Chapter I: Part 1

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THE GREAT WAR AND HOW IT AROSE

1915

Parliamentary Recruiting Committee 12, Downing Street, London, S.W.

CONTENTS.

PAGE.

Serbia's Position 3

Russia's Position 6

Germany's Position 6

Italy's Position 8

Germany's Selected Moment 8

Peace Thwarted by Germany 10

I. Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian
Ultimatum 11
II. Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia 11
III. Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers 12
IV. Germany Asked to State Form of Mediation between
Russia and Austria-Hungary 13
V. Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary 14
VI. Russia's Final Attempt at Peace 15

German Militarism Wins 17

How France Came In 19

How Great Britain Came In 19

War with Austria 22

Japan's Ultimatum to Germany 22

Allies' Declaration of Common Policy 23

Turkey Joins Germany 24

More German Intrigues 26
The Near East 26
The Far East 27
West Africa 28
South Africa 28

How the Germans Make War 29

Germany's Attempted Bribery 36

APPENDIXES.

A. Germany's Knowledge of Contents of Austro-Hungarian
Ultimatum 40

B. How Germany Misled Austria-Hungary 46

C. Some German Atrocities in Belgium 48

D. Germany's Employment of Poisonous Gas 52

E. Efforts of German Ministers of State to lay Blame on
England 52

F. List of Parliamentary Publications respecting the War 55

THE GREAT WAR.

SERBIA'S POSITION.

On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and the Archduchess were assassinated on Austrian territory at Serajevo by two Austrian subjects, both Bosniaks. On a former occasion one of these assassins had been in Serbia and the "Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities, found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual."[1] After a "magisterial" investigation, the Austro-Hungarian Government formally fixed upon the Serbians the guilt both of assisting the assassins and of continually conspiring against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and on July 23, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Serbia of which the following were the chief terms[2]:--

"The Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of
their 'Official Journal' of the 13-26 July the following
declaration:--

"'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary--_i.e._, the general tendency of which the
final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal
consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"'The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and
functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda...."

"The Royal Serbian Government further undertake:

"To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which
is directed against its territorial integrity; ...

"To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both
as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of
instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the
propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

"To remove from the military service, and from the administration
in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the
Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of
communicating to the Royal Government;

"To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the
Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive
movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
Monarchy;

"To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of
the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation
relating thereto."

In effect Austria wished to force Serbia (_a_) to admit a guilt which was not hers; (_b_) to condemn officers in her army without trial at Austria's direction[3]; (_c_) to allow Austrian delegates to dispense such justice in Serbian Courts as they might think fit. In other words, Serbia was to lose her independence as a Sovereign State. And to all these claims Austria demanded an acceptance within 48 hours--until 6 p.m. on July 25, 1914. Yet, in spite of this, Serbia, within the specified time, sent her reply[4], which amounted to an acceptance of Austria's demands, subject, on certain points, to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power--Germany not excepted--had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade the same evening, and Serbia was left with no option but to order a general mobilisation.

An outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.

As Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador on one occasion "the Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian Note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept."[5]

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended in order to give the requisite time to negotiate an amicable settlement. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain asked Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and Petrograd in favour of conciliation. Italy assented, France assented, Russia declared herself ready, Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired.

The British Charge d'Affaires at Constantinople discovered the true object in view when he telegraphed on July 29:--

"I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably
beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory. I
gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador
here who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica
under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the
Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented
with Serbian rule."[6]

So Austria contemplated no less than the break-up of the whole Balkan settlement to which she and Germany had been parties so recently as 1913. She was to take advantage of the weakened condition of the Balkan peoples (as a result of the Wars of 1912-13) to wage a war of conquest right down to the Aegean Sea.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 30.

[2] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 4.

[3] This demand was pointedly summed up by Mr. Lloyd George at the Queen's Hall, London, September 19, 1914, when he said:--

"Serbia ... must dismiss from her army the officers whom Austria
should subsequently name. Those officers had just emerged from a war
where they had added lustre to the Serbian arms; they were gallant,
brave and efficient. I wonder whether it was their guilt or their
efficiency that prompted Austria's action! But, mark you, the
officers were not named; Serbia was to undertake in advance to
dismiss them from the army, the names to be sent in subsequently.
Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that?
Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to
this country, saying 'You must dismiss from your Army--and from your
Navy--all those officers whom we shall subsequently name.' Well, I
think I could name them now. Lord Kitchener would go; Sir John
French would be sent away; General Smith-Dorrien would go, and I am
sure that Sir John Jellicoe would have to go. And there is another
gallant old warrior who would go--Lord Roberts. It was a difficult
situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a
great military power that could have put half-a-dozen men in the
field for every one of Serbia's men, and that Power was supported by
the greatest military Power (Germany) in the world."

[4] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 39.

[5] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 46.

[6] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 82.

RUSSIA'S POSITION.

Russia's interest in the Balkans was well-known. As late as May 23, 1914, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans" and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. The Russians are a Slav people like the Serbians. Serbian independence was one of the results of the Great War which Russia waged against Turkey in 1877. If Serbia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on July 29, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia was to be humiliated, then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at Petrograd, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. It was known to the Austrians and to every foreign secretary in Europe, that if the Tsar's Government allowed Serbia to be crushed by Austria, they would be in danger of a revolution in Russia. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan War, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade.

GERMANY'S POSITION.

Since the outbreak of war Germany has issued an Official White Book which states concisely and with almost brutal frankness the German case prior to the outbreak of hostilities,[7] in the following terms:--

"=The Imperial and Royal Government (Austria-Hungary) ... asked for
our opinion. With all our heart we were able to ... assure him
(Austria) that any action considered necessary ... would meet with
our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike
attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon
the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in
accordance with our duties as allies. We could not ... advise our
ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity,
nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this
all the less as our own interests were menaced through the
continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of
Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the
gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs
under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making
untenable the position of the Teutonic Race in Central Europe.=

"=A morally weakened Austria ... would be no longer an ally on whom
we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be
able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our
Easterly and Westerly neighbours.=

"_=We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her
action towards Serbia.=_"

Farther on in the German Official White Book (page 7) it is stated that the German Government instructed its Ambassador at Petrograd to make the following declaration to the Russian Government, with reference to Russian military measures which concerned Austria alone[8]:--

"=Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.=

"=But mobilisation means war.=

"=As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this
mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France....="

Here, then, we have the plain admission:--

That the steps subsequently taken were directed against Russia and
France.

That from the first Austria was given a free hand even to the
calculated extent of starting a great European war.

That a morally weakened Austria was not an ally on whom Germany
"could count" or "have confidence" though no reference is made to
Italy in this Official document.

FOOTNOTES:

[7] The German White Book (only authorised translation). Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin, pages 4 and 5. (Price, 40 pf.)

[8] Cd. 7717, No. 109. In a despatch from Berlin, July 30, 1914, Mons. Jules Cambon (French Ambassador) says:--

"Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the
Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the
success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything
depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise
completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this
might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and
consequently that of Germany.

"I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me
that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if
Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not
being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the
army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for
the German army, and 'that the words of which I reminded him did not
constitute a firm engagement on his part.'"

ITALY'S POSITION.

Italy's position on the eve of the Great War, and while the above machinations were in progress, is quite clear for the reason that she had been approached twelve months before to take part in a similar enterprise and had peremptorily refused. On August 9, 1913, the Italian Premier, Signor Giolitti, received a telegram from the Marquis di San Guiliano (Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs), acquainting him with the fact that Austria had just confided to Italy that, with the approval of Germany, she was about to deliver an ultimatum to Serbia, in essence identical with that actually sent on July 23, 1914, whereby the present Great War was kindled. Austria then asked Italy to consider this move to be a _casus foederis_ under the Triple Alliance--which is purely a treaty of defence--involving Italy's military assistance on the side of Austria and Germany.[9] To this the Italian Premier (Signor Giolitti) replied[10]:--

"If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a _casus
foederis_ cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking
on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch
as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a
declaration to this effect should be hope for action on the part of
Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure."

Italy, having on this occasion made her position clear, maintained her neutrality last July (1914) when Germany and Austria decided to proceed with the plans arranged over twelve months before. Italy remained neutral because she held that Germany and Austria were the aggressors--not Russia and France.[11] By not consulting Italy on the subject of action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary violated one of the fundamental clauses of the Triple Alliance, and eventually this led Italy to denounce the Treaty on May 4th, 1915, and finally, on May 24th, 1915, to declare war on Austria-Hungary.

FOOTNOTES:

[9] See Appendix "A." Italy denounced this treaty May 4th, 1915.

[10] Cd. 7860.

[11] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 152.

GERMANY'S SELECTED MOMENT.

The past history of Germany shows that she has always made her wars at her own "selected moment," when she thought her victim was isolated or unprepared. As General von Bernhardi says in his book, _Germany and the Next Great War_: "English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success." On July 23, 1914, when Austria launched her ultimatum to Serbia, the Chancelleries of Europe were taken by surprise. Germany and Austria chose their moment well.

(1) The British representatives were away from both Berlin and
Belgrade.

(2) M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, and the other
Ministers were away electioneering.

(3) The Russian Ambassadors were absent from Vienna, Berlin and
Paris, and the Russian Minister was absent from Belgrade. Indeed
the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had left "for the country in
consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the
(Austro-Hungarian) Ministry for Foreign Affairs."[12]

(4) The President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister
were out of France at Reval, on board the French Battleship "La
France."

(5) The Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had
left the Capital and his presence at Ischl was constantly used by
the Germans and Austrians as an excuse for not being able to get
things done in time.

The known facts of the crisis out of which the Great War arose and the messages of our Ambassadors suggest that Germany chose this particular time:--

(1) Calculating that Russia, if she did not fight, would be
humiliated, whilst Austria--Germany's ally--would be strengthened
by the conquest of Serbia; and

(2) Believing that if Russia chose to fight, even if she fought
with France as her ally, still it was a favourable moment.

The deepening of the Kiel Canal to permit German battleships to pass from the Baltic to the North Sea was just completed. Germany had at her disposal the larger part of a huge war tax of L50,000,000, and had added enormously to her land forces. The murder of the Archduke created a pretext which roused enthusiasm for war in Austria, and there can be little doubt that Germany was ready to use this wave of popular feeling for her own ends. Germany appears to have instilled into Austria-Hungary the belief that there was small danger in coercing Serbia.[13]

On the other hand, Germany aimed at thoroughly humiliating Russia and France, and appears to have calculated that if the worst came to the worst, she and Austria-Hungary would be in a position to beat them both. The German view of the European situation may be briefly set forth as follows:--

=Russia.=--Russia was passing through serious industrial troubles,
which it was thought might end in revolution.

=France.=--France was passing through a period of political chaos,
no Government being able to hold together for more than a few
weeks. And on July 13 the French had appointed a Committee to
inquire and report immediately on alleged deficiencies in various
defensive preparations.

=Belgium.=--Belgium was beginning a re-organisation of her Army
which would have gradually increased it to almost double its
present strength.

=Britain.=--Germany thought the Irish and general political
position in Britain made it impossible for her to show a united
front in foreign affairs, and that therefore she would be unable to
fight. The Germans seem to have assumed that Britain would be glad
incidentally to seize the chance of making money through neutrality
and would repudiate her treaty obligations to Belgium and her
friendship for France, and be content to see Germany ruthlessly
crushing the smaller Powers of Europe. Sir Edward Grey, on July 27,
1914, telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Petrograd:--"I have
been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian
circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand
aside."[14]

Our Ambassadors at Petrograd, (July 24, 1914), Rome, (July 29, 1914) and Paris (July 30, 1914), each stated that the Foreign Offices of Russia, Italy and France respectively thought that Germany was counting on our neutrality, while the German Foreign Minister, after war was actually declared, seemed totally unable to understand how we could go to war for what he called "a Scrap of Paper." The "Scrap of Paper" happened to be a treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and signed by both Great Britain _and_ Germany![15] The whole case is put in a nutshell in the despatch from the British Ambassador at Vienna, dated August 1, 1914, in which he says:--

"=I agree ... that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from
the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his
action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German
Government also desired war from the first.... Nothing can alter
the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on
their present course, if they have made up their mind with the
approval of Germany.="[16]

FOOTNOTES:

[12] Cd. 7717, No. 18.

[13] See Appendix "B."

[14] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 47.

[15] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Nos. 80, 99 and 160.

[16] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 141.

PEACE THWARTED BY GERMANY.

The attitude taken up by Germany and Austria-Hungary throughout the whole crisis can only lead to one conclusion--that both countries were determined to force their point, even at the risk of a European war. As showing the endeavours to devise means of averting a general conflict, they should be considered seriatim, together with the persistency with which they were blocked in Berlin:--

_(I.)--Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia._

On July 25, in reply to the Anglo-Russian efforts, to extend the forty-eight hour "time-limit" of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna telegraphed that he had been officially informed that "the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time-limit of the Note."[17] How Austria-Hungary was aided and abetted by Germany in this refusal is made plain in the despatch from the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin on the same day:--

"The (German) Minister for Foreign Affairs ... tells me that the
British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to
extend the time limit of the ultimatum, ... but he fears that in
the absence of Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs) "who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time,
his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the
wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined
to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance
of Serbia."[18]

_(II.)--The Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia._

When the extension of the time-limit of the Ultimatum to Serbia was refused by Austria, Sir Edward Grey thought the question of preventing or delaying hostilities might serve as a basis for discussion. The Austrian Ambassador explained that:--

"the Austrian Note should not be regarded as an Ultimatum; it
should be regarded as a step which, in the event of no reply, or in
the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would
be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations, and the immediate
departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade, without,
however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities."[19]

As Sir Edward Grey said in his Despatch to the British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, July 24, 1914:--

"The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march
into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should
march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria
not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But
none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany
would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should
inform Secretary of State."[20]

The following day (July 25, 1914), Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Charge d'Affaires in Berlin:--

"The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the
Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be
to break off diplomatic relations and commence military
preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German
Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of
mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had
urged yesterday should be delayed."[21]

But here again Germany was lukewarm, to say the least of it, as will be seen in the Despatch from the British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26, 1914:--

"Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that
German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to
Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a
favourable view of Serbian reply if it corresponds to the forecast
contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.

"Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this
communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they
associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German
Government do not see their way to going beyond this."[22]

_(III.)--Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers._

On July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey suggested to the German Ambassador that the only chance he could see of a mediating or moderating influence being effective was:--

"that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves should
work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour
of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and
Russia becoming threatening."[23]

Finding that Russia consented to this idea, Sir Edward telegraphed to our representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome on July 26, 1914, to the following effect:--

"Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct
Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and
Germany, and myself, to meet here in conference immediately for the
purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications?
You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do
this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of
the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at
Belgrade, Vienna and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request
that all active military operations should be suspended pending
results of conference."[24]

The Powers, _with the exception of Germany_, consented. Germany again proclaimed herself the disturbing element, as is shown in the following Despatch from the British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 27, 1914:--

"(German) Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would
practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not, in his
opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and
Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion,
desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace.
I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with
arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not
directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a
dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference
as you proposed was not practicable."[25]

Again, on July 29, 1914, the British Ambassador at Berlin reported:--

"I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told
me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government,
to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that
events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late
to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the
basis of discussion."[26]

_(IV.)--Germany asked to State any Form which Mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary might take._

How Germany endeavoured to shuffle out of the suggested mediation by the four Powers on the plea that the "form" was not one which Austria-Hungary could accept, is set forth in a Telegram from Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador in Berlin, dated July 29, 1914:--

"The German Government ... seemed to think the particular method of
conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations a
quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German
Government should suggest _any method_ by which the influence of
the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between
Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of
mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation
by _any method that Germany could suggest_ if mine was not
acceptable. _In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by
any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would
'press the button' in the interests of peace._"[27]

Here again Germany evaded the point, as is shown in the Telegram from the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30, 1914:--

"The Chancellor told me last night that he was 'pressing the
button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he
had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had
been precipitated rather than otherwise."[28]

Sir Edward Grey's telegram was sent off about 4 p.m. on July 29. His appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.[29] The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her.

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.

_(V.)--Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary._

Another excuse given by Germany for refusing mediation by the four Powers was the possibility of direct negotiations between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The British Ambassador in Berlin on July 27, in recording Germany's excuses, said that the German Secretary of State--

"added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed
that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof" (Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs) "to exchange views with Count
Berchtold" (Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs). "He thought
that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result,
and that it would be best before doing anything else to await
outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian
Governments."[30]

It is worth noting that, in reply to this Despatch from the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey wrote on July 29:--

"I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct
between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I
would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that,
but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government
have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the
Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to
discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the
means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict."[31]

Russia had done her best to open these negotiations, and endeavoured to get the German Government to advise Austria to continue negotiations thus opened. How the proposal was received by Germany is found in the following Despatch from the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, dated July 27, 1914:--

"I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal
in Vienna that Szapary" (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Russia)
"should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of
views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which
would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow" (German Foreign
Secretary of State) "answered that he was aware of this proposal
and that he agreed with Pourtales" (German Ambassador in Russia)
"that as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go
on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German
Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater
insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that _he
could not advise Austria to give way_."[32]

The result of Germany's hostile attitude to the plan was at once made apparent the next day in Vienna, where the Russian Ambassador reported on July 28, 1914:--

"Count Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs)
"replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and
of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg
Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian
Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the
energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no
longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the
Austro-Hungarian note."[33]

_(VI.)--Russia's Final Attempt at Peace._

Finally, on July 30, 1914, another attempt at peace by Russia is indicated in the Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome, in the following terms:--

"The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether
Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might
give--that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of
Serbia--and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we
would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him
the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate
action: 'If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question
has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready
to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the
sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military
preparations.'

"Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German
Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to
do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question,
for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order
that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military
preparations."[34]

And subsequently this was amended according to the following Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassadors abroad, dated July 31, 1914, Petrograd:--

"Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British
Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me
of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in
the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I
replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send
you the text of the modified formula, which is as follows:--

"'If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on
Serbian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between
Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest,
she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and
decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to the
Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a
sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to
maintain her waiting attitude."[35]

The possibility of peace was not thought hopeless by Sir Edward Grey, for, in a despatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, dated August 1, he says:--

"I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only
a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power
begins war.

"The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of
Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to
accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections
raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are
ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able
to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in
order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully
abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."[36]

That Austria was at last taking a more reasonable attitude is shown by the despatch from the Russian Ambassador in Paris, dated August 1, 1914:--

"The Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani" (French
Minister for Foreign Affairs), "and declared to him that Austria,
far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia,
was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against
Servia with the other powers. The French Government are much
exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the
French frontier for they are convinced that under the guise of
'Kriegszustand,' mobilisation is, in reality, being carried
out."[37]

Unfortunately at this point, when the Austro-Hungarian Government appeared ready to debate amicably with Russia, Germany stopped all efforts at peace by issuing an Ultimatum to Russia. News of this is given in a telegram to the Russian representatives abroad on August 1, in the following terms:--

"At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the
instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by
midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only
against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government
would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my
enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the
negative, but added that we were very near it."[38]

As Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, tersely put it in his despatch, dated from London, September 1, 1914, to Sir Edward Grey:--

"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna
were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous
ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany
intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to
St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which
only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on
the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. _A few days' delay
might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest
calamities in history._"[39]

FOOTNOTES:

[17] Cd. 7626, No. 12.

[18] Cd. 7626, No. 14.

[19] Cd. 7626, No. 16.

[20] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 11.

[21] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 25.

[22] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 34.

[23] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 11.

[24] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 36.

[25] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 43.

[26] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 75.

[27] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 84.

[28] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 107.

[29] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Nos. 85 and 101.

[30] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 43.

[31] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 84.

[32] Cd. 7626, No. 38.

[33] Cd. 7626, No. 45.

[34] Cd. 7626, No. 60.

[35] Cd. 7626, No. 67.

[36] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 131.

[37] Cd. 7626, No. 73.

[38] Cd. 7626, No. 70.

[39] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 161.

GERMAN MILITARISM WINS.

Thus Germany rejected all suggestions, while Austria, supported by Germany, was determined on war. The Serbian episode was clearly an excuse. Germany's alliance with Austria was "defensive." She was bound to join with Austria only in case of the latter being _attacked_ by Russia. Austria claimed that because Russia would not stand idle while Serbia was crushed, therefore Russia was the aggressor. Germany was a party to the Austrian attack on Serbia. The British Ambassador at Vienna on July 30 says: "I have private information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia _before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor_. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."[40]

Germany, therefore, chose this moment to send a challenge to Russia knowing that Russia must fight unless she were willing to be humiliated and disgraced in the eyes, not only of men of the Slav race in the Balkans, but in the eyes of the whole world.

The French Foreign Minister, telegraphing on July 31 to the French Ambassador in London as to Germany's aggressive steps on the Franco-German frontier, said: "All my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday (July 25)."[41] What has actually happened in the war goes to show that this must have been the case.

The precise situation at this point is well shown in the British Foreign Office introduction to _Great Britain and the European Crisis_:--

"At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched
an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her
mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for
the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown,
overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be
said is that, _according to the information in the possession of
His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time
proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general
mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next
day, the 1st August_. France also began to mobilise on that day.
The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal
from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy
until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the
German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war.
Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great
Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the
Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her
troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a
collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday
morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small
independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the
Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium.
The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had
become inevitable."

FOOTNOTES:

[40] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 95.

[41] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 105--Enclosure 3.

HOW FRANCE CAME IN.

France, by her alliance with Russia, was bound to stand by Russia if she was attacked by Germany and Austria. On July 31 the German Ambassador at Paris informed the French Government that Russia had ordered a complete mobilisation, and that Germany had given Russia twelve hours in which to order demobilisation and asking France to define her attitude. France was given no time, and war came, when German troops at once crossed the French frontier. Germany, by her attitude towards France, plainly admitted that she was the aggressor. She made no pretence of any cause of quarrel with France, but attacked her because of France's defensive alliance with Russia.

HOW GREAT BRITAIN CAME IN.

Great Britain was primarily drawn in to save Belgium. We were bound by a Treaty (1839) to which Germany and France were also parties, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. When Germany attacked France in 1870, Prince Bismarck gave Belgium a written declaration--which he said was superfluous in view of the Treaty in existence--that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided that neutrality were respected by the other belligerent Powers.

France has been faithful to her Treaty. She even left her Belgian frontier unfortified. On August 3, 1914, on the verge of war, our position was made plain by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, when he said:--

"When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be
a most important element in our policy--a most important subject
for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar
terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us
to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were
prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of
Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government
this reply:--

"'The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality
of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other
Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself
under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her
security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given
several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to
the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels
has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day.'

"From the German Government the reply was:--

"'The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not
possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the
Imperial Chancellor.'

"Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an
answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long
delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir
Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they
could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail,
in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing,
to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign."[42]

This clearly indicated that Germany would not respect the neutrality of Belgium, and the day after Sir Edward Grey's speech, on August 4, the German Army had penetrated Belgium on its way to France after a peremptory notice to the Belgian Government to the effect that the Imperial Government "will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable." Thus began the nightmare of German "Kultur," to which unoffending Belgium was subjected, and against which she appealed to the British Government: "Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory."[43] On August 4 Great Britain asked Germany for a definite assurance by midnight that she would not violate Belgian neutrality. Germany's attitude is unmistakable in the following report of an interview by our Ambassador in Berlin with the German Secretary of State:--

"Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his
answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having
crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been
already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why
the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely,
that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest
way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and
endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.

"It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by
the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the
paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got
through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
time.

"This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for
bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action
was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an
inexhaustible supply of troops....

"I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it
might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of
seeing him.... I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency
at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He
said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible
to a degree; just for a word--'neutrality,' a word which in war
time had so often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great
Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation.... He held Great
Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.
I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the
same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for
strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to
advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I
would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should
keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's
neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept,
or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great
Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: 'But at what price will
that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of
that?' I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that fear
of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking
solemn engagements, but His Excellency was so excited, so evidently
overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear
reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further
argument."[44]

Thus, when midnight struck on Tuesday, August 4, 1914, it found us at war with Germany for tearing up the "scrap of paper" which was Britain's bond.[45] And earlier in the same day the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, in the course of a remarkable speech in the Reichstag, admitted the naked doctrine, that German "necessity" overrides every consideration of right and wrong, in the following words:--

"=Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity
knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps" (as a
matter of fact the speaker knew that Belgium had been invaded that
morning) "are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary
to the dictates of international law.... The wrong--I speak
openly--that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as
soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is
threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest
possessions can have only one thought--how he is to hack his way
through (wie er sich durchhaut)!="[46]

FOOTNOTES:

[42] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Part II.

[43] Statements by Prime Minister, House of Commons, August 4 and 5, 1914.

[44] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 160.

[45] See Appendix E.

[46] The _Times_, August 11, 1914.

WAR WITH AUSTRIA.

From now onwards we were definitely allied with France in defence of Belgium's neutrality.

At 6 p.m. on August 6, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.

On August 12 Sir Edward Grey was compelled to inform Count Mensdorff (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London) at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture having occurred between France and Austria, a state of war between Great Britain and Austria would be declared from midnight of August 12.

JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY.

On August 17 the text of an ultimatum by Japan to Germany was published in the following terms:--

"We consider it highly important and necessary in the present
situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance
of the peace in the Far East and to safeguard general interests as
contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great
Britain.

"In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the
establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the
Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty
to give advice to the Imperial German Government, to carry out the
following two propositions:--

"(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters
the German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to
disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.

"(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the
Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or
compensation the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a
view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

"The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that
in the event of its not receiving by noon of August 23 an answer
from the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional
acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese
Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may
deem necessary to meet the situation."[47]

FOOTNOTES:

[47] Under Art. II of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, signed on July 13, 1911, it was agreed that if the two contracting parties should conduct a war in common, they should make peace in mutual agreement, etc.

BRITISH APPROVAL.

The Official Press Bureau issued the following on August 17:--

"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in
communication with each other, are of opinion that it is necessary
for each to take action to protect the general interest in the Far
East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping specially
in view the independence and integrity of China, and provided for
in that Agreement.