Chapter VII

THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
_August 1917_
_Reference Map No. 3._

At 5 a.m. on July 22 the Battalion left Bailleulval, marching to Mondicourt station, where we breakfasted and entrained for Belgium. After seven weary hours in the train we reached a village called Godewaersvelde (pronounced by the men “God help us”), and detrained. Hopes had been entertained that we might be allowed to pass the night here, but instead we were given a four hours’ march to Houtkerque, eventually arriving there at 12.30 a.m. It had been a long day, and we were thankful to get into the very meagre accommodation that had been allotted to us, though before doing so most of us felt compelled to inform the billeting officer exactly how meagre we thought it. There never was, and perhaps never will be, a more thankless job than billeting, or one which bred unpopularity so certainly. The most suitable officer was found to be a senior one, capable of being intensely rude to anyone who showed signs of impoliteness to him.

Preparations for the coming battle reached their zenith during the week at Houtkerque. In consequence of an order that every officer and N.C.O. was to be in possession of a map of the battle area which would show at a glance the objectives and contours, mapping became a disease, and the most hideous productions in the way of colour schemes resulted.

It was laid down that the 2nd in Command, two company commanders, the assistant adjutant, two company sergeant-majors, with a proportion of platoon commanders and other ranks, should not be taken into action, but left at Houtkerque, in order that the Battalion might be reorganised quickly in the event of heavy casualties. This personnel was accordingly left behind when, at midnight on July 30/31, we moved to St. Jans-ter-Biezen, which lay just east of Poperinghe. No sooner had we reached the camp here at 4 a.m. than all the guns of the two attacking armies opened fire, and the Third Battle of Ypres had begun.

An intense desire for news of the attack filled the whole of that day. The weather was dull and cloudy, and towards evening rain fell, which continued unceasingly throughout the night. Official communiqués from General Headquarters informed us that the first three objectives had been gained, but, although it was not so stated, we inferred that our casualties had been heavy. This was confirmed when, on the following day, we were ordered to send one company (C) up to the line to assist the 39th Division in bringing in their wounded.

The rain continued in torrents during the whole of that day and the next, and the prospect of the operations being successful and working to plan grew dimmer and dimmer.

Reports from the line of conditions which prevailed there were depressing in the extreme. The whole area had become a quagmire, and the task of moving up guns an impossibility. Never had such appalling weather made its appearance at such an unfortunate time.

A continuance of the operations was therefore postponed until such time as the guns could be shifted and the movement of troops became possible. The enemy meanwhile was presented with a priceless opportunity of reorganising, bringing up reinforcements, and making new positions preparatory to our next onslaught. He was, moreover, being driven back on to comparatively clean ground, while our armies were moving forward on to ground which had been shelled by our own guns for months past, and where roads no longer existed. For three days we watched the pouring rain and cursed the British Army’s luck.

On August 4 the Battalion moved through Poperinghe to a spot known as Dambre Camp, which lay about a mile north of Vlamertinghe. After a day’s reconnaissance of the line, the Battalion relieved the 1/1st Hertfordshire Regiment and a battalion of the Cheshire Regiment in support. These two battalions had suffered heavily in the attack and were dead-beat.

We found the conditions which prevailed even worse than the reports had led us to believe, for in addition to the sea of mud, which made movement almost impossible, enemy shelling was constant. Communication with companies was difficult in the extreme, as telephone wires were cut by shelling almost as soon as they were laid. At night, orderlies had a really terrible task, often under heavy shell-fire, to find the Headquarters of the Battalion and various companies. We were most fortunate to possess men so extraordinarily efficient for this ordeal, and it is safe to say that no body of men in the Battalion deserve more credit and praise for their magnificent work in the Ypres fighting than these runners. It was invariably of the most vital nature, including not only the carrying of important messages, but also the guiding of reliefs and ration parties. Rations, which had to be brought up to the line on pack animals (ponies and mules), were the cause of constant anxiety, and no one who has not accompanied those animals on a pitch-dark night, across open country pitted with shell-holes and with mud nearly to the knees, knows what difficulties the pack leaders experienced. Only too often an animal was killed on the way up, and its load had to be taken off and reloaded on to another, in the dark, with no possibility of showing a light.

It must not be imagined that our own artillery were quiet during these times—far from it. The majority of the guns were in position alongside a road or track, known as “Admiral’s Road,” which ran, roughly speaking, through the old “No Man’s Land.” Their positions were necessarily much exposed, and consequently received the enemy’s earnest attention at frequent intervals throughout the day and night. This, however, did not prevent them from throwing back quite as much “stuff” as was hurled at us, and although conditions underfoot were easier behind the German lines, the enemy opposite us must have had a very thin time of it. His nervousness was most apparent at dawn and dusk, when he would often send up his S.O.S. signal for no good reason and put down an intense barrage. On several occasions our own gunners replied heatedly, thinking that an attack was on foot, and a terrific artillery duel would ensue, all owing to a misapprehension.

It was in this area too that we first made our acquaintance with the German concrete blockhouse. The large majority of these constructions had stood the test of the bombardment which preceded our original attack, and they now provided a few headquarters with good cover; but the insides of these blockhouses were in most cases too filthy for words, and several of them were half filled with stagnant water. Cover, however, was cover, and to get it one was prepared to put up with a good deal.

CHEDDAR VILLA, ST. JULIEN.
]

On August 7 the Battalion relieved the 5th Gloucester Regiment in the front line, on the western outskirts of St. Julien (Map No. 3). A and B Companies held this outpost line, while C Company was in support round Canopus Trench, and D Company in reserve in California Drive and Falkenhayn Redoubt. Battalion Headquarters was at Vanheule Farm, which now consisted only of a flooded blockhouse. D Company Headquarters, with one platoon and the Regimental Aid Post, occupied Cheddar Villa, which was a superior blockhouse to Vanheule, except that the Germans, when they built it, had made a particularly large entrance which, now that it was in our hands, was completely exposed to enemy shells. The accommodation being very limited, the platoon were, on the first night, packed closely inside the opening trying to get a little sleep. The very first shell which landed near the blockhouse arrived straight through the opening and burst in the midst of the slumbering platoon. The effect was appalling—many were killed, and of those who were not killed, several lost limbs, many their legs. Happily the Medical Officer (Captain L. E. Hughes) was unhurt, and, as usual on such occasions, excelled himself in the relief he gave and the amount of work he accomplished in the next few hours.

We were relieved on the following night by the 1/5th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment, and moved back to Dambre Camp. The march from the line was exceedingly unpleasant, for the Battalion was literally chased out by shells of the 5·9 variety.

Considering that no active operations had taken place, and that the Battalion had only been twenty-four hours in the front line, with forty-eight hours in reserve, our casualties for the tour, amounting to two officers and sixty-seven other ranks, were certainly heavy, and they give a fair idea of the daily wastage due to shelling.

The weather had again turned wet, and, although it was known that the attack was to be resumed at the earliest favourable opportunity, it was not until the 13th that we got definite orders. From these, it transpired that the attack was to be carried on along the whole front of the Second and Fifth Armies, and that the XVIIIth Corps was to employ the 11th and 48th Divisions. The objective, so far as the 145th Infantry Brigade was concerned, was the high ground overlooking the valley of the Stroombeek; the order of battle of this Brigade was the 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment on the right, the 1st Bucks Battalion in the centre, the 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry on the left, with the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment in Brigade reserve.

The British front line on the Brigade front lay immediately west of the Steenbeek, whilst the Germans were holding a line consisting of organised shell-holes and reinforced houses, along the ridge 200 yards east of the stream.

Full orders for the Battalion attack and the artillery programme are given in Appendix IB; it will therefore be sufficient here to say that the Battalion was to form up for the attack west of the Steenbeek, on a front of 500 yards immediately north of the St. Julien bridge (Map No. 3). The formation was to be: two companies in front, A (Captain G. R. F. Knight) on the left and B (2/Lieutenant E. H. Fawcitt) on the right, each in two waves of two platoons, with C (Captain G. V. Neave) and D (Captain H. J. Pullman) in artillery formation behind right and left respectively.

Tanks were to have co-operated, but, owing to the waterlogged state of the ground, were counter-ordered at the last moment.

On the morning of August 15, the Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O.) marched from Dambre Camp to the canal bank. Here the afternoon was spent, and at 9.30 p.m. we began to move to the forming-up positions. It proved a most trying march, the greater part of the route being over ground a mass of shell-holes full of water, the night pitch-dark and enemy shelling heavy. There was, or had been, a trench-board track to guide us part of the way, but this did not help much, as in many places it had been completely blown away by shells. With nothing else to aid us in keeping direction, it was no real wonder that three platoons of C Company lost their way and failed to turn up in time to take part in the initial assault. The remainder of the Battalion reached the forming-up positions and were ready twenty minutes before zero, which was fixed for 4.45 a.m. on August 16, 1917.

At zero minus seven minutes, the two leading companies moved forward to cross the Steenbeek. At zero, the artillery barrage was put down 200 yards east of the stream and timed to creep forward at the rate of 100 yards every five minutes. The “going” was very bad indeed, as the ground was a mass of shell-craters and there were but few signs of dawn breaking. The result was that the barrage lifted off the enemy forward position before our leading wave could get up to it. A very heavy machine-gun fire was opened by the enemy from his concrete emplacements, and this was quickly reinforced by considerable rifle fire from his shell-hole positions. The fire almost entirely annihilated the leading wave of the right company, who instantly lost two out of their three officers. The second wave closed up and engaged the enemy with fire, while parties worked round the flanks, but the enemy kept up a very strong resistance, and until the leading platoons of D Company closed up and charged with the bayonet they showed no signs of giving in. This charge by the third wave was followed by a bout of hand-to-hand fighting around the blockhouses on the Hillock Farm-St. Julien road, until the garrison of one blockhouse put up their hands. After this the other garrisons soon followed suit. This was the situation on the right about 6 a.m.

The remains of B and D Companies were then quickly reorganised and pushed on in an attempt to overtake our barrage, which had by this time got well ahead of them. They could only succeed in advancing some 300 yards north-east of the outskirts of St. Julien, where they were confronted by a large sheet of water, with a blockhouse and two gunpits on the far side held by machine guns and riflemen. Every attempt made by these companies to get forward was stopped by a heavy cross-fire from these positions and others on the left.

THE STEENBEEK.
]

THE BATTLE-FIELD NEAR ST. JULIEN, YPRES.
]

The left leading company (A) met with less resistance at first, but on topping the slight ridge above the Steenbeek they came under a heavy cross-fire from Hillock Farm and two old gunpits west of it, as well as from positions away to their left, in front of the left Battalion, who had been held up close to the Steenbeck. The leading wave reached the gunpits with only sixteen men left. The second wave closed up, but its left platoon was completely stopped by fire from the direction of Maison du Hibou and Triangle Farm. The right platoon, carrying out their orders, continued the attack with the remains of the leading wave and succeeded in reaching their objective at Springfield at about 6.45 a.m. Many, however, were seen to fall as they passed Hillock Farm, and very few could actually have reached Springfield. After the first rush by this gallant party, every effort was made to reach the place and afford them assistance, but each attempt met with failure and many casualties, and at 9 a.m. the enemy were seen to rush the house, three or four of our men being afterwards led away.

At 7 a.m. Battalion Headquarters was established in a blockhouse on the west side of the Hillock Farm-St. Julien road, and made itself responsible for that road, whilst the other troops that remained were sent to reinforce the more forward position on the right. In the meantime the 5th Gloucesters on the right had got about 300 yards west of the Steenbeek, where they too were finally held up.

Soon after 8 a.m. the enemy were seen coming over the ridge north of Springfield in considerable numbers and collecting in a trench below it. As by this time we had no communication with the artillery, this massing by the enemy continued, whilst our companies were hastily reorganised for defence, and three Vickers guns brought into suitable positions. One platoon of the 1/4th Royal Berks was also got up and placed so as to protect our left flank, which was quite in the air.

At 9 a.m. three thick waves of the enemy were seen to move down towards Triangle Farm, where they got under cover. At 10 a.m. the enemy counter-attacked us heavily from this farm and from each side of it. The fire from our machine guns, Lewis guns and rifles was, however, too much for them, for after a short time they commenced to retire over the ridge by which they had come.

Sniping and machine-gun fire were brisk throughout the day, and we had several casualties, mostly in the neighbourhood of Hillock Farm, where our men had little cover and the slightest movement was visible to the enemy.

At 7.30 p.m., as it was getting dusk, about a hundred Germans attempted to rush the gunpits we were holding on the left, but they were stopped and suffered heavily. No further counter-attack occurred until 9.30 p.m., when the enemy again launched a surprise attack from the direction of Triangle Farm, and succeeded on this occasion in driving in our posts very slightly round Hillock Farm.

Reconnoitring patrols, sent out during the night, reported the enemy to be holding the line of the Springfield road.

Owing to enemy sniping, it had been found quite impossible to collect the wounded during the day, and a great amount of searching and clearing had to be done that night. Enemy dead lay along the Hillock Farm road in large numbers, the majority having been bayoneted.

The captures by the Battalion were:

80 prisoners (mostly 7th Bavarian Infantry Regiment).
1 field gun.
3 machine guns.

Large quantities of equipment and medical stores were also taken.

The attack proved that our barrage had no effect whatever on the garrisons of concrete blockhouses, and that for future operations it was essential that these houses should be dealt with by the “heavies” prior to any assault.

For such a comparatively small advance, it had been a costly attack, but, as our flanks even now were largely in the air, it is difficult to see how we could have maintained positions farther forward, had we been able to reach them.

Our casualties were:

_Officers._—Killed. Capt. G. V. Neave.
Capt. G. R. F. Knight.

Wounded. Lieut. F. D. Ollard.
2/Lieut. F. M. Passmore.
2/Lieut. G. A. Johnston.
2/Lieut. E. H. Fawcitt.
2/Lieut. R. E. Norman.
2/Lieut. A. T. Moyle.
2/Lieut. F. C. Marshall.

_Other Ranks._—Killed—54.
Wounded—193.
Missing—35 (14 afterwards reported prisoners of war).

2/Lieutenant G. A. Johnston showed remarkable gallantry during this action, in which he was very seriously wounded.

The Battalion was relieved the following evening by the 6th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment, and as a result of this action the following congratulatory messages were received:

“_To the General Officer Commanding 145th Infantry Brigade._ August 19, 1917.

“In case the exigencies of the service prevent me visiting your battalions to-day, please tell them that I appreciate very much the stubborn and determined fighting spirit shown by you, and your officers and men, in the battle on the 16th. Although the fortunes of war, in the form of concrete shelters and an unexpectedly strong preliminary position, prevented us from gaining more than a portion of the objectives we want, we made a very valuable improvement to our position for future progress. Besides the capture of over 100 prisoners, very severe loss was inflicted on the Germans, one small field gun and several machine guns were captured.

“It is not the mere capture of positions which is going to bring us the final victory, but the determined fighting, in spite of all difficulties, like that of the Bucks Battalion, which shows the enemy that he is beaten and cannot hope to beat us and must give in.

“I have the fullest confidence in your Brigade, and know that they will continue to fight with the same spirit with which they have always done, in spite of difficulties.—(_Signed_) R. FANSHAWE, _Major-General_.”

“_To General Sir H. de la P. Gough, K.C.V.O., K.C.B., Commanding Fifth Army._

“I wish to congratulate you personally, as well as the commanders, staffs and troops under your command, most warmly, on the successes gained by the Fifth Army yesterday, under conditions of great difficulty and in the face of the most determined opposition.

“The bad weather, which delayed the continuance of our offensive, enabled the enemy to bring up and concentrate considerable forces in reserve, and to make careful preparations to meet our attack yesterday. In spite of this, the determination and gallantry of the troops under your command succeeded in striking another of the successful blows, the cumulative effects of which are shattering the enemy’s power of resistance and will ultimately lead to his complete defeat.—(_Signed_) D. HAIG, _Field-Marshal_.”

Eight days’ rest in Dambre Camp was allowed us, before we again moved up to the line to take part in further operations. This time it was the turn of the 143rd and 144th Brigades to attack, the former on the right, the latter on the left, their objective being the red line shown on Map No. 3.

MAP Nº. 3.

THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
JULY TO OCTOBER 1917.
]

The 145th Brigade was to be in reserve until zero plus five hours, when it was to move through the leading brigades, and capture the line of farms included by the dotted blue line (Map No. 3). So far as this Brigade was concerned, the 1/4th Royal Berks and 1/4th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry were to leave the canal bank at zero, move across country to assembly positions about the green line, and be ready to carry out the attack on the dotted blue line at zero plus five hours. The 1/5th Gloucesters and the Bucks Battalion were to leave the canal bank at zero plus three hours, and move to the assembly positions vacated by the other two battalions.

Zero was fixed for 1.55 p.m. August 27, 1917. At 4.55 p.m. the head of the Battalion, marching by platoons, passed the canal bank. There appeared to be every prospect of a thoroughly disagreeable march, as shells are never so plentiful as during the few hours succeeding an attack, but we were most fortunate, for the Steenbeek was reached with hardly a casualty. The ground, however, between that stream and the Triangle Farm-St. Julien road was being very heavily shelled. This caused us casualties, but they were few compared with the immense number of shells falling around us. This was largely due to the state of the ground, which, whilst so deep in mud as to make progress almost impossible for us, minimised the resistance to the bursting shells and so diminished the force of their explosion.

Heavy rain had fallen throughout the previous night, with the result that the battle area was nothing more or less than a sea of mud. Many who were wounded and fell got sucked in, and were not discovered till long afterwards, often when it was too late.

The situation on our arrival was most obscure, but it was evident that very little, if any, progress had been made by the two leading brigades. It had been a case of pulling one foot out of the mud and putting the other in, whilst the enemy took full advantage of the weary process and shot hard at good and slowly moving targets. Rifles, bombs and Lewis guns became coated with muddy slime, which quickly put them out of action. Apart from this, the way was perilous in the extreme. Under such conditions the task set was impossible of achievement, and further progress was out of the question. The only real gain was the capture of Springfield by the 1/8th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment.

The night, passed in the neighbourhood of Maison du Hibou, was intensely dark; the evacuation of wounded presented even greater difficulties than on the 16th, and at least eight men to a stretcher were found to be necessary.

The following day, August 28, the whole Division was relieved in the line, the Bucks Battalion handing over to the 2/7th Battalion London Regiment.