Chapter VIII: The Intervention of the Kaiser (2)

After the fateful ultimatum had thus been given by Germany to Russia, the British Ambassador, pursuant to the instructions of his home office, saw the German Secretary of State on July 31st, and urged him

most earnestly to accept your [Sir Edward Grey's] proposal
and make another effort to prevent the terrible catastrophe
of a European war.

He [von Jagow] expressed himself very sympathetically toward
your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to
maintain peace _but said it was impossible for the Imperial
Government to consider any proposal until they had received
an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day_;
this communication, which he admitted had the form of an
ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the
Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would
immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and
Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at
once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even
more difficult for Russia to accept _by asking them to
demobilize in the south as well_. He replied that it was in
order to prevent Russia from saying that all her
mobilization was only directed against Austria.[80]

[Footnote 80: English _White Paper_, No. 121.]

The German Secretary of State also stated to Sir E. Goschen that both the Emperor William and the German Foreign Office

had even up till last night been urging Austria to show
willingness to continue discussions, and telegraphic and
telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a
promising nature, but Russia's mobilization had spoiled
everything.

Here again it must be noted that the telegraphic communications from Vienna have not yet been published by the Austrian Government, nor by the German Foreign Office in its official defense.

Sir Edward Grey's last attempt to preserve peace was on August 1st, when he telegraphed to Sir E. Goschen:

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if
only a little respite in time can be gained before any great
power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness
of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of
Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to
the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia
originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and
Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that the German
Government may be able to make use of the Russian
communications referred to above in order to avoid tension.
His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any
act which may precipitate matters.[81]

[Footnote 81: English _White Paper_, No. 131.]

At that time the twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia had already expired, but the British Ambassador saw the German Secretary of State on August 1st, and, after submitting to him the substance of Sir Edward Grey's telegram last quoted,

spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute
was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only
drawn in as Austria's ally. _If, therefore, Austria and
Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and
Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to
me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and
continue to work for a peaceful settlement._ Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to
discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and,
had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have
been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering
Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused
Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her
mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she
could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without
making war. _This was not the case with Germany. She had the
speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the
German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time
to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide
dominions _. The situation now was that, though the
Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the
specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had,
therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German
representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within
a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the
Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as
creating a state of war.[82]

[Footnote 82: English _White Paper_, No. 138.]

It will thus be seen that although Germany was urged to the very last to await the result of the conferences, which had just commenced with some slight promise of success between Austria and Russia, it nevertheless elected to declare war against Russia and thus blast beyond possible recall any possibility of peace. Its justification for this course, as stated in the interview with the German Secretary of State last quoted, was that it did not propose to forego its advantage of speed as against the advantage of Russia's numerical superiority. For this there might be some justification, if Russia had shown an unyielding and bellicose attitude, but apart from the fact that Russia had consistently worked in the interests of peace, Germany had the express assurance of the Czar that no provocative action would be taken while peace conferences continued. To disregard these assurances and thus destroy the pacific efforts of other nations, in order not to lose a tactical advantage, was the clearest disloyalty to civilization. In any aspect, Germany could have fully kept its advantage of speed by inducing its ally to suspend its aggressive operations against Servia, for in that event Russia had expressly obligated itself to suspend all military preparations.

As the final document in this shameful chapter of diplomacy, there need only be added the telegram, sent by the German Chancellor to his Ambassador at St. Petersburg on August 1, 1914, in which war was declared by Germany against Russia on the ground that while Germany and Austria should be left free to pursue their aggressive military preparations, Russia should, on the peremptory demand of another nation, cease the mobilization of its armies even for self-defense. It reads:

The Imperial Government has endeavored from the opening of
the crisis to lead it to a pacific solution. In accordance
with a desire which had been expressed to him by His Majesty
the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany
in accord with England had applied himself to filling a
mediatory role with the Cabinets of Vienna and St.
Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the result of
this, proceeded to the complete mobilization of her forces
on land and sea. As a consequence of this threatening
measure, motived by no military "_presage_" on the part of
Germany, the German Empire found itself in face of a grave
and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed
to safeguard herself against this peril it would have
compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany.
Consequently the German Government saw itself forced to
address to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all
the Russias, an insistence on the cessation of the said
military acts. Russia, having refused to accede to (not
having thought it should reply to), this demand, and having
manifested by this refusal (this attitude) that its action
was directed against Germany, I have the honor to make known
to your Excellency the following:

His Majesty the Emperor, My August Sovereign, in the name of
the Empire, taking up the challenge, considers himself in a
state of war with Russia.

The feverish haste with which this fatal step was taken, is shown by the fact that the German Ambassador could not even wait to state whether Russia had refused to answer or answered negatively. This war--thus begun in such mad haste--is likely to be repented of at leisure.

A few hours before this rash and most iniquitous declaration was made the Czar made his last appeal for peace. With equal solemnity and pathos he telegraphed the Kaiser:

_I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are
forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the
same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these
measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to
negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the
universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid
of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to
prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence
your urgent reply._

This touching and magnanimous message does infinite credit to the Czar. Had the Kaiser been as pacific, had he been inspired by the same enlightened spirit in the interests of peace, had he been as truly mindful of the God of nations, whom the Czar thus invoked, it would have been possible to prevent the "shedding of blood," which has now swept away after only three months of war the very flower of the youth of Europe.

To this the Kaiser replied:

I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to
Your Government the way through which _alone_ war may yet be
averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no
telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of
Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my
army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your
Government is the _sole_ way to avoid endless misery. Until
I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to
enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most
earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to
commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of
our frontiers.

In this is no spirit of compromise; only the repeated insistence of the unreasonable and in its consequences iniquitous demand that Russia should by demobilizing make itself "naked to its enemies," while Germany and Austria, without making any real concession in the direction of peace, should be permitted to arm both for offense and defense.

There were practical reasons which made the Kaiser's demand unreasonable. Mobilization is a highly developed and complicated piece of governmental machinery, and even where transportation facilities are of the best, as in Germany and France, the mobilization ordinarily takes about two weeks to complete. In Russia, with limited means of transportation, it was impossible to recall immediately a mobilization order that had gone forward to the remotest corners of the great Empire. The record shows that the Kaiser himself recognized this fact, for in a telegram which he sent on August 1st to King George, with respect to the possible neutralization of England, the Kaiser said:

I just received the communication from Your Government
offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great
Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under
these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking
France. _On technical grounds My mobilization, which had
already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against
two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be
countermanded because, I am sorry, Your telegram came so
late._ But if France offers Me neutrality which must be
guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course
refrain from attacking France and employ My troops
elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The
troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped by
telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.[83]

[Footnote 83: No such offer had been made. The Kaiser's error was due to a misunderstanding, which had arisen quite honestly between Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador in London. King George promptly corrected this misapprehension of the Kaiser.

See also Addendum, p. 192.]

If it were impossible for the Kaiser, with all the exceptional facilities of the German Empire, to arrest his mobilization for "technical" reasons, it was infinitely more difficult for the Czar to arrest immediately his military preparations. The demand of Germany was not that Russia should simply cancel the mobilization order. It was that Russia should "cease within twelve hours all warlike measures," and it demanded a physical impossibility.

In any event, mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but simply preparation, as the Czar had so clearly pointed out to the Kaiser in the telegram already quoted. It is the right of a sovereign State and by no code of ethics a _casus belli_. Germany's demand that Russia should not arm to defend itself, when its prestige as a great European power was at stake and when Austria was pushing her aggressive preparations, treated Russia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State. Its rejection must have been recognized by the Kaiser and his advisers as inevitable, and, on the theory that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts, it must be assumed that the Kaiser in this mad demand at that time desired and intended war, however pacific his purposes may have been when he first took the helm.

Such will be his awful responsibility "to the last syllable of recorded time."

How well prepared Germany was, the sequel developed only too surely. _On the following day_--August 2d--its troops invaded Luxemburg and an abrupt demand was made upon Belgium for permission to cross its territory.

Upon the declaration of war, the Czar telegraphed to King George of England as follows:

"In this solemn hour, I wish to assure you once more I have done all in my power to avert war."

_Such will be the verdict of history._

ADDENDUM

I

THE SUPPRESSED TELEGRAM FROM THE CZAR

It is a curious and suggestive fact that the German Foreign Office in publishing the correspondence between the Kaiser and the Czar omitted one of the most important telegrams.

The Russian Government on January 31, 1915, therefore, made public the following telegram which the Czar sent to the Kaiser on July 29, 1914:

"Thanks for your conciliatory and friendly telegram.
Inasmuch as the official message presented to-day by your
Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different
tone, I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be
right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to The Hague
Conference. I trust in your wisdom and friendship."

The German Foreign Office has since explained that they regarded this telegram as too "_unimportant_" for publication. Comment is unnecessary.

It thus appears that the Czar at the beginning of his correspondence with the Kaiser suggested that the whole dispute be submitted to The Hague Tribunal for adjustment. Servia had already made the same suggestion.

As the world owes the first Hague Convention to the Czar's initiative, it can justly be said to his lasting credit that he at least was loyal to the pacific ideal of that great convention of the nations.

II

THE AUSTRIAN OFFER OF JULY 31, 1914

The author has noted (_ante_, p. 175) that as the belated offer of Austria on July the 31st "to discuss [with Russia] the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia" did not offer to suspend military preparations or operations, the concession was more nominal than real. The Austrian _Red Book_ converts this inference into a certainty, and makes clear that Austria's pretended change of policy was only diplomatic finesse, as it contained no substantial modification of its uncompromising attitude.

Russia had proposed on July the 30th (_ante_, p. 166) that "if Austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon Servian territory" and further agreed that the question of "the reparation which Servia could accord to the Government of Austria-Hungary" could be examined by the Great Powers, Russia would suspend her military preparations. As the underlying question was whether Austria should be permitted to subjugate Servia without interference, it was vital that that subjugation should not proceed pending an examination by all interested powers into its justice and ultimate ends.

Sir Edward Grey had previously requested Germany on July the 28th "to use its influence" with the Austrian Government "to the effect that the latter either consider the reply from Belgrade satisfactory or else accept it as a basis for discussion between the Cabinets." The German Foreign Office then instructed the German Ambassador at Vienna "to submit the British proposal to the Vienna Cabinet for its consideration" (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 43). As a result of this suggestion, Count Berchtold on July the 29th (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 44) again shut the door upon any compromise by the contention that Austria

"no longer is in a position to meet the Servian reply in the
spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time when
the German request was presented here, a state of war
already existed between the Dual Monarchy and Servia, _and
thus the Servian reply had been superseded by events_."

The only counter-suggestion which Austria then made was as follows:

"Should the British Cabinet be prepared to exert its
influence upon the Russian Government for the maintenance of
peace among the Great Powers, and for a localization of the
war, which had been forced upon us by the Servian agitation
of many years' standing, such efforts would meet with the
Imperial and Royal Government's appreciation." (Austrian
_Red Book_, No. 44.)

On July 31st the German Ambassador at Vienna, acting on instructions (which instructions are again not disclosed in the German _White Book_) informed Count Berchtold "of a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky," in the course of which the British Secretary of State declared to the German Ambassador that Russia felt unable "to treat directly with Austria-Hungary and therefore requested Great Britain to resume her mediation" and that "as a condition of this mediation, however, the Russian Government stipulates the suspension of hostilities in the meanwhile." (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 51.)

Thereupon Count Berchtold made the eleventh hour offer in question by instructing the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg

"to express our readiness to consider Sir Edward Grey's
proposition to mediate between us and Servia despite the
changes brought about in the situation by Russia's
mobilization. _Our acceptance, however, is subject to the
condition that our military action against Servia shall
nevertheless proceed and that the British Cabinet shall
induce the Russian Government to stop the mobilization
directed against us. It is understood that in this case we
would at once cancel our defensive military counter-measures
in Galicia, which had been forced upon us by Russia's
mobilization._" (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 51.)

This suggestion was fatally objectionable in that it required Russia to suspend its preparations to defend its interests while permitting Austria to proceed with the subjugation of Servia. As the "bone of contention" was this subjugation of Servia, this belated and ostensibly conciliatory proposal of Austria amounted to an absurdity. In that classic of nonsense, _Alice in Wonderland_, the unreasonable and violent Queen announced in the trial of the Knave the similar procedure of "sentence first, verdict afterwards," and Austria's final proposal was essentially a like folly, for, stripped of diplomatic pretense, it amounted to this, that Austria, while tying Russia's hands, should proceed not merely to sentence but even to execute Servia and subsequently discuss the justice of its action when it had become irremediable.

The possible theory which we suggested (_ante_, p. 175), that Austria at the eleventh hour may have experienced a change of heart and had adopted a more conciliatory course, is apparently untenable.

III

THE INVASION OF FRANCE ON AUGUST 1ST

It has been Germany's contention that not only did the mobilization of Russia cause the war, but that its eastern and western frontiers were violated by Russian and French soldiers at a time when Germany's intentions were sincerely pacific.

At 7 P.M. on July the 31st, Germany had given France until 1 P.M. of the following day to declare whether it would remain neutral in the event of a Russian-German war, and at that hour Viviani advised the German Ambassador that France "would do that which her interests dictated." (German _White Paper_, No. 27.) Notwithstanding France's virtual refusal to meet the demand of Germany, the latter did not declare war on France on that day, and this is the more significant as it immediately declared war on Russia. The German Ambassador remained in Paris until August the 3d, and only then demanded his passports when his position in the French Capitol had become untenable.

In the meantime Germany was awaiting some act of aggression on the part of France, that would enable it under the terms of the Triple Alliance to demand as of right the cooperation of Italy, while France, determined for this and other reasons not to be the aggressor, had withdrawn its troops ten kilometers from the frontier and refused to take any offensive step either before or after the expiration of the ultimatum.

The confidential telegram of the Kaiser to King George suggests the possibility that on August the 1st, about the time that the eighteen-hour ultimatum had expired, Germany was ready and intended to commence an immediate invasion of France, for on that day the Kaiser telegraphs to King George:

"_I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on
my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and
telephone from crossing into France._" (_Ante_, p. 187.)

The exact hour when the Kaiser sent the King this message is conjectural. We know from the German _White Paper_ that at 11 A.M. on that day Sir Edward Grey inquired of Prince Lichnowsky over the telephone whether Germany was "in a position to declare that we would not attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France should remain neutral."

This message prompted the Kaiser's telegram to King George. How soon thereafter the Kaiser sent his telegram we do not know, but as the impossibility of France's neutrality was recognized in Berlin on receipt of Lichnowsky's telegram by 5 P.M. on that day, it is altogether probable that the Kaiser's telegram was sent between those hours.

If the telegram in question is now analyzed and the fair natural import is given to the Kaiser's language, it would seem that the invasion of France, either before or in any event simultaneously with the expiration of the eighteen-hour ultimatum, had been determined upon by the Kaiser and his military staff, for the Kaiser's intimation that he has "stopped by telegraph and telephone [his army] from crossing into France" fairly implies that previous orders had been given to commence such invasion and that these orders had been hurriedly recalled in the most expeditious way, upon the supposed intimation of Sir Edward Grey that England might guarantee the neutrality of France.

Under these circumstances, with the German Ambassador still at Paris and ostensibly preserving friendly relations, it is evident that the invasion was either to precede or to follow immediately upon the severance of diplomatic relations. This in itself may not be indefensible under international law, but it throws a searchlight upon the contention of Germany that its intentions were pacific and that it had been surprised by a sudden and treacherous attack on the part of Russia, France, and England.

The difficulty, however, is to reconcile this apparent intention of the Kaiser's military staff to invade France on August the 1st and the action of his Foreign Office in failing to make any declaration of war against France and in retaining its Ambassador at Paris and permitting the French Ambassador to remain at Berlin. The diplomatic records abundantly show that this latter policy of the German Foreign Office was followed in the hope that France would become the aggressor, but its inconsistency with the policy of the War Office implied in the Kaiser's telegram is obvious.

Possibly the Kaiser's soldiers and diplomats were not working in complete harmony. It may be true that the many blunders of German diplomats were in part due to the reckless impetuosity of the War Office and it is possible that some of von Bethmann-Hollweg's and von Jagow's diplomatic blunders are more properly attributable to the Kaiser and Moltke.

It is also possible that the natural inference from the Kaiser's language above quoted is misleading and that the telegram to King George did not mean to imply that any orders for an invasion had been cancelled but simply that the army leaders on the Western frontier had been cautioned not to cross the frontier until further orders.

Another possible theory is that the Kaiser for political reasons may have exaggerated the extent of his concession, and magnified the urgency of the situation to induce prompt and favorable action by Great Britain.

But the readiness of Germany to strike a quick and fatal blow at Paris cannot be gainsaid and strangely contrasts with the "injured innocence" protestations that it was treacherously surprised by an unexpected attack. Always with Prussia, "the readiness is all."

IV

THE USE OF THE WORD "ENGLAND"

In making these scattered _addenda_, I take this occasion to make the _amende honorable_ to some of my readers, who since the first editions of this book appeared have taken exception to my use of the word "England" and "English," where obviously "Great Britain" and "British" were meant. These critics are technically correct, but I hope that they will acquit me of any intention of ignoring any part of the British Empire in using a term, which by common and immemorial usage has been applied throughout the world as synonymous with the great Empire. I should deeply regret it, if any other intention were imputed to me, for in the magnificent struggle which Great Britain has made for the highest ideals of civilization and the basic rights of humanity, no one now or hereafter can ever ignore the heroic part which has been played by Scotland, Ireland, Canada, and the over-sea dominions

May I not plead that the word "England," has to common intent a broader as well as a more restricted meaning and that when the poet, the historian or--as in my case--the student uses the word "England" in reference to a world-wide controversy, no one is likely to misapprehend his meaning. Such use is certainly as common and as generally understood as that of the word "American" as applied to a Citizen of the United States, although in both cases the characterization is not strictly accurate. To my critics in Scotland and Ireland who have made this criticism of my book, I can only say:

"Let my disclaiming from a purposed evil
Free me so far in your most generous thoughts,
That I have shot mine arrow o'er the house,
And hurt my brother."