Chapter III

THE SOMME
_July 1916_

July 1, that day full of hopes and expectations, dawned at last. The previous week had been so noisy that away in Couin Woods one hardly noticed the increased bombardment denoting zero hour. Our departure for Mailly-Maillet had been fixed for 9 a.m., and by that time no rumours had reached us, let alone accurate news. However, after marching for about half an hour, word was passed down the column that Gommecourt Wood and Serre were ours and the attack was going well. This, although it proved later to be quite inaccurate, more than satisfied us at the time.

Our bivouacs, in the plantations to the south-west of Mailly-Maillet, did not tend to allay our restlessness, and listening to rumours and the 15-inch gun just below us was our only occupation.

In the afternoon, commanding officers and adjutants were summoned to Brigade Headquarters. They returned with plans for a proposed attack by the 8th, 144th and 145th Infantry Brigades. For this attack, which was to be a night operation, the Battalion was to be in Brigade reserve. Officers and N.C.O.’s were sent forward to reconnoitre the ground, so as to be able to support the assault, should assistance be necessary. The attacking battalions had actually formed up when, at ten minutes before zero, operations were cancelled.

There had been a change in the situation, and it had been decided that the VII. Corps should withdraw to the line it had held previous to attacking that morning. If this didn’t spell failure, nothing did, and our hopes, which had been running sadly too high, crashed to the ground.

The Battalion remained in these bivouacs until the evening of July 3, when a move was made back to our old huts in Couin Woods. We were destined to carry out one further tour in the Hébuterne trenches, before our next move, which took place in motor lorries, after handing over our camp on July 14, at the Bus-Bayencourt-Sailly-Coigneux cross-roads, to the 11th Battalion Middlesex Regiment.

The attack farther south, commenced on the 1st inst., had been pressed forward satisfactorily during the days following and, when the news of the 13th that several more villages had been taken together with numerous prisoners was succeeded by our hasty dispatch in motor lorries to Senlis, our spirits rose once more. At Senlis we remained two days, during which time company commanders carried out useful reconnaissances of the ground round La Boisselle, with a view to ascertaining the best routes up to the line.

Orders having been received that the Battalion was to carry out a reconnaissance in force of the enemy line, which now ran between Ovillers and Pozières, a move was made on the evening of July 17 to some bivouacs on the Albert-Bapaume road, and as soon as it was dark we started up to the line, marching by platoons. Our orders were to ascertain whether the enemy was holding four certain points. If these points were not held by him, they were to be occupied by us and made into strong points. Heavy fighting was not to be undertaken.

The tasks were allotted to A and D Companies, each company detailing one platoon for each of the points in its sector. B and C Companies supplied carrying parties.

At 1 a.m. during the night of July 17/18 the attacking platoons advanced in two lines of sections in file, with a point patrol immediately in front, led by the officer in charge. All points were found to be strongly held, and only one was occupied by us, viz. the most easterly, which was rushed by a platoon of A Company under 2/Lieutenant B. C. Rigden. This platoon, after driving off several bombing attacks and starting to consolidate, was ordered to withdraw, owing to the other points not having been taken. The reconnaissance, however, succeeded in its object, for the positions and strength of the German dispositions in this area were established.

The Battalion received the thanks and congratulations of the Divisional Commander. Our casualties were:

_Officers_: Died of wounds 2/Lieutenant C. Hall (wounded severely in the head whilst bringing in casualties). Missing 2/Lieutenant R. C. Norwood (afterwards presumed killed).

_Other ranks_: Killed 2 Wounded 29 Missing 27 (all later presumed killed).

Efforts on the part of search parties, who were sent out to find the missing, were fruitless, on account of the extreme darkness of the night.

It was daylight when we started to move back, for the evacuation of the wounded had taken some little while. The trench which led us back presented one of the most gruesome sights we had yet seen, the floor being literally paved with the bodies of dead Englishmen. Nor was this all. Bodies lay over the parapet with rifle and fixed bayonet still held in the hand. Others were seated or lying on fire-steps in most lifelike positions. All had been killed at least a week previously, but burial parties had been too much occupied farther back to reach them as yet. It was not difficult to picture how these men had come by their end—a German machine gun skimming the parapet of the trench with deadly accuracy at the moment when our men were going over the top of it.

Although our orders were to move back to billets at Bouzincourt, we were under no delusions as to our fighting in this area being finished. The next blow to be struck was certain to be on a very much larger scale, and would probably affect the whole Battalion. Sure enough, the following day brought out the plans of Divisional Headquarters for an attack, which included the 145th Infantry Brigade.

The objectives of the Bucks Battalion were points A and B (Map No. 1) and the trenches adjoining these points. The 1/5th Battalion Gloucester Regiment were to attack on our left, and the 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks Light Infantry on our right.

On July 19, the Battalion marched through Albert, and took over bivouacs from 1/5th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment by the side of the Albert-Bapaume road. The following day was a busy one, what with the issuing of detailed orders, explanatory lectures to the N.C.O.’s and men, and the drawing and distribution of stores such as small arms ammunition, grenades, Verey lights, ground flares, shovels, all of which would have to be carried into the attack. C Company were most unlucky to have an accident, while detonating their bombs, which caused several casualties, and did not help them towards making a cheery start.

By 10.30 p.m. company commanders had given their final instructions to the men, and off we started for the front line, which lay some two and a half miles distant.

The Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds) was to attack in four lines, on a front of two companies, each in line of platoons in column of sections,—two Sections in first line, one in second and one in third,—C Company (Captain G. G. Jackson) on the right, A Company (Captain N. S. Reid, M.C.) on the left. B Company (Captain L. W. Crouch) was in immediate support to both companies in one line, and formed the fourth wave. The enemy trench was situated about 325 yards distant from our front assembly trench (known as Sickle Trench), but a tape was laid by the Royal Engineers 175 yards from the German line, for the Battalion to form up on.

MAP Nº. 1.

SOMME OPERATIONS

JULY TO SEPT^R. 1916.
]

Zero was fixed for 2.45 a.m. on July 21, and at 2.15 a.m. our companies left Sickle Trench to form up on the tape. D Company (Captain E. V. Birchall) moved up to garrison Sickle Trench, as soon as the other three companies went forward to their tapes. Although no unusual amount of gunfire had as yet started, the enemy appeared to be very nervous, starting at 2.30 a.m. to send up large quantities of flares. This was disconcerting, as it showed too plainly that he was very much on the _qui vive_. A few minutes later, red flares went up from his lines. Whether these were a signal to his machine guns to open fire is not known, but open they did—and to some tune. So long as the hands of the watch did not point to 2.45 a.m. it was possible to lie flat, though even so some few were hit. The moment to go forward, however, arrived, and still the German machine guns chattered unceasingly. At 2.45 a.m. our guns opened with a roar, and shells flew just over our heads by the thousand, bursting their shrapnel in a line of flashes along the trench opposite us. It was the signal to advance. Few, however, were able to do so, for as men rose the machine guns of the enemy, upon whom our barrage appeared to be having no effect, scythed them down. Officers especially were dropping on all sides. A few isolated men reached the objective, but of these hardly any returned. The attack, including that portion of it made by the Gloucesters and Oxfords on our flanks, failed, and there seems little doubt that the enemy were aware of our intentions, probably owing to the bright moonlight. Casualties were heavy and included:

_Officers._—Killed. Capt. L. W. Crouch.
2/Lieut. J. P. Chapman.
2/Lieut. C. G. Abrey.
2/Lieut. C. W. Trimmer.

Wounded. 2/Lieut. H. C. E. Mason.
2/Lieut. B. C. Rigden.
2/Lieut. H. V. Shepherd.
2/Lieut. A. P. Godfrey.

Wounded and prisoner. Capt. G. G. Jackson.

_Other ranks._—Killed—8.
Wounded—96 (including 9 sergeants).
Missing—41 (all afterwards presumed killed).

Thus of the thirteen officers who were present with the three attacking companies, only four were unhit. Captain L. W. Crouch, who was killed, had for many years taken an active part in the training of his Aylesbury Company, and had rendered the Battalion great service during the period overseas. His death was felt most keenly by all ranks.

The failure of this attack was a great blow to the whole Battalion, as it was our first serious attack, and it was as disappointed and sadder men that we made our way back to the bivouacs: nearly everyone had lost a real pal, temporarily or for always.

For the survivors, sleep was the first consideration, for we were worn out; after that, reorganisation, with a view to the next attack, orders for which might arrive at any moment. We were terribly short of officers and short of N.C.O.’s, but fortunately, four officers had been left out of the attack with a view to coping with this emergency in case it should arise.

At 3 p.m. the following day (July 22), when our greatest efforts were concentrated on refitting, cleaning up, tracing the missing and the thousand things necessary after a battle, orders arrived to the effect that the Battalion was to move forward at 10 p.m. to some disused trenches, about two miles north. Here we were to stay for the night, in support of the remainder of the Brigade, who were to attack about midnight.

The attack was to be general along the greater part of the front held by the Fourth Army, while the Australians were to capture Pozières, with the 145th Infantry Brigade on their immediate left, in the order from right to left—1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks Light Infantry, 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment, 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, with the Bucks Battalion in reserve in the Mash Valley behind Ovillers.

Thus, at 10 p.m., we once more left our bivouacs and moved to these support positions.

At zero, half an hour after midnight (July 22/23), the host of guns all around us broke forth in one monstrous roar. The flashes of them were on all sides, and overhead we heard the shells, shrieking, whistling and whining through the air, on the way to German trenches. Gunfire and bursting shells lit up the country in fitful starts, giving sudden pictures of ridges of ground, ruins and woods, revealing their shapes. Rockets of every colour soared up from the German lines, in an endeavour to give to their guns, and headquarters in rear, some indication of the storm and trouble that assailed the garrison. A more wonderful or more terrible picture it is impossible to imagine.

News of the attack filtered back to us slowly, but it was soon after 3 a.m. that a message reached us from Brigade Headquarters that the Commanding Officer was required to report there immediately. He returned about 4 a.m. The 1/4th Oxfords and 1/4th Royal Berks had gained a footing in their objectives, but had suffered heavy casualties. They were cut off from the Australians by a large stretch of trench, which remained in enemy hands. On the extreme left, the 5th Gloucesters had been unsuccessful, thus leaving the Berks in a very perilous position.

Our orders were to attack and seize at all costs that portion of the line which had been attacked by the Gloucesters (Birchall Trench Map No. 1). Zero had been fixed for 6.30 a.m. on July 23, and as we had two miles of strange country to cover before reaching the “jumping off” trench, no time could be lost; orders were necessarily scanty, and much was left to the initiative of company commanders.

The attack was one of very great difficulty, owing to the run of the trenches. The enemy position was a stretch of trench approached by two communication trenches, C and D, each about 400 yards long. The right-hand one was in good condition, and met the enemy’s trench at right angles, but the enemy had a bomb-stop about 50 yards from the junction. The left-hand communicator was badly damaged, and ran at an obtuse angle into the enemy’s line.

B (Captain O. V. Viney) and D (Captain E. V. Birchall) Companies were detailed for the attack. B Company assembled in the left communicator, D Company in the right.

Both companies, at zero, were to leave their trenches and to form inwards on the intervening space, which was about 200 yards. A Company (Captain N. S. Reid) were to be in support at the bottom of the communicator. C Company (Captain P. A. Hall) were to provide the necessary carrying parties, after the attack had been launched.

While moving up into position along the left-hand communicator, B Company suffered a very grave misfortune. Our heavy guns, which had been ordered to bombard the objective before zero, were shooting very short, and many of their shells fell right in the ranks of the company. Many casualties resulted, the trench being blocked with them in several places. Progress under these conditions became difficult in the extreme, and, in spite of the energy shown by the officer in command, the company just failed to reach their forming up positions in time to take any real part in the assault.

D Company, however, under the splendid leadership of Captain E. V. Birchall, were able to carry out their orders to the letter, and by dint of following our barrage so closely as to be almost in it, captured the whole position single-handed. A Company were immediately sent up to assist D Company in the work of consolidation and the clearing of prisoners, who were appearing in considerable numbers, coming over the top. These prisoners soon repented of this, however, as a battery of German guns, either intentionally or thinking they were our men, landed several shells in their midst and “dropped” quite a number; the remainder took to the trenches. In all, the prisoners collected numbered two officers and about 150 men. One of these officers stated that the assault had taken them entirely by surprise, as they were waiting for the barrage to lift, before manning the parapet; and declared his opinion that the success of our assault, where two previous ones had failed, was due entirely to the way in which we had hugged the barrage.

Consolidation proceeded apace, thanks largely to the efforts of Captain N. S. Reid, and, at the end of a very short time, we were able to report that a bombing section had got in touch with the 4th Royal Berks on our right.

The enemy made frequent attempts during the day to retake the trench by means of bombing attacks, but they were in all cases successfully driven off. It was not till midnight of July 23/24 that he put down a heavy barrage on the captured line, though, to our great surprise, no attack developed, and at 12 noon the following day we were enabled, very thankfully, to hand over the position intact to the 5th Gloucesters and return to our bivouacs near Albert. Our casualties in this action were:

_Officers._—Wounded (died
of wounds) Capt. E. V. Birchall.
Wounded Capt. O. V. Viney.
Lieut. E. N. C. Woollerton.
2/Lieut. R. E. M. Young.
2/Lieut. F. Niall.

_Other ranks._—Killed—7.
Wounded—68.
Missing—8 (all later presumed killed).

The death of Captain Birchall was a very real loss and sorrow to the whole Battalion. Probably no company ever had a better, fairer or more capable commander, and no officer a truer friend. A large number of most valuable senior N.C.O.’s were also casualties in this action, including C.S.M. R. Read and Sergt. F. Barrett, both of whom were killed.

The success of this action amply compensated for the failure of our previous one, and the Battalion was proud indeed to receive the following letter from its Brigade Commander, Brigadier-General H. R. Done, D.S.O.:

_To Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds_

“Please give my heartiest congratulations to all ranks of the regiment under your command, on their gallant and entirely successful attack on July 23. By this success, which was obtained in spite of heavy loss, you enabled the Brigade to carry out the whole of the task allotted, and also made secure the position of the troops who had already gained a footing in the enemy’s position on your right.”

The following was also received:

“The Army Commander wishes to thank all ranks of the 48th Division for their excellent work during the past ten days. By their exertions they have greatly extended our hold on Ovillers and have directly contributed towards the ultimate capture of Pozières.”

As may well be imagined, the last ten days had left their mark on the Battalion. Our strength was reduced to a very low figure, and even this included a draft of sixty-eight privates, who had arrived on the evening of July 21, and of whose capabilities we did not know sufficient to warrant our taking them into action. As regards officers and N.C.O.’s the shortage was acute.

It was now decided that the Division should be withdrawn, and on July 26, at 7 a.m., the Battalion marched back to temporary billets at Arquèves, moving via Bouzincourt, Hédauville and Varennes. Here we remained forty-eight hours, before resuming the march to Beauval, via Raincheval and Beauquesne. The Battalion marched exceedingly well during these two moves, which one may safely say was distinctly creditable, considering the strenuous days of the past fortnight, the insufficient sleep, and the fact that full marching order was being carried.

The following day, however, saw us started off on a seventeen-mile march to Domléger, by way of Candas, Fienvillers and Bernaville. This proved too much for the new draft which had joined us on the 21st, and, after the first twelve miles, considerable difficulty was experienced in getting them along! The old hands marched into Domléger as cheerily as they had left Albert, and great was the delight of everyone at the prospect of a few days’ complete rest and some measure of comfort.