Chapter IV: The Creed of Islám.99 (1)

Faith is defined by Muslim theologians as: "Confession with the tongue and belief with the heart."[100] It is said to "stand midway between hope and fear." It is sub-divided into Imán-í-mujmal and Imán-í-mufassal. The former is an expression of the following faith: "I believe in God, His names and attributes, and accept all His commands."[101] The latter is the acceptance of the following dogmas: "I believe in God, Angels, Books, Prophets, the Last Day, the Predestination by the Most High God of good and evil and the Resurrection after death."[102] These form the articles of faith which every Muslim must believe, to which belief, in order to render it perfect, he must add the performance of the "acts of practice," _viz._: (1) "The recital of the Kalima or creed:--'There is no deity but God, and Muhammad is the Apostle of God.' (2) Sulát. The five daily prayers. (3) Roza. The thirty days fast of Ramazán. (4) Zakát. The legal alms. (5) Hajj, or the pilgrimage to Mecca." This chapter will contain an account of the Imán--the dogmas of Islám. An account of the Dín--the practical duties, will be given in the next chapter. {117}

1. GOD.--This article of the faith includes a belief in the existence of God, His unity and attributes, and has given rise to a large number of sects. Some acquaintance with the various controversies which have thus arisen is necessary to a correct knowledge of Islám. I commence the consideration of this subject by giving the substance of a Sunní, or orthodox treatise known as the Risála-i-Berkevi. The learned orientalist M. Garcin de Tassy, considered it to be of such authority that in his "L'Islamisme d'après le Coran" he has inserted a translation of the Risála.[103] Muhammad Al-Berkevi, speaking of the Divine attributes, says:--

(1). Life. (Hyát). God Most High is alone to be adored. He has neither
associate nor equal. He is free from the imperfections of humanity. He
is neither begotten nor does He beget. He is invisible. He is without
figure, form, colour or parts. His existence has neither beginning nor
end. He is immutable. If He so wills, He can annihilate the world in a
moment of time and, if it seem good to Him, recreate it in an instant.
Nothing is difficult to Him, whether it be the creation of a fly or
that of the seven heavens. He receives neither profit nor loss from
whatever may happen. If all the Infidels became Believers and all the
irreligious pious, He would gain no advantage. On the other hand, if
all Believers became Infidels, He would suffer no loss.

(2). Knowledge. ('Ilm). He has knowledge of all things hidden or
manifest, whether in heaven or on earth. He knows the number of the
leaves of the trees, of the grains of wheat and of sand. Events past
and future are known to Him. He knows what enters into the heart of man
and what he utters with his mouth. He alone, except those to whom He
has revealed them, knows the invisible things. He is free from
forgetfulness, negligence and error. His knowledge is eternal: it is
not posterior to His essence.

(3). Power. (Qudrat). He is Almighty. If He wills, He can raise the
dead, make stones talk, trees walk, annihilate the heavens and the
earth and recreate of gold or of silver thousands similar to those
destroyed. He can transport a man in a moment of time from the east to
the west, or from the west to the east, or to the seventh heaven. His
power is eternal à priori and à posteriori. It is not posterior to His
essence.

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(4). Will (Irádah). He can do what He wills, and whatever He wills
comes to pass. He is not obliged to act. Everything, good or evil, in
this world exists by His will. He wills the faith of the believer and
the piety of the religious. If He were to change His will there would
be neither a true believer nor a pious man. He willeth also the
unbelief of the unbeliever and the irreligion of the wicked and,
without that will, there would neither be unbelief nor irreligion. All
we do we do by His will: what He willeth not does not come to pass. If
one should ask why God does not will that all men should believe we
answer: "We have no right to enquire about what God wills and does. He
is perfectly free to will and to do what He pleases." In creating
unbelievers, in willing that they should remain in that state; in
making serpents, scorpions and pigs: in willing, in short, all that is
evil God has wise ends in view which it is not necessary that we should
know. We must acknowledge that the will of God is eternal and that it
is not posterior to His essence.

(5). Hearing. (Sama'). He hears all sounds whether low or loud. He
hears without an ear for His attributes are not like those of men.

(6). Seeing. (Basr). He sees all things, even the steps of a black ant
on a black stone in a dark night; yet He has no eye as men have.

(7). Speech. (Kalám). He speaks, but not with a tongue as men do. He
speaks to some of His servants without the intervention of another,
even as He spoke to Moses, and to Muhammad on the night of the
ascension to heaven. He speaks to others by the instrumentality of
Gabriel, and this is the usual way in which He communicates His will to
the prophets. It follows from this that the Qurán is the word of God,
and is eternal and uncreated.

These are the "haft sifát," or seven attributes of God. There is unanimity of opinion as to the number of attributes, but not as regards their nature and the extent of the knowledge concerning them to which men can attain. Thus some say that the knowledge of God is the first thing to acquire; but Imám Sháfa'í and the Mutazilites say that a man must first attain to the _idea_ of the knowledge of God. The meaning of the expression "Knowledge of God" is the ascertaining the truth of His existence, and of His positive and privative attributes, as far as the human understanding can enter into these matters. The unity is not a mere numerical unity but absolute, for the number one is the first of a series and implies a second, but God has not a {119} second. He is "singular without anything like Him, separate having no equal;" for, "had there been either in heaven or earth gods beside God, both surely had gone to ruin." (Súra xxi. 22). God is not a substance, for substance has accidents, but God has none: otherwise His nature would be that of "dependent existence." God is without parts, for otherwise he would not exist till all the parts were formed, and His existence would depend on the parts, that is, on something beside Himself.

The orthodox strictly prohibit the discussion of minute particulars, for say they, "just as the eye turning to the brightness of the sun finds darkness intervene to prevent all observation, so the understanding finds itself bewildered if it attempts to pry into the nature of God." The Prophet said: "We did not know the reality of the knowledge of Thee;" and to his followers he gave this advice: "Think of God's gifts, not of His nature: certainly you have no power for that." The Khalíf Akbar is reported to have said: "to be helpless in the search of knowledge is knowledge and to enquire into the nature of God is Shirk (infidelity)."[104] A moderate acquaintance with Muslim theology shows that neither the injunction of the Prophet nor the warning of the Khalíf has been heeded.

According to the early Muslims, the Companions and their followers, enquiries into the nature of God and His attributes were not lawful. The Prophet knowing what was good for men, had plainly revealed the way of salvation and had taught them:--

"Say: He is God alone:
God the eternal!
He begetteth not, and He is not begotten;
And there is none like unto Him." (Súra cxii)

This was sufficient for them to know of the mystery of the Godhead. God is far beyond the reach of the human {120} understanding. He alone embraces all in His comprehension. Men should therefore mistrust their own perceptive faculties and notions and should obey the inspired legislator Muhammad, who loving them better than they love themselves, and knowing better than they do what is truly useful, has revealed both what they ought to believe and what they ought to do. It is true that men must exercise their reason, but they must not do so with regard to the divine attributes.[105]

Dogma is divided into two portions, usúl and farú'--(_i.e._, roots and branches.) The former include the doctrine about God; the latter, as the name implies, consist of truths which result from the acceptance of the former. The orthodox belief is that reason has only to do with the "farú'," for the usúl being founded on the Qurán and Sunnat have an objective basis.

Differences of opinion about various branches of the "farú'," led to discussions which did not stop there but went on to the "usúl," and so paved the way for the rise of scholastic theology ('Ilm-i-kalám.) I have already in the chapter on the exegesis of the Qurán explained the difference in meaning between muhkam (obvious) verses and mutashábih (intricate) ones. This difference lies at the very foundation of the present subject. It is, therefore, necessary to enter a little into detail.

The question turns very much on the interpretation of the 5th verse of the 3rd Súra: "He it is who hath sent down to thee 'the Book.' Some of its signs are of themselves perspicuous (muhkam): these are the basis of the {121} Book--and others are figurative (mutashábih.) But they whose hearts are given to err, follow its figures, craving discord, craving an interpretation; yet none knoweth its interpretation but God. And the stable in knowledge say, 'We believe in it: it is all from our Lord.' But none will bear this in mind, save men endued with understanding." Here it is clearly stated (1) that no one except God can know the interpretation of mutashábih verses, and (2) that wise men though they know not their interpretation, yet believe them all. Many learned men, however, say that the full stop should not be placed after the word "God" but after "knowledge," and so this portion of the verse would read thus: "None knoweth its interpretation but God and the stable in knowledge. They say: 'we believe, &c.'" On this slight change in punctuation, which shows that the 'stable in knowledge' can interpret the mutashábih verses, opposite schools of theology have arisen in Islám.

The latter reading opens the way to a fearless investigation of subjects which all the early Muslims avoided as beyond their province. In the early days of Islám it was held that all parts of the Qurán, except the muhkam verses and the purely narrative portions, were mutashábih; that is, all verses which related to the attributes of God, to the existence of angels and genii, to the appearance of Antichrist, the period and signs of the day of judgment, and generally all matters which are beyond the daily experience of mankind. It was strongly felt that not only must there be no discussion on them,[106] but no attempt should be made to understand or act on them. Ibn 'Abbás, a Companion, says: "One must believe the mutashábih verses, but not take them for a rule of conduct." Ibn Jubair was once {122} asked to put the meaning of the Qurán into writing. He became angry and said: "I should rather be palsied in one-half of my body than do so."[107] 'Ayesha said: "Avoid those persons who dispute about the meaning of the Qurán, for they are those whom God has referred to in the words, 'whose hearts are given to err.'"

The first reading is the one adopted by the Asháb, the Tábi'ín and the Taba-i-Tábi'ín and the great majority of Commentators. The Sunnís generally, and, according to the testimony of Fakr-ud-dín Rází (A.H. 544-606), the Sháfa'í sect are of the same opinion.

Those who take the opposite view are the Commentators Mujáhid (died A.H. 101), Rábí' bin Ans and others. The scholastic theologians[108] (Mutakallimán) generally adopt the latter reading.[109] They argued thus: how could men believe what they did not know; to which their opponents answered, that the act of belief in the unknown is the very thing here praised by God. The scholastics then enquired why, since the Qurán was sent to be a guide and direction to men, were not all its verses muhkam? The answer was, that the Arabs acknowledged two kinds of eloquence. One kind was to arrange words and ideas in a plain and simple style so that the meaning might be at once apparent, the other was to speak in figurative language. Now, if the Qurán had not contained both these styles of composition, it could not have claimed the position it does as a book absolutely perfect in form as well as in matter.[110]

Bearing in mind this fundamental difference of opinion, we can now pass on to the consideration of the attributes.

{123} The essential attributes are Life, Knowledge, Power, Will, for without these the others could not exist. Then the attributes of Hearing, Seeing, Speech give us a further idea of perfection. These are the "Sifát-i-Sabútiah," or affirmative attributes, the privation of which would imply loss; there are also Sifát-i-Salbiah, or privative attributes, such as--God has no form, is not limited by place, has no equal, &c. The acts of sitting, rising, descending, the possession of face, hands, eyes, &c., being connected with the idea of corporeal existences imply imperfection and apparently contradict the doctrine of "exemption" (tenzih) according to which God is, in virtue of His essence, in no way like the creatures He has made. This was a difficulty, but the four great Imáms all taught that it was impious to enquire into these matters for all such allusions were mutashábih. "The Imám Hanbal and other early divines followed in the path of the early Muslims and said: 'We believe in the Book and the Sunnat, and do not desire explanations. We know that the High God is not to be compared to any created object: nor any creature with Him.'"[111] Imám As-Sháfa'í said that a man who enquired into such matters should be tied to a stake, and carried about, and that the following proclamation should be made before him: "This is the reward of him who left the Qurán and the Traditions for the study of scholastic theology." Imám Hanbal says: "Whosoever moves his hand when he reads in the Qurán the words, 'I have created with my hand,' ought to have his hand cut off; and whoever stretches forth his finger in repeating the saying of Muhammad, 'The heart of the believer is between two fingers of the Merciful,' deserves to have his finger cut off." At-Tirmízí when consulted about the statement of the Prophet that God had descended to the lowest of the seven heavens, said: "The descent is intelligible, the manner how is unknown; the belief therein {124} is obligatory; and the asking about it is a blameable innovation." But all such attempts to restrain discussion and investigation failed.

The two main points in the discussion of this question are (1) whether the attributes of God are internal or external, whether they are part of His essence or not, and (2) whether they are eternal or not.

The two leading Sects were the Sifátians (or Attributists) and the Mutazilites. The Sifátians whom the early orthodox Muslims follow, taught that the attributes of God are eternally inherent in His essence without separation or change. Every attribute is conjoined with Him as life with knowledge, or knowledge with power. They also taught that the mutashábih verses were not to be explained, and such were those which seemed to show a resemblance between God and His creatures. So at first they did not attempt to give the meaning of the terms, "hands, eyes, face, &c.," when applied to God. They simply accepted them as they stood. In course of time, as will be seen, differences of opinion on this point led to some sub-divisions of this sect.

The Mutazilites were the great opponents of the Sifátians. They rejected the idea of eternal attributes, saying that eternity was the formal attribute of the essence of God. "If," said they, "we admit the eternal existence of an attribute then we must recognize the multiplicity of eternal existences." They also rejected the attributes of hearing, seeing and speech, as these were accidents proper to corporeal existences. They looked upon the divine attributes as mental abstractions, and not as having a real existence in the divine essence. The Mutazilites were emphatically the Free thinkers of Islám. The origin of the sect was as follows: Al Hasan, a famous divine, was one day seated in the Mosque at Basra when a discussion arose on the question whether a believer who committed a mortal sin became thereby an unbeliever. The Khárigites (Ante p. 76) {125} affirmed that it was so. The orthodox denied this, saying that, though guilty of sin, yet that as he believed rightly he was not an infidel.[112] One of the scholars Wásil Ibn Atá, (who was born at Madína A.H. 80), then rose up and said: "I maintain that a Muslim who has committed a mortal sin should be regarded neither as a believer nor an unbeliever, but as occupying a middle station between the two." He then retired to another part of the Mosque where he was joined by his friend 'Umr Ibn Obaid and others. They resumed the discussion. A learned man, named Katáda, entering the Mosque, went up to them, but on finding that they were not the party in which Al Hasan was, said 'these are the Seceders (Al-Mutazila).' Al Hasan soon expelled them from his school. Wásil then founded a school of his own of which, after the death of his master, 'Umr Ibn Obaid became the head.

Wásil felt that a believer, though sinful, did not merit the same degree of punishment as an infidel, and thus starting off on the question of _degrees_ of punishment, he soon opened up the whole subject of man's responsibility and the question of free-will. This soon brought him into conflict with the orthodox on the subject of predestination and that again to the subject of the inspiration, the interpretation and the eternity of the Qurán, and of the divine attributes. His followers rejected the doctrine of the "divine right" of the Imám, and held that the entire body of the Faithful had the right to elect the most suitable person, who need not necessarily be a man of the Quraish tribe, to fill that office. The principles of logic and the teaching of philosophy were brought to bear on the precepts of religion. According to Shahrastání the Mutazilites hold:--

"That God is eternal; and that eternity is the peculiar property of His
essence; but they deny the existence of any eternal attributes (as
distinct from His nature). For they say, He is Omniscient as to {126}
His nature; Living as to His nature; Almighty as to His nature; but not
through any knowledge, power or life existing in Him as eternal
attributes; for knowledge, power and life are part of His essence,
otherwise, if they are to be looked upon as eternal attributes of the
Deity, it will give rise to a multiplicity of eternal entities."

"They maintain that the knowledge of God is as much within the province
of reason as that of any other entity; that He cannot be beheld with
the corporeal sight; and with the exception of Himself everything else
is liable to change or to suffer extinction. They also maintain that
Justice is the animating principle of human actions: Justice according
to them being the dictates of Reason and the concordance of the
ultimate results of this conduct of man with such dictates."

"Again, they hold that there is no eternal law as regards human
actions; that the divine ordinances which regulate the conduct of men
are the results of growth and development; that God has commanded and
forbidden, promised and threatened by a law which grew gradually. At
the same time, say they, he who works righteousness merits rewards and
he who works evil deserves punishment. They also say, that all
knowledge is attained through reason, and must necessarily be so
obtained. They hold that the cognition of good and evil is also within
the province of reason; that nothing is known to be right or wrong
until reason has enlightened us as to the distinction; and that
thankfulness for the blessings of the Benefactor is made obligatory by
reason, even before the promulgation of any law upon the subject. They
also maintain that man has perfect freedom; is the author of his
actions both good and evil, and deserves reward or punishment hereafter
accordingly."

During the reigns of the 'Abbásside Khalífs Mámún, Mutasim and Wathik (198-232 A.H.) at Baghdád, the Mutazilites were in high favour at Court, Under the 'Abbásside dynasty[113] the ancient Arab Society was revolutionized, Persians filled the most important offices of State; Persian doctrines took the place of Arab ones. The orthodox suffered bitter persecution. The story of that persecution will be told later on. The Khalíf Wathik at length relented. {127} An old man, heavily chained, was one day brought into his presence. The prisoner obtained permission to put a few questions to Ahmad Ibn Abu Dá,úd, a Mutazilite and the President of the Court of Inquisition. The following dialogue took place. "Ahmad," said the prisoner, "what is the dogma which you desire to have established." "That the Qurán is created," replied Ahmad. "This dogma, then, is without doubt an essential part of religion, insomuch that the latter cannot without it be said to be complete?" "Certainly." "Has the Apostle of God taught this to men or has he left them free?" "He has left them free." "Was the Apostle of God acquainted with this dogma or not?" "He was acquainted with it." "Wherefore, then, do you desire to impose a belief regarding which the Apostle of God has left men free to think as they please?" Ahmad remaining silent, the old man turned to Wathik and said, "O Prince of Believers, here is my first position made good." Then turning to Ahmad, he said, "God has said, 'This day have I perfected religion for you, and have filled up the measures of my favours upon you; and it is my pleasure that Islám be your religion.' (Súra v. 5). But according to you Islám is not perfected unless we adopt this doctrine that the Qurán is created. Which now is most worthy of credence--God, when He declares Islám to be complete and perfect, or you when you announce the contrary?" Ahmad was still silent. "Prince of Believers," said the old man, "there is my second point made good." He continued, "Ahmad, how do you explain the following words of God in His Holy Book?--'O Apostle! proclaim all that hath been sent down to thee from thy Lord; for if thou dost not, thou hast not proclaimed His message at all.' Now this doctrine that you desire to spread among the Faithful, has the Apostle taught it, or has he abstained from doing so?" Ahmad remained silent. The old man resumed, "Prince of Believers, such is my third argument." Then turning to Ahmad he said: "If the Prophet was acquainted with the doctrine {128} which you desire to impose upon us, had he the right to pass by it in silence?" "He had the right." "And did the same right appertain to Abu Bakr, Omar, Osmán and 'Ali?" "It did," "Prince of Believers," said the prisoner, "God will, in truth, be severe on us, if He deprives us of a liberty which He accorded to the Prophet and his Companions." The Khalíf assented, and at once restored the old man to liberty. So ended one of the fiercest persecutions the orthodox have ever had to endure, but so also ended the attempt to break through the barriers of traditionalism.[114] The next Khalíf, Al Mutawakhil, a ferocious and cruel man, restored the orthodox party to place and power. He issued a fatva (decree) declaring that the dogma that the Qurán was created was an utter falsehood. He instituted severe measures against Christians, Jews, Shía'hs and Mutazilites. Ahmad Ibn Abu Dá,úd was one of the first to be disgraced. Heresy and latitudinarianism were banished.

The final blow to the Mutazilites, however, came not from the Khalíf but a little later on from Abu Hasan-al-Ash'arí (270-340 A.H.)

The Mutazilites expelled from power in Baghdád, still flourished at Basra where one day the following incident occurred. Abu 'Alí Al-Jubbai, a Mutazilite doctor, was lecturing to his students when Al-Ash'arí propounded the following case to his master: "There were three brothers, one of whom was a true believer, virtuous and pious; the second an infidel, a debauchee and a reprobate; and the third an infant; they all died. What became of them?" Al-Jubbai answered: "The virtuous brother holds a high station in Paradise, the infidel is in the depths of hell, and the child is among those who have obtained salvation." {129} "Suppose now," said Al-Ash'arí, "that the child should wish to ascend to the place occupied by his virtuous brother, would he be allowed to do so?" "No," replied Al-Jubbai, "it would be said to him: 'thy brother arrived at this place through His numerous works of obedience to God, and thou hast no such works to set forward.'" "Suppose then," said Al-Ash'arí, "that the child should say: 'this is not my fault, you did not let me live long enough, neither did you give me the means of proving my obedience.'" "In that case," said Al-Jubbai, "the Almighty would say: 'I knew that if I allowed thee to live, thou wouldest have been disobedient and have incurred the punishment of hell: I acted, therefore, for thy advantage.'" "Well," said Al-Ash'arí, "and suppose the infidel brother were here to say: 'O God of the Universe! since Thou knowest what awaited him, Thou must have known what awaited me; why then didst Thou act for his advantage and not for mine?'"[115] Al-Jubbai was silent, though very angry with his pupil, who was now convinced that the Mutazilite dogma of man's free-will was false, and that God elects some for mercy and some for punishment without any motive whatever. Disagreeing with his teacher on this point, he soon began to find other points of difference, and soon announced his belief that the Qurán was not created. This occurred on a Friday in the Great Mosque at Basra. Seated in his chair he cried out in a loud voice: "They who know me know who I am; as for those who do not know me I shall tell them; I am 'Alí Ibn Ismá'íl Al-Ash'arí, and I used to hold that the Qurán was created, that the eyes (of men) shall not see God, and that we ourselves are the authors of our evil deeds; now, I have returned to the truth: I renounce these opinions, and I take the engagement to refute the Mutazilites and expose their infamy and turpitude."[116]

He then, adopting scholastic methods, started a school of {130} thought of his own, which was in the main a return to orthodoxy. The Ash'arían doctrines differ slightly from the tenets of the Sifátians of which sect Al-Ash'arí's disciples form a branch. The Ash'aríans hold--

(i.) That the attributes of God are distinct from His essence, yet in such a way as to forbid any comparison being made between God and His creatures. They say they are not "_'ain_ nor _ghair_:" not of His essence, nor distinct from it: _i.e.,_ they cannot be compared with any other things.

(ii.) That God has one eternal will from which proceed all things, the good and the evil, the useful and the hurtful. The destiny of man was written on the eternal table before the world was created. So far they go with the Sifátians, but in order to preserve the moral responsibility of man they say that he has power to convert will into action. But this power cannot create anything new for then God's sovereignty would be impaired; so they say that God in His providence so orders matters that whenever "a man desires to do a certain thing, good or bad, the action corresponding to the desire is, there and then, created by God, and, as it were, fitted on to the desire." Thus it seems as if it came naturally from the will of the man, whereas it does not. This action is called Kasb (acquisition) because it is acquired by a special creative act of God. It is an act directed to the obtaining of profit, or the removing of injury: the term is, therefore, inapplicable to the Deity. Abu Bakr-al-Bakillání, a disciple of Al-Ash'arí, says: "The essence or substance of the action is the effect of the power of God, but its being an action of obedience, such as prayer, or an action of disobedience, such as fornication, are qualities of the action, which proceed from the power of man." The Imám Al-Haramain (419-478 A.H.) held "that the actions of men were effected by the power which God has created in man." Abu Isháq al Isfarayain says: "That which maketh impression, or hath influence on action, is a compound of the power of God and the power of man." {131}

(iii.) They say that the word of God is eternal, though they acknowledge that the vocal sounds used in the Qurán, which is the manifestation of that word, are created. They say, in short, that the Qurán contains (1) the eternal word which existed in the essence of God before time was; and (2) the word which consists of sounds and combinations of letters. This last they call the created word.

Thus Al-Ash'arí traversed the main positions of the Mutazilites, denying that man can by the aid of his reason alone rise to the knowledge of good and evil. He must exercise no judgment but accept all that is revealed. He has no right to apply the moral laws which affect men to the actions of God. It cannot be asserted by the human reason that the good will be rewarded, or the bad punished in a future world. Man must always approach God as a slave, in whom there is no light or knowledge to judge of the actions of the Supreme. Whether God will accept the penitent sinner or not cannot be asserted, for He is an absolute Sovereign, above all law.[117]

The opinions of the more irrational sub-divisions of the Sifátians need not be entered into at any length.

The Mushábihites (or Assimilators), interpreting some of the mutashábih verses literally, held that there is a resemblance between God and His creatures; and that the Deity is capable of local motion, of ascending, descending, &c. These they called "declarative attributes." The Mujassimians (or Corporealists) declared God to be corporeal, by which some of them meant, a self-subsisting body, whilst others declared the Deity to be finite. They are acknowledged to be heretics.

{132}

The Jabríans gave great prominence to the denial of free agency in man, and thus opposed the Mutazilites, who in this respect are Kadríans, that is, they deny "Al-Kadr," God's absolute sovereignty, and recognize free will in man.

These and various other sub-divisions are not now of much importance. The Sunnís follow the teaching of Al-Ash'arí, whilst the Shí'ahs incline to that of the Mutazilites.

Connected with the subject of the attributes of God is that of the names to be used when speaking of Him. All sects agree in this, that the names "The Living, the Wise, the Powerful, the Hearer, the Seer, the Speaker," &c., are to be applied to God; but the orthodox belief is that all such names must be "tauqífi," that is dependent on some revelation. Thus it is not lawful to apply a name to God expressive of one of His attributes, unless there is some statement made, or order given by Muhammad to legalize it. God is rightly called Sháfí (Healer), but He cannot be called Tabíb which means much the same thing, for the simple reason that the word Tabíb is never applied in the Qurán or the Traditions to God. In like manner the term 'Álim (Knower) is lawful, but not so the expression 'Áqil (Wise). The Mutazilites say that if, in the Qurán or Traditions, there is any praise of an attribute, then the adjective formed from the name of that attribute can be applied to God even though the actual word does not occur in any revelation. Al-Ghazzálí (A.H. 450-505), who gave in the East the death-blow to the Muslim philosophers, says: "The names of God not given in the Law, if expressive of His glory, may be used of Him, but only as expressive of His attributes, not of His nature." On the ground that it does not occur in the Law, the Persian word "Khuda" has been objected to, an objection which also holds good with regard to the use of such terms as God, Dieu, Gott, &c. To this it is answered, that as "Khuda" means "one who comes by himself" it is equivalent to the term Wájib-ul-Wajúd, {133} "one who has necessary existence," and therefore so long as it is not considered as the "Ism-i-Zát (name of His nature) it may with propriety be used."[118]

The current belief now seems to be that the proper name equal to the term Alláh, current in a language, can be used, provided always that such a name is not taken from the language of the Infidels; so God, Dieu, &c, still remain unlawful. The names of God authorised by the Qurán and Traditions are, exclusive of the term Alláh, ninety-nine in number. They are called the Asmá-i-Husná[119] (noble names); but in addition to these there are many synonyms used on the authority of Ijmá'. Such are Hanán, equal to Rahím (Merciful) and Manán, "one who puts another under an obligation." In the Tafsír-i-Bahr it is stated that there are three thousand names of God; one thousand of which are known to angels; one thousand to prophets; whilst one thousand are thus distributed, _viz._, in the Pentateuch there are three hundred, in the Psalms three hundred, in the Gospels three hundred, in the Qurán ninety-nine, and one still hidden.

The following texts of the Qurán are adduced to prove the nature of the divine attributes:--

(1). Life. "There is no God but He, the Living, the Eternal." (Súra ii. 256). "Put thy trust in Him that liveth and dieth not." (Súra xxv. 60).

(2). Knowledge. "Dost thou not see that God knoweth all that is in the heavens, and all that is in the earth." (Súra lviii. 8). "With Him are the keys of the secret things; none knoweth them but He: He knoweth whatever is on the land and in the sea; and no leaf falleth but He knoweth it; neither is there a grain in the darknesses of the earth, nor a thing green or sere, but it is noted in a distinct writing." (Súra vi. 59).

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(3). Power. "If God pleased, of their ears and of their eyes would He surely deprive them. Verily God is Almighty." (Súra ii. 19). "Is He not powerful enough to quicken the dead." (Súra lxxv. 40). "God hath power over all things." (Súra iii. 159.)

(4). Will. "God is worker of that He willeth." (Súra lxxxv. 16). "But if God pleased, He would surely bring them, one and all, to the guidance." (Súra vi. 35). "God misleadeth whom He will, and whom He will He guideth--God doeth His pleasure." (Súra xiv. 4, 32).

As this attribute is closely connected with the article of the Creed which refers to Predestination, the different opinions regarding it will be stated under that head.

There has never been any difference of opinion as to the existence of these four attributes so clearly described in the Qurán: the difference is with regard to the mode of their existence and their operation. There is, first, the ancient Sifátian doctrine that the attributes are eternal and of the essence of God: secondly, the Mutazilite theory that they are not eternal; and, thirdly, the Ash'arían dogma that they are eternal, but distinct from His essence.

There is also great difference of opinion with regard to the next three attributes--hearing, sight, speech. For the existence of the two first of these the following verses are quoted, "He truly heareth and knoweth all things." (Súra xliv. 5). "No vision taketh in Him, but He taketh in all vision." (Súra vi. 103).

The use of the terms sitting, rising, &c., hands, face, eyes, and so on, gave rise as I have shown to several sub-divisions of the Sifátians. Al-Ghazzálí says: "He sits upon His throne after that manner which He has Himself described and in that sense which He Himself means, which is a sitting far remote from any notion of contact or resting upon, or local situation." This is the Ash'arían idea, but between the Ash'aríans and those who fell into the error of the {135} Mujassimians,[120] there was another school. The followers of Imám Ibn Hanbal say that such words represent the attributes existing in God. The words "God sits on His throne" mean that He has the power of sitting. Thus, they say, "We keep the literal meaning of the words, we allow no figurative interpretation. To do so is to introduce a dangerous principle of interpretation, for the negation of the apparent sense of a passage may tend to weaken the authority of revelation. At the same time we do not pretend to explain the act, for it is written: 'There is none like unto Him.' (Súra cxii.) 'Nought is there like Him.' (Súra xlii. 9.) 'Unworthy the estimate they form of God.'" (Súra xxii. 73.) To prove that God occupies a place they produce the following Tradition: "Ibn-al-Hákim wished to give liberty to a female slave Saouda and consulted the Prophet about it. Muhammad said to her, 'Where is God?' 'In heaven,' she replied. 'Set her at liberty, she is a true believer.'" Not, say the Commentators, because she believed that God occupied a place but because she took the words in their literal signification. The Shí'ahs consider it wrong to attribute to God movement, quiescence, &c, for these imply the possession of a body. They hold, too, in opposition to the orthodox that God will never be seen, for that which is seen is limited by space.

The seventh attribute--speech--has been fruitful of a very long and important controversy connected with the nature of the Qurán, for the word "Kalám" means not mere speech, but revelation and every other mode of communicating intelligence. Al-Ghazzálí says:--

"He doth speak, command, forbid, promise, and threaten by an eternal
ancient word, subsisting in His essence. Neither is it like to the word
of the creatures, nor doth it consist in a voice arising from the
commotion of the air and the collision of bodies, nor letters {136}
which are separated by the joining together of the lips or the motion
of the tongue. The Qurán, the Law, the Gospel and the Psalter are books
sent down by Him to His Apostles, and the Qurán, indeed, is read with
tongues written in books, and is kept in hearts; yet, as subsisting in
the essence of God, it doth not become liable to separation and
division whilst it is transferred into the hearts and on to paper. Thus
Moses also heard the word of God without voice or letter, even as the
saints behold the essence of God without substance or accident."

The orthodox believe that God is really a speaker: the Mutazilites deny this, and say that He is only called a speaker because He is the originator of words and sounds.

They also bring the following objections to bear against the doctrine of the eternity of the Qurán. (1) It is written in Arabic, it descended, is read, is heard, and is written. It was the subject of a miracle. It is divided into parts and some verses are abrogated by others. (2) Events are described in the past tense, but if the Qurán had been eternal the future tense would have been used. (3) The Qurán contains commands and prohibitions; if it is eternal who were commanded and who were admonished? (4) If it has existed from eternity it must exist to eternity, and so even in the last day, and in the next world, men will be under the obligation of performing the same religious duties as they do now, and of keeping all the outward precepts of the law. (5) If the Qurán is eternal, then there are two eternals.

The position thus assailed was not at first a hard and fast dogma of Islám. It was more a speculative opinion than anything else, but the opposition of the Mutazilites soon led all who wished to be considered orthodox to become not only stout assertors of the eternity of the Qurán, but to give up their lives in defence of what they believed to be true. The Mutazilites by asserting the subjective nature of the Quránic inspiration brought the book itself within the reach of criticism. This was too much for orthodox Islám to bear even though the Khalíf Mámún in the {137} year 212 A.H. issued a fatva declaring that all who asserted the eternity of the Qurán were guilty of heresy. Some six years after this, the Imám Ahmad Ibn Hanbal was severely beaten, and then imprisoned because he refused to assent to the truth of the decree issued by the Khalíf. Al Buwaiti, a famous disciple of As-Sháfa'í, used an ingenious argument to fortify his own mind when being punished by the order of the Khalíf. He was taken all the way from Cairo to Baghdád and told to confess that the Qurán was created. On his refusal, he was imprisoned at Baghdád and there remained in chains till the day of his death. As Ar-Rábí Ibn Sulaimán says: "I saw Al Buwaiti mounted on a mule: round his neck was a wooden collar, on his legs were fetters, from these to the collar extended an iron chain to which was attached a clog weighing fifty pounds. Whilst they led him on he continued repeating these words, 'Almighty God created the world by means of the word _Be!_ Now, if that word was created, one created thing would have created another.'"[121] Al Buwaiti here refers to the verse, "Verily our speech unto a thing when we will the same, is that we only say to it, 'Be,' and it is,--Kun fayakúna." (Súra xxxvi. 82). This, in the way Al Buwaiti applied it, is a standing argument of the orthodox to prove the eternity of the Qurán.

When times changed men were put to death for holding the opposite opinion. The Imám As-Sháfa'í held a public disputation in Baghdád with Hafs, a Mutazilite preacher, on this very point. Sháfa'í quoted the verse, "God said _be, and it was_," and asked, "Did not God create all things by the word _be?_" Hafs assented. "If then the Qurán was created, must not the word _be_ have been created with it?" Hafs could not deny so plain a proposition. "Then," said Sháfa'í, "All things, according to you, were created by a created being, which is a gross inconsistency and manifest {138} impiety." Hafs was reduced to silence, and such an effect had Sháfa'í's logic on the audience that they put Hafs to death as a pestilent heretic. Thus did the Ash'arían opinions on the subject of the Divine attributes again gain the mastery.[122]

The Mutazilites failed, and the reason why is plain. They were, as a rule, influenced by no high spiritual motives; often they were mere quibblers. They sought no light in an external revelation. Driven to a reaction by the rigid system they combated, they would have made reason alone their chief guide. The nobler spirits among them were impotent to regenerate the faith they professed to follow. It was, however, a great movement, and at one time, it threatened to change the whole nature of Islám. This period of Muslim history, famed as that in which the effort was made to cast off the fetters of the rigid system which Islám was gradually tightening by the increased authority given to traditionalism, and to the refinements of the four Imáms, was undoubtedly a period of, comparatively speaking, high civilization. Baghdád, the capital of the Khalífate, was a busy, populous, well-governed city. This it mainly owed to the influence of the Persian family of the Barmecides, one of whom was Vizier to the Khalíf Hárún-ur-Rashíd. Hárún's fame as a good man is quite undeserved. It is true that he was a patron of learning, that his Empire was extensive, that he gained many victories, that his reign was the culminating point of Arab grandeur. But for all that, he was a morose despot, a cruel man, thoroughly given up to pleasures of a very questionable nature. Drunkenness and debauchery were common at court. Plots and intrigues were ever at work. Such was the state of one of the greatest, if not the greatest, periods {139} of Muslim rule. This, too, was at a time most favourable for the development of any good which Islám might have possessed. It should be remembered that whatever glory is rightly attached to this period is connected with an epoch when heresy was specially prevalent, when orthodoxy was weak in Baghdád. The culture of the time was in spite of, not on account of, the influence of orthodox Islám.

2. ANGELS.--Of this article of the creed Muhammad Al-Berkevi says:--

"We must confess that God has angels who act according to His order and
who do not rebel against Him. They neither eat nor drink, nor is there
amongst them any difference of sex. Some are near the throne of God;
those are His messengers. Each one has his particular work. Some are on
earth, some in heaven, some are always standing, some always prostrate
themselves and some laud and praise God. Others have charge of men and
record all their actions. Some angels are high in stature and are
possessed of great power. Such an one is Gabriel (Jibrá,íl) who in the
space of one hour can descend from heaven to earth, and who with one
wing can lift up a mountain.

We must believe in 'Izrá,íl who receives the souls of men when they
die, and in Isráfíl into whose charge is committed the trumpet. This
trumpet he has actually in his hand, and placed to his mouth ready to
blow when God gives the order. When he receives that order he will blow
such a terrible blast that all living things will die.[123] This is the
commencement of the last day. The world will remain in this state of
death forty years. Then God Most High will revive Isráfíl who will blow
a second blast, at the sound of which all the dead will rise to
life."[124]

This confession of faith makes no mention of Míká,íl (Michael), the fourth of the archangels. His special duty is to see that all created beings have what is needful for them. He has charge of the rain-fall, plants, grain and all that is required for the sustenance of men, beasts, fishes, &c. Gabriel's special charge is the communication of God's will to prophets. The words "one terrible in power" (Súra liii. 5) {140} are generally applied to him. He is honoured with the privilege of nearness to God. Tradition says that on the night of the Mi'ráj, the Prophet saw that Gabriel had six hundred wings, and that his body was so large that from one shoulder to the other the distance was so great that a swift flying bird would require five hundred years to pass over it.

Nine-tenths of all created beings are said to be angels who are formed of light. Their rank is stationary, and each is content with the position he occupies. Their one desire is to love and to know God. Whatever he commands they do. "All beings in the heaven and on the earth are His: and they who are in His presence disdain not His service, neither are they wearied: they praise Him day and night." (Súra xxi. 19, 20.) They are free from all sin.[125] It is true that they did not wish for the creation of Adam, and this may seem like a want of confidence in God. It is said, however, that their object was not to oppose God, but to relieve their minds of the doubts they had in the matter. Thus "when the Lord said to the angels, 'Verily, I am about to place one in my stead on earth,' they said: 'Wilt Thou place there one who will do ill therein, and shed blood when we celebrate thy praise and extol thy holiness.' God said: 'Verily I know what ye know not.'" It is true that Iblís was disobedient, but then he belonged not to the angelic order but to that of the jinn. "When we said to the angels, 'prostrate yourselves before Adam,' they all prostrated themselves save Iblís, who was of the jinn, and revolted from his Lord's behest." (Súra xviii. 48.) (See also Súra ii. 33.)

Angels appear in human form on special occasions, but usually they are invisible. It is a common belief that animals can see angels and devils. This accounts for the saying, "If you hear a cock crow, pray for mercy, for it has seen an angel; but if you hear an ass bray, take refuge with God, for it has seen a devil."

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The angels intercede for man: "The angels celebrate the praise of their Lord and ask forgiveness for the dwellers on earth." (Súra xlii. 3.) They also act as guardian angels: "Each hath a succession of angels before him and behind him who watch over him by God's behest." (Súra xiii. 12.) "Is it not enough for you that your Lord aideth you with three thousand angels sent down from on high?" (Súra iii. 120.) "Supreme over His servants He sendeth forth guardians who watch over you, until when death overtaketh any one of you our messengers take his soul and fail not." (Súra vi. 61.)

In the Traditions it is said that God has appointed for every man two angels to watch over him by day, and two by night. The one stands on the right hand side of the man, the other on his left. Some, however, say that they reside in the teeth, and that the tongue of the man is the pen and the saliva of the mouth the ink.[126] They protect the actions of men and record them all whether good or bad. They are called the Mua'qqibát, _i.e._, those who succeed one another. They also bear the name of Kirám-ul-Kátibín, "the exalted writers." They are referred to in the Qurán. "Think they that we hear not their secrets and their private talk? Yes, and our angels who are at their sides write them down." (Súra xliii. 80).

There are eight angels who support the throne of God. "And the angels shall be on its sides, and over them on that day eight shall bear up the throne of thy Lord." (Súra lxix. 17). Nineteen have charge of hell. "Over it are nineteen. None but angels have we made guardians of the fire." (Súra lxxiv. 30).

There is a special arrangement made by Providence to mitigate the evils of Satanic interference. "Iblís," says Jábir Maghrabí, "though able to assume all other forms is not permitted to appear in the semblance of the Deity, or {142} any of His angels, or prophets. There would otherwise be much danger to human salvation, as he might, under the appearance of one of the prophets, or of some superior being, make use of this power to seduce men to sin. To prevent this, whenever he attempts to assume such forms, fire comes down from heaven and repulses him."