Chapter XII: The Battle of Jutland (2)

At 5.35 P.M. the _Lion’s_ course was gradually altered from N.N.E. to N.E. in order to conform to the signalled movements and resulting position of the British Battle Fleet. The enemy’s battle cruisers also gradually hauled to the eastward, being probably influenced in this movement by reports received from their light cruisers, which were by this time in contact with the light cruiser _Chester_ and in sight of our 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron led by Rear-Admiral Hood.

The proceedings of these vessels will now be described.

At 4 P.M., in accordance with my directions, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, proceeded at full speed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At 5 P.M. the squadron, comprising the _Invincible_ (Flag), _Inflexible_, and _Indomitable_, in single line ahead in that order, with the destroyers _Shark_, _Christopher_, _Ophelia_, and _Acasta_, disposed ahead as a submarine screen, had the light cruiser _Canterbury_ five miles ahead and the light cruiser _Chester_ bearing N. 70° W., and was steering S. by E. at 25 knots. The visibility was rapidly decreasing. According to the _Indomitable’s_ report, objects could be distinguished at a distance of 16,000 yards on some bearings, and on others at only 2,000 yards, and from then onwards, according to the same report, the visibility varied between 14,000 and 5,000 yards, although other reports place it higher at times.

At 5.30 P.M. the sound of gunfire was plainly heard to the south-westward, and the _Chester_ turned in that direction to investigate, and, at 5.36 P.M., sighted a three-funnelled light cruiser on the starboard bow, with one or two destroyers in company. The _Chester_ challenged and, receiving no reply, altered course to west to close, judging from the appearance of the destroyer that the vessel was hostile.

As the _Chester_ closed, course was altered to about north in order to avoid being open to torpedo attack by the destroyer on a bearing favourable to the latter. This turn brought the enemy well abaft the port beam of the _Chester_ and on an approximately parallel course. During the turn the _Chester_ sighted two or more light cruisers astern of the first ship, and the leading enemy light cruiser opened fire on the _Chester_, the latter replying immediately afterwards, at a range of about 6,000 yards. The visibility at this time, judging by the distance at which the enemy’s light cruisers were sighted from the _Chester_, could not have exceeded 8,000 yards. The enemy’s fourth salvo hit the _Chester_, put No. 1 gun port out of action, and killed and wounded a large proportion of the gun crews of Nos. 1, 2, and 3 port guns. The light cruisers sighted by the _Chester_ undoubtedly belonged to one of the enemy’s scouting groups stationed on the starboard bow of their battle cruisers.

Captain Lawson of the _Chester_, in view of the superior force to which he was opposed, altered course to the N.E. and towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, bringing the enemy’s light cruisers, all of which had opened a rapid and accurate fire, astern of him. The enemy vessels turned after the _Chester_, and during the unequal engagement, which lasted for 19 minutes, Captain Lawson successfully manœuvred his ship with a view to impeding the accuracy of the hostile fire, realising that she was in no condition to engage such superior forces successfully in her damaged state.

The _Chester_ closed the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and took station N.E. of this squadron, joining the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at a later phase of the action. The ship suffered considerable casualties, having 31 killed and 50 wounded; three guns and her fire control circuits were disabled; she had four shell holes a little distance above the water line. It was on board the _Chester_ that the second Victoria Cross of the action was earned, posthumously, by Jack Cornwell, Boy 1st Class, who was mortally wounded early in the action. This gallant lad, whose age was less than 16½ years, nevertheless remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the guns’ crew, dead and wounded, all round him.

Meanwhile flashes of gunfire were seen from the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at 5.40 P.M., and Rear-Admiral Hood turned his ships to starboard and brought the enemy light cruisers, which were engaging the _Chester_, and from which vessels the flashes came, on to his port bow. During this turn the destroyers attached to the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were brought on to the port quarter of the squadron. As soon as Rear-Admiral Hood made out his position he led his squadron with the _Canterbury_ between the enemy and the _Chester_, on a course about W.N.W., and at 5.55 P.M. opened an effective fire on the German light cruisers with his port guns, at a range of about 10,000 to 12,000 yards. The enemy vessels turned away from this attack and fired torpedoes at the battle cruisers; the tracks of five torpedoes were seen later from the _Indomitable_. At about 6.10 P.M. the _Invincible_ and _Indomitable_ turned to starboard to avoid these torpedoes, three of which passed very close to the latter ship, and ran alongside within 20 yards of the vessel. The _Inflexible_ turned to port.

Meanwhile more enemy light cruisers were sighted astern of the first group, and the four British destroyers, _Shark_, _Acasta_, _Ophelia_ and _Christopher_, attacked them and the large destroyer force in company with them, and were received by a heavy fire which disabled the _Shark_ and damaged the _Acasta_. On board the _Shark_ the third V.C. of the action was earned by her gallant captain, Commander Loftus Jones, this award also being, I regret to say, posthumous.

The attack of the British destroyers was carried out with great gallantry and determination, and having frustrated the enemy’s torpedo attack on the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, Commander Loftus Jones turned his division to regain his position on our battle cruisers. At this moment three German vessels came into sight out of the mist and opened a heavy fire, further disabling the _Shark_ and causing many casualties on board; Commander Loftus Jones was amongst those wounded. Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, commanding the _Acasta_, came to the assistance of the _Shark_, but Commander Loftus Jones refused to imperil a second destroyer, and directed the _Acasta_ to leave him. The _Shark_ then became the target for the German ships and destroyers. Commander Loftus Jones, who was assisting to keep the only undamaged gun in action, ordered the last torpedo to be placed in the tube and fired; but whilst this was being done the torpedo was hit by a shell and exploded, causing many casualties. Those gallant officers and men in the _Shark_ who still survived, continued to fight the only gun left in action, the greatest heroism being exhibited. The captain was now wounded again, his right leg being taken off by a shell; but he still continued to direct the fire, until the condition of the _Shark_ and the approach of German destroyers made it probable that the ship would fall into the hands of the enemy, when he gave orders for her to be sunk, countermanding this order shortly afterwards on realising that her remaining gun could still be fought. Shortly afterwards she was hit by two torpedoes, and sank with her colours flying. Only six survivors were picked up the next morning by a Danish steamer. In recognition of the great gallantry displayed, the whole of the survivors were awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. Their names are: W. C. R. Griffin, Petty Officer; C. Filleul, Stoker Petty Officer; C. C. Hope, A.B.; C. H. Smith, A.B.; T. O. G. Howell, A.B.; T. W. Swan, Stoker.

At this point it is well to turn to the proceedings of our advanced cruiser line, which at 5 P.M. was about 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, the latter being at that time in Lat. 57.24 N., Long. 5.12 E., steering S.E. by S. at 20 knots. It should be noted that, owing to decreasing visibility, which was stated in reports from the cruisers to be slightly above six miles, the cruisers on the starboard flank had closed in and were about six miles apart by 5.30 P.M. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron was about 16 miles due east of the advanced cruiser line, but was steering more to the southward on a converging course at a speed of about five knots faster.

At 5.40 P.M. firing was heard ahead by the cruiser line, and shortly afterwards ships were seen from the _Minotaur_ to be emerging from the mist. Rear-Admiral Heath, the senior officer of the cruiser line, had recalled the ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron on hearing the firing and had ordered them to form single line ahead on the _Minotaur_. He then made the signal to engage the enemy, namely, the ships in sight ahead; but before fire was opened they replied to his challenge and were identified as the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers and steering to the westward.

At 5.47 P.M. the _Defence_, with the _Warrior_ astern, sighted on a S. by W. bearing (namely, on the starboard bow) three or four enemy light cruisers, and course was altered three points to port, bringing them nearly on a beam bearing. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in the _Defence_, then signalled “Commence fire.” Each ship fired three salvoes at a three-funnelled cruiser. The salvoes fell short, and the _Defence_ altered course to starboard, brought the enemy first ahead, and then to a bearing on the port bow, evidently with the intention of closing. The latter alteration of course was made at 6.1 P.M., and by this time projectiles from the light cruisers were falling in close proximity to the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_. These ships opened fire with their port guns at 6.5 P.M. and shortly afterwards passed close across the bows of the _Lion_ from port to starboard. One light cruiser, probably the _Wiesbaden_, was hit by the second salvoes of both ships, appeared to be badly crippled, and nearly stopped. Our ships continued to close her until within 5,500 yards. From about 6.10 P.M. onwards they had come under fire of guns of heavy calibre from the enemy’s battle cruisers, but Sir Robert Arbuthnot, as gallant and determined an officer as ever lived, was evidently bent on finishing off his opponent, and held on, probably not realising in the gathering smoke and mist that the enemy’s heavy ships were at fairly close range. At about 6.16 P.M. the _Defence_ was hit by two salvoes in quick succession, which caused her magazines to blow up and the ship disappeared. The loss of so valuable an officer as Sir Robert Arbuthnot and so splendid a ship’s company as the officers and men of the _Defence_ was a heavy blow. The _Warrior_ was very badly damaged by shell fire, her engine-rooms being flooded; but Captain Molteno was able to bring his ship out of action, having first seen the _Defence_ disappear. From diagrams made in the _Warrior_ it appears that the German battle cruisers turned 16 points (possibly with a view either to close their Battle Fleet or to come to the aid of the disabled _Wiesbaden_), engaged the _Defence_ and _Warrior_, and then turned back again. This supposition is confirmed by sketches taken on board the _Duke of Edinburgh_ at the same time. Owing to the smoke and the mist, however, it was difficult to state exactly what occurred. From the observations on board the _Warrior_ it is certain that the visibility was much greater in her direction from the enemy’s line, than it was in the direction of the enemy from the _Warrior_. Although the _Defence_ and _Warrior_ were being hit frequently, those on board the _Warrior_ could only see the ships firing at them very indistinctly, and it is probable that the low visibility led to Sir Robert Arbuthnot not realising that he was at comparatively short range from the German battle cruisers until he was already under an overwhelming fire.

The _Warrior_ passed astern of the 5th Battle Squadron at the period when the steering gear of the _Warspite_ had become temporarily disabled.[K]

[K] _Cf._ page 350.

The _Duke of Edinburgh_, the ship next to the westward of the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_ in the cruiser screen, had turned to close these ships when they became engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers in accordance with a signal from the _Defence_. The _Duke of Edinburgh_ joined in the engagement, but, on sighting the Lion on her starboard bow, did not follow the other ships across the bows of the battle cruisers, as to do so would have seriously incommoded these vessels; she turned to port to a parallel course and eventually joined the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.

The _Black Prince_ was observed from the _Duke of Edinburgh_ to turn some 12 points to port at the same time that the _Duke of Edinburgh_ turned, but her subsequent movements are not clear; the German accounts of the action stated that the _Black Prince_ was sunk by gunfire at the same time as the _Defence_, but she was not seen to be in action at this time by any of our vessels, and, moreover, a wireless signal, reporting a submarine in sight and timed 8.48 P.M., was subsequently received from her. It is probable that the _Black Prince_ passed to the rear of the Battle Fleet at about 6.30 P.M., and that during the night she found herself close to one of the German battle squadrons, and was sunk then by superior gunfire. In support of this theory, the German account mentions that a cruiser of the “Cressy” type was sunk in that manner during the night. None of the ships of this class was present during the engagement, but the _Black Prince_ might well have been mistaken for a ship of this type in the circumstances.

The print from which this was reproduced was found in a German dug-out between Ostend and Zeebrugge, on November 4, 1918]

We left the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at about 6.10 P.M. at the termination of their engagement with enemy light cruisers, turning to avoid torpedoes fired at them. At about this time Rear-Admiral Hood sighted the _Lion_ and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and at about 6.16 P.M. hoisted the signal to his squadron to form single line ahead, and turned to take station ahead of the _Lion_ and to engage the hostile battle cruisers, which at 6.20 P.M. were sighted at a range of 8,600 yards.

A furious engagement ensued for a few minutes, and the fire of the squadron was judged by those on board the _Invincible_ to be very effective. Rear-Admiral Hood, who was on the bridge of the _Invincible_ with Captain Cay, hailed Commander Dannreuther, the gunnery officer in the fore control, at about 6.30 P.M., saying, “Your firing is very good. Keep at it as quickly as you can; every shot is telling.” At about 6.34 P.M. the _Invincible_, which had already been hit more than once by heavy shell without appreciable damage, was struck in “Q” turret. The shell apparently burst inside the turret, as Commander Dannreuther saw the roof blown off. A very heavy explosion followed immediately, evidently caused by the magazine blowing up, and the ship broke in half and sank at once, only two officers, including Commander Dannreuther, and four men being subsequently picked up by the destroyer _Badger_. The British Navy sustained a most serious loss in Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, one of the most distinguished of our younger flag officers, and in Captain Cay and the officers and men of his flagship. The difficulties of distinguishing enemy ships even at the close range of this engagement is revealed by the fact that the officers in the _Invincible_ and _Indomitable_ were under the impression that they were engaging battle cruisers, whilst officers in the _Inflexible_, stationed between these two ships in the line, reported that her fire was being directed at a battleship of the “Kaiser” or “König” class, and that only one ship could be seen.

Just before the loss of the _Invincible_, the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Napier, had carried out an effective torpedo attack on the enemy’s battle cruisers; both the light cruisers _Falmouth_ and _Yarmouth_ fired torpedoes at the leading battle cruiser. It was thought that one of the torpedoes hit its mark as a heavy under-water explosion was felt at this time.

After the loss of the _Invincible_, the _Inflexible_ was left as leader of the line, and as soon as the wreck of the _Invincible_ had been passed, course was altered two points to starboard to close the enemy ships, which were disappearing in the mist. A further turn to starboard for the same purpose was made, but at this time, 6.50 P.M., the battle cruisers being clear of the leading battleships (which were bearing N.N.W. three miles distant), Sir David Beatty signalled the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line of the battle cruisers, and the _Inflexible_ and _Indomitable_ took station astern of the _New Zealand_.

The course of events can now be traced with accuracy. The _Chester_ with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which by 5.40 P.M. had got ahead of the Battle Fleet’s cruiser screen, encountered some of the light cruisers composing the enemy’s screen, and engaged them, and, in doing so, drew the enemy’s light cruisers towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which, with the _Canterbury_ and destroyers, turned to about W.N.W. to assist the _Chester_ and to engage the enemy vessels.

In the course of this movement a destroyer attack was made by four British destroyers on the enemy’s light cruisers. This attack was apparently thought by the Germans to come from the flotillas with the Battle Fleet, as far as can be judged from their report of the action; the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were undoubtedly mistaken by their vessels for the van of our Battle Fleet, since mention is made in the German report of the British Battle Fleet having been sighted at this time by the German light forces, steering in a westerly or north-westerly direction. The mistaken idea caused the van of the High Sea Fleet to turn off to starboard.

So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course at this time, the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south-easterly course before, through, and immediately subsequent to deployment, gradually hauling round afterwards, first through south to south-west, and, then, to west, _but it was not until_ 8 P.M. _that a westerly course was being steered_.

The only point that is not clear is the identity of the light cruiser engaged and seriously damaged by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The ship engaged by the _Defence_ and _Warrior_ was apparently the _Wiesbaden_. It seems to be impossible that the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron engaged the same vessel, and it is more likely to have been another light cruiser in the enemy’s screen. The two engagements took place at almost the same time, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron opening fire at 5.55 P.M., and the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_ (the 1st Cruiser Squadron) commencing their engagement with the starboard guns at about 5.50 P.M. and continuing it with the port guns at 6.5 P.M. It is hardly possible, even in the conditions of low visibility that prevailed, that the two squadrons could have been engaging the same vessel.

Mention should be made here of the work of the destroyer _Onslow_, commanded by Lieut.-Commander J. C. Tovey, which at 6.5 P.M. sighted an enemy’s light cruiser in a position on the bows of the _Lion_ and favourable for torpedo attack on that ship. The _Onslow_ closed and engaged the light cruiser with gunfire at ranges between 2,000 and 4,000 yards, and then, although severely damaged by shell fire, succeeded in closing a German battle cruiser to attack with torpedoes; she was struck by a heavy shell before more than one torpedo could be fired. Lieut.-Commander Tovey thought that his order to fire all torpedoes had been carried out, and finding that this was not the case, closed the light cruiser and fired a torpedo at her, and then sighting the Battle Fleet fired the remaining torpedoes at battleships. The _Onslow’s_ engines then stopped, but the damaged destroyer _Defender_, Lieut.-Commander Palmer, closed her at 7.15 P.M. and took her in tow under a heavy fire, and, in spite of bad weather during the night and the damaged condition of both destroyers, brought her back to home waters, transferring her on June 1st to the care of a tug.