Chapter VII: The Attitude of France

Before proceeding to record the second and final stage in the peace parleys, in which the German Kaiser became the protagonist, it is desirable to interpolate the additional data, which the French _Yellow Book_ has given to the world since the preceding chapter was written and the first editions of this book were printed. This can be done with little sacrifice to the chronological sequence of this narrative.

The evidence of the _Yellow Book_ is fuller in scope and greater in detail than the other governmental publications, and while largely cumulative in its character, it serves to bring into a sharper light certain phases of this extraordinary controversy.

It has been prepared with great care by M. Jules Cambon, who was the French Ambassador at Berlin during the controversy, and MM. de Margerie and Berthelot, experienced and influential diplomats in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It consists of 160 documents, classified into seven chapters, each dealing with different periods of time in the great controversy. The delay in its presentation is somewhat compensated by the exceptional fullness of the data which is thus submitted to the scrutiny of a candid world.

The French _Yellow Book_ confirms the impression that France was most fortunate in having entrusted its interests at the difficult post of Berlin in this great crisis to so distinguished and experienced a diplomat as M. Jules Cambon.

Throughout the whole controversy the impartial reader is deeply impressed with the fact, which the more candid apologists for Germany are themselves disposed to admit, that Germany's chief weakness lay in its incapable diplomatic representatives. An interesting subject for conjecture suggests itself as to what would have happened if Prince Bismarck had been at the helm at this critical juncture. His guiding principles of statecraft with reference to foreign relations were to isolate the enemy, make him the apparent aggressor, and then crush him as effectually and speedily as possible. He never would have initiated this war. His nature was that of the fox as well as the lion.

In the years that have succeeded his dismissal, a certain dry rot, due to the tendency of the Prussian Government to distribute its diplomatic offices among highborn but incompetent Junkers,--_une petite gentilhommerie pauvre et stupide_, as Bismarck once described them--had affected the efficiency of German diplomacy. Feebly attempting to walk in the steps of the Iron Chancellor, they wittingly or unwittingly reversed Bismarck's policy by almost isolating Germany, consolidating its enemies, and then proceeding to attack them simultaneously. This may have been magnificent courage, but it was not wise statecraft. The might of the German sabre was supposed to offset these blundering disciples of Machiavelli.

Russia, England, and France were more fortunate and of their representatives few, if any, shone with greater intellectual distinction or moral courage than M. Jules Cambon. This distinguished diplomat had had exceptional experience in representing his country in various capitals of the world, and the author, who enjoyed the honor of his acquaintance, when he was accredited to Washington, already knew, what the documents in the French _Yellow Book_ so clearly reveal, that Cambon was a diplomat of great intellectual ability. With acute sagacity he grasped the significance of the fateful events, in which he was a participant. To his calm and well-poised intellectuality he added a moral force, resulting from the clear integrity of his purpose and the broad humanity of his aims.

On more than one occasion he spoke "in the name of humanity," and in his constant attempt to convince the German Foreign Office as to its clear duty to civilization to preserve the peace of the world, he became the representative, not merely of France, but of civilization itself.

In this great diplomatic controversy, one of the greatest in the history of the world, the three representatives, who stand out with the greatest intellectual and moral distinction, are Sazonof, Grey, and Cambon.

The first displayed the greatest sagacity in divining from the very outset the real purposes of Germany and Austria and in checkmating the diplomatic moves, which sought to make Russia apparently the aggressor.

Sir Edward Grey's chief merit lay in his unwearying but ineffectual efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem and also in the absolute candor--so unusual in diplomacy--with which he dealt on the one hand with the efforts of Russia and France to align England on their side at the beginning of the quarrel, and on the other, to continue friendly negotiations with Germany and Austria, without in any respect unfairly misleading them as to England's possible ultimate action.

The French Ambassador will justly receive the approval of posterity for the high courage and moral earnestness with which he pressed upon the German Foreign Office the inevitable consequences of its acts.

The first chapter of the French _Yellow Book_ consists largely of communications written from Berlin by M. Jules Cambon in the year 1913. Its most interesting document is his report from Berlin under date November 22, 1913, as to a conversation between the Kaiser and the King of Belgium, with reference to a change in the pacific attitude, which Cambon had previously imputed to the Kaiser.

To the world at large this statement would be more convincing if the source of the information had been disclosed. Those who know M. Jules Cambon, however, will have a reasonable confidence that when he states that he received the record of this conversation "from an absolutely sure source," more than usual credence can be given to the statement. Reading between the lines, the implication is not unreasonable that the source of Cambon's authority was King Albert himself, but this rests only on a plausible conjecture.

The fact that so trained an observer as the French Ambassador had seen in the Kaiser a marked change as early as 1913 is significant, and history may justify Cambon in his shrewd conjecture that "the impatience of the soldiers," meaning thereby the German General Staff, and the growing popularity of his chauvinistic son, the Crown Prince, had appreciably modified the pacific attitude of the Kaiser, which had served the cause of peace so well in the Moroccan crisis. Cambon's recital of the incident in question, written on November 22, 1913, justifies quotation _in extenso_.

I have received from an absolutely sure source a record of a
conversation which is reported between the Emperor and the
King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the
General Staff, General von Moltke, a fortnight ago--a
conversation which would appear greatly to have struck King
Albert. I am in no way surprised by the impression created,
which corresponds with that made on me some time ago.
Hostility against us is becoming more marked, and the
Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace. The German
Emperor's interlocutor thought up to the present, as did
everybody, that William II., whose personal influence has
been exerted in many critical circumstances in favor of the
maintenance of peace, was still in the same state of mind.
This time, it appears, he found him completely changed. The
German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of
peace against the bellicose tendencies of certain German
parties. William II. has been brought to think that war with
France is inevitable, and that it will have to come one day
or the other. The Emperor, it need hardly be said, believes
in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its
assured success.

General von Moltke spoke in exactly the same sense as his
sovereign. He also declared that war was necessary and
inevitable, but he showed himself still more certain of
success. "For," said he to the King, "this time we must put
an end to it" (_cette fois il faut en finir_), "and your
Majesty can hardly doubt the irresistible enthusiasm which
on that day will carry away the whole German people."

The King of the Belgians protested that to interpret the
intentions of the French Government in this manner was to
travesty them, and to allow oneself to be misled as to the
feelings of the French nation by the manifestations of a few
hotheads, or of conscienceless intriguers.

The Emperor and his Chief of General Staff none the less
persisted in their point of view.

During this conversation the Emperor, moreover, appeared
overwrought, and irritable. As the years begin to weigh upon
William II. the family traditions, the retrograde feelings
of the Court, and, above all, _the impatience of the
soldiers_, are gaining more ascendency over his mind.
Perhaps he may feel I know not what kind of jealousy of the
popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of
the Pan-Germans, and perhaps he may find that the position
of the Empire in the world is not commensurate with its
power. Perhaps, also, the reply of France to the last
increase in the German army, the object of which was to
place Germanic superiority beyond question, may count for
something in these bitternesses, for whatever one may say it
is felt here that the Germans cannot do much more. One may
ask what lay behind the conversation. The Emperor and his
Chief of General Staff may have intended to impress the King
of the Belgians, and _to lead him not to resist in case a
conflict with us should arise_[37]....

[Footnote 37: French _Yellow Book_, No. 6.]

This picture of the Kaiser is interesting and significant.

Germany's loss of prestige in the Moroccan controversy, due to the Kaiser's unwillingness to precipitate a war at that time and his somewhat diminished popularity with his people, not only accentuated the desire of his military camarilla to find another pretext for a war, but may have modified the Kaiser's resistance to this bellicose policy. Until that time he had been quite content to _play_ the part of Caesar. It may be questioned whether he had previously a real desire to _be_ a Caesar. To describe himself metaphorically as "clad in shining armor" and to shake the "mailed fist" was his constant pose. "And so he played his part." As long as the world was content to take this imperial fustian in a Pickwickian sense, the imperial _impresario_ found the same enjoyment as when he staged Sardanapalus on the boards of the Berlin Theater.

The Kaiser was destined to stage a greater spectacle than the burning of a Babylonian palace. His crowning achievement was to apply the torch to civilization itself.

Prior to 1913 neither his wishes nor plans carried him further than the congenial art of imperial posing. Behind his natural preference for peace was ever the lurking fear that a disastrous war might cost him his throne. The experience of Napoleon the Third was quite too recent to be ignored.

In the Moroccan controversy, the unwillingness of France to assent to all demands and the resolute purpose of England to support its ally, presented a crisis, which could not be met with rhetorical phrases, and the Kaiser found himself confronted with a situation, in which a very considerable number of thoughtful and influential Germans favored an immediate appeal to arms, and as to which only his word was wanted to precipitate hostilities in 1911.

The Kaiser at that time failed to meet the expectations of those who had expected a more warlike attitude from the knight "clad in shining armor," and the expression "William the Peaceful" was bandied about with increasing contempt by the war party in Germany, whose passions the Crown Prince--not unwilling to push his royal father prematurely from the pedestal of popularity--was assiduously fanning.

While the fact cannot yet be regarded as established, the writer believes that the future may indubitably show that the Kaiser did have full knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum in advance of its issuance and gave his consent to the policy of that _coup_ in the hope that it would somewhat restore his diminished prestige. He probably followed this policy in the confident expectation that Russia would yield, as it had yielded in 1908 in the Bosnian incident, and when he discovered in Norway that Russia, while willing to maintain peace upon any reasonable terms, was not disposed to surrender all its legitimate interests in the Servian question, he, as will be more fully narrated in the next chapter, hurried back to Berlin and for a time attempted to reverse the policy and bring about a peaceful adjustment.

Unfortunately this attempt came too late. His military camarilla had determined upon war. Preparations were then being feverishly made, and the German and Austrian chancelleries were steadily and deliberately shutting the door upon any possibility of peace.

To withdraw under these circumstances from an untenable position meant a substantial impairment of his already diminished prestige. A Washington would have saved the situation, but the Kaiser was not a Washington.

Another most illuminating feature of this chapter of the _Yellow Book_ is a report from the French Embassy in Berlin to its Foreign Office on the public opinion of Germany in the summer of 1913, as disclosed by the reports of the French consular representatives in Germany. It gives an extraordinary analysis of conditions in Germany prior to the war, and it describes in great fullness the many causes which were contributory to the creation of a powerful war party in Germany. As it is not in strictness a part of the diplomatic record, it is not embodied in the text of this book, but its value as an acute analysis of conditions in Germany--made before the passions of the war had clouded the judgment--will repay the reader's careful consideration.

The second chapter of the French _Yellow Book_ deals with the events which took place between the murder of the Archduke and the Austrian ultimatum and presents new and cumulative evidence of substantial value.

The French Consul General at Budapest, in a report to his Foreign Office under date July 11, 1914, after showing that the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, had refused to disclose, even to the Hungarian Chamber, the results of the judicial inquiry into the Serajevo murder and the decision taken by the Austrian Cabinet, proceeds to show how the suppression of the news in Austria was a part of the scheme to make the ultimatum to Servia so abrupt and speedy that no course would be open to Servia and Europe other than an immediate and unconditional surrender.

Everything is for peace in the newspapers, but the mass of
the public believes in war and fears it.... The Government,
whether it be seriously desirous of peace, or whether it be
_preparing a coup_, is now doing everything it can to allay
this anxiety. That is why the tone of the Government
newspapers has been lowered first, by one note and then by
two, until now it has become almost optimistic. But the
Government newspapers themselves have carefully spread the
alarm. Their optimism to order is really without an echo.
The nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer one cannot
neglect, is a sure proof of that. Stocks, without exception,
have fallen to improbably low prices. The Hungarian four per
cent. was yesterday quoted at 79.95, a price which has never
been quoted since the first issue.[38]

[Footnote 38: French _Yellow Book_, No. 11.]

Simultaneously a very different note was sounded by the organ of the military party in Vienna. The _Militaerische Rundschau_, a few days before the ultimatum to Servia, said:

"The moment is still favorable for us. If we do not decide
upon war, the war we shall have to make in two or three
years at the latest will be begun in circumstances much less
propitious; now the initiative belongs to us. Russia is not
ready, the moral factors are for us, might as well as right.
_Since some day we shall have to accept the struggle, let us
provoke it at once._"[39]

[Footnote 39: _Ibid._, No. 12.]

Before the Austrian ultimatum was issued there had been some preliminary informal negotiations between Austria and Servia and the latter had expressed its willingness to give to Austria the most ample reparation "provided that she did not demand judiciary cooperation," and the Servian Minister at Berlin warned "the German Government that it would be dangerous to endeavor by this inquiry (_i.e._, by the participation of Austrian officials in the courts of Servia) to damage the prestige of Servia."[40]

[Footnote 40: French _Yellow Book_, No. 15.]

It thus appears that Austria and Germany had warning in advance of the issuance of the ultimatum that if this humiliating demand were included it would meet with refusal. Their intention to precipitate this war or impose their will upon Europe may therefore be measured by the fact that, with full knowledge that that particular demand would not be accepted, it was made a leading feature of the ultimatum, and finally became the principal outstanding difference after Servia had accepted substantially all the other demands of Austria. This was reported by Cambon to his Foreign Office two days before the ultimatum was issued and at that time Germany was fully advised as to the one demand, which Servia could not in justice to its sovereignty accept. In the same letter, Cambon advises his Foreign Office that Germany had already issued the "preliminary warning of mobilization, which places Germany in a sort of _garde-a-vous_ during periods of tension."[41]

[Footnote 41: _Ibid._, No. 15.]

A further corroboration of Germany's knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum before its issuance is found in a report of the French Minister at Munich to the French Foreign Office, written on the day when the Austrian ultimatum was issued, and a full day before it reached any capital except Berlin and Belgrade. He writes:

The Bavarian Press appears to believe that a peaceful
solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible
but even probable. Official circles, on the contrary, for
some time past, have displayed with more or less sincerity
positive pessimism.

_The Prime Minister notably said to me to-day that the
Austrian note, of which he had cognizance, was in his
opinion drawn up in terms acceptable to Servia, but that the
present situation appeared to him none the less to be very
grave._[42]

[Footnote 42: French _Yellow Book_, No. 21.]

As it is unlikely that the Austrian Government would have dealt directly with the Bavarian Government without similar communications to the German Foreign Office, it follows as a strong probability that the German Foreign Office and probably each of the constituent States of Germany knew on July the 23d that Austria intended to demand that which Servia had previously indicated its unalterable determination to refuse. Under these circumstances the repeated and insistent assurances that the German Foreign Office gave to England, France, and Russia that it "_had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in and had not exercised any influence on its contents_"[43] presents a policy of deception unworthy of a great nation or of the twentieth century.

[Footnote 43: _Ante_, p. 36.]

It regarded this policy of submarine diplomacy as necessary, not only to throw the other nations off their guard while Germany was arming, but also to support its contention that the quarrel between Servia and Austria was a local quarrel. If it appeared that Germany had instigated Austria in its course, it could not have supported its first contention that the quarrel was a local one and it could not reasonably dispute the right of Russia to intervene. For this purpose the fable was invented. It deceived no one.

The French _Yellow Book_ discloses another even more amazing feature of this policy of deception, for it shows on the authority of the Italian Foreign Minister that Germany and Austria did not even take their own ally into their confidence. The significance of this fact cannot be overestimated. Nothing in the whole record more clearly demonstrates the purpose of the German and Austrian diplomats to set a trap for the rest of Europe.

Under the terms of the Triple Alliance it was the duty of each member to submit to its associates all matters which might involve the possibility of joint cooperation. Even if this had not been written in the very terms of the Alliance, it would follow as a necessary implication, for when each member obligated itself to cooperate with its allies in any attack upon either of them, but not in any _aggressive_ war, it necessarily followed that each ally had the right to the fullest information as to any controversy which might involve such action, so that it might determine whether it fell within the terms of the obligation.

Neither the German nor the Austrian Foreign Office have ever submitted any documentary proof that they discharged this obligation to their ally and it may be added they have never pretended that they did so.

If further proof were needed, we find in the French _Yellow Book_ a report from the French Minister at Rome to his Foreign Office, under date July the 27th, reporting a conversation between the French Minister and the Italian Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, on that day, in which the latter spoke of the

contents of the Austrian note, _and assured me that he had
had no previous knowledge of them whatever_.

He was well aware that the note was to be vigorous and
energetic in character, but he had no idea that it could
take such a form. I asked him if it was true, as is stated
in certain newspapers, that in this connection he had
expressed in Vienna approval of Austrian action, and had
given the assurance that Italy would fulfill her duties as
an ally towards Austria. He replied, "_In no way have we
been consulted; we have been told nothing whatever._ We have
therefore had no reason to make any communication of this
nature in Vienna."[44]

[Footnote 44: French _Yellow Book_, No. 72.]

The reason for this secrecy is not far to seek. Almost a year before the Archduke's death, Austria had sounded Italy as to its willingness to acquiesce or participate in a war by Austria against Servia, and Italy had refused. For this reason and also because an Austrian war against Servia was not to the interests of Italy, Austria and Germany both recognized, without even consulting their ally, that they could not count upon its cooperation in such a war. To submit their proposed action to Italy was to invite a deliberate expression of disapproval, and this would make it more difficult for them to demand its cooperation, if they could carry out their policy of so flouting Russia as to compel it to initiate an aggressive war, as they clearly hoped to do.

There was, however, another and very practical reason for this failure to consult their ally. We have seen that the whole policy of the Austrian ultimatum was founded upon secrecy. The plan was to give to Europe no possible intimation of the intended action until it was accomplished and then to give to Europe only twenty-four hours within which to deliberate or act. If as a matter of courtesy Austria and Germany submitted to their ally their proposed course of action, Italy, being wholly opposed to any such unprovoked attack upon Servia, might find a way, either by open and public protest or by dropping a confidential intimation, to advise the other countries as to what was in preparation. This would defeat the principal purpose of Germany and Austria, to force a quick decision and to prepare for eventualities before any other country could make ready. Germany and Austria therefore wholly ignored their ally and pursued their stealthy policy to its discreditable end.

When their diplomatic communications are disclosed in full, this feature of their policy may disclose some significant admissions.

We have already seen (_ante_, p. 35) that when on July the 20th, three days before the Austrian ultimatum was issued, Sir Edward Grey asked Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, as to what news he had from Vienna with reference to the intentions of his country, Prince Lichnowsky affected to be ignorant. But it appears from a letter, which M. Paul Cambon[45] wrote to his Foreign Office on July the 24th, 1914, that Prince Lichnowsky had returned to London from Berlin about a month before and had "displayed pessimistic views as to the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin." Cambon adds that the English Foreign Office and his other diplomatic colleagues had all been struck "by the anxious appearance of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin."[46]

[Footnote 45: The French Ambassador at London.]

[Footnote 46: French _Yellow Book_, No. 32.]

So designedly was the Austrian ultimatum withheld from the chancelleries of Europe, other than Vienna and Berlin, that on the day following its issuance at Belgrade, the only information which M. Jules Cambon had of its issuance were the extracts in the press, and he thereupon saw the German Secretary of State and asked him whether such an ultimatum had been sent.

Herr von Jagow replied affirmatively, adding that the note
was energetic, and that he approved it, the Servian
Government having long since exhausted Austrian patience. He
considers, moreover, that for Austria the question is one of
a domestic nature, and he hopes that it will be localized. I
then said to him that, not having received any instructions,
I only wished to have with him an entirely personal exchange
of views. I then asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really
been in complete ignorance of the Austrian claims before
they were communicated to Belgrade, _and as he replied that
this was so_, I expressed my surprise that he should thus
undertake to support pretensions, the limit and nature of
which he ignored.

"It is only," said Herr von Jagow, interrupting me, "because
we are talking personally between ourselves that I allow you
to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself
Servia will probably be given over to internal troubles.
That will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you
know where Vienna will lead you?" I added that the language
of the German Press was not that of a people who were
indifferent and foreign to the affair, but told of active
support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time
given to Servia in which to yield would make a bad
impression upon Europe.

Herr von Jagow replied that he expected "_un peu
d'emotion_," on the part of Servia's friends, but that he
counted upon their giving Servia good advice.

"I do not doubt," I then said, "that Russia will make an
effort in Belgrade to bring the Cabinet to make what
concessions are acceptable, but if you ask something of one,
why not ask it of the other? And if it be expected that
advice will be given in Belgrade, is it not legitimate to
expect that on the other hand advice will also be tendered
to Vienna?"

The Secretary of State allowed himself to say that that
would depend on circumstances, but, recovering himself
immediately, declared that the matter must be localized. He
asked me if really I considered the situation serious.
"Assuredly," I replied, "for, if what is going on has been
pondered over, I do not understand why people have cut their
bridges behind them."[47]

[Footnote 47: French _Yellow Book_, No. 30.]

The _Yellow Book_ throws further light upon the extraordinarily petty finesse, with which the chancelleries of Berlin and Vienna attempted to take a snap judgment upon the rest of Europe. We learn from Exhibit No. 55 that Count Berchtold had given to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, prior to the issuance of the ultimatum, an express assurance "that the claims against Servia would be thoroughly acceptable," and that upon this assurance Count Schebeko had left Vienna on a leave of absence. During his absence and at a time when the President of the French Republic, the French Premier, and its Minister of Foreign Affairs were far distant from Paris and on the high seas, the ultimatum was issued, and, as we have seen, Count Berchtold immediately betook himself to Ischl and remained there until the expiration of the brief time limit in the ultimatum.

The same policy was pursued with reference to other Ambassadors, for when France instructed its representative in Vienna "to call the attention of the Austrian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note and the demands formulated by it permitted one to count upon a pacific denouement."[48]

[Footnote 48: French _Yellow Book_, No. 20.]

In the same communication, in which this information is embodied, we gain the important information that "in the Vienna Diplomatic Corps the German Ambassador recommends violent resolutions whilst declaring ostensibly that the Imperial Chancellery is not _wholly_ in agreement with him on this point."

Pursuant to the same ostrich policy, the German Secretary of State, as we have previously seen (_ante_, pp. 71-75), gave to both the French and English Ambassadors the absence of Count Berchtold at Ischl as an excuse for the failure of Germany to get any extension of the time limit, and not only did he assure them repeatedly and in the most unequivocal way that the German Foreign Office had no knowledge of, or responsibility for, the Austrian ultimatum, but when on July the 25th the Russian Charge requested a personal appointment with von Jagow in order to present his country's request for such an extension, the German Secretary of State only gave "him an appointment at the end of the afternoon, that is to say, _at the moment when the ultimatum will expire_," and in view of this illusory appointment the Russian Charge (M. Bronewsky)

sent, with all speed, a written note to the Secretary of
State, in which he pointed out that the delay of the
communication made by Austria to the Powers rendered the
effect of the communication illusory, since it did not give
the Powers time to become acquainted with the facts alleged
before the expiry of the ultimatum. He insisted very
urgently on the necessity of extending it, if one had not in
view the creation of a great crisis.[49]

[Footnote 49: French _Yellow Book_, No. 42.]

Thus in Berlin and Vienna by concerted action the representatives of England, France, and Russia were evaded until the time limit for Servia had expired.

Contrast with this petty finesse the spirit with which Sazonof attempted to reach an agreement with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 26th, as set forth in the report of the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, under that date. He says:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy
perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful
solution. "I shall show myself ready to negotiate up to the
last instant," he said to me.

It is in this spirit that he has asked Count Szapary[50] to
come and see him for a "frank and loyal explanation." In his
presence M. Sazonof discussed the Austro-Hungarian
ultimatum, article by article, showing clearly the insulting
character of the different clauses. "The intention which
inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you
pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory
against the agitation of Servian anarchists, but the step to
which you have had recourse is not defensible." He
concluded, "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, _and
I will guarantee the result_."[51]

[Footnote 50: The Austrian Ambassador.]

[Footnote 51: French _Yellow Book_, No. 54.]

Upon one phase of Germany's foreign policy in this crisis the French _Yellow Book_ naturally throws more light than the other publications. I refer to the attempt of Germany to coerce France into a position of neutrality, or possibly to secure from it some definition of its attitude, which would compromise its relations with Russia. The _Yellow Book_ charges that the German Ambassador, under the pretext of securing an authorized statement to the press to allay public excitement, thus attempted to compromise France. The documents go far to suggest this possibility but are not wholly convincing.

The German Ambassador on July the 24th, the very day that the ultimatum reached the chancelleries of Europe, and on the day when von Jagow untruthfully claimed that it had first reached Berlin, called upon the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him a formal note, _of which he was unwilling to leave a copy_, although he characterized it as a note of importance.

It may be here noted that on more than one occasion in this diplomatic crisis the German representatives were unwilling to leave a copy of the diplomatic messages which they orally communicated.

In his memorandum the French Minister for Foreign Affairs says:

The German Ambassador especially directed my attention to
the last two paragraphs of his note before he read it. He
indicated that in them lay the chief point. I took note of
the actual text, which is as follows: "The German Government
considers that the present question is a matter to be
settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and
that the Powers have the greatest interest in restricting
it to the two interested parties. The German Government
ardently desires the localization of the conflict, since by
the natural play of alliances any intervention by another
Power would have incalculable consequences."

I remarked to the German Ambassador that just as it appeared
to be legitimate to call for the punishment of all those
concerned in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it
seemed difficult to require measures which could not be
accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of
Servia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to
submit to them, would risk being carried away by a
revolution.

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen[52] that his note
only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and
simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the
part of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave
the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken
into consideration; that of Servia's acceptance and of
her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the
punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the
suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they
were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

[Footnote 52: The German Ambassador.]

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired
by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it
could be examined; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill
it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take
part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third
party Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally
cease to take interest in Servia, to take an attitude which
was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localize the
dispute.

Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these
considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always
possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian
note the character of a simple _mise en demeure_, which
permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that
personally he had no views.[53]

[Footnote 53: French _Yellow Book_, No. 28.]

On the following day the German Ambassador again called at the French Foreign Office and protested against an article, which had appeared in a Paris newspaper and which had characterized his communication of the preceding day as the "German menace." The German Ambassador again gave an unequivocal assurance

that there was no agreement between Austria and Germany over
the Austrian note, _of which the German Government was
ignorant_, although the German Government had subsequently
approved it on receiving communication of it _at the same
time as the other Powers_.[54]

[Footnote 54: _Ibid._, No. 36.]

The hardihood of this statement, in view of the fact that on the preceding day, simultaneously with the service of the ultimatum, the threatening demand had been delivered by Germany to the leading European chancelleries that the quarrel between Austria and Servia must be localized, is apparent. Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, then denied that his suggestion of "incalculable consequences," if the dispute were not localized, was a "menace." This statement, repeated by German diplomats in other capitals, approaches the ludicrous. The first military power of Europe formally advises other nations that unless they waive their legitimate claims and interests, "incalculable consequences" will follow, and it is gravely suggested that this is not a "menace."

On the following day Baron von Schoen made two visits at the French Foreign Office and assured the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that

Germany _was on the side of France in the ardent desire for
the maintenance of peace_, and she earnestly hoped that
France would use her influence in a soothing manner in St.
Petersburg.

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that
she had committed no act throwing doubt upon her moderation,
and that we were in agreement with her in seeking for a
peaceful solution of the struggle. It therefore appeared to
me that in counterpart Germany should act in Vienna, _where
the efficacy of her action was sure_, with a view to
avoiding military operations tending to the occupation of
Servia.

The Ambassador having pointed out to me that that was
irreconcilable with the position adopted by Germany, "that
the question only concerned Austria and Servia," I said to
him that mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg might be
made by the four Powers who were less directly interested in
the matter.

Baron von Schoen then sheltered himself behind his lack of
instructions on this point, and I told him that in these
circumstances I did not feel able to act in St. Petersburg
alone.

Our conversation concluded with the renewed assurance by the
Ambassador as to the peaceful intentions of Germany, who, he
declared, was with France on this point.[55]

[Footnote 55: French _Yellow Book_, No. 56.]

The incident now followed, which suggested to the French Foreign office a subtle attempt of Germany to compromise the relations of France with Russia by imputing disloyalty to the former. On his second visit a few hours later, Baron von Schoen desired the French Foreign Office to give to the public a statement with reference to the preceding interview, and suggested the following, which he dictated to the French official:

"The German Ambassador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs
had a further interview in the course of the afternoon,
during which they examined, _in_ _the most friendly spirit
and with a feeling of pacific solidarity, the means which
might be employed for the maintenance of general peace_."

The Acting Political Director at once replied: "Then, in
your mind, everything is settled, and you give us the
assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note, or will be
willing to converse with the Powers with regard to it?"

The Ambassador appeared to be taken aback, and made a
vigorous denial. It was therefore pointed out to him that if
nothing had changed in the negative attitude of Germany, the
terms of the suggested "note to the Press" were excessive,
and likely to give French opinion a false feeling of
security by creating illusions as to the actual situation,
the dangers of which were but too evident.[56]

[Footnote 56: French _Yellow Book_, No. 57.]

It is not surprising that the French Foreign Office looked askance at these German suggestions of "pacific solidarity" with France, which contrasted so strangely with Germany's refusal to work for peace and its sinister menaces to other countries. France's suspicion that Baron von Schoen was thus attempting to compromise its loyalty in the eyes of Russia cannot be said to be without some foundation, although it is as reasonable to assume that these professions of the German Ambassador were only an incident to the general plan of lulling France and its allies into a false sense of security. Here again the full truth can only be ascertained when Germany is willing to submit to the scrutiny of the world the records of its Foreign Office.

On July 26th, M. Jules Cambon had an interview with the German Secretary of State and earnestly supported Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that a conference be called in which England, France, Germany, and Italy should participate for the preservation of peace. This interview is at once so dramatic, and almost prophetic, that it justifies quotation _in extenso_:

To Cambon's proposition, von Jagow replied, as he did to the
British Ambassador, that he could not accept a proposal to
charge the Italian, French, and German Ambassadors with the
task of seeking, with Sir Edward Grey, a means of solving
the present difficulties, for that would be to establish a
regular conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and
Russia. I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his
response, but that the great object, which Sir Edward Grey
had in view, _was above a question of form_, and what was
important was the association of England and France with
Germany and Italy in laboring for peace; that this
association could show itself in common action in St.
Petersburg and Vienna; that he had frequently expressed to
me his regret at seeing the two groups of alliances always
opposed to each other in Europe, and that here he had an
opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by
showing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in
common agreement to prevent a struggle. Herr von Jagow
evaded the matter by saying that Germany had her engagements
with Austria. _I pointed out that the relations of Germany
with Vienna were no more close than those of France with
Russia, and that it was he himself who raised the question
of the two opposed groups of alliances._

The Secretary of State then said that he did not refuse to
act with a view to avoiding an Austro-Russian conflict, but
that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian conflict.
"One is the consequence of the other," I said, "and it would
be well to prevent the creation of any new state of affairs
calculated to bring about the intervention of Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was
obliged to observe his engagements with regard to Austria,
_I asked him if he had pledged himself to follow Austria
everywhere blindfold_, and if he had made himself acquainted
with the Servian reply to Austria, which had been handed to
him that morning by the Servian Charge d'Affaires. "_I have
not yet had time_," he said. "I regret it," I replied. "You
will see that except on points of detail Servia has yielded
completely. It would seem, however, that since Austria has
obtained the satisfaction, which your support procured her,
you might to-day advise her to be content, or to examine
with Servia the terms of the Servian reply."

As Herr von Jagow did not answer me clearly, I asked him if
Germany wanted war. He protested energetically, saying that
he knew that that was my idea but that it was completely
incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act in consequence.
_When you read the Servian reply, weigh the terms with your
conscience, I beg you in the name of humanity, and do not
personally assume a portion of the responsibility for the
catastrophe, whose preparation you are allowing._" Herr von
Jagow protested again, adding that he was ready to join
England and France in any common effort, but that some form
must be found for this intervention which he could accept
and that the Cabinets should agree among themselves upon the
matter. "Moreover," he added, "direct conversations between
Vienna and St. Petersburg are begun and are proceeding. I
expect much good of them, and I have hope."[57]

[Footnote 57: French _Yellow Book_, No. 74.]

In his solemn injunction to von Jagow "_in the name of humanity_" _to weigh the terms in his conscience_, Cambon struck a loftier note than any of the diplomatic disputants. Macaulay has said that the "French mind has always been the interpreter between national ideas and those of universal mankind," and at least since the French Revolution the tribute has been deserved.

He, who carefully and dispassionately reads the diplomatic correspondence which preceded the war, must be impressed with the different point of view of the two groups of disputants. Both the written and oral communications of the German and Austrian representatives failed to suggest at any time a note other than one of selfish nationalism. We search in vain for the most distant recognition of the fact that the world at large had any legitimate interest in the controversy. The insistent note, which Austria sounded, was that its interests required its punitive action against Servia, even though the peace of the world were thereby sacrificed, and that of Germany repeated with equal insistence that its "closest interests" summoned it to the side of Austria.

In marked contrast to this spirit of national selfishness is the repeated admonition of Sir Edward Grey that the whole question should be considered in its "larger aspects," thereby meaning the peace and welfare of Europe; while the Czar, with evident sincerity, suggested to the Kaiser that "with the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood," and proposed a reference of the question to the Hague. Similarly the appeal of Jules Cambon to von Jagow, "in the name of humanity" was more than the ordinary exchange of diplomatic views. Von Jagow's conception of his duty is shown by the fact that he had taken a position involving "incalculable consequences" without even reading the Servian reply.

Cambon approved himself a worthy "yoke fellow in equity" with Sir Edward Grey, and no loftier tone was sounded by any participant in this great controversy, unless we except Goschen's solemn statement to von Bethmann-Hollweg in the equally dramatic interview, which succeeded the rupture of relations between England and Germany, when Goschen stated that "it was so to speak a matter of life and death for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked," and added, "that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn promises."