutions respecting these matters, and how much better they could be conveyed in conversation than by letter; and knowing also, that Mr Vaughan was in confidential correspondence with him, and he was and always had been strongly attached to the American cause, I concluded it would be prudent to prevail upon him to go immediately to England.

I accordingly had an interview with Mr Vaughan, and he immediately despatched a few lines to Lord Shelburne, desiring that he would delay taking any measures with M. Rayneval until he should either see or hear further from him.

Mr Vaughan agreed to go to England, and we had much previous conversation, on the points in question; the substance of which was;

That Britain, by a peace with us, certainly expected other advantages than a mere suspension of hostilities, and that she doubtless looked forward to cordiality, confidence, and commerce.

That the manner as well as the matter of the proposed treaty was therefore of importance, and that if the late assurances respecting our independence were not realized by an unconditional acknowledgment, neither confidence nor peace could reasonably be expected; that this measure was considered by America as the touchstone of British sincerity, and that nothing could abate the suspicions and doubts of her good faith, which prevailed there.

That the interest of Great Britain, as well as that of the Minister, would be advanced by it; for as every idea of conquest had become absurd, nothing remained for Britain to do, but to make friends of those whom she could not subdue; that the way to do this was by leaving us nothing to complain of, either in the negotiation or in the treaty of peace, and by liberally yielding every point essential to the interest and happiness of America; the first of which points was, that of treating with us on an equal footing.

That if the Minister really meant to make peace with us, it was his interest to make us believe so, and thereby inspire us with a certain degree of confidence, which could no otherwise be obtained; that his enemies charged him with insincerity on this very point, and that it must be useful to him to convince all the world that such a charge was groundless.

That it would be vain to amuse themselves with expectations from the affected moderation of France on this head; for that America never would treat on any but an equal footing, and, therefore, although such expectations might cause delay, they would ultimately be fruitless.

That a little reflection must convince him, that it was the interest and consequently the policy of France to postpone if possible the acknowledgment of our independence, to the very conclusion of a general peace, and by keeping it suspended until after the war, _oblige us by the terms of our treaty, and by regard to our safety, to continue in it to the end_.

That it hence appeared to be the obvious interest of Britain immediately to cut the cords, which tied us to France, for that, though we were determined faithfully to fulfil our treaty and engagements with this Court, _yet it was a different thing to be guided by their or our construction of it_.

That among other things we were bound not to make a separate peace or truce, and that the assurance of our independence was avowed to be the object of our treaty. While therefore Great Britain refused to yield this object, we were bound, as well as resolved, to go on with the war, although perhaps the greatest obstacles to a peace arose neither from the demands of France nor America. Whereas, that object being conceded, we should be at liberty to make peace the moment that Great Britain should be ready to accede to the terms of France and America, without our being restrained by the demands of Spain, with whose views we had no concerns.

That it would not be wise in Great Britain to think of dividing the fishery with France and excluding us; because we could not make peace at such an expense, and because such an attempt would irritate America still more; would perpetuate her resentments, and induce her to use every possible means of retaliation by withholding supplies in future to the fishery, and by imposing the most rigid restraints on a commerce with Britain.

That it would not be less impolitic to oppose us on the point of boundary and the navigation of the Mississippi;