Chapter IV: Part III: , being the Mexican Tour: Pike's Itinerary, pp (2)

The Committee meet to-morrow morning will Gen^l. Dearborne
have the goodness to furnish them with the necessary
information by that time--I would have waited on you
personally but am this day to set on General Court Martial
which convenes at 9 OC. A. M.

I am Sir with High Respect
& Esteem your ob. ser^t
[Signed] Z M PIKE Maj^r.
6 Reg^t Infy

The Hon^l.
HENRY DEARBORNE
Sec W. Dep^t.

Nothing came of this move. Pike was less fortunate than Lewis and Clark. The difference did not all depend upon merit; simply, he had no political "pull." His expeditions originated with General Wilkinson; they were military movements with which the President had nothing to do. Jealousy is the most nearly universal of human weaknesses, in high as well as low places; besides which, Thomas Jefferson had his own opinion of James Wilkinson. Whatever Major Pike may have thought of it, he certainly lost little time in dancing attendance on Congress; he was not built for a lobbyist. In Dec., 1808, we find him on military duty at Fort McHenry, Md., as appears from various official letters of his before me, but which need not be transcribed, as they represent merely the routine correspondence of an army officer. At some period in 1809 he was transferred to the West; and he was on duty as military agent in New Orleans from Sept. 13th, 1809, to Mar. 10th, 1810, or later, by virtue of the following order:

CAMP TERRE AU BŒUF,
Sep^t. 13^th. 1809--

SIR

The Situation of the public service and the impossibility
of finding a suitable Character in private life to
undertake the temporary duties of Military Agent, Obliges
me to impose that Office on you.... [instructions follow.]

[Signed] J. WILKINSON

Maj^r. Z. M. PIKE

During his tour of duty in New Orleans Major Pike became lieutenant-colonel of the 4th Infantry Dec. 31st, 1809. One of Lieutenant-Colonel Pike's letters shows that he did not forget "Baroney," his quondam companion in arms on the Arkansaw:

NEW ORLEANS
March 4^th. 1810

SIR

Ensign Vasquez of the 2^d Infantry who was late Interpreter
on the tour of Discovery to the source of the Arkansaw &^c
presented himself to me at this place. After being three
years in the United States service without receiving any
settlement I made a statement of his accounts and gave him
an advance in Cash and a draft for the balance, in order
that if the form of settlement did not meet your
approbation they might be corrected. He has been absent
going on four years, and begs permission to return to St
Louis to see his Aged parents, which I hope will be granted
him by the Hon^l. Secretary of War. The French language is
his proper one; but he speaks Spanish very well, and is
beginning with the English, but very imperfectly as yet.
Under those circumstances I should conceive his services
would be most important on the Spanish Frontiers. As he is
about to embark for the City of Washington, I shall furnish
him with a duplicate of this letter, and remain Sir, with

the highest Respect & Esteem
Your Obdt. Servt.
Z. M. PIKE

The Hon^l WILLIAM EUSTIS}
Secretary War Department}

There is little to mark Lieutenant-Colonel Pike's career in 1810-11, or until the breaking out of the war of 1812. From many letters I have seen by which he can be traced in these years, uneventful for him, I select one which shows the workings of his mind at this time, as well as his readiness to ventilate the views which he entertained. Characters such as his have visions which they may freely express without carrying conviction to others. The following communication was received at the War Department from Mississippi Territory:

CANTONMENT, WASHINGTON June 10, 10

SIR

Although, it may be deemed unmilitary in me (a Subordinate
in Command) to address myself immediately to the War
Department yet the purport of this Communication being
principally of a private nature, I presume it will not, be
deemed a great deviation from propriety.--I entered the
Army at the early age of fifteen, and have continued to
pursue my profession with enthusiasm to the present time a
period upwards of Sixteen years during which I have had
every practical experience which the times offered of
becoming a Soldier.--Together with a Careful perusal of
numerous Millitary authors in the French & English
languages.--But hapily for my Country her Councils have
been guided by Such Judicious Measures; That the
opportunity which I have so long panted for, of Calling
into Action, The Experience I possess, has never
Occured.--Knowing that it must be the interest of the U.S
to keep at peace with the world, and despairing of ever
being Call^d Into actual service I should some time since
have resign^d the sword and became a farmer, (The only
proffession I can acquire) only for the unsettled state of
our foreign affairs.--Fortune has at length placed me
(Through the instrumentality of General Hampton) at the
Head of the Compleatest body of Infantry in the US.--If
this Regiment should be Consolidated and the Co^l. not
join, I should be very happy to retain the Command and
remain in this quarter.--If not I would hope to be ordered
to join my Regiment in New England, a quarter of the Union
I should be gratify^d. in spending some time in.--Should I
remain here and be permitted to introduce the modern
Discipline--into the Corps I would pledge my existance it
would be equal to any in the U S. in one year. This is a
subject of much diversity of Oppinion, as many gentlemen
wish to Confine us to Stuben.[M-15]--The value of whose
system no man appreciates more justly than myself. But the
Battle of Jena but too fatally evinced to the Prusian
Monarch that the mordern improvements in the Art of War had
been such, as entirely to overturn the principles of
manourvres of the Malboroughs--Eugenes and Fredericks. The
Millitary Establishment of the United States can only be
viewed as the nuclues of an Army in Case of War, from
whence Could be drawn Staff Officers well versed in tactics
and police--In the foregoing observations I mean to cast no
reflections on my superior officers;--but Conceive at the
same time the Ideas may not be deemed obtrusive On the
Hon^l Secty of War.--Whilst makeing this unofficial
Communication I think it my duty to intimate the situation
in which the neighbouring province of Florida now stands.
The Goverment is in a Compleat state of Lethargie.--The
Citizens are forrming committees and appear to be disposed
to offer their allegiance to the U S. when if it should be
refused, they will Make it a tender to Great Britain this
would have been done some time since had they not feared
the Isle of Cuba.--That Cuba is competant to keep them in
Subjection by force is extremely doubtful; But what line of
Conduct the U. S will persue on the Occasion is an
important question.--our views should only be turned to the
effect our interferance would have abroad for we have
disposible force in this territory & Orleans when joined to
the Malcontents amply sufficient to secure possession of
the province; But with respect to the effect this would
have on Mexico is seriously to be taken into concideration
Mexico including all the possessions of Spain North of
Terra Firma [Tierra Firme], must constitute ere long a
great and independant power of at least seven millions of
souls, with more of the precious metals than any other
nation in the world will it not be an object of the first
Magnitude for the U S to secure the trade, friendship and
alliance of this people. They never will become a maratime
or manufactoring nation they are at present pastorial and
On trial will prove Warlike. I hesitate not to say they Can
pour forth thousans of Calvary surpass'd by none in the
World. To this power We might become the Carryers and
Manifactories, for which no Nation Could vie with us; which
would be sources of immence Wealth.--And an Augmentation of
our power.--To this very important object I humby Conceive
a too early attention Cannot be paid--On this subject I
have probaly intruded my oppinion on Mr. Eustis, but I
could not forbear giveing those intimations which I
conceived might be beneficial to my Country.--I had a
brother in the Millitary Academy from whom I have not heard
for some time should he merit the favour of his
Country;--or if his Fathers Thirty Years service or my own
claim some small indulgence for him, I hope he may be
appointed an Ensign of Infantry and sufferd to join the
Regiment to which I may be attached; the latter part of
this request is not made from a desire that I may have it
in my power to shew him any favour;--far from it,--but
that, I may have him near me to Restrain the Disposition
which all youths evince for irregularities. And point out
to him the paths of propriety and Honor, also that he may
benefit [by] the few years he can appropriate to study by
the use of a variety of Millitary Authors I have
collected.--Such are my reasons for wishing my brother with
me. I hope this may meet the approbation of the Hon^be
Secr^ty.--And this letter may be attributed to its true
motives, and that the Honble Secty may beleive me as I am
from Duty and inclination Sincerely devoted to my Country
and his obedt

Hble Sert--
[Signed] Z M PIKE

The Hon^l.
WM. EUSTIS
Secy War Dep^t--

Lieutenant-Colonel Pike's "despair of ever being called into service" was of short duration. He was soon to be called upon to lay down his life for his country on the battlefield. From April 3d, 1812, to July 3d of that year he had been deputy quartermaster-general. He was promoted to the colonelcy of the 15th Infantry July 6th, 1812. The war was upon us. Colonel Pike's qualifications for the command of a regiment may be best estimated in the terms of his military biographer, General Whiting, who says, pp. 309-311:

Probably no officer in the army, at that time, was held in
higher estimation. This was not because he had seen much
actual service, for he had hardly been in the presence of
the enemy before the day on which he fell. It was on the
promise, rather than the fulfilment, that the public mind
rested his character for boldness and enterprise; and his
fitness to direct and control men had been determined, to
an extent that warranted much confidence, by his
expeditions in the north-west and the south-west. He had
there given such proofs of those qualities, as established
a reputation in advance. He had exhibited, moreover, an
indefatigable activity in the drill of his regiment,
requiring of all under his command an unwearied devotion to
duty, and an exact and prompt obedience to orders.

His regiment became an example of zeal, discipline, and
aptitude in movements; his men had an unbounded belief in
his capacity, and his officers looked up to him with
unusual respect and affection. He inspired that confidence
in all under his orders, which is almost a certain evidence
that it is merited.

At the opening of the war of 1812, we were almost without
any fixed guides in tactics and discipline. The standard of
the latter part of the revolution, and of subsequent times,
"Old Steuben," which had been approved by Washington, and
had led to some of the best triumphs of the closing years
of that glorious period, had become obsolete, even before
any substitute was provided. Hence, when new regiments came
into service by scores in 1812, nothing was prescribed for
regulation or for drill. The old regiments had their forms
and customs, which preserved in them the aspect of
regulars. But even these presented no uniform example. Some
adopted the "nineteen manœuvres" of the English; others,
the ninety-and-nine manœuvres of the French; while a few
adhered to old Dundas; and fewer still to older Steuben.

Nothing was laid down by the proper authority; therefore
all manner of things were taken up without any authority at
all. Amid this confusion, or wide latitude of choice,
General Pike, though brought up in the old school, was
often tempted, by his ambitious desire for improvement, to
run into novelties. With a prescribed rule, he would have
been the most steady and uncompromising observer of it.
But, in such a competition for beneficial change, he most
naturally believed himself as capable as others of changing
for the better.

In this spirit of innovation, the 15th regiment underwent
many changes, and exhibited, even in times when novelties
and singularities were no rarities, perhaps the widest
departure from common standards of any regiment in service.
Adopting the French system of forming in three ranks, his
third rank was armed in a manner peculiar to itself, having
short guns, being the ordinary musket cut off some inches,
and long pikes. It was said, by the wags of the day, that
his own name suggested the manner, and the regiment was
often called "Pike's regiment of pikes."

These pikes presented a formidable appearance on drill and dress parade, when the men could display their tactics with the precision of automata. They were even retained in the assault of Fort York. But at the first engagement after the fall of General Pike, the men threw them away, together with the cut-off pieces, and picked up English muskets to fight with. The experiment of putting his regiment on snow-shoes which Pike tried--doubtless remembering their serviceability to himself and his company on the upper Mississippi in the winter of 1805-6--does not seem to have proven any more lasting or decided a success.

Colonel Pike's sword was stronger than his pen, as we know; but he could sharpen either weapon on occasion, as the following spirited repulse of a newspaper attack on his regiment will show:[M-16]

CAMP NEAR PLATTSBURG [N. Y.], _Oct. 12th, 1812_.

SIR:

However incompatible it may be with the character and
profession of a soldier, to enter into the party politics
of the day, yet when the honor of the government, the corps
he commands, and his personal fame are wantonly attacked,
and attempted to be sacrificed to satiate the malignant
venom of party purposes, it becomes his duty as a man, a
patriot, to come forward and boldly contradict the base
calumniator. The following piece "from the Connecticut
Herald" and republished in the New York Herald of October
3d, is not only calculated to bring disrepute on the
government, but to hold up our army as a mob wanting in
discipline as well as in patriotism. The piece alluded to
is as follows, viz.:

"The multiplied proof of folly, or of madness, or some
worse cause, that have driven the nation into a ruinous,
offensive war, are accumulating with every day's
experience. Barely to enumerate the evidence would occupy
columns. Two or three facts of recent occurrence, which
have come to my knowledge, are in point and worthy of
record. It is then a fact (for I state it on the best
authority) that either the national treasury is so
miserably empty, or the proper department so deficient in
duty, that the army under General Dearborn, which has so
long been idling away their time near Albany, was not only
unpaid, but unprovided with the common necessaries of a
camp; and when, a few days since, a part of these troops
were ordered to the frontiers, one whole regiment (Colonel
Pike's) absolutely refused, and deliberately stacked their
arms, declaring they would not move until paid. In this
refusal they were justified by their colonel, and an old
soldier, who admitted they ought not to march unless the
government would first pay the arrears due them. It
fortunately happened that Mr. Secretary Gallatin was then
at Albany, and on learning the state of affairs at the
encampment, he borrowed $20,000 from one of the banks on
his private credit, by which means the troops were paid,
and cheerfully followed their commander."

In contradiction to this statement it will be sufficient to
give the following facts:

[Firstly]--That the regimental paymaster had in his hands
funds to pay the whole regiment up to the 31st. And [that]
within three days of the period when the troops moved,
three companies were paid previous to the march and the
balance so soon as the troops halted a sufficient time to
give the officers an opportunity to adjust the rolls and
prepare the accounts of the recruits.

Secondly--That those funds were received by the regimental
paymaster from the district paymaster, Mr. Eakins, who was
then at Albany, and not from Mr. Gallatin whom, it is
believed, did not arrive till after the regiment moved from
Greenbush.

These facts can be corroborated by every officer of the
15th Infantry, who one and all deem the paragraph published
in the Herald a base calumny, a direct attack on their
honor as soldiers, and declare that the author, whoever he
may be, has asserted gross untruths. As for myself, I have
had the honor to serve in the army from the rank of
volunteer to the station I now hold, during the
Administration of Gen. Washington, Mr. Adams, Mr.
Jefferson, and Mr. Madison, and can affirm that I have
known some troops under the three first to have been upward
of a year without a payment, and under the latter for eight
months. This was owing to the dispersed state of our troops
on the western frontiers. But never did I hear of a corps
shewing a disposition to refuse to do their duty, because
they had not received their pay; nor do I believe the
American army has been disgraced by an instance of the kind
since the Revolutionary War. But ask any man of
consideration, what time it requires to organize an army,
or a corps of new recruits--if, owing to the want of a
knowledge of the officers to forms of returns, accounts,
etc., it will not be some time before a new corps can be as
well equipt, or appear as much like soldiers, as an old
one? Every soldier will reply that it will require two
years at least to teach both officers and men to reap the
same benefit from the same supplies as old soldiers. And
although at this time the 15th regiment has been as
regularly supplied as any other corps with clothing, pay,
arms, and accoutrements, even to watch coats to protect the
centinel against the winter storms, yet were there an old
regiment laying by their side, who had received the same
supplies, they would most indubitably be better equipped
and make themselves more comfortable, having the saving of
two or more years' supplies on hand. But whether ill or
well supplied, the soldiers and officers have too just a
sense of the duty they owe their country and their own
honor, ever to refuse to march against the enemy. And the
colonel begs leave to assure the author of the above
paragraph, that he hopes he will forbear any future attempt
to injure his reputation by praising an action which, if
true, must have forever tarnished the small claim he now
has to a military character.

[Signed] Z. M. PIKE,
_Colonel 15th U. S. Infantry_.

Colonel Pike seldom had occasion to make proclamations of a politico-military character. But one such which he issued while he was in command of a district may be here cited. It is not dated, in the printed form before me, but was no doubt given out in Jan., 1813, as it appears in Niles' Register for the week ending Jan. 30th, III. No. 22, p. 344:

_To all whom it may concern._ The state of hostility which
exists between the Kingdom of Great Britain and the United
States makes it necessary that the intercourse which may
take place between this country and the adjacent province
of Canada should be regulated on the principles which
govern belligerent nations. I have had it in charge from
the commanding general, Chandler [John Chandler, of New
Hampshire, d. 1841] that no person should be permitted to
pass in or out of Canada without his permission, or, in his
absence, the permission of the commandant of the district
of Champlain. This order has been communicated to the
commanding officer on the lines, and will be strenuously
enforced.

Some members of the community have been found so void of
all sense of honor, love of country, or any other principle
which has governed the virtuous of all nations and ages, as
to hold correspondence with and give intelligence to our
enemies. It therefore becomes my duty to put the laws in
full force. The two following sections of the rules and
articles of war, which are equally binding on the citizen
and the soldier, are published for the information of the
public, that no one may plead ignorance, as from this time
henceforward they shall be enforced with the greatest
severity.

"Art. 56. Whosoever shall relieve the enemy with money,
victuals, or ammunition, or shall knowingly harbor or
protect an enemy shall suffer DEATH, or such other
punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a
court-martial.

"Art. 57. Whosoever shall be convicted of holding
correspondence with, or giving intelligence to, the enemy,
either directly or indirectly, shall suffer DEATH, or such
other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a
court-martial."

[Signed] _Z. M. Pike, Col. 15th Regt. Inf.
Commanding West Lake Champlain_.

During the winter of 1812-13, when the 15th regiment was stationed on the northern frontier, in view of the operations to be undertaken against the posts of the enemy on the lakes, great confidence in this well-disciplined and zealous body of troops was felt by General Henry Dearborn, formerly secretary of war, and then the senior major-general of the army, in immediate command. As we have just seen, General Pike was in charge of a military district on Lake Champlain; his command was then of about 2,500 men. Various desultory demonstrations against the enemy had proved futile, in some cases fatuous and disgraceful. The War Department determined upon a more consistent and apparently feasible plan of concerted operations, which had in view the reduction of all the British posts on the St. Lawrence river and Lake Ontario. The capture of Kingston (site of old Fort Frontenac) was a measure of first importance. The garrison was supposed to be small, and lulled in a sense of security, owing to the rigors of the season and the numerical insignificance of our troops at Sackett's Harbor; nor was Kingston likely to be re-enforced from below, as the British forces were menaced on the Lower St. Lawrence by Pike's troops on Lake Champlain. It was proposed to transport these in sleighs to the foot of Lake Ontario with such promptitude that the movement could not be counteracted. General Dearborn also proposed to concentrate other forces at Sackett's Harbor, to which place his headquarters at Albany were to be moved at once. This was in Feb., 1813. But while these measures were pending, Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of the Canadas, prorogued the Parliament then in session, and moved to Kingston with re-enforcements for that place. According to General Dearborn's dispatches of Mar. 3d from Sackett's Harbor, this demonstration seemed so alarming that operations against Kingston were suspended in favor of others which had regard to the safety of Sackett's Harbor; though it appears in General Armstrong's History of the War that Sir George Prevost had executed a clever ruse with few troops, and "countervailed his antagonist only by dexterous and well-timed reports," Whiting's Pike, p. 290 _seq._

The proposed attack on Kingston over the ice having been abandoned, the Secretary of War's alternative plan of reducing in succession the several posts on and about Lake Ontario engaged General Dearborn's attention. The Secretary indicated the order in which the successive attacks were to be made, viz.: Kingston and York on Lake Ontario; George and Erie on the Niagara river. But this sequence was not strictly regarded by General Dearborn, who determined to attack Kingston last instead of first; considering the rotation of the assaults to be of minor consequence, in view of the main features of a campaign which had for its object the reduction of all the posts named in the order of the Secretary. The general commanding, on consultation with Commodore Isaac Chauncey, concluded to make York the initial point of attack; George to come next, and then Kingston.

The prospect held out by this plan of the campaign was
certainly very promising. It had all such probabilities in
its favor as could be commanded by those who control only
one side of the current of events. The force that could and
would be brought to bear on each point of attack was ample,
and left as little to hazard as prudence would suggest. The
plan was founded on the best principles of strategy, and
highly creditable to the generalship which dictated it. Had
it been carried out with the spirit and perseverance with
which it was commenced, there was every reasonable prospect
of a successful issue. The causes of its failure were
obvious: delays, without proper objects, after the capture
of Fort George; and a change of command, wholly unnecessary
and inexpedient, which led to the waste of nearly an entire
season of inactivity (Whiting, p. 297).

As noted by this military critic and historian, General Dearborn was relieved from command early in July, 1813, his successor being enjoined to rest on his arms, except in the event of certain improbable contingencies which never arose, until the arrival of General Wilkinson, who did not reach Fort George until September, or resume operations until Oct. 1st; so that "nearly three months were utterly wasted by a body of 4,000 troops."

But I have digressed from the attack on Fort York, with which alone are we here concerned.

In the latter part of April, 1813, the navigation of Lake Ontario was open, and no molestation was apprehended, as it was known that Sir James Yeo's fleet was not operative. Agreeably with the plan of the campaign above briefly noted, therefore, General Dearborn embarked on board Commodore Chauncey's fleet, with about 1,700 troops, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Pike, Apr. 25th. On the morning of the 27th the fleet reached York harbor, where it was intended to debark for the assault on Fort York. This military post defended the place which had been known as Toronto till 1793, and was then called York till 1834, when it resumed its aboriginal name.

* * * * *

The true signification of the Iroquois word which has settled in the form _Toronto_, after long fluctuation of all its vowels, is uncertain, or at any rate, is still questioned. It is now most frequently translated "trees in the water," or by some equivalent phrase, with reference to the formerly wooded, long, low spit of land which still encompasses the harbor of Ontario's metropolis. Irrespective of its etymology, the various connotations of _Toronto_ in successive historical periods are to be carefully discriminated. If we turn to old maps, we see that the present Georgian bay of Lake Huron was Toronto bay; the present Lake Simcoe was Toronto lake; present Severn river and the Humber were each of them Toronto river. In the seventeenth century, Toronto was the official designation of a region between Lake Simcoe and the Georgian bay--the country of the Hurons, on the large peninsula which intervenes between Lake Huron and Lake Ontario. The comparatively narrow neck of this peninsula offered, by means of Humber river and certain portages, a convenient way to pass between these two great lakes--it was, in fact, an Indian thoroughfare. The mouth of the Humber consequently became an Indian rendezvous, and the name of the whole region thus became best known in connection with the locality of the present city. As the southern terminus of this highway, on Lake Ontario, offered an eligible site for a trading-post, advantage was taken of such an opportunity to cut off trade from Chouagen (Oswego) by planting the original establishment of the Whites near the mouth of the Humber. Such was the French Fort Rouillé, built in 1749, and named in compliment to Antoine Louis Rouillé, Comte de Jouy, then colonial minister. This post was destroyed in 1756, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the English. It became better known as Fort Toronto than it had been by its proper French name, and later on passed into history as Old Fort Toronto, in distinction from the two other establishments to which the name was successively bequeathed. Fort Rouillé, by whatever name called, was never lost sight of entirely. Lossing's Field Book of the War of 1812, New York, 1868, p. 593, has a cut which shows its appearance when it had been to some extent renovated in 1812-13. The exact site is now marked by a monument, lying alongside which is an inscribed stone. These memorials are pointed out to visitors, on the lake shore, in the southwest corner of the present Exposition grounds, on the western side of the city of Toronto. After the abandonment of old Fort Rouillé the region round about remained for nearly half a century a wild whose solitude may have been only relieved by the lodges of a few Misisagas--those Indians of Ojibwa affinities who had become members of the Iroquois confederation in 1746, three years before the fort was built. In 1791, Upper and Lower Canada were instituted by parliamentary measures which Pitt guided to success; the latter was practically the province of Quebec; the former became the province of Ontario, the refuge and future home of the United Empire Loyalists. For the capital of Ontario, a site was to be chosen in then unbroken wilds. The first provincial Parliament of the new province of Upper Canada was held in May, 1793, at Newark, the present town of Niagara, where the river of that name enters Lake Ontario. But this place was ineligible; the river became an international boundary; the guns of the United States Fort Niagara could be trained upon Newark; and in August of the same year the seat of government of the new province was transferred to the new site which had been surveyed to that end by Bouchette, and selected for the purpose by General and Governor John Graves Simcoe (b. Feb. 25th, 1752, d. Oct. 6th, 1806). To this place Simcoe gave the name of York, after the duke, second son of George III. The evolution of this embryo of future greatness was slow; for many years "Little York," or "Muddy York," as it was styled by some in derision, had but a few hundred inhabitants; its maintenance was mainly due to the United Loyalists already mentioned. In April, 1813, the works by which York was defended, and which General Pike carried by assault, were those called Fort York; later they were known as Fort Toronto, or "the Fort at Toronto." The town which Simcoe had christened York did not resume the original designation of the locality till 1834, when it was incorporated as the city of Toronto.

This magnificent metropolis, which so admirably illustrates the effect of American momentum upon English stability, is situated upon the north side of Lake Ontario, 39 miles northeast of Hamilton (which occupies the _fond du lac_) and 310 miles west-southwest of Montreal; at the observatory the position is calculated to be in latitude 43° 39' 35" N. and longitude 79° 23' 39" W. of the Greenwich meridian. The city extends westward from the vicinity of the Don in the direction of the Humber, across the small stream known as Garrison creek. It thus has several miles of lake front on the south, at the bay or harbor of Toronto, partly shut off from the lake by low land which was once a peninsula, and some small islands, with an entrance only from the west; but the peninsula has been artificially cut off from the mainland. At its end stood a blockhouse, in a position known as Gibraltar point; another blockhouse stood at the mouth of the Don, on the left or east bank of that river. One now drives a few blocks from any hotel in the heart of the city to "old" Fort York, at present dismantled, but very much in evidence still of the scene of General Pike's victory and mortal hurt. The visitor will be warned off the premises by the functionary who has these _disjecta membra_ in charge, as Lossing had been before I was; but may nevertheless keep on the main street or road through the frowning earthworks, and will presently find himself on Garrison Common. This is the large level piece of ground, the middle of the lake front of which is occupied by the present barracks, or "new fort." At points included within the present garrison and parade ground were the positions of two outer defenses of old Fort York, respectively called at that time the Western and the Half Moon battery; these were the first and second obstacles for Pike to surmount in advancing upon the main defenses of York. Crossing Garrison Common in a few minutes we enter the Exposition grounds, at the further corner of which, to the left, and directly upon the lake shore, stand the Rouillé monument and inscribed cairn already mentioned, together with a historical cabin; a pier juts into the lake close by these objects. The direct distance between the Rouillé monument and old Fort York is about 6,000 feet--little over a mile by the road; the present barracks are nearly midway between those two places. Old Fort York occupies a position about the mouth of Garrison creek, between Front Street and the water's edge, at the foot of Tecumseh Street, and close to Queen's Wharf, in the midst of railroad tracks, freight houses, and depots. The magazine, which was exploded at the cost of many American and some British lives, stood in a depression at or near the mouth of the creek, with its top nearly on a level with higher ground on either hand; it is said that its existence was not suspected by the enemy. It was a comparatively large structure of its kind, solidly built of heavy stone masonry, and contained a great quantity of powder, shot, and shell. All the positions here in mention may be inspected in a leisurely drive of an hour. Those who have not been over the ground, or have not a city map at hand, will be helped to a clear understanding of the situation by the diagram given in Lossing, p. 590; together with the sketches there given of York, of Fort York, of the magazine which was blown up by General Sheaffe's order, and of the Western battery whose explosion was accidental. Of the latter, the picture represents the remains as they were in 1860.

The conflicting accounts of uninformed, unconsciously biased, or willfully mendacious writers have shrouded in obscurity the clear and intelligible relation which can be given of the battle of York. Especially have the two explosions which occurred during the assault been confounded and falsified in history. It is necessary, at the outset, to dissociate in mind these two catastrophes, namely: (1) The accidental explosion of a portable magazine at the Western battery during the advance of the Americans upon the main works. (2) The intentional explosion of the fixed magazine during the retreat of the British from the main works. The latter was somewhat premature, owing to overmuch zeal of the soldier who had been ordered to fire the train; but it was premeditated.

A diligent comparison of many different descriptions of the battle of York has satisfied me that the account in Whiting, Pike's most formal biographer, leaves much to be desired, and that Lossing's relation is decidedly preferable in most particulars. The latter gives, on the whole, the clearest and truest picture which any modern historian has painted. Lossing consulted the official reports of the commanders, both British and American; the accounts given by Thompson, Perkins, James, Auchinleck, Armstrong, Christy, Ingersoll, and others; Whiting's Biography of Pike; Hough's County histories; Roger's Canadian History; Smith's Canada; Cooper's Naval History; Niles' Register; the Portfolio; the Analectic Magazine; he had some manuscripts of actors in the scene, besides various verbal relations; and he went over the ground in person. In the following sketch I shall lean more heavily upon Lossing than upon Whiting; but for numerous particulars shall refer back of both to contemporaneous records and official reports, on both sides. I shall also adduce a certain obscure author, P. Finan, who is among those who witnessed the fight, and who describes what he saw in his little-known Journal of a Voyage to Quebec in the Year 1825, with Recollections of Canada during the late American War in the Years 1812-13, Newry, printed by Alexander Peacock, 1828. H. A. Fay's Collection of Official Documents, etc., 1 vol., 8vo, New York, 1817, gives General Dearborn's and Commodore Chauncey's reports to the Secretary of War and of the Navy, respectively, and the terms of the capitulation after the capture. Brannan's Official Letters, etc., 1 vol., 8vo, Washington, 1823, gives in full Pike's vigorous and rigorous brigade order, pp. 144-146; the reports said of Dearborn and of Chauncey; and various other items. These and many other materials are also contained in earlier form in Niles' Weekly Register, IV. Mar.-Sept., 1813. What here follows is derived mainly from the sources I have thus indicated, but also includes a certified copy of the most important one of the original Sheaffe documents in the Archives of Ontario at Ottawa.

General Pike's brigade order for the attack on York appears as follows in Niles' Register, IV. pp. 229, 230:

SACKETT'S HARBOR, April 25, 1813.

BRIGADE ORDER. When the debarkation shall take place on the
enemy's shore, Major Forsyth's light troops, formed in four
platoons, shall be first landed. They will advance a small
distance from the shore, and form the chain to cover the
landing of the troops. They will not fire unless they
discover the approach of a body of the enemy, but will make
prisoners of every person who may be passing, and send them
to the general. They will be followed by the regimental
platoons of the first brigade, with two pieces of Brooks'
artillery, one on the right and one on the left flank,
covered by their musketry, and the small detachments of
riflemen of the 15th and 16th Infantry. Then will be landed
the three platoons of the reserve of the first brigade,
under Major Swan.[M-17] Then Major Eustis, with his train of
artillery, covered by his own musketry. Then Colonel
M'Clure's volunteers, in four platoons, followed by the
21st regiment, in six platoons. When the troops shall move
in column, either to meet the enemy or take a position, it
will be in the following order, viz.: First, Forsyth's
riflemen, with proper front and flank guards; the regiments
of the first brigade, with their pieces; then three
platoons of reserve; Major Eustis' train of artillery;
volunteer corps; 21st regiment; each corps sending out
proper flank guards. When the enemy shall be discovered in
front, the riflemen will form the chain, and maintain their
ground until they have the signal (the preparative) or
receive orders to retire, at which they will retreat with
the greatest velocity, and form equally on the two flanks
of the regiments of the first brigade, and then renew their
fire. The three reserve platoons of this line under the
orders of Major Swan, 100 yards in the rear of the colors,
ready to support any part which may show an unsteady
countenance. Major Eustis and his train will form in the
rear of this reserve, ready to act where circumstances may
dictate.

The second line will be composed of the 21st Infantry in
six platoons, flanked by Colonel M'Clure's volunteers,
equally divided as light troops. The whole under the orders
of Colonel Ripley.[M-18]

It is expected that every corps will be mindful of the
honor of the American arms, and the disgraces which have
recently tarnished our arms; and endeavor, by a cool and
determined discharge of their duty, to support the one and
wipe off the other. The riflemen in front will maintain
their ground at all hazards, until ordered to retire, as
will every corps of the army. With an assurance of being
duly supported, should the commanding general find it
prudent to withdraw the front line, he will give orders to
retire by the heads of platoons, covered by the riflemen;
and the second line will advance by the heads of platoons,
pass the intervals, and form the line, call in the light
troops, and renew the action. But the general may find it
proper to bring up the second line on one or both flanks,
to charge in columns, or perform a variety of manœuvres
which it would be impossible to foresee. But as a general
rule, whatever may be the directions of lines at the
commencement of the action, the corps will form as before
directed. If they then advance in line, it may be in
parallel eschelons of platoons, or otherwise, as the ground
or circumstances may dictate.

No man will load until ordered, except the light troops in
front until within a short distance of the enemy, and then
charge bayonets; thus letting the enemy see that we can
meet them in their own weapons. Any man firing or quitting
his post without orders, must be put to instant death, as
an example may be necessary. Platoon officers will pay the
greatest attention to the coolness and aim of their men in
the fire; their regularity and dressing in the charge.
Courage and bravery in the field do not more distinguish
the soldier than humanity after victory; and whatever
examples the savage allies of our enemies may have given
us, the general confidently hopes that the blood of an
unresisting or yielding enemy will never stain the weapons
of the soldiers of his column.

The unoffending citizens of Canada are many of them our own
countrymen, and the poor Canadians have been forced into
the war. Their property must therefore be held sacred, and
any soldier who shall so far neglect the honor of his
profession as to be guilty of plundering the inhabitants,
shall, if convicted, be punished with death. But the
commanding general assures the troops that, should they
capture a large quantity of public stores, he will use his
best endeavors to procure them a reward from his
government.

This order shall be read at the head of each corps and
every field officer shall carry a copy, in order that he
may at any moment refer to it; and give explanations to his
subordinates.

All those found in arms in the enemy's country, shall be
treated as enemies; but those who are peaceably following
the pursuits of their various avocations, friends--and
their property respected.

By order of Brigadier-general Z. M. PIKE.

CHARLES G. JONES,[M-19]
Assistant aid-de-camp.

Of quite another character than the foregoing order is the next word which reaches us from General Pike--probably from the last letter he ever wrote. It is always the soldier, but now the son and not the officer who speaks, in this letter addressed to his father. The extract is undated and unsigned, but was penned at Brownsville, near Sackett's Harbor, on the day before the expedition sailed from the latter place. I cite from Niles' Register of Saturday, July 10th, 1813, p. 304, these affecting passages:

"I embark to-morrow in the fleet at Sackett's Harbor, at the head of a column of 1,500 choice troops, on a secret expedition. If success attends my steps, honor and glory await my name--if defeat, still shall it be said we died like brave men, and conferred honor, even in death, on the AMERICAN NAME.

"Should I be the happy mortal destined to turn the scale of war, will you not rejoice, O my father? May Heaven be propitious, and smile on the cause of my country. But if we are destined to fall, may my fall be like Wolfe's--to sleep in the arms of victory."

His aspiration was answered, for he turned the scale of war; his dream of glory came true, for he fell asleep, like Wolfe, in the arms of victory!

Commodore Isaac Chauncey's fleet, which conveyed the American troops from Sackett's Harbor to York, consisted of 14 vessels: the Madison, flagship; Oneida, Fair American, Hamilton, Governor Tompkins, Conquest, Asp, Pert, Julia, Growler, Ontario, Scourge, Lady of the Lake, and the transport Raven.

On that fateful 27th of April, 1813, about seven o'clock in the morning, when this fleet had reached York, the intention was to land the troops at old Fort Rouillé, whence the advance to the assault of Fort York would have been only about a mile, along the lake front, over the level ground of present Garrison Common. But a strong east wind drove the boats "a considerable distance" leeward, to some wooded point in the direction of the Humber. Exactly how far this was does not appear; but there is evidence that it was not more than some fraction of a mile--probably not as far west of Fort Rouillé as the latter was west of Fort York. General Dearborn says, "about a mile and a half" from Fort York, which would be about half a mile west of Fort Rouillé; and the place called Grenadier Point has been named in this connection. Doubtless the whole of the troops were not landed at precisely the same spot. General Dearborn remained with the fleet, which was to bombard York after landing the troops under the command of General Pike. The former's official report to Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War, dated Headquarters, York, Upper Canada, Apr. 28th, 1813, includes this passage (Brannan, p. 149):

I had been induced to confide the immediate command of the
troops in action to General Pike, from a conviction that he
fully expected it, and would be much mortified at being
deprived of the honor, which he highly appreciated.

As rendered in Niles' Register, IV. p. 179, it is to the same effect, but somewhat differently worded:

To the general I had been induced to confide the immediate
attack, from a knowledge that it was his wish and that he
would have been mortified had it not been given to him.

We will hear from Pike himself once more before he falls. It is before any landing has been effected. Forsyth's boats are nearing the shore; they are fired upon from the woods, but have not yet answered a shot. Pike is standing on the deck of the flagship, surrounded by his staff, straining his eager eyes impatiently at the boats, which he sees have been driven beyond the intended point of debarkation. "'By God! I can't stay here any longer!' and addressing himself to his staff--'Come, jump into the boat!' which we immediately did, the commodore having reserved a boat specially for him and his suite; the little coxswain was ordered immediately to steer for the middle of the fray, and the balls whistled gloriously around; probably their number was owing to seeing so many officers in one boat; but we laughed at their clumsy efforts as we pressed forward with well-pulled oars."[M-20]

The first troops which effected a landing were Forsyth's[M-21] Rifles, conveyed in two boats. Their debarkation was promptly resisted by a choice body of light troops from Fort York, consisting of a company of Glengary Fencibles, with some Indians, under Major Givens. From an advantageous position in the woods which had been taken up, the enemy opened a galling fire as our troops left the boats. Concerning this opening engagement I cite Whiting, pp. 300-303:

The riflemen were formed on the bank as promptly as
possible, when the boats returned to the fleet for other
troops. In the meantime, this gallant little band, assisted
by some few other troops that were thrown on shore in other
boats, sustained the brunt of the combat. The numbers in
this initial struggle were about equal, and it became a
fair and close fight, to be turned either way as
re-enforcements should happen to arrive. The British light
troops were choice men, and commanded by a brave officer.

Forsyth's men were undisciplined, but had seen some
desultory service on the Ogdensburg frontier, and had
unbounded confidence in their leader, who was rather an
extraordinary man, and regarded as a most promising
partisan officer. He had peculiar notions as to the manner
of training men. The common rules of discipline were looked
upon by him with the utmost contempt. All he seemed to
require of those under him was, that they should be good
marksmen, and ready to follow him....

At the time of this expedition, Major Forsyth was a fat
man, probably weighing some 200 pounds. The uniform of his
men was green, and, at the time he landed, he wore a
broad-skirted coat of that color, which was unbuttoned and
thrown back, displaying a white vest spread over his ample
chest, that afforded a mark for an enemy equal to the
chalked circle of a common infantry target. He had on his
head a broad-brimmed black hat. Soon after the landing, the
armorer of his regiment, a favorite of both himself and his
men, was killed. The skill of this man was such as enabled
him to give the rifle its most deadly character; and the
efficiency of the regiment was consequently supposed, both
by officers and men, to depend much upon him. When he fell,
every man felt as if a deed had been perpetrated by the
enemy that demanded revenge; and the whole detachment, from
Major Forsyth down to the most indifferent marksman,
entered into the combat with a fierce spirit of retaliation
that, no doubt, contributed much to the obstinacy of the
stand they made, and the unusual loss sustained by the
enemy immediately opposed to them.

Taking to the woods in which the British light troops were
posted, the riflemen, after their loose manner, placed
themselves behind trees, and thus carried on the contest
with their more concentrated, better ordered, and,
therefore, more exposed opponents. It is said that Major
Forsyth continued, throughout the action, to move to and
fro, armed only with a light sword, immediately in the rear
of his men, pointing out with an earnest solemnity that
partook both of sorrow and anger, to one rifleman and
another, some one of the enemy, and exclaiming that he was
the man who had killed the favorite armorer. This
suggestion was almost sure to be fatal to the enemy thus
specially branded with the guilt of having taken off the
best man of the corps. The British light troops were nearly
all left on the ground they first occupied, being too
strong to retreat while the landing was only partially
made, and too much exposed to stand before such expertness
of aim, rendered so fierce and unyielding by one of the
chance shots of an opening fight.

The force under Forsyth was soon supported by Major King's[M-22] battalion of the 15th Infantry, consisting of three companies--Captain John Scott's, Captain White Youngs', and that of Captain John Lambert Hoppock, who had been mortally wounded in the boats. When General Pike had landed with the whole body of his troops, the attacking force was represented by the 6th, 15th, 16th, and 21st Infantry, Colonel Maclure's 3d regiment of New York Militia, and several pieces of artillery.

At the first sharp collision, as we have seen, the British were defeated, not without much loss on both sides. On their retreat, the bugles sounded the advance, and the troops pressed forward along the lake shore toward Fort York, which was meanwhile bombarded from the fleet. One of General Pike's staff says: "Our march was by the lake road in sections, but the route was so much intersected by streams and rivulets, the bridges over which had been destroyed by the enemy as they retreated, that we were considerably retarded in our progress. We collected logs, and by severe efforts at length contrived to pass over one field piece and a howitzer, which were placed at the head of our column, in charge of Captain Fanning[M-23] of the 3d Artillery; and thus we proceeded through a spacious wood, as we emerged from which we were saluted by a battery of 24-pounders. The general then ordered one of his aids (Fraser) and a sergeant to proceed to the right of the battery, in order to discover how many men were in the works. We did so, and reported to him the number, and that they were spiking their own guns. The general immediately ordered Captain Walworth of the 16th [_sic_] with his company of grenadiers to make the assault. Walworth gallantly ordered his men to trail arms and advance at the accelerated pace; but at the moment when they were ordered to recover and charge the enemy, the enemy broke in the utmost confusion, leaving several men wounded on the ground which they abandoned."

This first serious obstacle to Pike's advance was the Western battery already described, p. lxvii, where the explosion occurred before Captain Walworth[M-24] could carry out the order to charge this work. This accident caused some loss of life to the defenders, but none to the assaulters. Lossing has, concerning it: