Chapter IV: The Creed of Islám.99 (3)

Muslims who commit great (Kabíra) sins, though they die unrepentant, will not remain in hell for ever, for, "whosoever shall have wrought an atom's weight of good shall {169} behold it." (Súra xcix. 7). It is asserted that the fact of believing in Islám is a good work and merits a reward: this cannot be given before the man enters hell to be punished for his sins, and therefore he must be, after a while, released from punishment. "Perfect faith (Imán-i-Kámil) consists in believing with sincerity of heart and acting in accordance thereto, but the actions are not the faith itself. Great sins, therefore, prevent a man from having "perfect faith," but do not destroy faith (Imán), nor make the Muslim an infidel, but only a sinner."[162] The Mutazilites teach that the Muslim who enters hell will remain there for ever. They maintain that the person who, having committed great sins, dies unrepentant, though not an infidel, ceases to be a believer and hence suffers as the infidels do.

The orthodox belief is that Muhammad is now an Intercessor and will be so at the Last Day. The intercession then is of several kinds. There is the 'great intercession' to which the words, "it may be that thy Lord will raise thee to a _glorious station_," (Súra xvii. 81) are supposed to refer. The Maqám-i-mahmúd, (glorious station), is said to be the place of intercession in which all persons will praise the Prophet.[163] In the Zád-ul-Masír it is said that the Maqám-i-mahmúd refers to the fact that God will place the Prophet on His Throne. Others say that it is a place in which a standard will be given to the Prophet, around whom all the other prophets will then gather to do him honour. The first interpretation is, however, the ordinary one. The people will be in great fear. Muhammad will say: "O my people! I am appointed for intercession." Their fear will then pass away. The second intercession is made so that they may enter into Paradise without rendering an account. The authorities differ with regard to this. The third intercession is on behalf of those Muslims who {170} ought to go to hell. The fourth for those who are already there. No one but the Prophet can make these intercessions. The fifth intercession is for an increase of rank to those who are in Paradise. The Mutazilites maintained that there would be no intercession for Muslims guilty of great sins, and adduced in favour of their opinion the verse: "Fear ye the day when soul shall not satisfy for soul at all, nor shall any intercession be accepted from them, nor shall any ransom be taken, neither shall they be helped." (Súra ii. 45). The orthodox bring in reply this Hadís-i-Sahíh: "The Prophet said: 'my intercession is for the men of my following who have committed great sins.'" If this Tradition is disputed, they then say that the verse in the Qurán just quoted does not refer to Muslims at all, but to the Infidels.[164]

According to a Tradition related by Anas the Prophet said: "In the day of resurrection Musalmáns will not be able to move, and they will be greatly distressed and say: 'would to God that we had asked Him to create some one to intercede for us, that we might be taken from this place, and be delivered from tribulation and sorrow.'" The Tradition goes on to state how they sought help from Adam and the prophets of the old dispensation, who, one and all, excused themselves on account of their own sinfulness. At length Moses told them to go to Jesus, the Apostle of God, the Spirit of God and the Word of God. They did so and Jesus said: "Go to Muhammad who is a servant, whose sins God has forgiven both first and last." The Prophet continued, according to the Tradition, "then the Musalmáns will come to me, and I will ask permission to go into God's presence and intercede for them."[165]

The second advent of Christ is a sign of the last day. "Jesus is no more than a servant whom We favoured ... {171} and he shall be a sign of the last hour." (Súra xliii. 61). He will not, according to the Qurán, come as a judge, but like other prophets to be judged. "We formed with them (_i.e._ prophets) a strict covenant, that God may question the men of truth as to their truth, (_i.e._ how they have discharged their prophetic functions)." (Súra xxxiii. 7, 8). He will come to bear witness against the Jews who reject him: "In the day of resurrection, He will be a witness against them." (Súra iv. 158).

It is necessary to believe in the pond of the Prophet called Kausar. This faith is founded on the verse "Truly we have given thee an _abundance_." (Súra cviii. 1). Bukhárí says: "The meaning of Kausar is the 'abundance of good' which God gives to the Prophet. Abu Básh said to one Sa'íd, 'the people think that Kausar is a river of Paradise.' Sa'íd replied, 'Kausar is a river in which there is abundance of good.'" According to the same authority Muhammad said: "My pond is square, its water is whiter than milk, its perfume better than that of musk, whosoever drinks thereof will thirst no more."

There are many degrees of felicity in heaven to which the believers are admitted. The Prophet, according to Tirmízí, said there were one hundred. Some of these may possibly be meant by the eight names they give to Paradise. (1.) Jannat-ul-Khuld. "Say: Is this, or the _Garden of Eternity_ which was promised to the God-fearing, best?" (Súra xxv. 16.) (2.) Jannat-us-Salám. "For them is a _Dwelling of Peace_ with their Lord." (Súra vi. 127.) (3.) Dár-ul-Qarár. "The life to come is the _Mansion which abideth_." (Súra xl. 42.) (4.) Jannat-ul-'Adan. "To the Faithful, both men and women, God promiseth gardens and goodly mansions in the _Garden of Eden_." (Súra ix. 73.) (5.) Jannat-ul-Mawá. "Near which is the _Garden of Repose_." (Súra liii. 15.) (6) Jannat-un-Na'ím. "Amid _delights_ shall the righteous dwell." (Súra lxxxii. 13.) (7) Jannat-ul-Illiyún. "The register of the righteous is {172} in _Illiyún_." (Súra lxxxiii. 18,) (8.) Jannat-ul-Firdaus. "Those who believe and do the things that are right, they shall have the _Gardens of Paradise_ for their abode." (Súra xviii. 107.)

Hell is said to have seven divisions. The Qurán, though it mentions the names of these divisions, does not state what classes of persons will be sent to each; but Muslim Commentators have supplied the needed information. They classify them thus:--(1.) Jahannam, for sinners who die without repentance. (2.) Lazwá, for the infidels (_i.e._, Christians.) (3.) Hutama, a fire for Jews, and according to some for Christians. (4.) Sa'ir, for devils, the descendants of Iblís. (5.) Saqar, for the magians: also for those who neglect prayer. (6.) Jahím, a boiling caldron for idolaters: also for Gog and Magog. (7.) Háwía, a bottomless pit for hypocrites. It is said that heaven has one division more than hell to show that God's mercy exceeds His justice.

The Muhammadan writers give very full and minute accounts of the events connected with the resurrection, judgment and future state of those who are lost, and of those who are saved. Sale gives such an excellent summary of these opinions, that it is not necessary to enter into details here. The orthodox belief is that the statements in the Qurán and the Traditions regarding the pleasures of Paradise are to be taken literally.[166]

6. THE PREDESTINATION OF GOOD AND EVIL.--I have already in the section in which the attribute "will" is described (p. 118) given some account of the dogmatic statements concerning the doctrine of predestination; but as it always forms a distinct chapter in Musalmán books, I treat it separately here. Having, however, in the passage referred {173} to, given Al Berkevi's words on the attribute "will," it is only necessary to make a short extract from his dogmatic statement concerning Predestination. He says:--

"It is necessary to confess that good and evil take place by the
predestination and predetermination of God, that all that has been and
all that will be was decreed in eternity, and written on the _preserved
table_;[167] that the faith of the believer, the piety of the pious and
good actions are foreseen, willed, predestinated, decreed by the
writing on the _preserved table_, produced and approved by God; that
the unbelief of the unbeliever, the impiety of the impious and bad
actions come to pass with the fore-knowledge, will, predestination and
decree of God, but not with His satisfaction and approval. Should any
ask why God willeth and produceth evil, we can only reply that He may
have wise ends in view which we cannot comprehend."

Another confession of faith has:--

"Whoever shall say, that God is not delighted with virtue and faith,
and is not wroth with vice and infidelity, or that God has decreed good
and evil with equal complacency is an infidel."

There are three well-defined schools of thought on the subject:--

First.--The Jabríans, so called from the word "_jabr_" compulsion, deny all free agency in man and say that man is necessarily constrained by the force of God's eternal and immutable decree to act as he does.[168] They hold that as {174} God is the absolute Lord, He can, if He so wills, admit all men into Paradise, or cast all into hell. This sect is one of the branches of the Ash'aríans with whom on most points they agree.

Secondly.--The Qadríans, who deny _Al-Qadr_, or God's absolute decree, say that evil and injustice ought not to be attributed to God but to man, who is altogether a free agent. God has given him the power to do or not to do an act. This sect is generally considered to be a branch of the Mutazilite body, though in reality it existed before Wásil quitted the school of his master Hasan (Ante. p. 125). As Wásil, however, followed the opinions of Mábad-al-Johní, the leading Kadrían divine, the Mutazilites and Qadríans are practically one and the same.

Thirdly.--The Ash'aríans, of whom I have already given some account, maintain that God has one eternal will which is applied to whatsoever He willeth, both of His own actions and those of men; that He willeth that which He knoweth and what is written on the _preserved table_; that He willeth both good and evil. So far they agree with the Jabríans; but then they seem to allow some power to man, a tenet I have already explained when describing their idea of "Kasb" (Ante. p. 130). The orthodox, or Sunní belief is theoretically Ash'arían, but practically the Sunnís are confirmed Jabríans. The Mutazilite doctrines are looked upon as quite heretical.

No subject has been more warmly discussed in Islám than that of predestination. The following abstract of some lengthy discussions will present the points of difference.

The Ash'aríans, who in this matter represent in the main orthodox views, formulate their objections to the Mutazilite system thus:--

(i). If man is the causer of an action by the force of his own will, then he should also have the power of controlling the result of that action.

(ii). If it be granted that man has the power to _originate_ {175} an act it is necessary that he should know all acts, because a creator should be independent in act and choice. Intention must be conditioned by knowledge. To this the Mutazilites well reply that a man need not know the length of a road before he walks, or the structure of the throat before he talks.

(iii). Suppose a man wills to move his body and God at the same time wills it to be steady, then if both intentions come to pass there will be a collection of opposites; if neither, a removal of opposites; if the exaltation of the first, an unreasonable preference.

(iv). If man can create an act, some of his works will be better than some of the works of God, _e.g._ a man determines to have faith: now faith is a better thing than reptiles, which are created by God.

(v). If man is free to act, why can he not make at once a human body; why does he need to thank God for grace and faith?

(vi). But better far than all argument, the orthodox say, is the testimony of the Book. "All things have we created under a fixed decree." (Súra liv. 49). "When God created you and _that ye make_." (Súra xxxvii. 94). "Some of them there were whom God guided and there were others decreed to err." (Súra xvi. 38). As God decrees faith and obedience He must be the causer of it, for "on the hearts of these hath God graven the Faith." (Súra lviii. 22). "It is he who causeth you to laugh and weep, to die and make alive." (Súra liii. 44). "If God pleased He would surely bring them, one and all, to the guidance." (Súra vi. 36). "Had God pleased, He had guided you all aright." (Súra vi. 150). "Had the Lord pleased, He would have made mankind of one religion." (Súra xi. 120). "God will mislead whom he pleaseth, and whom He pleaseth He will place upon the straight path." (Súra vi. 39.) Tradition records that the Prophet said: "God is the maker of all makers and of their actions."[169]

{176}

The Mutazilites took up the opposite side of this great question and said:--

(i). If man has no power to will or to do, then what is the difference between praising God and sinning against Him; between faith and infidelity; good and evil; what is the use of commands and prohibitions; rewards and punishments; promises and threats; what is the use of prophets, books, &c.

(ii). Some acts of men are bad, such as tyranny and polytheism. If these are created by God, it follows that to tyrannise and to ascribe plurality to the Deity is to render obedience. To this the Ash'aríans reply that orders are of two kinds, immediate and mediate. The former which they call "Amr-i-takwíti," is the order, "Be and it was." This comprehends all existences, and according to it whatever is ordered must come to pass. The latter they call "Amr-i-tashri'í," an order given in the Law. This comes to men through prophets and thus is to be obeyed. True obedience is to act according to that which is revealed, not according to the secret intentions of God, for that we know not.

(iii). If God decrees the acts of men, He should bear the name of that which he decrees. Thus the causer of infidelity is an infidel; of tyranny a tyrant, and so on; but to speak thus of God is blasphemy.

(iv). If infidelity is decreed by God He must wish it; but a prophet desires faith and obedience and so is opposed to God. To this the orthodox reply, that God knows by His eternal knowledge that such a man will die an infidel. {177} If a prophet intends by bringing the message of salvation to such an one to make God's knowledge become ignorance, he would be doing wrong; but as he does not know the secret decrees of God, his duty is to deliver his message according to the Hadís: "A prophet has only to deliver the clear message."

(v). The Mutazilites claimed as on their side all verses of the Qurán, in which the words to do, to construct, to renew, to create, &c., are applied to men. Such are the verses: "Whatever is in the heavens and in the earth is God's that He may reward those who _do_ evil according to their deeds: and those who _do_ good will He reward with good things." (Súra liii. 32). "Whoso shall have _wrought_ evil shall not be recompensed but with its like: but whoso shall have _done_ the things that are right, whether male or female and is a believer, these shall enter Paradise." (Súra xl. 43). Say: "the truth is from the Lord; let him then who will believe; and let him who will, be an infidel." (Súra xviii. 28).[170] "Those who add Gods to God will say: 'If God had pleased neither we nor our fathers had given Him companions.' Say: 'Verily ye follow only a conceit, ye utter lies.'" (Súra vi. 149). The Hadís is also very plain. "All good is in Thy hands and evil is not to Thee." (Al-khair kuluhu fí yadaika wash-sharru laisa 'alaika.)

The Ash'aríans have one famous text which they bring to bear against all this reasoning and evidence. It is: "This truly is a warning; and whoso willeth, taketh the way of his Lord; but _will it ye shall not_, unless God will it, for God is knowing, wise." (Súra lxxvi. 29, 30). To the Hadís they reply (1) that there is a difference between acquiescence in evil and decreeing it. Thus the expression "God willeth not tyranny for His servants," does not mean {178} that God hath not decreed it, but that tyranny is not one of His attributes: so "evil is not to Thee" means it is not an attribute of God; and (2) the Hadís must be explained in accordance with the teaching of the Qurán.

The Muslim philosophers tried to find a way out of the difficulty. Averhoes says: "We are free to act in this way or that, but our will is always determined by some exterior cause. For example, we see something which pleases us, we are drawn to it in spite of ourselves. Our will is thus bound by exterior causes. These causes exist according to a certain order of things which is founded on the general laws of nature. God alone knows before hand the necessary connection which to us is a mystery. The connection of our will with exterior causes is determined by the laws of nature. It is this which in theology we call, 'decrees and predestination.'"[171]

I have already shown how, as Islám grew into a system, the Muslims fell into a Cabbalism, and a superstitious reverence for the mere letters and words of the Qurán. With this declension came a still more distorted view of the character of God. The quotations made from the Qurán in the last few pages will have shown that whilst some passages seem to attribute freedom to man and speak of his consequent responsibility, others teach a clear and distinct fatalism. The great strength of Islám lay in the energy with which Muhammad preached the doctrine that God was a divine Ruler, one who would deal righteous judgment, who "taught man that which he knew not." As the system became more complex and dogmatic--a very necessary result of its first principles--men lost the sense of the nearness of God. He became an unapproachable being. A harsh unfeeling Fate took the place of the Omnipotent Ruler. It is this dark fatalism which, whatever the Qurán may teach on the subject, is the ruling principle in all Muslim {179} communities. It is this which makes all Muhammadan nations decay. Careless of self-improvement,[172] heedless of the need of progress, the Muslim nations, still independent, are in all that relates to the higher aspects of intellectual and civilized life far behind the nations of the west.

The subject of _'Ilm-i-Aqáíd_, or the science of dogma properly ends here, but most Muslim treatises include in this branch of the subject a few practical remarks. I therefore add a summary of them here. The believer who commits murder, fornication, &c., does not cease to be a Muslim provided that he does not say that these are allowed: should he die unrepentant, God can punish him for a while in hell, or forgive him without punishment. The Hadd, a punishment based on a Záhir, or obvious sentence of the Qurán requires that a Muslim who apostatizes shall be put to death.[173] In the case of an apostate woman, Imám Abu Hanífa ruled that she should be imprisoned and beaten every day. The other three Imáms, Málik, Sháfa'í and Hanbal said that she should be put to death in accordance with the Tradition which says: "He who changes his religion, kill." The Arabic word "man," usually translated "He who" is of common gender, and so these Imáms include women in the list of those who, after apostasy, are to be killed.[174] God does not pardon polytheism and infidelity; but He can, if He willeth, pardon all other crimes. If any one is asked, "dost thou believe?" he should reply, "I am truly a believer," and not say: "If God {180} willeth."[175] If any one says to him: "Wilt thou die in the faith?" he should reply: "I do not know, God knows." Except when speaking of prophets, or of those of whom the Prophets have spoken, such as Abu Bakr, Omar, Osmán and 'Alí, it must not be said of any one, "he is gone to Paradise," for God only knows his state. Prayer should be made for a deceased Muslim whether he was a good or bad man. To give alms, to read the Qurán, to perform other good works, and to apply the merit thus gained to the souls of the dead is a pious and beneficial act.

{181}

NOTE TO CHAPTER IV.

MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY.

I have shown in the preceding chapter how the earlier scholastics, or
the Mutazilites, as they are called, were finally crushed by the
orthodox party. The later scholastics, or the philosophers, form the
subject of this note. The Khalíf Mámún (813-833 A.D.), a notorious
free-thinker, was the first to give an impulse to philosophic
researches. It was then that Greek philosophical works were translated
into Arabic. The Greek author most patronized was Aristotle, partly,
because his empirical method accorded with the positive tendencies of
the Arab mind better than the pure idealism of Plato; and, partly,
because his system of logic was considered an useful auxiliary in the
daily quarrels between the rival theological schools. It was quite
natural that Aristotle should be thus followed. "The Musalmán mind was
trained in habits of absolute obedience to the authority of fixed
dogmas. The Muslims did not so much wish to discover truth as to
cultivate their own intellect. For that purpose, a sharp and subtle
systematist like Aristotle was the very man they required."[176] Some
idea of the range of subjects then discussed may be gained from an
account given by the Arab historian, Masoudi, of a meeting held under
the Presidentship of Yahya, one of the famous Barmecide family.[177]
Yahya thus addressed the meeting: "You have discussed at length the
theory of concealment (Al-Kumún) and manifestation (Al-Zahúr), of
pre-existence and creation, of duration and stability, of movement and
quiescence, of the union and separation (of the Divine substance), of
existence and non-existence, of bodies and accidents, of the approval
and the refutation (of the Isnáds of the Traditions), of the absence or
the existence of attributes in God, of potential and active force, of
substance, quantity, modality and relation, of life and annihilation.
You have examined the question as to whether the Imám rules by divine
right, or by popular election; you have had an exhaustive discussion on
metaphysical subjects, in their principles and corollaries. Occupy
yourselves to-day with the subject of love," &c.

The translation of the works of Aristotle, as indeed of all the Greek
authors, was made by Syrian and Chaldean Christians, and {182}
especially by the Nestorians who, as physicians, were in high favour
with the liberal Khalífs of the 'Abbásside dynasty. In some cases the
translation into Arabic was made from Syriac versions, for in the time
of the Emperor Justinian many Greek works had been translated into the
latter language. The most celebrated translator was the historian
physician Honein-Ibn-Ishak (died 876 A.D.), a man profoundly acquainted
with the Syriac, Greek and Arabic languages. He was at the head of a
school of interpreters in Baghdád, to which his son Ishak-ben-Honein
and his nephew Hobeisch-Al-Asam also belonged. In the tenth century
(A.D.) Yahya-ben-Adi and Isa-ben-Zara'a translated some works and
corrected earlier translations of others. It is to these men that the
Arabs owe their chief acquaintance with Plato.

The study of Aristotle spread rapidly amongst the Muslim people,
especially amongst the heretical sects. The orthodox looked with grave
suspicion on the movement, but could not for a while stay the impulse.
The historian Makrizi says: "The doctrine of the Philosophers has
worked amongst the Muslims evils most fatal. It serves only to augment
the errors of the heretics and to increase their impiety."[178] It came
into contact with Muslim dogmas in such subjects as the creation of the
world, the special providence of God and the nature of the divine
attributes. To a certain extent the Mutazilites were supported by the
philosophical theories they embraced, but this did not diminish the
disfavour with which the orthodox looked upon the study of philosophy.
Still it grew, and men in self defence had to adopt philosophic
methods. Thus arose a later system of scholasticism. The earlier system
was confined mainly to matters of religion; the later school occupied
itself with the whole range of philosophic investigation, and thus went
farther and farther away from orthodox Islám.

The Muslims themselves did not write books on philosophy in the earlier
period. Men of liberal tendencies imbibed its teaching, but orthodoxy
finally gained the day over the earlier scholastics, and in the form
known as that of the Ash'arían School became again supreme.[179] The
great intellectual movement of the Philosophers proper, the later
scholastics (Mutakallimán), lasted longer, but by the end of the
twelfth century (A.D.) the whole Muhammadan world had again become
orthodox. Saláh-ud-dín (Saladin) and his successors in Egypt were
strong supporters of the Ash'aríans.

{183}

The period now under review was one prolific of authors on grammar,
rhetoric, logic, exegesis, traditions and the various branches of
philosophy; but the men who stand out most prominently as philosophers
were then, and are now, considered heretics.[180]

Al-Kendi, was born at Basra, on the Persian Gulf. He died about 870
A.D. He was a very scientific man, but a thorough rationalist in
theology. He composed commentaries on the logic of Aristotle. In his
great work on the unity of God he has strayed far away from Muslim
dogmas.

Al Farabi, another philosopher patronized by the 'Abbássides, seems to
have denied not only the rigid and formal Islámic view of inspiration,
but any objective revelation at all. He held that intuition was a true
inspiration, and that all who had acquired intuitive knowledge were
real prophets. This is the only revelation he admits. He received his
philosophical training at Baghdád, where for a while he taught; but
finally he went to Damascus, where he died 950 A.D.

Ibn Sina, better known as Avicenna, a man of Persian origin, was a
Philosopher of great note, but of him it is said that in spite of the
concessions he made to the religious ideas of his age, he could not
find favour for his opinions, which ill accord with the principles of
Islám. He was born near Bukhárá, in the year 980 A.D. For a while he
taught medicine and philosophy in Ispahán.

Ibn Badja, (Avempace) was one of the most celebrated Muslim
Philosophers of Spain. He was born at Saragossa towards the end of the
eleventh century. He is distinguished for having opposed the mystical
tendencies of the teaching of Al-Ghazzálí, and for maintaining that
speculative science alone was capable of leading man to a true
conception of his own proper nature. He was violently attacked by the
orthodox divines who declared that all philosophical teaching was "a
calamity for religion and an affliction to those who were in the good
way."

Al-Ghazzálí was born A.D. 1059 in Khorásán. He was a famous Muslim
divine. He adopted scholastic methods. For a while he was President of
the Nizámiah College at Baghdád. He travelled much, and wrote many
books to prove the superiority of Islám over all other religions and
over philosophy. The first result of his wide and extensive study of
the writings of the philosophers, and of the heretics was that he fell
into a state of scepticism with regard to religion and philosophy. From
this he emerged into Súfíism, in {184} which his restless spirit found
satisfaction. On Súfíism, however, he exercised no very notable
influence; but the scepticism which he still retained as regards
philosophy rendered him a very formidable opponent to those who were
trying to bring Islám into accord with philosophic theories. His works,
"Tendency of Philosophers," and "Destruction of the Philosophers" had
an immense influence. In the preface to the latter book, he speaks of
"those who arrogate to themselves a superior intelligence, and who, in
their pride, mistaking the precepts of religion, take as a guide the
authority of certain great men, instead of revealed religion." It is,
however, and with some show of reason supposed that Al-Ghazzálí did not
really object to all that he condemned, but that to gain the orthodox
he wrote what he did. Indeed, Moses of Narbonne states that Ghazzálí
later on in life wrote a book, circulated only amongst a few select
friends, in which he withdrew many of the objections he had raised in
the "Destruction of Philosophers." Be that as it may, it is
acknowledged that he dealt a blow to philosophy from which in the East
it has never recovered; that is, as far as the Muslim world is
concerned. His course marks a reaction of the exclusively religious
principle of Islám against philosophical speculation, which in spite of
all accommodation never made itself orthodox.

In Spain philosophy still found an ardent defender in Ibn Rashíd,
better known as Averhoes. This celebrated man was born at Cordova in
the year 1126 A.D., or about 520 of the Muhammadan era. He came of a
noble and learned family, whilst he himself must ever occupy a
distinguished place amongst the Muslim Philosophers. "Without dispute
he was one of the most learned men of the Muslim world, and one of the
profoundest commentators of Aristotle. He knew all the sciences then
accessible to the Muslims and was a most prolific writer."[181] One of
his most famous works was the "Refutation of the destruction of
Philosophers." Notwithstanding his philosophical opinions Averhoes
claimed to pass for a good Muslim. He held that the philosophic truths
are the highest object of research; but that only a few men could by
speculation arrive at them, and that, therefore, a divine revelation
through the medium of prophets was necessary for spreading amongst men
the eternal verities which are proclaimed alike by philosophy and
religion. He held, it is true, that the orthodox had paid too much
attention to the letter, and too little to the spirit, and that false
interpretations had educed principles not really to be found in
religion. This {185} profession and a rigid adherence to outward forms
of worship, however, did not save him from suspicion. He was accused of
preaching philosophy and the ancient sciences to the detriment of
religion. He was deprived of his honours and banished by the Khalíf
Al-Mansúr to Lucena, near Cordova. In his disgrace he had to suffer
many insults from the orthodox. One day on entering the mosque with his
son he was forcibly expelled by the people. He died at Morocco in 1198
A.D. Thus passed away in disgrace the last of the Muslim Philosophers
worthy of the name.[182] In Spain a strict prohibition was issued
against the study of Greek philosophy, and many valuable works were
committed to the flames. Soon after the rule of the Moors in Spain
began to decline. The study of philosophy came to an end, and liberal
culture sank under the pressure of the hard and fast dogmatic system of
Islám. In Spain,[183] as in Baghdád, orthodoxy gained the day. There
was much of doubtful value in the speculations of the Muslim
Philosophers, but they were Muslims, and if they went too far in their
efforts to rationalize Islám, they also tried to cast off what to them
seemed accretions, added on by the Traditionalists and the Canonical
Legists. They failed because like the earlier scholastics they had no
gospel to proclaim to men, no tidings to give of a new life which could
enable wearied humanity to bear the ills to which it was subject.
Another strong reason was that the orthodoxy against which they strove
was a logical development of the foundations of Islám, and these
foundations are too strongly laid for any power other than a spiritual
one to uproot. They were men of good position in life, voluminous
writers, profound admirers of Aristotle, and "more or less devoted to
science, especially to medicine." Yet they did not advance philosophy,
and science they left much as they found it. They preserved something
of what Grecian thought had achieved, and so far their labour is not
lost.

Thus Islám has, as a religion, no right to claim any of the glory which
Muslim philosophers are supposed to have shed around it. {186} The
founders of Islám, the Arabs, produced but one philosopher of
note.[184] The first impetus to the study was given by heretical
Khalífs employing Christians at Baghdád to translate Greek books;
whilst in Spain, where philosophy most flourished, it was due largely
to the contact of intelligent Muslims with learned Jews. Even there,
the philosophers were, as a rule, the objects of bitter persecution.
Now and again, a liberal minded Khalíf arose, but a system such as
Islám survives the liberal tendencies of a generation. From the close
of the twelfth century (A.D.) downwards it would be difficult to point
to any Muslim Philosopher, much more to an Arab one, whose work is of
any real value to the human race. For four hundred years the contest
raged, a contest such as Islám has never since seen. This great effort
to bring it into accordance with the main stream of human thought, to
introduce into it some element of progress utterly failed. The lesson
is plain. Any project of reform in Islám which admits in any degree its
fundamental principles must fail. Revolution, not reform, is the only
hope for the permanence of an independent Muslim state when it enters
into the circle of civilized nations.

{187}

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