Chapter XXXII: Section 3 (2)

[83] _Id._ See also Herdic _v._ Roessler, 109 New York, 127 (1888); Hill and Co. Lmtd. _v._ Hoover, 220 U.S., 329. “Where a suit is brought on a contract of which a patent is the subject matter, either to enforce such contract, or to annul it, the case arises on the contract and not under the patent laws.” Hartell _v._ Tilghman, 99 U.S., 558. See also Dale Tile Mfg. Co. _v._ Hyatt, 125 U.S., 46 (1888).

[84] Rex _v._ Dawson, 5 State Trials.

[85] U. S. _v._ Smith, 5 Wheaton, 153 (1820).

[86] Art. iii., 2: 1.

[87] U. S. _v._ Rodgers, 150 U. S., 249 (1893).

[88] Art. i., 8: 11; The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635 (1862).

[89] Brown _v._ U. S., 8 Cranch, 110; American Insurance Co. _v._ Canter, 1 Peters, 511; Lamar _ex._ _v._ Browne _et al._, 92 U. S., 187; Mormon Church _v._ U. S., 136 U. S., 1.

[90] Hepburn _v._ Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445 (1804).

[91] Barron _v._ Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243 (1833).

[92] Metropolitan R. R. Co. _v._ District of Columbia, 132 U. S., 1 (1889).

[93] Ft. Leavenworth R. R. Co. _v._ Lowe, 114 U. S., 525 (1885).

[94] Art. iv., 3.

[95] Dorr _v._ U. S., 195 U. S., 138 (1904); Hawaii _v._ Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197 (1903); Dooley _v._ U. S., 183 U. S., 151 (1901); Downes _v._ Bidwell, 182 U. S. (1901); Rasmussen _v._ U. S., 197 U. S., Weems _v._ U. S., 217 U. S., 349. (But see dissenting opinions in above cases.)

[96] Downes _v._ Bidwell, _supra_, and cases and laws therein cited and quoted.

[97] _Idem._

[98] There are powerful dissenting opinions in the various Insular Cases. The chief objection to the unlimited control of insular territory by Congress is that Congress itself, by the Constitution, possesses only limited powers. How can a limited Congress exercise unlimited powers?

[99] Downes _v._ Bidwell, _supra_. (The Court cites, in confirmation, the history of Congress and of the British Parliament.)

[100] Bank of Commerce _v._ New York City, 2 Black, 620 (1862) quoting from McCulloch _v._ Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 431 (1819). The principle is laid down in the decision that “the sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission; but it does not extend to these means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United States.” _Id._ 429.

[101] Bank of Commerce _v._ New York City, _supra_.

[102] Loan Association _v._ Topeka, 20 Wallace, 655 (1874), quoting Cooley on _Constitutional Limitations_, 479.

[103] P. R. Co. _v._ Pennsylvania, 15 Wallace, 300 (1872). The constitutional use of the taxing power by the United States and by the several States is examined by Hamilton in _The Federalist_, No. xxxii.,—the classic contemporaneous exposition of the taxing clauses of the Constitution. For a judicial examination of these clauses see Transportation Company _v._ Wheeling, 99 U. S., 273 (1878). The idea held both by Hamilton and by the Court is that taxation is the exercise of sovereign power; that “all subjects over which the sovereign power of a State extends are objects of taxation,” but that “objects over which it does not extend, as for example, the means and instruments of the general government, are exempt from taxation.” (The quotation in Transportation Co. _v._ Wheeling, from McCulloch _v._ Maryland is not verbally accurate.)

[104] The phrase (_Federalist_, No. lxii.) may be Hamilton’s or Madison’s.

[105] P. R. Co., _v._ Pennsylvania, 15 Wallace, 300.

[106] This principle applies also in international law.

[107] The principle is established in McCulloch _v._ Maryland.

[108] Kirtland _v._ Hotchkiss, 100 U. S., 491 (1879).

[109] Kirtland _v._ Hotchkiss, _supra_. Thus, “If the law treats the mortgagee’s interest in the land as real estate for his protection, it is not easy to see why the law should forbid it to be treated as real estate for the purpose of taxation.” Savings and Loan Society _v._ Multnomah County, 169 U. S., 421 (1898).

[110] McCulloch _v._ Maryland, _supra_, quoted in The Collector _v._ Day, 11 Wallace, 113 (1870).

[111] The Collector _v._ Day, _supra_. (The Court quotes the Tenth Amendment, in this connection, as the basis of its decision.)

[112] _Idem._

[113] The Collector _v._ Day, _supra_.

[114] _Id._

[115] The Collector _v._ Day, _supra_.

[116] _Id._

[117] Amendment XVI.

[118] Compare the effect of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments on the decision of the Supreme Court in Scott _v._ Sandford, 19 Howard, 393 (1857).

[119] To what extent a salaried official of a State is exempt from inclusion of his salary as income taxable under the Sixteenth Amendment is as yet not determined by judicial decision. “The corporate franchises, the property, the business, the income of corporations created by a State may undoubtedly be taxed by the State; but in imposing such taxes care should be taken not to interfere with or hamper, directly or by indirection, interstate or foreign commerce, or any other matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal government. This is a principle so often announced by the courts, and especially by this court (the Supreme Court of the United States) that it may be received as an axiom of our constitutional jurisprudence.” Philadelphia and Southern Steamship Company _v._ Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326 (1887).

[120] United States _v._ R. R. Co., 17 Wallace, 322 (1873).

[121] See the Chapter on _The Law of Fundamental Rights_, _post_.

[122] Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. _v._ Price County, 133 U. S., 496 (1890). As to exemptions, the decisions are conflicting. Not infrequently notices may be seen of exemption of manufacturing plants, or other industrials, from taxation, if they locate within a community. Mississippi in its constitution of 1890 made such exemptions by special ordinance. Such exemption has been held valid in Franklin Needle Co. _v._ Franklin, 65 N. H., 177; Florida Central Railway Co. _v._ Reynolds, 183 U. S., 476; _Per contra_, Brewer Brick Co. _v._ Brewer, 62 Maine, 62.

[123] Loan Association _v._ Topeka, 20 Wallace, 655 (1874); Kingman _v._ City of Brockton, 153 Mass., 255 (1891); an admirable note citing decisions as to a good tax may be found in L. B. Evans, _Leading Cases on American Constitutional Law_ (Ed. 1916), p. 211.

[124] Art. i., 2: 3; 8: 1.

[125] Art. i., 8: 1. Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S., 321 (1885); Kelly _v._ Pittsburgh, 104 U. S., 78 (1881); French _v._ Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S., 324 (1901); Veazie Bank _v._ Fenne, 8 Wallace, 533 (1869); Corporation Tax Cases, 220 U. S., 611 (1911).

[126] South Carolina _v._ United States, 199 U. S., 437 (1905). The State conducted dispensatories and derived profit from them. It was held liable for internal revenue. The exercise by the State, as a dispenser, was held not to exempt it from the operation of the law.

[127] Art. i., viii., 3.

[128] Brig Wilson _v._ U. S., 1 Brockenbrough, 437 (1820).

[129] See decision of the Supreme Court sustaining the “Webb-Kenyon” Law decommercializing (interstate) intoxicating liquors, Clark Distilling Company _v._ W. Md. R. R. Co.; _Id._ _v._ Am. Ex. Co. and State of W. Va. (January 8, 1917).

The power of Congress to deal with the hours of work and wages of employees engaged in interstate commerce is examined in Wilson _v._ New and Ferris, Receivers, Mo. Ok., & G. Railway Co., March 19, 1917. (Constitutionality of the “Adamson” law.)

[130] Art. vi., 2.

[131] Marbury _v._ Madison, 1 Cranch, 177 (1803).

[132] McCulloch _v._ Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 430 (1819).

[133] Brown _v._ Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419 (1827).

[134] Gibbons _v._ Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 1 (1824).

[135] Pensacola Telegraph Co. _v._ Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S., 1 (1877).

[136] So in Gibbon _v._ Ogden, _supra_.

[137] Henderson _v._ Mayor of New York, 92 U. S., 259 (1875); L. S. & M. S. Railway Co. _v._ Ohio, 173 U. S. (1899); Railroad Co. _v._ Husen, 95 U. S., 465 (1877); Brimmer _v._ Rebman, 138 U. S., 78 (1891); Morgan’s S. S. Co. _v._ Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S., 455 (1886); Leisy _v._ Hardin, 135 U. S., 100 (1890); Schellenberger _v._ Pennsylvania, 171 U. S., 1 (1898).

[138] The trend of these respective lines is disclosed by the decisions in the cases cited in this Chapter.

[139] Pensacola Telegraph Co. _v._ Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S., 1 (1877). The important word here is “jurisdiction.” “To bring the transportation within the control of the State, as part of its domestic commerce, the subject transported must be within the entire voyage under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.” Hanley _v._ Kansas City Southern Railroad Co., 187 U. S., 617 (1903). The Immigration Law (February 20, 1897, amended March 26, 1910), contains the protective features the State would demand through exercise of its police power. So too the Federal Meat Inspection Act (March 4, 1907).

[140] _The Daniel Ball_, 10 Wallace, 557 (1870).

[141] Act of Congress, March 2, 1893.

[142] “The insurance business does not constitute interstate commerce.” Paul _v._ Virginia, 8 Wallace, 168 (1868). But the power to regulate commerce doubtless includes legislation placing common carriers engaged in interstate commerce under such federal control as to constitute federal ownership of railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, steamships, sailing vessels, etc., etc. Such ownership is illustrated in France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and in other countries.

[143] The Sherman Anti-Trust Law of July 2, 1890, and decisions of the Supreme Court concerning it, are illustrations.

[144] See the Hours of Service Act (March 4, 1907); the Adamson Act (1916), and other acts indicative of the trend in the congressional exercise of the power.

[145] United States _v._ E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S., 1 (1895).

[146] Art. i., 8: 3.

[147] Coe _v._ Errol, 116 U. S., 525.

[148] Kidd _v._ Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.

[149] Cooley _v._ Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 Howard, 299 (1851).

[150] Escanaba Company _v._ Chicago, 107 U. S., 678 (1882).

[151] Harman _v._ Chicago, 147 U. S., 396 (1893).

[152] Sands _v._ Manistee River Improvement Company, 123 U. S., 238.

[153] Brown _v._ Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419 (1827).

[154] Brown _v._ Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419 (1827).

[155] Walton _v._ Missouri, 91 U. S., 275 (1875).

[156] The evil effect of discriminating State legislation, and the like, during the Articles of Confederation, are dwelt on by the Court in Walton _v._ Missouri, _supra_.

[157] Walton _v._ Missouri, _supra_.

[158] Robbins _v._ Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S., 489 (1887).

[159] _Idem._

[160] Crutcher _v._ Kentucky, 141 U. S., 47 (1891).

[161] As by the act forbidding the transportation of lottery tickets through the mails.

[162] Crutcher _v._ Kentucky, 141 U. S., 47 (1891).

[163] _Idem._ Cases decisive of the police powers of a State are numerous. The principle involved may be deduced from Railroad Company _v._ Huson, 95 U. S., 465 (1877); Brimmer _v._ Rebman, 138 U. S., 78 (1891); Morgan’s S. S. Company _v._ Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S., 455 (1886); Leisy _v._ Hardin, 135 U. S., 100 (1890); L. S. and M. S. R. R. _v._ Ohio, 173 U. S., 285 (1899).

[164] Crutcher _v._ Kentucky, _supra_.

[165] Brown _v._ Houston, 114 U. S., 622 (1885), in which the cases are cited.

[166] Telegraph Company _v._ Texas, 105 U. S., 460 (1881).

[167] Leisy _v._ Hardin, 135 U. S., 100 (1890). An act of the Legislature, or a constitutional provision prohibiting the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors within a State, is an example of exercise of the police power by a State. See also Rhodes _v._ Iowa, 170 U. S., 412 (1898). Schellenberger _v._ Pennsylvania, 171 U. S., 1 (1898); and cases cited _supra_ touching State police power.

[168] The Passenger Cases, 7 Howard, 283.

[169] R. R. Co. _v._ Huson, 95 U. S., 465 (1877).

[170] Turner _v._ Maryland, 107 U. S., 38 (1882).

[171] Inman S. S. Co. _v._ Tinker, 94 U. S., 238 (1876).

[172] Packet Co. _v._ Keokuk, 95 U. S., 80 (1877).

[173] Transportation Co. _v._ Wheeling, 99 U. S., 273 (1878).

[174] Lottery Cases, 188 U. S., 321 (1903).

[175] _Id._

[176] 26 Statutes at Large, 209.

[177] Northern Securities Company _v._ United States, 193 U. S., 197 (1904).

[178] Beef-Trust case, Swift and Co. _v._ U. S., 196 U. S., 375.

[179] Danbury Hatters’ Case, Loewe _v._ Lawler, 208 U. S., 274; see also Pullman Car Company, 64 Fed. Reporter, 724.

[180] _In re_ Neagle, 135 U. S., 1 (1889).

[181] _In re_ Debs, 158 U. S., 564 (1895).

[182] The Addystone Pipe & Steel Company _v._ United States, 175 U. S., 211 (1899).

[183] The Shreveport Case, (Houston, East and West Texas Railway Co. _v._ United States; Texas and Pacific Railway Co. _v._ United States) 234 U. S., 342 (1914).

NOTE.—Cases further illustrating prohibition of a business or activity by operation of laws passed under the commerce clause: United States _v._ Holliday, 3 Wallace, 407 (1866); Buttfield _v._ Stranahan, 192 U. S., 470 (1904); U. S. _v._ Del. & Hudson Ry., 213 U. S., 366 (1909); Hope _v._ U. S., 227 U. S., 308 (1913).

Cases illustrating exercise of the power over commerce given by the clause and exercising jurisdiction over commerce claimed to be intrastate but forming as it were a link in the chain of interstate commerce: Lord _v._ S. S. Co., 102 U. S., 541 (1880); Wilmington Transportation Co. _v._ California Railroad Commission, 236 U. S., 151 (1915); Hanley _v._ Kansas City Southern Ry., 187 U. S., 617 (1903).

It will be well to read the dissenting opinions in any of these cases as these usually emphasize the power of the State over commerce.

[184] Art. i., 10: 1.

[185] McCrackin _v._ Hayward, 2 Howard, 608 (1844).

[186] Woodruff _v._ Trapnall, 10 Howard, 190 (1850).

[187] Woodruff _v._ Trapnall, 10 Howard, 190 (1850).

[188] Murray _v._ Charleston, 96 U. S., 432 (1877).

[189] _Idem._

[190] Salt Company _v._ East Saginaw, 13 Wallace, 373 (1871).

[191] Fisk _v._ Jefferson Police Jury, 116, U. S., 131 (1885).

[192] Trustees of Dartmouth College _v._ Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518 (1819).

[193] Case of the conjunction of Washington and Jefferson Colleges, Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wallace, 190 (1871).

[194] Boyd _v._ Alabama, 94 U. S., 645.

[195] Beer Company _v._ Massachusetts, 97 U. S., 25 (1877).

[196] Douglas _v._ Kentucky, 168 U. S., 488 (1897).

[197] Douglas _v._ Kentucky, _supra_; New Orleans Gas Co. _v._ Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S., 650 (1885).

[198] See the cases cited in New Orleans Gas Co. _v._ Louisiana, _supra_.

[199] Georgia R. R. and Banking Co. _v._ Smith, 128 U. S., 174 (1888); East Hartford _v._ Hartford Bridge Co., 10 Howard, 511 (1850). But a judgment (judicial decision) is not a contract in the meaning of the Constitution. Morley _v._ L. S. & M. S. R. R., 146 U. S., 162 (1892).

[200] McCrackin _v._ Hayward, 2 Howard, 608 (1844). All legal remedies for the enforcement of a contract belonging to it at the time and place when and where it is made are a part of its obligation. Any provision of a State law or constitution impairing such remedies are void. Gunn _v._ Barry, 15 Wallace, 610 (1872); Mitchell _v._ Clark, 110 U. S. (1884). But the prohibition, in the Constitution, of any State to make any law impairing the obligation of contracts “did not give to Congress power to provide laws for the general enforcement of contracts; nor power to invest the courts of the United States with jurisdiction over contracts, so as to enable parties to sue upon them in those courts. It did, however, give the power to provide remedies by which the impairment of contracts by State legislation might be counteracted and corrected: and this power was exercised.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3 (1883).

[201] Juilliard _v._ Greenman, 110 U. S., 421 (1884), and see note _supra_, p. 92.

[202] Consult Mitchell _v._ Clark, 110 U. S., 633 (1884) from which the quotation is taken.

[203] This raises the whole question of national sovereignty.

[204] Amendment V.; XIV.

[205] Missouri Pacific Ry. _v._ Nebraska, 164 U. S., 403 (1896).

[206] Pennoyer _v._ Neff, 95 U. S., 714 (1877); Arndt _v._ Griggs, 134 U. S., 316 (1890).

[207] Cunnius _v._ Reading School District, 198 U. S., 458 (1905), sustaining a Pennsylvania statute that provided for administration upon estates of persons presumed to be dead by reason of long absence from the State. Mattingly _v._ District of Columbia, 97 U. S., 687 (1878); that which a State Legislature may have dispensed with by a prior statute it may dispense with by a subsequent one; an irregularity or defect which might be made immaterial by prior law, the Legislature has power to make immaterial by a subsequent law. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 371.

[208] License Cases, 5 Howard, 588.

[209] Bartemeyer _v._ Iowa, 18 Wallace, 129.

[210] Foster _v._ Kansas, 112 U. S., 201.

[211] Mugler _v._ Kansas, 123 U. S., 623 (1887).

[212] _Idem._

[213] Amendment V.

[214] Pumpelly _v._ Green Bay Co., 13 Wallace, 166 (1871).

[215] _Idem._

[216] Preceding case and Central Bridge Corporation _v._ City of Lowell, Gray (Mass.), 474 (1855).

[217] Pierce _v._ Drew, 136 Mass., 75 (1883). The case grew out of plaintiff’s claim for damages because the town had granted a telegraph company the right to erect its poles, wires, etc., along the highway abutting plaintiff’s land. The highway being land in public use, plaintiff claimed indirect or consequential damages because of the erection of the poles, wires, etc., of the duly franchised telegraph company. Plaintiff’s complaint was (_inter alia_) that said poles, wires, etc., disfigured and depreciated his property. See also Bedford _v._ U. S., 192 U. S., 217 (1904); the principle therein further examined.

[218] Kohl _v._ United States, 91 U. S., 367 (1875).

[219] Kohl _v._ United States, 91 U. S., 367 (1875).

[220] Art. i., 2: 5; 3: 6.

[221] Compare Art. i., 6: 1, 2; 9: 8; Art. ii., 1: 1; Art., 5, 8; “officer” in Art. ii., 2: 1,2; Art. ii., 4: 1; “offices” in Art. iii., 1: 1; vi., 3. There is every reason that the framers of the Constitution used words with profound discernment and discriminating care.

[222] Art. ii., 2: 1.

[223] _Id._ i., 8: 11.

[224] _Id._ i., 7: 2.

[225] Constitution of Pennsylvania, 1873, iv., 16.

[226] Art. ii., 2: 2.

[227] _Id._ _The Federalist_, No. lxxv.

[228] Art. ii., 2: 2.

[229] _Id._, 2: 1.

[230] July (14?), 1864. Lincoln’s _Works_ (Century Ed.) i., 548.

[231] _In re_ Neagle, 135 U. S., 1 (1889).

[232] Spaulding _v._ Vilas, 161 U. S., 483; U. S. _v._ Windom, 137 U. S., 636; U. S. _v._ Blaine, 139 U. S., 306. Marbury _v._ Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Kendall _v._ U. S., 12 Peters, 524; U. S. _v._ Black, 128 U. S., 40; Mississippi _v._ Johnson, 4 Wallace, 475; Georgia _v._ Stanton, 6 Wallace, 57.

[233] _Ex parte_ Garland, 4 Wallace, 333 (1886).

[234] Art. i., 3: 6.

[235] _Id._, 3: 4, 5.

[236] Notes of conversation, etc., C. E., Stevens, _Sources of the Constitution of the United States_, 169.

[237] _Id._, 168.

[238] Mississippi _v._ Johnson, 4 Wallace, 475 (1866).

[239] _Idem._

[240] Mississippi _v._ Johnson, 4 Wallace, 475 (1866).

[241] Many cases; see State _ex rel._ _v._ Stone, 120 Missouri, 428 (1894), in which most of the cases are cited. But _mandamus_ will issue to an appointee of the executive, a ministerial officer, to perform a ministerial act. U. S. _ex rel._ Daly, 28 App. D. C., 552; 35 Wash. Law Rep., 81; Garfield _v._ U. S. _ex rel._ Frost, 30 App. D. C., 165; 35 Wash. Law Rep., 771; Griffin _v._ U. S., _ex rel._ Le Cuyer, 30 App. D. C., 291; 36 Wash. Law Rep., 103; Drake _v._ U. S., _ex rel._ Bates, 30 App. D. C., 312; 36 Wash. Law Rep., 140; U. S. _ex rel._ Newcomb Motor Co., 30 App. D. C., 464; 36 Wash. Law Rep., 150; also 36 Wash. Law Rep., 681. Also U. S. _ex rel._ _v._ Black, 128 U. S., 40 (1888).

[242] United States _ex rel._ _v._ Black, 128 U. S., 40; and see the cases cited in preceding note.

[243] Art. iii., 1: 1.

[244] For the history of this amendment see the author’s _Constitutional History of the United States_, ii., 264–290.

[245] See Iredell’s dissenting opinion in Chisholm _v._ Georgia, 2 Dallas 419 (1793).

[246] _The Federalist_, No. xvi.

[247] Art. iii., 2: 1; Amendment XI.

[248] No. lxxx.

[249] _In re_ Neagle, 135 U.S., 1 (1889).

[250] _The Federalist_, No. lxxx.

[251] _Id._ For example, were the Vice-President to preside over the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment.

[252] _The Federalist_, _id._

[253] _The Federalist_, _id._

[254] Robertson _v._ Cease, 97 U. S., 646.

[255] Art. iii., 2: 2.

[256] Marbury _v._ Madison, 1 Cranch, 174.

[257] Cohens _v._ Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 414 (1821).

[258] _Idem._

[259] So Congress has denied such jurisdiction to State courts,—Revised Statutes, U. S., Sec. 687.

[260] Davis _v._ Packard, 7 Peters, 276; Börs _v._ Preston, in U. S., 252 (1884).

[261] Cohens _v._ Virginia, _supra_.

[262] This power has been discussed in the preceding Chapters on Sovereignty, Legislation, Commerce, Taxation, Contracts, etc. See index.

[263] Bank of Commerce _v._ New York City, 2 Black, 620 (1862).

[264] Marbury _v._ Madison, 1 Cranch, 137 (1803).

[265] The relation of the United States to the State judiciary; the subject of concurrent (State and federal) judicial jurisdiction, is examined by Hamilton in _The Federalist_, Nos. lxxviii-lxxxiii. See also Martin _v._ Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheaton, 304 (1816).

[266] Hepburn _v._ Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445 (1805).

[267] Art. iii.

[268] United States _v._ Freight Association, 166 U. S., 290, citing many cases.

[269] American Insurance Company _v._ Cantor, 1 Peters, 542.

[270] Luther _v._ Borden, 7 Howard, 1 (1848).

[271] The whole subject of the American judiciary is largely technical and can be known only through intimate knowledge of the _Reports_, of the _Statutes at Large_, and familiarity with _practice_. In the present chapter the _essentials of the law_ of judicial procedure are the immediate subject.

[272] Marbury, _v._ Madison, 1 Cranch, 163.

[273] Marbury _v._ Madison, 1 Cranch, 176–180.

[274] All of Marshall’s decisions rest on the principle, thus set forth, and it remains fundamental in America, applying alike in the States and in the United States.

[275] The principle is examined in State _ex rel._ _v._ Stone, 120 Missouri, 428 (1894). Also in Luther _v._ Borden, 7 Howard, 1 (1848).

[276] See Constitution of Massachusetts, Judiciary, III.

[277] _Political Science and Constitutional Law_, J. W. Burgess, ii., 365; “I do not hesitate to call the governmental system of the United States the aristocracy of the robe; and I do not hesitate to pronounce this the truest aristocracy for the purposes of government which the world has yet produced.” _Id._

[278] United States _v._ Lee, 106 U. S., 196 (1882).

[279] Case of Supervisors of Elections, 114 Mass., 247 (1873); the quotation (in the decision) is from the Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780, Part I, xxx. “The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.” Marbury _v._ Madison, 1 Cranch, 163.

[280] State _ex rel._ _v._ Simons, 32 Minn., 540 (1884). _Ex parte_ Griffiths, 118 Indiana, 83 (1889).

[281] _Idem._

[282] Harwood _v._ Wentforth, 162 U. S., 547 (1896).

[283] Osborn _v._ Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton, 738 (1824).

[284] Osborn _v._ Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton, 738 (1824).

[285] Many cases; see Southern Pacific Railroad Co. _v._ California, 118 U. S., 109 (1866); Beck _v._ Perkins, 139 U. S., 628 (1891).

[286] Börs _v._ Preston, 111 U. S., 252. (1884).

[287] The steamboat _Magnolia_, 20 Howard, 296 (1857).

[288] _Ex parte_ Siebold, 100 U. S., 37 (1879). Thus canals are highways of commerce and subject to “regulation” by Congress. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S., 17 (1903); _Ex parte_ Boyer, 109 U. S., 629 (1884).

[289] Stanley _v._ Schwalby, 162 U. S., 255 (1896), where the cases are cited.

[290] Cohens _v._ Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 414 (1821).

[291] United States _v._ Texas, 143 U. S., 621 (1892). The doctrine also in South Dakota _v._ North Dakota, 192 U. S., 286 (1904).

[292] Ames _v._ Kansas, 111 U. S., 449 (1884); the “party” may be a State (including its corporate subdivisions), or a natural person (or persons), or an artificial person (a corporation).

[293] Wisconsin _v._ Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S., 265 (1888).

[294] Hans _v._ Louisiana, 134 U. S., 1 (1890). The history of the Eleventh Amendment includes the entire record as to suits against States. The principles involved may be found as discussed by Hamilton in _The Federalist_, No. lxxxi; by Marshall, Madison, Mason, and Henry, in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, 3 Elliott’s Debates; in Mr. Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion in Chisholm _v._ Georgia, 2 Dallas, 419; and a special history of the Amendment in the author’s _Constitutional History of the United States_, ii., 264–293. The Eleventh Amendment overruled the decision in the Chisholm case. As to suits against a State by its own citizens see Railroad Co. _v._ Tennessee, 101 U. S., 337 (1879). The principle here is that the sovereign may assent to being sued by its own citizens,—an assent declared by the State constitution, but available by the citizen only according to acts of the Legislature. The privilege (if it exists) is statutory. But suit against an officer, or agent of the State,—or of the United States, is not barred if that officer exercises a ministerial function; such suit is not a suit against the sovereign (United States, or State). See U. S. _v._ Lee, 106 U. S., 196 (1882); Cunningham _v._ Macon & Brunswick R. R. Co., 109 U. S., 446 (1883).

[295] Judiciary Act, 1789, 1888 (and so amended.)

[296] The Ohio and Mississippi R. R. Co. _v._ Wheeler, 1 Black, 286 (1861). Hooe _v._ Jamieson, 166 U. S., 395 (1897).

[297] Martin _v._ Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheaton, 304 (1816); opinion by Mr. Justice Story; this case remains the leading case on the appellate jurisdiction of federal courts. The appellate jurisdiction of the courts is discussed by Marshall in Marbury _v._ Madison: “The essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause,” _Ex parte_, Watkins, 7 Peters, 568 (1833).

[298] Gaines _v._ Fuentes, 92 U. S., 10 (1875). Security Mutual Life Insurance Company _v._ Prewitt, 202 U. S., 246 (1906).

[299] Whitten _v._ Tomlinson, 160 U. S., 231 (1895). But as to conflicting jurisdiction of State and federal courts see Riggs _v._ Johnson County, 6 Wallace, 166 (1867).

[300] Green _v._ Neal’s Lessee, 6 Peters, 291 (1832).

[301] _Idem._ The question is examined in Pana _v._ Bowler, 107 U. S., 529 (1882). Gelpoke _v._ City of Dubuque, 1 Wallace, 175 (1863).

[302] Burgess _v._ Seligman, 107 U. S., 20 (1883). Bucher _v._ Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S., 555 (1888).

[303] Smith _v._ Alabama, 124 U. S., 465 (1888). Western Union Telegraph Company _v._ Call Publishing Company, 181 U. S., 92 (1901).

[304] Art. i., 8: 17; 9: 6, 8; 10: 1, 2, 3; Art. iii.,2: 1, 2, 3; Art. iv., 1: 1; 2: 1, 2, 3; 3: 1, 2; 4: 1; Art. v., Art. vi., 2, 3; Art. vii., 1; Amendments VI., X., XI., XIII., XIV., XV., XVI., XVII.

[305] Thompson _v._ Whitman, 18 Wallace, 457 (1873).

[306] McElmayle _v._ Cohen, 13 Peters, 312. Story, _Commentaries on the Constitution_, 1313.

[307] Williamson _v._ Berry, 8 Howard, 540.

[308] Thompson _v._ Whitman, 18 Wallace, 457.

[309] Hanley _v._ Donaghue, 116 U. S., 1 (1885).

[310] Hanley _v._ Donaghue, 116 U. S., 1 (1885).

[311] _Idem._

[312] Talbot _v._ Seeman, 1 Cranch, 38 (1801). The principle here declared is not to be applied strictly in extradition cases, whether between the several States or between the United States and another nation.

[313] Buckner _v._ Finley, 2 Peters, 590 (1829).

[314] Buckner _v._ Finley, 2 Peters, 590 (1829).

[315] Art. iii., 2: 1.

[316] Paul _v._ Virginia, 8 Wallace, 168 (1868).

[317] _Idem._

[318] Ward _v._ Maryland, 12 Wallace, 418.

[319] Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wallace, 77 (1872). Blake _v._ McClung, 172 U. S., 239 (1898).

[320] Blake _v._ McClung, _supra_.

[321] _Ex parte_ Reggel, 114 U. S., 642 (1885). Pennoyer _v._ Neff, 95 U. S., 714 (1877).

[322] Art. iv., 2: 2. Revised Statutes, §§ 5278, 5279.

[323] _Ex parte_ Reggel, _supra_.

[324] Lascelles _v._ Georgia, 148 U. S., 537 (1893).

[325] Art. i., 10: 1.

[326] Lascelles _v._ Georgia, _supra_. In international law the right of extradition does not include fugitives for _political_ offenses. This exemption is an incident of sovereignty.

[327] Consult United States _v._ Rauscher, 119 U. S., 407.

[328] Lascelles _v._ Georgia, _supra_.

[329] Luther _v._ Borden, 7 Howard, 1 (1848).

[330] _Idem._

[331] Luther _v._ Borden, 7 Howard, 1 (1848).

[332] Art. iv., 4: 1.

[333] Minor _v._ Happersett, 21 Wallace, 162 (1874).

[334] _Idem._

[335] Texas _v._ White, 7 Wallace, 700 (1868).

[336] There are many cases expository of this principle: McCulloch _v._ Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316; Barron _v._ Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wallace, 36; United States _v._ Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 542; _Ex parte_ Siebold, 100 U. S., 371; Fong Yue Ting _v._ U. S., 149 U. S., 698; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wallace, 457.

[337] Art. iv., 3: 1.

[338] Art. iii.; Art. iv. § 10; Amendments VI., X., XI., XIII., XIV., XV., XVII., and doubtless also in the matter of federal elections (election of members of the House of Representatives, and of United States Senators) as by Wiley _v._ Sinkler, 179 U. S., 58; _Ex parte_ Yarbrough, 110 U. S., 651, and in all other Federal relations.

[339] Sands _v._ Manistee Improvement Company, 123 U. S., 288 (1887).

[340] If admitted by Proclamation of the President (and so Congress may provide) conformity to conditions imposed is duly announced by him. The enabling acts since 1789 vary in content. They are reprinted in _The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws of the States, Territories and Colonies Forming the United States of America_. 7 vols. Washington, Government Printing Office 1909.

[341] The provision of the Ohio constitution of 1912 limiting the right to vote to “white male citizens of the United States” (Ohio, Art. v., § 1) citizens with the Fifteenth Amendment of the national Constitution. The power of the Judiciary of the United States to declare constitutions and laws that are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States unconstitutional, null, and void is discussed in the preceding chapter.

[342] Art. iv., 3: 2.

[343] American Insurance Company _v._ Canter, 1 Peters, 551 (1828). National Bank _v._ County of Yankton, 101 U. S., 129 (1879).

[344] National Bank _v._ County of Yankton, _supra_. But all rights commonly known as _fundamental_ do not work as limitations of the power of Congress to govern Territories or “outlying possessions”; see Downes _v._ Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244 (1901). Until this decision these _fundamental_ rights were construed as _limitations_ of the power of Congress in its government of Territories; see Callan _v._ Wilson, 127 U. S., 540 (1888). Thompson _v._ Utah, 170 U. S., 343 (1898).

[345] Downes _v._ Bidwell, _supra_, and supporting cases.

[346] Barron _v._ Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243 (1833).

[347] Downes _v._ Bidwell, _supra_.

[348] _Idem._ In Brown _v._ Walker, 161 U. S., 591 (1896), (_i. e._, five years before the decision in Downes _v._ Bidwell), the Court declared: “The object of the first eight amendments to the Constitution was to incorporate into the fundamental law of the land certain principles of natural justice which had become permanently fixed in the jurisprudence of the mother country, etc.”

[349] The dissenting opinions in Downes _v._ Bidwell should be read; powerful as they are, they are _not_ the opinion of the Court and _do not declare what the law is_.

[350] Cohens _v._ Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 414 (1821).

[351] The power of Congress over territory incorporated into the United States,—that is, over territory over which the Constitution has been extended by Congress is limited by the Constitution: Thompson _v._ Utah, 170 U. S., 343 (1898). Rasmussen _v._ United States, 197 U. S., 516 (1905); but over territory _not so incorporated_, see Hawaii _v._ Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197 (1903); Dorr _v._ U. S., 195 U. S., 138 (1904). The decisions support the doctrine that once the Constitution has been extended over territory, it cannot be withdrawn (Downes _v._ Bidwell) and consequently, all the limitations which by the Constitution affect Congress operate as limitations of its power over the territory, and therefore operate as fundamental rights and privileges of the inhabitants of such territory.

[352] So throughout _The Federalist_, and notably in Nos. xliv., xlv., li.

[353] But note the Sixteenth Amendment.

[354] First Inaugural. _Works_ (Century Ed.), ii., 7.

[355] Art. ii., 1: 2; Amendment XII.

[356] In 1787 distrust of the people, among the framers of the Constitution, explains the constitutional provision. James Wilson urged election of the President by popular vote. South Carolina in 1860 was the last State to appoint presidential electors by its Legislature. There is widespread belief in America now that the President should be elected by direct popular vote, as are Congressmen and United States Senators. At present the “electoral vote” is 531; the person receiving the majority of these 531 votes is President of the United States. By American laws there are upwards of 20,000,000 voters; by American constitutional law, the person receiving 266 “electoral” votes is President.

[357] Art. ii., 2: 1.

[358] _Id._ 3.

[359] Cincinnati, Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co. _v._ Commissioners, 1 Ohio St., 88; and see a full discussion of the issue in Field _v._ Clark, 143 U. S., 649 (1892).

Thus technically, the veto power is not a legislative but an executive power, though it is common to speak of the participation of the executive in legislation.

[360] Art. i., 2: 5; 3: 6. The subject is discussed in Chapters VII and VIII.

[361] Art. i., 8: 1.

[362] _Id._, 8: 12. In practice appropriations are for one year; if the purpose for which the appropriation was made is not effected within the year, the appropriation ceases to be available, unless to the contrary as declared in the law; but an unexpended appropriation may be made available (sometimes) by resolution of Congress, or even of the branch of Congress specially concerned.

[363] Art. i., 8: 16.

[364] _Id._, 9: 3. The limitation as to prohibition of the slave trade was temporary. _Id._, 9: 1.

[365] _Id._, 9: 5.

[366] _Id._, 9: 6.

[367] Art. i., 9: 8.

[368] _Id._, 5: 4.

[369] _Id._, 7: 1.

[370] _Id._, 6: 2. This is a limitation of the freedom of choice of certain individuals rather than a limitation of Congress as a legislative body; but what is forbidden to a member of Congress cannot be made lawful for him by act of Congress; thus the limitation may be one of legislation. The provision (Art. i., 9: 2) concerning the suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_ is not a limitation of the power of Congress, for Congress is the judge whether public safety requires the suspension of the writ.

[371] Art. iii., 3: 1, 2.

[372] Art. iii., 3: 2; _Id._ i., 9: 3.

[373] _Id._ iv., 3: 1.

[374] _Id._, 3: 2.

[375] The first ten Amendments were demanded in 1787–8 as specific limitations of legislative power of the United States, and as a protection of fundamental, original rights of the people.

[376] The history of these Amendments in the author’s _Constitutional History of the United States_, ii., 199–263.

[377] First Amendment.

[378] Amendments II., III., IV., V.

[379] See the Ninth Amendment.

[380] It will be noticed that this Amendment is not a limitation of the States; it applies to the United States.

[381] This is brought out by Marshall in Marbury _v._ Madison, 1 Cranch, 137,—the corner-stone of many later decisions.

[382] The limitations of the States by the Constitution of the United States have already been discussed in earlier chapters. Examination of present State constitutions will disclose existing limitations prescribed by the sovereignty, the people of the State.

[383] Art. i., 4: 1. The right to vote for members of Congress has its foundation in the Constitution of the United States, not in that of any State: Wiley _v._ Sinkler, 179 U. S., 58; _Ex parte_ Yarbrough, 110 U. S., 651. This means a limitation of State powers,—as some might say; in strictness, it means a definition of federal powers; the jurisdiction of a State cannot exclude the jurisdiction of the United States.

[384] _Id._, 8: 17.

[385] No. lxii. (The authorship, strictly speaking, is uncertain, being assigned “to Hamilton _or_ Madison.”)

[386] Art. i., 10: 1.

[387] Art. i., 10: 2, 3.

[388] _Id._ ii., 2: 1.

[389] _Id._ iii., 2: 2.

[390] Amendment XI.

[391] Amendment XIII.

[392] Amendment XIV.

[393] _Id._

[394] Art. i., 2: 3.

[395] _Id._ v.

[396] _Id._ i., 2: 4. Amendment XVII., 2.

[397] Art. iv., 1: 2.

[398] Amendment XII.

[399] Art. ii., 2: 2.

[400] _Id._ iv., 2: 1.

[401] _Id._, 4. But the Governor cannot so apply if the Legislature is in session. The reason here is that the people of the State have fully empowered their representatives in the Legislature “to see that the Commonwealth suffers no harm.”

[402] Art. v.

[403] The Sixteenth Amendment (income tax) bears most heavily on States having large cities and a manufacturing population. It is possible that States which would be but slightly affected by a proposed amendment, might favor and ratify it; to avoid this possible discrimination, the suggestion has been made that in such a case the power of a State to ratify or to oppose ratification should be in proportion to its interests as affected by the proposed amendment. To this suggestion answer has been made that the Constitution is national, not local, in purpose and operation.

[404] Art. vi., 2, 3.

[405] Tenth Amendment.

[406] Ninth Amendment.

[407] The first quotation is from Downes _v._ Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244 (1901); the second, from Gibbons _v._ Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 235 (1824), decision by Marshall. The application of the principle laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in 1824 and elaborated, at times, by the Supreme Court,—as in 1901,—was discussed by the eminent jurist, Thomas M. Cooley, in a brief address to the North Dakota Constitutional Convention, July 17, 1889. At that time he was Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission. “Don’t, in your constitution-making, legislate too much. In your constitution you are tying the hands of the people. Don’t do that to any such extent as to prevent the Legislature, hereafter, from meeting all evils that may be within the reach of proper legislation. Leave something for them. _Take care to put proper restrictions upon them_, but at the same time leave what properly belongs to the field of legislation to the Legislature of the future. _You have got to trust somebody in the future and it is right and proper that each department of government should be trusted to perform its legitimate functions._” Proceedings and Debates of the First Constitutional Convention of North Dakota, Assembled in the City of Bismarck, July 4 to August 17, 1889, p. 67. (Italization in text, not in original.)

[408] Thirty-three States have an elective judiciary. In Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Mississippi, and New Jersey, the Governor nominates and the Senate confirms judges; in Rhode Island, Vermont, South Carolina, and Virginia, the Legislature elects the judges; in Florida, the Governor appoints judges of the Superior Courts and judges of the Supreme Court are elected by the people.

[409] Strictly executive functions are not within the jurisdiction of courts of law. See the discussion in Chapter VII.

[410] Marbury _v._ Madison, 1 Cranch, 137 (1803).

[411] Art. vi., 2, 3.

[412] Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. _v._ Wellman, 143 U. S., 339 (1892); Frees _v._ Ford, 6 New York, 176 (1852); Commonwealth _v._ McCloskey, 2 Rawle (Pa.) 374; Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pickering (Mass.), 96.

[413] McCulloch _v._ Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 421 (1819).

[414] _Idem._, 423.

[415] No. lxxxiv.

[416] _Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution_, McMaster and Stone, 254. Both Hamilton and Wilson were overruled by the public demand for a Bill of Rights, and the first ten Amendments were speedily added to the Constitution.

[417] Ogden _v._ Saunders, 12 Wheaton, 332 (1827); Martin _v._ Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheaton, 304 (1816); United States _v._ Aaron Burr, Cotton’s _Constitutional Opinions of John Marshall_, 1.100; Sturgis _v._ Crowningshield, 4 Wheaton, 122 (1819); Cohens _v._ Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 264 (1821); Cooley, _Constitutional Limitations_, 6th Edition, 204.

[418] Norton _v._ Shelby County, 118 U. S., 425.

[419] The relation of the judiciary to ministerial officers has already been examined; see Chapters VII and VIII. But see in this connection, the Secretary _v._ McGarrahan, 9 Wallace, 298; United States _v._ Black, 128 U. S., 40; United States _v._ Windom, 137 U. S., 636; United States _v._ Blaine, 139 U. S., 306; State _ex rel._ _v._ Stone, 120 Missouri, 428.

[420] Pennsylvania, 1873, Art. iv. §16. This provision does not empower the Governor to cut down an item, but in practice, it is so construed.

[421] As sovereignty is a unit, any examination of particular aspects of it must be but a partial examination of its operations. The Constitution of the United States is a unit, in so far as the sovereignty,—the people of the United States,—have made it the expression of their plan of government. It follows that close examination of any department or feature of the Constitution as a plan of government discloses that feature in relation with other features; the Constitution is an expression of a mass of relations. Thus it is that a decision of the Supreme Court may relate to several matters, seemingly without relation, but necessarily co-related. The present chapter on _The Law of Limitations_ discusses executive, legislative, and judiciary and the principles of government by which it acts. _The entire subject of American constitutional law must be viewed as a whole._ See Pollock _v._ Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S., 601 (1895); Field _v._ Clark, 143 U. S., 649 (1892). Also _The Federalist_, Nos. xliv.-lvi.

[422] Art. ii., 2: 2.

[423] American Insurance Company _v._ Canter, 1 Peters, 511.

[424] Amendments IX., X.

[425] Art. vi., 3. The ratifying conventions, 1788–9, formulated in the aggregate some two hundred amendments in the nature of provisions in a Bill of Rights. These, reduced to twelve, were presented by Madison (May 25, 1789) in the House of Representatives and were duly submitted to the States for ratification. Ten were ratified (1790).

[426] Reynolds _v._ United States, 98 U. S., 145 (1878).

[427] Davis _v._ Beason, 133 U. S., 333.

[428] Cooley, _Principles of Constitutional Law_, 3d Edition, 226. As to “Readings from the Bible” in public schools, _see_ Pfeiffer _v._ Board of Education, 77 N. W. Reporter, 250 (1898); State _ex rel._ Weiss _v._ District Board, 76 Wisconsin, 177 (1890).

[429] People _v._ Ruggles, 8 Johns (N. Y.), 290. The exemption from taxation of property belonging to religious bodies (corporations) is not because of any fundamental right of such bodies to exemption, but because of the will of the legislature. It is a matter of policy.

[430] The winning of these and other fundamental rights is largely the subject of English constitutional history.

[431] So expressed in many State constitutions, as Pennsylvania, 1873, i., 7.

[432] A right fully established at the trial of the Seven Bishops, 1688.

[433] United States _v._ Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 542 (1875).

[434] West _v._ Cabell, 153 U. S., 78; Weeks _v._ U. S., 232 U. S., 383; _Ex parte_ Milligan, 4 Wallace, 2; U. S. _v._ Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U. S., 318; U. S. _v._ Boyd, 116 U. S., 616 (the leading case), and Cotting _v._ Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S., 79 (1901).

[435] Paul _v._ Virginia, 8 Wallace, 168 (1808); Blake _v._ McClung, 172 U. S., 239 (1898); Lockner _v._ New York, 198 U. S., 45 (1905).

[436] The rights of the person, and his or her rights of property are the essential subject of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments. Similar provisions are included in the Bills of Rights in the State constitutions.

[437] Corfield _v._ Coryell, 4 Washington C. C., 371; Slaughter House Cases 16 Wallace, 36.

[438] This act of sovereignty is so rare as almost to be unknown. In America the act takes the form of an amendment to the Constitution.

[439] The forty-eight States have had, in the aggregate, some one hundred and twenty-five constitutions, and to these have been added some three hundred amendments (1776–1917). The federal Constitution has been amended seventeen times (1787–1913).

[440] Downes _v._ Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244 (1901).

[441] Pfeiffer _v._ Board of Education of the City of Detroit, 77 N. W. Rep., 250 (1898).

[442] Reynolds _v._ United States, 89 U. S., 145 (1878).

[443] Boyd _v._ United States, 116 U. S., 616 (1886). (Important historical data given in this case.)

[444] Robertson _v._ Baldwin, 165 U. S., 275 (1897).

[445] Cooley, _Constitutional Limitations_, 353; _Ex parte_ Wall, 107 U. S., 265 (1883). Murray’s Lessee _v._ The Hoboken Land and Improvement Company, 18 Howard, 272 (1855), considered the leading case.

[446] Hurtado _v._ California, 110 U. S., 516 (1884).

[447] Yick Wo _v._ Hopkins (San Francisco Laundry Cases), 118 U. S., 356 (1886).

[448] Pembina Mining Company _v._ Pennsylvania, 125 U. S., 181 (1888). Barbier _v._ Connolly, 113 U. S., 27 (1885). Holden _v._ Hardy, 169 U. S., 366 (1898). But an act making it a criminal offense to employ a female in any clothing factory more than forty-eight hours in any one week violates the Fourteenth Amendment as violating the right of contract and being class legislation: Ritchie _v._ State, 155 Illinois, 98 (1895).

[449] Dent _v._ West Virginia, 129 U. S., 114 (1889). And cases cited.

[450] Barbier _v._ Connolly, _supra_. Mugler _v._ Kansas, 123 U. S., 623 (1887). The power to regulate, that is, the jurisdiction of the police power of the State, as decided in Munn _v._ Illinois, 94 U. S., 113 (1876), includes the power “to provide a maximum charge for the storage and handling of grain” in a warehouse privately owned. This is settled law, but careful reading should be made of the dissenting opinions in this case: Budd _v._ New York, 143 U. S., 517 (1892), sustaining Munn _v._ Illinois, with strong dissenting opinions; Spring Valley Water Works _v._ Schottler, 110 U. S., 347 (1884) sustaining Munn _v._ Illinois, with strong dissenting opinions. The economic question here is whether the State can fix prices, wages, compensation, hours of labor, etc. In this connection examine Lockner _v._ New York, 198 U. S., 45 (1905), sustaining a law of New York State making it a penal offense for any employer to require and permit any employee to work for him more than sixty hours in any one week. The law was sustained as a constitutional exercise by the State of its police power; but see dissenting opinions. The _per contra_ was “the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract.”

[451] Capital Traction Company _v._ Hof, 174 U. S., 1 (1899). Many cases cited and the history of trial by jury given.

[452] Mr. Justice Matthews in Yick Wo _v._ Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356 (1886).

[453] Amendment XIV., July 28, 1868. It will be noticed here that the word “territory” is not used.

[454] Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wallace, 36 (1872).

[455] Amendment XIV.

[456] Art. iv., 2: 1.

[457] See p. 150.

[458] Canfield _v._ Coryell, 4 Washington, C. C., 371, 380; Paul _v._ Virginia, 8 Wallace, 180, and see pp. 191–211 of the present volume.

[459] Slaughter House Cases, _supra_.

[460] Crandall _v._ Nevada, 6 Wallace, 36 (1867).

[461] Slaughter House Cases, _supra_. (Some additional rights are secured citizens of the United States by Amendment XIV., §2; and by Amendments XIII. and XV.)

[462] Minor _v._ Happersett, 21 Wallace, 162 (1874).

[463] Art. iv., 4.

[464] Minor _v._ Happersett, _supra_. (But see _Ex parte_ Yarbrough, 110 U. S., 651.)

[465] These qualifications, in the aggregate, have been of age, sex, residence, religion, property, race, and tax-paying. See the provisions in the State constitutions in _Charters and Constitutions_, 7 vols., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1909; and a detailed account of these early qualifications (1776–1850) in the author’s _Constitutional History of the American People_, i., ch. iii.

[466] Art. i., 2: 1; Amendment XVII.

[467] _Ex parte_ Yarbrough, 110 U. S., 651, 653; Wiley _v._ Sinkler, 179 U. S., 58 (1900).

[468] United States _v._ Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 542 (1875).

[469] _Idem._

[470] Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3 (1883).

[471] _Idem._

[472] _Ex parte_, Siebold, 100 U. S., 371 (1879).

[473] Strauder _v._ West Virginia, 100 U. S., 303 (1879).

[474] Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3 (1883).

[475] 14 Statutes at Large, 27, Ch. 31; Enforcement Act, May 31, 1870, 16 Statutes at Large, 140, Ch. 114.

[476] Civil Rights Cases, _supra_.

[477] That is, violating Amendments VI. and XIV.

[478] Hurtado _v._ California, 110 U. S., 516 (1884).

[479] “The trial by jury in civil cases guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment (Walker _v._ Sauvinet, 92 U. S., 90) and the right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment (Presser _v._ Illinois, 116 U. S., 252) have been distinctly held not to be privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States against abridgment by the States, and in effect the same decision was made in respect of the guarantee against prosecution, except by indictment of a grand jury in the Fifth Amendment (Hurtado _v._ California, 110 U. S., 516) and with respect to the right to be confronted with witnesses, contained in the Sixth Amendment (West _v._ Louisiana, 194 U. S., 258). In Maxwell _v._ Dow, 176 U. S., 606, when the plaintiff in error had been convicted in a State court of a felony upon an information, and by a jury of eight persons, it was held that the indictment made indispensable by the Fifth Amendment, and the trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, were not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as those words were used in the Fourteenth Amendment.... We conclude, therefore, that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination (‘see Amendment V.’) is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship guaranteed by this clause (‘the first clause’) of the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.” Twining _v._ State of New Jersey, 211 U. S., 78 (1908).

[480] United States _v._ Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S., 649 (1898).

[481] Art. i., 8: 4.

[482] United States _v._ Villato, 2 Dallas, 373; Nishimura Ekin _v._ U. S., 142 U. S., 651; Luria _v._ U. S., 231 U. S., 9.

[483] _Ex parte_ Griffiths, 118 Indiana, 83 (1889), citing many cases, (_inter alia_) Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dallas, 409, n.; United States _v._ Ferrera, 13 Howard, 40, n.; United States _ex rel._ _v._ Duell, 172 U. S., 576 (1898), also to be consulted.

[484] United States _v._ Rodgers, 150 U. S., 249 (1893).

[485] Guinn and Beal _v._ United States, 238 U. S., 347 (1915).

[486] _Idem._

[487] _Idem._ and citing _Ex parte_ Yarbrough 110 U. S., 651 (already considered in the present Chapter) and Neal _v._ Delaware, 103 U. S., 370. The decisions of the Supreme Court do not conflict with a State constitution that requires, as a qualification for voting, a literacy test, or a religious test, or a property test, or indeed any test which is not a discrimination on account of race color or previous condition of servitude.

[488] Calder _v._ Bull, 3 Dallas, 386 (1798); Kring _v._ Missouri, 107 U. S., 221 (1882); Thompson _v._ Utah, 170 U. S., 343 (1898). All the State constitutions forbid _ex post facto_ laws.

The right secured to the citizen by the constitutional inhibition of _ex post facto_ legislation forms part of his, or her, privileges and immunities; for though the inhibition cannot be said to be derived from the common law,—and may be said to be essentially statutory, it has become recognized as a fundamental right and of rank with any other fundamental right.

[489] Hollinger _v._ Davis, 146 U. S., 314 (1892).

[490] _Idem._

[491] Boyd _v._ United States, 116 U. S., 616 (1886). The right covers “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Art. iv.

[492] Harris _v._ People, 128 Illinois, 585 (1889).

[493] Art. v., Act of February 11, 1893, Statutes at Large, 443; Brown _v._ Walker, 161 U. S., 591 (1896).

[494] Amendment VI. Mattox _v._ United States, 156 U. S., 237 (1895).

[495] _Idem._

[496] In the original the clauses are not numbered, nor is there any title to the document. It begins, “WE THE PEOPLE.”

[497] See Amendments XIII., XIV., XV., XVI.

[498] See Amendment XVII.

[499] See Amendment XII.

[500] See Amendment XI.

[501] See Amendments XIII., XIV., XV.

[502] The word, “the,” being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first Page, The Word “Thirty” being partly written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first Page, The Words “is tried” being interlined between the thirty-second and thirty-third Lines of the first Page and the Word “the” being interlined between the forty-third and forty-fourth Lines of the second Page.

[503] New Jersey withdrew her consent to the ratification on March 27, 1868.