Chapter III: Part 3

"Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that
Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian Note, and had
only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that
Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to
forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a
situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He
declared besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian
reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied
Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often
ill-informed, represented it to be."[94]

A denial by the German Ambassador to England of his Government's cognisance of the Note is referred to in a despatch from the Russian Ambassador in London (Count Benckendorff) to M. Sazonof, dated July 25, 1914:--

"Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him
that the German Government were not informed of the text of the
Austrian Note, but that they entirely supported Austria's
action."[95]

On July 25, 1914, a Note was handed by the German Ambassador at Petrograd to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:--

"We learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by
certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the
Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany
is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the
text of the Austrian Note before it was presented, and exercised no
influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly
attributed to Germany.

"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims
made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers
justified."[96]

That this assumed ignorance was received with scepticism, and in some cases frank disbelief in other quarters, is apparent. The French Ambassador in Berlin reported on July 25:--

"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of
events.... He does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the
Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's demarche.

"He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the
Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly
chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the
Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation."[97]

From the French Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 came the following statement to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris:--

"Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution
of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed
her on to aggressive action against Serbia in order to be able
herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances
which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under
conditions which have been thoroughly considered."[98]

Up to this date, as the Russian Berlin representative reported to his Government the Official German Wolff Bureau (News Agency) had not published the text of the conciliatory Serbian reply, although it had been communicated to them; nor had it appeared _in extenso_ in any of the local papers--because of the _calming_ effect it would have had on German readers![99]

On the same day (July 28) the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris sent the following message to the French Ambassadors abroad:--

"I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning;
he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to
make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk
over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action
which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's
intentions, he declared that he did not know them and was ignorant
of the nature of the means of coercion which she was
preparing."[100]

But how does this compare with the following extract from a telegram sent the next day (July 29) by the Kaiser to the Tsar:--

"I cannot ... consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an
'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely
unreliable."[101]

On July 29 the French Minister at Brussels reported:--

"I report the following impressions of my interview with M.
Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact
information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies
every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian
Government would have taken an initiative which would lead,
according to a preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without
previous arrangement with the Emperor William.

"The German Government stand 'with grounded arms' ready to take
peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there
is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us
would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues
share this feeling."[102]

Finally, on July 30, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, stated to Sir Edward Grey:--

="I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the
text of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched,
and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German
Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."=[103]

Confirmation of the whole evidence is found in the commercial world, for as Sir E. H. Holden, Chairman of the London City and Midland Bank, stated on January 29, 1915:--

"On the 18th of July last (1914) the Dresdner Bank caused a great
commotion by selling its securities and by advising its clients to
sell their securities. This was recognised as the first
semi-official intimation of a probable European conflagration...."

FOOTNOTES:

[84] Cd. 7717, No. 19.

[85] Cd. 7717, No. 21.

[86] Cd. 7717, No. 30.

[87] Cd. 7717, No. 32.

[88] Cd. 7717, No. 28.

[89] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 9.

[90] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 6.

[91] Cd. 7860, page 401.

[92] Cd. 7717, No. 41.

[93] Cd. 7626, No. 19.

[94] Cd. 7717, No. 57.

[95] Cd. 7626, No. 20.

[96] Cd. 7626, No. 18.

[97] Cd. 7717, No. 35.

[98] Cd. 7717, No. 83.

[99] Cd. 7626, No. 46.

[100] Cd. 7717, No. 78.

[101] Cd. 7717, Appendix 5, No. 3.

[102] Cd. 7717, No. 87.

[103] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 95.

APPENDIX B.

HOW GERMANY MISLED AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Germany's view is very clearly indicated in a despatch from the British Ambassador at Vienna, dated July 26, 1914:--

"According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will
keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is
resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Serbian
territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my
question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by
public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he
said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose,
the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of
Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was
perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would
not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step
which would probably result in many frontier questions in which
Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian
and Persian questions, being brought into the melting-pot. France,
too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.... He doubted
Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia,
acting as if she made any such claim. _As for Germany, she knew
very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this
matter._"[104]

Germany's view is further explained by the British representative at Berlin, on July 26, 1914:--

"Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador
at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria
annexed bits of Serbian territory Russia would not remain
indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia
would not act if Austria did _not_ annex territory."[105]

The result of this German influence is shown on the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin by the following despatch from Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914:--

"Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most
unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make
war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."[106]

So successful were the Germans in impressing this false view upon the Austrians that the position is best described by the British Ambassador in Vienna in his despatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 27, 1914:--

"I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the
Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the
Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war (with Serbia)
inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved
to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a
Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been
administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to
proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the
prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention
would undoubtedly be a great disappointment."[107]

Added to which we have further proof in a despatch from the British Ambassador at Rome, dated July 23, 1914:--

"Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign
Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the
conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was
absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many
disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has
occasioned, to score a definite success."[108]

FOOTNOTES:

[104] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 32.

[105] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 33.

[106] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 71.

[107] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 41.

[108] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 38.

APPENDIX C.

SOME GERMAN ATROCITIES IN BELGIUM.

In December, 1914, a Committee was appointed by the British Government to inquire into the German outrages in Belgium and France. Under the Chairmanship of Lord Bryce, this Committee was composed of:--

THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M. (Regius Professor of Civil Law at
Oxford, 1870; Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1886;
Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster (with seat in Cabinet), 1892;
President of Board of Trade, 1894; one of the British Members of
the International Tribunal at The Hague; Chief Secretary for
Ireland, 1905-6; His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary at Washington, 1907-12).

THE RT. HON. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, Bt., K.C., LL.D., D.C.L. (Judge
of Admiralty Court of Cinque Ports since 1914; Editor of Law
Reports since 1895; Chairman, Royal Commission on Public Records,
1910; Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1883-1903; Author
of The Law of Torts, 1887; History of English Law, 1895.)

THE RT. HON. SIR EDWARD CLARKE, K.C. (Solicitor-General, 1886-92).

SIR ALFRED HOPKINSON, K.C. (Professor of Law, Owen's College,
Manchester (Principal, 1898-1904); Adviser to the Bombay
University, 1913-14).

MR. H. A. L. FISHER (Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University;
Chichele Lecturer in Foreign History, 1911-12).

MR. HAROLD COX, M.A. (Editor, _Edinburgh Review_).

SIR KENELM E. DIGBY, K.C., G.C.B. (Permanent Under-Secretary of
State at Home Office, 1895-1903).

This eminent and impartial Tribunal, after carefully weighing the evidence (Cd. 7894 and Cd. 7895) came to the following grave conclusions:--

"(i) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and
systematically organised massacres of the civil population,
accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.

"(ii) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians,
both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated,
and children murdered.

"(iii) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of
property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the
German Army, that elaborate provision had been made for systematic
incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings
and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be
alleged, being indeed part of a system of general terrorisation.

"(iv) That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken,
particularly by the using of civilians, including women and
children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a
less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the
frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.

"Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, the
Committee conceive that they would be doing less than their duty
if they failed to record them as fully established by the evidence.
Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a
scale unparalleled in any war between civilised nations during the
last three centuries."

The Report makes it plain that apart from the first outbreak of outrages intended to cow the Belgians into submission, fresh bursts of plunder and rapine took place on specific occasions when the Germans suffered defeat. Cowardly vengeance was thus wreaked on the innocent Belgian civilians for the defeat of German arms. For example, on August 25, 1914, the Belgian Army, sallying out from Antwerp, drove the enemy from Malines. The Germans promptly massacred and burnt at Louvain, "the signal for which was provided by shots exchanged between the German Army retreating after its repulse at Malines and some members of the German garrison of Louvain, who mistook their fellow-countrymen for Belgians."[109] Similarly when a successful sortie from Antwerp drove the Germans from Aerschot, they retaliated by a blood-vendetta upon the civil population.

The Germans have endeavoured to justify their brutal excesses by bringing counter-charges against Belgian civilians. For instance, the Chancellor of the German Empire, in a communication made to the press on September 2, 1914, and printed in the _Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, of September 21, said: "Belgian girls gouged out the eyes of the German wounded. Officials of Belgian cities have invited our officers to dinner, and shot and killed them across the table. Contrary to all international law, the whole civilian population of Belgium was called out, and after having at first shown friendliness carried on in the rear of our troops terrible warfare with concealed weapons. Belgian women cut the throats of soldiers whom they had quartered in their homes while they were sleeping."

Upon this Lord Bryce's Committee make the comment: "No evidence whatever seems to have been adduced to prove these tales."[110]

Of both individual and concerted acts of barbarity, the report teems--for example:--[111]

"It is clearly shown that many offences were committed against
infants and quite young children. On one occasion children were
even roped together and used as a military screen against the
enemy, on another three soldiers went into action carrying small
children to protect themselves from flank fire. A shocking case of
the murder of a baby by a drunken soldier at Malines is thus
recorded by one eye-witness and confirmed by another:--

"'One day when the Germans were not actually bombarding the town I
left my house to go to my mother's house in High Street. My husband
was with me. I saw eight German soldiers, and they were drunk. They
were singing and making a lot of noise and dancing about. As the
German soldiers came along the street I saw a small child, whether
boy or girl I could not see, come out of a house. The child was
about two years of age. The child came into the middle of the
street so as to be in the way of the soldiers. The soldiers were
walking in twos. The first line of two passed the child; one of the
second line, the man on the left, stepped aside and drove his
bayonet with both hands into the child's stomach, lifting the child
into the air on his bayonet and carrying it away on his bayonet, he
and his comrades still singing. The child screamed when the soldier
struck it with his bayonet, but not afterwards.'"[112]

The following brief extracts of German atrocities are taken from Official Reports issued by the Belgian Legation:--[113]

"On the evening of the 22nd" (August, at Tamines) "a group of
between 400 and 450 men was collected in front of the church, not
far from the bank of the Sambre. A German detachment opened fire on
them, but, as the shooting was a slow business, the officers
ordered up a machine gun, which soon swept off all the unhappy
peasants still left standing. Many of them were only wounded, and,
hoping to save their lives, got with difficulty on their feet
again. They were immediately shot down. Many wounded still lay
among the corpses," and some of these were bayoneted....

"Next day, Sunday, the 23rd, about 6 o'clock in the morning,
another party consisting of prisoners made in the village and the
neighbourhood were brought into the square, ... in the square was a
mass of bodies of civilians extending over at least 40 yards by 6
yards. They had evidently been drawn up and shot.... An officer
asked for volunteers to bury the corpses. Those who volunteered
were set to work and dug a trench 15 yards long, 10 broad and 2
deep. The corpses were carried to the trench on planks.... Actually
fathers buried the bodies of their sons, and sons the bodies of
their fathers.

"There were in the square both soldiers and officers. They were
drinking champagne. The more the afternoon drew on the more they
drank.... We buried from 350 to 400 bodies." ... A wounded man was
buried alive, a German doctor having apparently ordered his
interment....

"About 9 in the morning" (at Dinant, August 23) "the German
soldiery, driving before them by blows from the butt-end of rifles,
men, women, and children, pushed them all into the Parade Square,
where they were kept prisoners till 6 o'clock in the evening. The
guard took pleasure in repeating to them that they would soon be
shot. About 6 o'clock a captain separated the men from the women
and children. The women were placed in front of a rank of infantry
soldiers, the men were ranged along a wall. The front rank of them
were told to kneel, the others remaining standing behind them. A
platoon of soldiers drew up in face of these unhappy men. It was in
vain that the women cried out for mercy for their husbands, sons,
and brothers. The officer ordered his men to fire. There had been
no inquiry nor any pretence of a trial. About 20 of the inhabitants
were only wounded, but fell among the dead. The soldiers, to make
sure, fired a new volley into the heap of them. Several citizens
escaped this double discharge. They shammed dead for more than two
hours, remaining motionless among the corpses, and when night fell
succeeded in saving themselves in the hills. Eighty-four corpses
were left on the square and buried in a neighbouring garden."

"On Friday, August 21st, at 4 o'clock in the morning" (at Andenne,
between Namur and Huy) "the" (German) "soldiers spread themselves
through the town, driving all the population into the streets and
forcing men, women, and children to march before them with their
hands in the air. Those who did not obey with sufficient
promptitude, or did not understand the order given them in German,
were promptly knocked down. Those who tried to run away were shot.
It was at this moment that Dr. Camus" (the Burgomaster), "against
whom the Germans seemed to have some special spite, was wounded by
a rifle shot, and then finished off by a blow from an axe. His body
was dragged along by the feet for some distance....

"Subsequently the soldiers, on the order of their officers, picked
out of the mass some 40 or 50 men who were led off and all shot,
some along the bank of the Meuse, and others in front of the Police
Station.

"The rest of the men were kept for a long time in the Place. Among
them lay two persons, one of whom had received a ball in the chest,
and the other a bayonet wound. They lay face to the ground with
blood from their wounds trickling into the dust, occasionally
calling for water. The officers forbade their neighbours to give
them any help.... Both died in the course of the day.... In the
morning the officers told the women to withdraw, giving them the
order to gather together the dead bodies and to wash away the
stains of blood which defiled the street and the houses."

FOOTNOTES:

[109] Cd. 7894, p. 14.

[110] Cd. 7894, p. 26.

[111] Professor J. H. Morgan, Representative of the Home Office, attached to the Headquarters Staff of the British Expeditionary Force, states in a letter to the _Times_, dated May 20, 1915:--

" ... There has lately come into my hands--unfortunately too late
for use by the Committee--evidence which establishes beyond
reasonable doubt that the outrages upon combatants in the field are
committed by the orders of responsible officers, such as Brigade and
Company Commanders, and that British and Belgian soldiers are the
objects of peculiar malignancy.... _There is some evidence to show
that the East Prussian and Bavarian regiments are the worst
offenders. The French military authorities, who have been of great
assistance to me in my inquiries, informed me that they have now a
very considerable 'black list' of this character. When the time
comes to dictate terms of peace and to exact reparation that list
will be very useful...._ In the earlier stages of the war there was
a widespread disinclination on the part of our officers and men to
credit stories of 'atrocities.' Nothing has impressed me more than
the complete change of conviction on this point, especially among
our officers. As a Staff Officer of the highest eminence said to me
lately, 'The Germans have no sense of honour in the field.' Any
sense of the freemasonry of arms has practically disappeared among
them, and deliberate killing of the wounded is of frequent
occurrence."

[112] Cd. 7894. p. 32.

[113] The Commission chiefly responsible for these official Belgian reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State (President); Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and Vice-President of the Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman of the City of Antwerp; M. Van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court of Antwerp; and, as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of Legation.

APPENDIX D.

GERMANY'S EMPLOYMENT OF POISONOUS GAS.

The following is a copy of a Report dated May 3, 1915, by Field-Marshal Sir John French on the employment by the Germans of poisonous gases as weapons of warfare:--

"The gases employed have been ejected from pipes laid into the
trenches, and also produced by the explosion of shells especially
manufactured for the purpose. The German troops who attacked under
cover of these gases were provided with specially designed
respirators, which were issued in sealed pattern covers. This all
points to long and methodical preparation on a large scale.

"A week before the Germans first used this method they announced in
their official _communique_ that we were making use of asphyxiating
gases. At the time there appeared to be no reason for this
astounding falsehood, but now, of course, it is obvious that it was
part of the scheme. It is a further proof of the deliberate nature
of the introduction by the Germans of a new and illegal weapon, and
shows that they recognised its illegality and were anxious to
forestall neutral, and possibly domestic, criticism.

"Since the enemy first made use of this method of covering his
advance with a cloud of poisoned air he has repeated it both in
offence and defence whenever the wind has been favourable.

"The effect of this poison is not merely disabling, or even
painlessly fatal, as suggested in the German Press. Those of its
victims who do not succumb on the field, and who can be brought
into hospital, suffer acutely, and in a large proportion of cases
die a painful and lingering death. Those who survive are in little
better case, as the injury to their lungs appears to be of a
permanent character and reduces them to a condition which points to
their being invalids for life. These effects must be well known to
the German scientists who devised this new weapon and to the
military authorities who have sanctioned its use.

"I am of opinion that the enemy has definitely decided to use these
gases as a normal procedure, and that protests will be useless."

APPENDIX E.

EFFORTS OF GERMAN MINISTERS OF STATE TO LAY BLAME ON BRITAIN.

Since the war, both the German Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, and the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, have endeavoured to explain away the former's phrase: "a scrap of paper," which shocked the diplomatic conscience of the world. Both have endeavoured to lay the blame for the conflict at Great Britain's door.[114] The German Imperial Chancellor now declares that:--

"Documents on the Anglo-Belgian Military Agreement which ... we
have found in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office ... showed
that England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium
without the consent of the Belgian Government."[115]

The true facts of the case are to be seen in the following extract from the statement issued by the Belgian Minister in London, on March 17, 1915:--

"A month after the declaration of war the German Chancery
discovered at Brussels the reports of certain conversations which
had taken place in 1906 and in 1912 between two British Military
Attaches and two Chiefs of the Staff of the Belgian Army. In order
to transform these reports into documents which would justify
Germany's conduct it was necessary to garble them and to lie. Such
was the only way in which the German action against Belgium could
be made to appear decent.... Thus it came to pass that, with a
shamelessness for which history shows few parallels, the German
Chancery gave out that a 'Convention' had existed, by which Belgium
had betrayed her most sacred pledges and violated her own
neutrality for the benefit of England. To produce an impression on
those ignorant of the facts, 'German honesty' suppressed, when the
precis of the above-named conversations was published, the clause
in which it was set forth that the exchange of opinion therein
recorded _did reference only to the situation that would be created
if Belgian neutrality had already been violated_. The Belgian
Government gives to the allegations of the German Chancery the only
answer that they deserve--they are a tissue of lies, all the more
shameless because they are set forth by persons who claim to have
studied the original documents.

"But what are the documents which Germany produces in order to
prove Belgium guilty? They are two in number:--

"(1) The narrative of certain interviews which took place between
Lieutenant-General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. In the
course of these interviews the British officer set forth his views
as to the way in which England could help Belgium _in case the
latter were attacked by Germany_. One phrase in the document
clearly proves that Colonel Barnardiston is dealing with a
hypothetical case--viz., 'the entry of English troops into Belgium
would only take place after a violation of Belgian neutrality by
Germany.' The translation in the _Norddeutsche Zeitung_ of November
25 _omits this clause_, the phrase which gives its exact scope and
significance to the document. Moreover, the photograph of General
Ducarne's report contains the words, 'The officer with whom I spoke
insists that our conversation has been absolutely confidential.'
For the word _conversation_ the _Norddeutsche Zeitung_ substitutes
the word 'convention.' Colonel Barnardiston is made to say that
'our convention' has been absolutely confidential![116]

"Such proceedings need no commentary.

"(2) The second document is the report of a conversation on the
same subject in April, 1912, between Lieutenant-General Jungbluth
and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. In the course of the conversation
the former observed to the latter that 'any English intervention in
favour of Belgium, if she were the victim of German aggression,
could only take place with our consent.' The British Military
Attache raised the point that England might perhaps exercise her
rights and duties, as one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgium,
without waiting for the appeal to be made to her. This was Colonel
Bridges' personal opinion only. The British Government has always
held, as did the Belgian Government, that the consent of the latter
was a necessary preliminary.

"The Belgian Government declares on its honour that not only was no
'Convention' ever made, but also that neither of the two
Governments ever made any advances or propositions concerning the
conclusion of any such convention. Moreover, the Minister of Great
Britain at Brussels, who alone could contract engagements in her
behalf, never intervened in these conversations. And the whole
Belgian Ministry are ready to pledge themselves on oath that no
conclusions arising from these conversations were ever brought
before the Cabinet, or even laid before one single member of it.
The documents which the Germans discovered give evidence of all
this. Their meaning is perfectly clear provided that no part of
them is either garbled or suppressed.

"In face of calumnies repeated again and again, our Government,
faithfully reflecting Belgian uprightness, considers that it is its
duty to inflict once more on the spoiler of Belgium the brand of
infamy--his only legitimate reward. It also takes the opportunity
of declaring, in answer to allegations whose malevolence is
obvious, that:--

"(1) Before the declaration of war no French force, even of the
smallest size, had entered Belgium.

"(2) Not only did Belgium never refuse an offer of military help
offered by one of the guaranteeing Powers, but after the
declaration of war she earnestly solicited the protection of her
guarantors.

"(3) When undertaking, as was her duty, the vigorous defence of her
fortresses, Belgium asked for, and received with gratitude, such
help as her guarantors were able to place at her disposition for
that defence.

"Belgium the victim of her own loyalty, will not bow her head
before any Power. Her honour defies the assaults of falsehood. She
has faith in the justice of the world. On the day of judgment the
triumph belongs to the people who have sacrificed everything to
serve conscientiously the cause of Truth, Right, and Honour."

In the foregoing connection, the following extract from a statement authorised by Sir Edward Grey on January 26, 1915, is of interest:--

"As regards the conversation ... the Belgian officer said to the
British: 'You could only land in our country with our consent,' and
in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical
assurance that no British Government would violate the neutrality
of Belgium; and that 'so long as it was not violated by any other
Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their
territory.'

"The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated
in this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying 'he did
not believe England would take such a step, because he did not
think English public opinion would justify such action.' What Sir
Edward Grey actually wrote was:--'I said that I was sure that this
Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of
Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be
the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of
it.'

"If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were
conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian
officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to him,
namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of
strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the Belgian
frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract--railways
deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium,
such as was carried out in August last. This fact alone was enough
to justify any communications between Belgium and other Powers on
the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality
unless it were previously violated by another Power...."

FOOTNOTES:

[114] Interview with Herr von Jagow, by the _New York World_, March 28, 1915; interview with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, by the Associated Press, in New York papers, January 25, 1915.

[115] No such "conversations" took place in 1911. A passing reference only to the Morocco situation of 1911 was made in the 1912 "conversations." This appears to be the German Chancellor's sole foundation for his assertion. Cd. 7860, p. 360.

[116] In a letter to the _Morning Post_ of February 8, 1915, Mr. A. Hamon, Professor de l'Universite, Nouville de Bruxelles, writes:--

"In October and November last (13th and 24th) the _Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung_ published the documents seized by the Germans
in the Belgian archives. The German Government then published a
Dutch edition of these documents, accompanied by a photographic
reproduction of the said documents. The pamphlet bears the name of
R. W. E. Wijnmalen as publisher, in the town of Den Haag (The
Hague). On the photographic document we read in the margin: 'The
entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the
violation of our neutrality by Germany.' Now, this extremely
important note is omitted in the Dutch translation. It was also
omitted in the German translation. This is a falsification through
omission, a very serious falsification, as it modified the meaning
of the document.

"But we have worse still. On the top of page 2 of General Ducarne's
letter to the Minister, he says: 'My interlocutor insisted on this
fact that "our conversation was quite confidential...."' In the
Dutch translation, instead of 'conversation,' there is 'convention'
(overeenkomst)! The mistake is great and cannot be but purposely
made. The German Government thus changes into a convention, that is
to say, an agreement, what is but a simple conversation."

APPENDIX F.

LIST OF PARLIAMENTARY PUBLICATIONS RESPECTING THE WAR.

Correspondence respecting the European Crisis. Misc. No. 6 (1914).

Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German Government. Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Misc. No. 8 (1914).

German Organisation for Influencing the Press of other Countries. Despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Misc. No. 9 (1914).

Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian Government. Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna. Misc. 10 (1914).

Documents respecting Negotiations preceding the War published by the Russian Government. Misc. No. 11 (1914).

Papers relating to the Support offered by the Princes and Peoples of India to His Majesty in connection with the War. (I.O. paper.)

Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War published by the Belgian Government. Misc. No. 12 (1914).

Correspondence respecting Events leading to the Rupture of Relations with Turkey. Misc. No. 13 (1914).

Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople summarising Events leading up to Rupture of Relations with Turkey and Reply. Misc. No. 14 (1914).

Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War published by the French Government. Misc. No. 15 (1914).

Despatch to Sir H. Howard containing instruction respecting his Mission to the Vatican. Misc. No. 1 (1914).

Temperance Measures adopted in Russia since the outbreak of the War. Despatch from Petrograd enclosing Memo. Misc. No. 2 (1915).

Letter July 31/14 from President of French Republic to the King respecting the European Crisis, and His Majesty's Reply. Misc. No. 3 (1915).

Treatment of German Prisoners in United Kingdom. Correspondence with the U.S. Ambassador respecting. Misc. No. 5 (1915).

Rights of Belligerents: Correspondence with U.S. Government. Misc. No. 6 (1915).

Treatment of Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in the U.K. and Germany respectively: Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and U.S. Ambassador respecting. Misc. No. 7 (1915).

Release of Interned Civilians and the Exchange of Diplomatic. &c., Officers, and of certain classes of Naval and Military Officers, Prisoners of War in the United Kingdom and Germany respectively. Misc. No. 8 (1915).

Sinking of German Cruiser "Dresden" in Chilean Territorial Waters: Notes exchanged with the Chilean Minister. Misc. No. 9 (1915).

List of certain Commissions and Committees set up to deal with Public Questions arising out of the War.

Bad Time kept in Shipbuilding, Munitions and Transport Areas: Report and Statistics.

Alleged German Outrages: Report of Committee.

Alleged German Outrages: Appendix to Report of Committee.

Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War. Misc. No. 10 (1915).

Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians at certain places of detention in Germany: Report by United States Officials. Misc. No. 11 (1915).

Correspondence regarding the Naval and Military Assistance afforded to His Majesty's Government by His Majesty's Oversea Dominions. (Cd. 7607.)

Correspondence relating to Gifts of Food-Stuffs and other Supplies to His Majesty's Government from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies. (Cd. 7608.)

Correspondence regarding Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies. (Cd. 7646.)

Papers relating to Scales of Pensions and Allowances of Officers and Men of the Oversea Contingents and their Dependents. (Cd. 7793.)

Correspondence on the subject of the proposed Naval and Military Expedition against German South-West Africa. (Cd. 7873.)

Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion and the Policy of the Government with regard to its suppression. (Cd. 7874.)

Further Correspondence regarding Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies. (Cd. 7875.)

* * * * *

Transcriber's note:

The transcriber made this change to the text to correct an obvious error:

1. p. 34, "appproaches" --> "approaches"

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