Chapter XXVI: Cambrai and Gouzeaucourt (2)

“That night the 4th Battalion handed over its burden to some
one else. It was due to be relieved. The Chaplain had
arrived to see to it that the brave dead had decent burial.
When it was possible, the Grenadiers always carried down
their dead, so that in the future, grouped together, they
would stand as a memorial of the cause they fought for, and
indicate plainly to future generations how Grenadiers could
fight and die――a monument to the power of discipline,
self-sacrifice, and pride of race.”

No. 1 Company under Captain Sloane-Stanley, No. 3 under Lieutenant Nash, and No. 4 under Captain Paton, dug themselves in with entrenching tools along the Anneux chapel――Mœuvres road, while No. 2, under Captain Britten, was placed in Anneux chapel itself. The shelling was very violent, and all the roads, by which supplies and supports had to move, were accurately and persistently shelled. The Brigadier, Lord Henry Seymour, came along, quite unconcerned and not even wearing a helmet, to see how these companies were getting on, and told them they might have to move up later into Bourlon Wood. When it got dark snow began to fall, and it became bitterly cold. The position of a lent battalion is by no means an enviable one, and soon orders and counter-orders from different authorities succeeded each other with amazing rapidity. Finally definite orders were sent to the Battalion to take up a position in Bourlon Wood, and at the same time it was placed under the orders of the 186th Brigade. While this move was being carried out, Lieutenant Nash was wounded in the leg and sent back to the dressing-station. In order to keep in touch with the 186th Brigade, Second Lieutenant Tuckwell was sent to Graincourt to act as liaison-officer to General Bradford, V.C.

Bourlon Wood, which covers about 100 acres, might well have been a typical English covert, with its tall trees interspersed with undergrowth about eight feet high. The line to be held consisted of a road running north and south, parallel to the front line. The ground was soaking wet, and the men had to force their way through the dripping leaves and lie out in the wood with no protection of any kind. Digging through the stubborn soil and soaking undergrowth was no easy matter with light entrenching tools, but they soon produced some sort of cover. The Fortieth Division, however, had succeeded in its attack, and so there was nothing for the 4th Battalion to do but to remain in the wood where it was. In the evening, much to the satisfaction of every one, it reverted to the command of the Guards Division. Lieutenant Ingleby, the acting Quartermaster, arrived at Battalion Headquarters at 11 that night, having guided the transport up to Anneux chapel through intense shelling, and reported that Second Lieutenant N. A. Pearce, the transport officer, who had shown great determination and pluck in his efforts to bring all that was wanted up to the men in the trenches, had been killed by a shell. Major-General Feilding received the following message from Major-General Ponsonby:

I wish to express on behalf of my Division my sincere thanks
for the support given us on the 24th and 25th by the
Battalions of the Guards Division placed at my disposal for
the defence of Bourlon Wood, namely the 2nd Battalion Scots
Guards and 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards.

I should like to bring to your notice particularly the 2nd
Battalion Scots Guards, who throughout the period prevented
the enemy from breaking through the right flank of the
position, and assisted in repelling at least two of the
enemy’s counter-attacks. I enclose extracts from the report
of the Brigadier-General commanding the 119th Infantry
Brigade:

“The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards reinforced the firing line,
which had become very thin, early in the morning of November
25, and remained in action until they came under the orders
of the 186th Infantry Brigade on the night of 26-27th
November. All ranks behaved with the utmost gallantry, and
assisted to repel at least two German counter-attacks in
addition to continual enemy pressure. They inspired all with
great confidence.

“The 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards came under my command in
the afternoon of the 25th inst. To reach a position of
readiness it had to cross the open in artillery formation
for a great distance under enemy observation, and were
heavily shelled in so doing. The men were as steady as if on
parade. To the above-mentioned units I wish to express my
gratitude.”

[Sidenote: Nov. 26.]

The next day passed quietly, and the company commanders were able to go in turn to Battalion Headquarters to have some rest. In the evening snow fell heavily, and the men had a cold and uncomfortable night. The 4th Battalion was again to be lent to another brigade, that of General Sergison-Brooke, who received orders to attack Fontaine. It was not actually wanted for the attack, but merely to form a defensive line, on which the assaulting waves could fall back in case of failure.

The enemy put down a heavy barrage on the whole line that night, and Lord Gort sent Captain Chapman to inquire from the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards what was happening, but it proved to be merely the outcome of nervousness on the part of the Germans, and no attack developed. The Battalion moved off at 5.30 A.M., to take up new positions facing east instead of north, at very short notice; and, as the night was very dark and wet and the enemy was so close, the advance into position required some care. In order to prevent any confusion in the jumping-off line, the Battalion was told to occupy a position immediately in rear of the line, and to move up in the line only when the attack had actually started.

ATTACK ON FONTAINE

[Sidenote: Nov. 27.]

In a drizzle of rain, and under an intense enemy barrage, the attack of Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade started at 6.30 in the morning of the 27th. It reached its objective, but the cost was so great, that the survivors found it impossible to maintain the position they had so dearly gained, without reinforcements. So weak were the attacking battalions, that they were in danger of being overwhelmed by counter-attacks. While the 4th Battalion was waiting for orders about 10 A.M., the German counter-attacks began to develop, and fire from the left became very heavy. No. 2 Company under Captain Britten was sent off to secure the left flank of the Division, which seemed to be in a dangerously weak condition. As they came up Second Lieutenant Windeler was killed by a sniper, and Captain Britten himself was wounded in the arm by a rifle bullet. Soon afterwards Second Lieutenant Oliver, who was now in command of No. 3 Company, was severely wounded in the chest, arm, and foot, while going out to bring in a wounded Irish Guardsman. The casualties among other ranks were proportionately heavy.

A warning order arrived from Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke at 10.30 A.M., preparing the Battalion to supply two companies for the support of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Coldstream, but it seemed doubtful whether a couple of companies, or even four, would be of any use in the circumstances. Captain Gerard, the Adjutant, reported that he had heard from Captain Paton that already the 2nd Guards Brigade was falling back to the original line.

Lord Gort went off at once with Captain Chapman to the headquarters of the 3rd Battalion, and discussed the new situation with Colonel Thorne. They decided that it would be inadvisable, in view of the enemy’s strength, and the absence of any appreciable reserves on our side, to renew the attack, and so use up the 4th Battalion with small chance of success. Orders were accordingly issued for the original line now held by the 4th Battalion to become the line of resistance, under the command of Captain Paton and Captain Sloane-Stanley. That night the 4th Battalion was relieved, and returned to the Hindenburg line at Flesquières.

[Sidenote: Nov. 28.]

On the 28th it marched to Trescault, and pitched a camp on the open ground between the Trescault――Metz road and Havrincourt Wood. The enemy’s aircraft left them no peace, and so the tents were struck the next morning, and pitched again in Havrincourt Wood. The undergrowth was thick, and the cutting of it took some time, but when the camp was finished it proved snug and sheltered.

[Sidenote: Nov. 30.]

The officers had just finished breakfast on the 30th, and were about to inspect their companies, when the news arrived that the Germans had broken through the line near Gonnelieu. It was said that the enemy had been seen marching in fours through Gouzeaucourt. Immediately orders were given for the Battalion to be ready to start at a moment’s notice. Although the men had expected a quiet day, and were quite unprepared, so perfect were the organisation and discipline that in half an hour’s time the Battalion was ready to move off.

Lord Gort’s orders were to concentrate on Metz, and accordingly the Battalion moved off in that direction. The road was full of transport moving in the opposite direction, and with it ran a stream of men looking strangely unlike British soldiers, with no rifles or equipment――wounded and unwounded with incoherent stories, officers half-undressed, gunners with breechblocks in their hands, all with a hunted look. Some high-explosive shells came streaming over, and pitched not far from the road. Lord Henry Seymour with his commanding officers rode on ahead to try and glean some information, while the four battalions of his Brigade marched through Metz, past the beetroot factory and on to the open ground beyond, where they lay down and waited.

ATTACK ON GONNELIEU

About 2.30 P.M. the whole Brigade, in artillery formation, moved off in the direction of Gouzeaucourt, and in the meantime the attack of De Crespigny’s Brigade had been completely successful and required no reinforcements. The direction of the march was consequently slightly changed. The 4th Battalion crossed the Trescault――Gouzeaucourt road, where, thanks to Lieutenant Ingleby, the cookers arrived, and the men were provided with hot food. That night General Walker, commanding the 16th Brigade of the Sixth Division, held a conference at the 4th Battalion Headquarters. His object was to ensure that the 4th Battalion understood his scheme of attack, for if his brigade failed it would have to carry out his plan. The hurried manner in which the attack was planned, and the obviously scanty information on which the plan was based, seemed to indicate that it was not likely to succeed. At 1 A.M. a warning order was issued to the effect that Seymour’s Brigade would assault Gonnelieu, if the attack of the 16th Brigade failed. Lord Gort thereupon wrote out his orders with the very meagre information at his disposal.

To have to select a definite objective after dark made things very difficult, since the final disposition depended upon the attack of the 16th Brigade, and whatever happened an indefinite front line would be the result. If the 16th Brigade succeeded, Seymour’s Brigade would simply relieve it, but if it failed the attack would have to be attempted a second time. These considerations alone made it necessary to work out alternative schemes. Lord Henry Seymour fortunately prepared a detailed plan for the worst event, and fully realised that his Brigade was to be employed in a manner generally accepted as impossible, except in a great emergency, involving the advance of infantry, unsupported by artillery, across the open against an enemy occupying trenches, and houses bristling with machine-guns.

The following officers took part in the attack on Gonnelieu:

Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O.,
M.V.O., M.C. Commanding Officer.
Major W. S. Pilcher, D.S.O. 2nd in Command.
Capt. C. R. Gerard Adjutant.
Capt. M. Chapman Intelligence Officer.
Capt. H. H. Sloane-Stanley No. 1 Company.
Lieut. C. E. Irby ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. M. Chitty ” ”
2nd Lieut. B. J. Hubbard, M.C. No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. C. Denman ” ”
2nd Lieut. D. E. A. Horne ” ”
Capt. J. B. M. Burke, M.C. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. the Hon. A. H. L. Hardinge ” ”
Lieut. L. R. Abel-Smith ” ”
Capt. G. H. T. Paton, M.C. No. 4 Company.
Lieut. B. C. Layton ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. J. M. Veitch ” ”

When the news of the failure of the 16th Brigade’s attack reached Lord Gort, he at once started off with the Battalion, and crossed the Villers Plouich road. On reaching the railway the companies extended, and dug themselves in. There they waited in the dark for zero hour.

The order of battle for Seymour’s Brigade was as follows: The 1st Battalion Welsh Guards on the right and the 4th Battalion Grenadiers on the left were to undertake the attack. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers was in support on the left, and had to protect the left flank as the attack advanced, while the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards had already occupied the high ground about Villers Plouich. In the 4th Battalion No. 2 Company under Second Lieutenant Hubbard on the right and No. 3 under Captain Burke on the left formed the first line. No. 4 Company under Captain Paton was in support, and No. 1 under Captain Sloane-Stanley formed the reserve. Captain Chapman was sent forward to establish a forward Battalion Headquarters.

[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]

Without any artillery preparation the attack started at 6.30 A.M. It was still fairly dark, but the Germans could see enough to use their machine-guns with considerable accuracy. The line of advance was over open ground, up a gentle slope leading to Gonnelieu, and there was no cover or protection of any kind for the attackers. On came the leading companies of the 4th Battalion in perfect order. The men never wavered for an instant, though they knew that they were to be sacrificed to save the situation. They all understood that the rules of modern warfare were to be defied, and that instead of following a creeping barrage they were to advance across the open, with not even a preliminary bombardment. Though they knew this, they never faltered.

The enemy’s machine-gun fire when it broke over them was terrible, like a driving hailstorm, but the pace was never checked for a moment. Especially on the right the fire was terrific, and No. 2 Company, which had gone rather too far in that direction, suffered heavy losses: one platoon was practically wiped out. Second Lieutenant Hubbard himself was killed, and Second Lieutenant Denman was mortally wounded, gallantly attempting to silence a German machine-gun, while Second Lieutenant Horne was also wounded. No. 3 Company under Captain Burke maintained its direction, and had few casualties until it came up close to the village. On reaching a road running in the direction of Vacquerie, it had to pause for a moment to allow No. 4 to come up before continuing its advance. Second Lieutenant Veitch had his thigh smashed by a bullet, and fell back into a shell-hole. Almost simultaneously a man shot through the head fell on the top of him, and being too weak to move the dying man, for twelve hours he remained in this cramped position.

The left of the line met with less resistance than the right, and so got far in advance. No. 3 Company dashed forward into the outskirts of Gonnelieu, but the village seemed almost impregnable against infantry unsupported by tanks or artillery. A small enclosure sheltered by ruined buildings was the only protected spot, the ground all round it was swept by machine-gun fire, and of course the shrubs and rank grass were no cover at all. Captain Burke dashed in on the left, and penetrated into the eastern outskirts of Gonnelieu, while Lieutenant Hardinge with a few men got round to the north of the village, and brought up a Lewis gun to a position in the cemetery. This had a most disconcerting effect on the enemy, for it threatened his right flank, and enfiladed the troops opposing Nos. 2 and 4 Companies.

The Germans quickly grasped the fact that this movement on Lieutenant Hardinge’s part required immediate action. They managed to press back the troops on the left of the Brigade, with a view of enfilading the cemetery. With great ingenuity they worked round with their machine-guns, and soon Lieutenant Hardinge’s position became untenable. All his men were killed or wounded with the exception of Sergeant Hull. Then the gun jammed. There was now nothing to be done but to get back as best he could, and being luckily only slightly wounded, he was able to make his way back, accompanied by Sergeant H. Hull.

Meanwhile Lieutenant L. Abel-Smith and Sergeant Williams went down a line of huts to the right, to see if an advance could be made in that direction, but were met with a withering fire from the right flank. With two platoons they therefore advanced a short distance down the centre of the village, but the enemy’s machine-gun fire was so fierce that the ground over which they crawled was plastered with bullets. Some men, who were creeping along behind a wall, were killed by bullets which pierced the brickwork, and Lieutenant L. Abel-Smith himself was wounded.

This most gallant attempt on the part of No. 3 Company to capture the village resulted in such heavy losses that it was obvious it would have to retire. A German counter-attack as it was attempting to consolidate its position settled the matter. A certain number of men managed to get back, but most of them were killed or taken prisoners, including Captain Burke himself, who died fighting to the last. The same fate befell Second Lieutenant Chitty, who, with a party of No. 1 Company, had succeeded in entering the village.

Captain Paton with No. 4 Company had the difficult task of deciding what he should do, on reaching the trench in front of Gonnelieu. No. 3 had gone on into the outskirts, and there was no sign of the Welsh Guards on his right. It was obvious that his best plan would be to hold the trench until the others came up into line, so that at least those who had gone on would have a strong supporting line to retire to. But there was a mixed medley of men on his left, who seemed to be wavering in the face of the counter-attack. Captain Paton thereupon leaped out of his trench, and ran across the open, with machine-gun bullets ploughing up the ground all round him. With almost reckless bravery he went from trench to trench in full sight of the German machine-gunners, encouraging these groups of men from various regiments. At first he seemed to have almost a charmed life, and his splendid example inspirited all who saw him. The situation was saved, and he fell soon afterwards mortally wounded. For this conspicuous act of gallantry he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. Captain Gerard, the Adjutant, who came up to obtain information for Lord Gort, found that owing to Captain Paton’s efforts the left flank was secure.

It was now clear that without considerable reinforcements and unlimited sacrifices the village could not be taken. The enemy’s machine-guns were too strong. The Germans were counter-attacking, and were able to overpower any parties that had gained a footing in the village. Only one of the fourteen tanks that had been expected appeared, and, although it was undoubtedly a great help to the Welsh Guards, it was quite inadequate by itself. The Brigade on the left and the Welsh Guards on the right had been held up, so that even had the Battalion taken the village they would not have been able to hold it. A German officer captured that day stated that his battalion had attacked from behind Gonnelieu at 6 A.M., and as our attack started at 6.30 they had been completely disorganised by our advance, which they imagined was a counter-attack delivered with amazing rapidity.

Captain Sloane-Stanley, who had come up with No. 1 Company, determined to consolidate the trench immediately in front of Gonnelieu, so that it might be held with what remained of the attacking Companies. Lieutenant Irby of the same Company held a block in the trench against persistent bombing attacks, and eventually knocked out a German machine-gun by counter-bombing. Lord Gort himself now came up to see exactly how matters stood, and walked about, as he always did on such occasions, with an absolute disregard for all danger. It was not long, however, before he was severely wounded; the only wonder was that he had not been hit before. There were many acts of individual bravery, and perhaps the gallantry displayed by Sergeants Canham and Buckle was one of the most conspicuous. At one time, when the enemy were advancing dangerously near our line, these two sergeants left their trench, and charged. The Germans, imagining that these two wore only the foremost of a large party, fled in confusion.

Major Pilcher, who now assumed command of the 4th Battalion, was confronted with a very difficult situation. The sadly depleted ranks of the Battalion were holding the trench in front of Gonnelieu, and there were only three officers left――Captain H. Sloane-Stanley, Lieutenant Layton, and Lieutenant Irby. The tactical position was hazardous in the extreme, for both flanks were in the air and dangerously large gaps in the line seemed to invite a German attack. When the troops on the left retired, Major Pilcher called on the 1st Battalion Grenadiers to send up one Company to his assistance, and Captain Rhodes was sent to form a defensive flank. Later, when further assistance was required, two more Companies under Captain Spence and Captain Lawford advanced down the sunken road, and prolonged the line to the left. This timely assistance undoubtedly saved the left flank of the 4th Battalion, and enabled it to maintain its position.

[Sidenote: Dec. 3.]

The line now formed a salient in front of Gonnelieu; the apex being held by the 4th Battalion with some men of the Northants Labour Battalion. On the left was the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, which formed a defensive flank, while the Welsh Guards écheloned back to the right. This position was maintained until December 3, when the 4th Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, which latter had been due the night before. Owing to the delay the already exhausted officers and men had to spend a further twenty-four hours in the trenches, exposed to a hard frost. It was only through almost superhuman efforts that they received their rations on the morning of the 2nd, as the failure to relieve them had upset all arrangements for supply.

On the night of the 3rd they marched back, and bivouacked in the open on some ground north of Gouzeaucourt Wood, where they remained ready, in case their services should be required.

When the Guards Division left the area of operations near Gouzeaucourt, the 4th Battalion proceeded to Etricourt, where they entrained for Laherliere. Thence they marched to Gouy-en-Artois, and were placed in comfortable billets in a château. On December 11 they proceeded to Dainville, where they remained till the end of the month training. The weather became very cold and misty, and later there was a good deal of snow. On the 23rd the following officers joined the Battalion: Lieutenant F. C. Lyon, the Hon. C. C. S. Rodney, Second Lieutenant B. R. Osborne, Second Lieutenant R. D. Richardson, and Second Lieutenant C. J. Dawson-Greene.

THE 1ST BATTALION

[Sidenote: 1st Batt. Nov.]

After the operations at Bixschoote in October, the 1st Battalion remained in billets at Zudroue, near Watten. During this period the following officers joined the Battalion: Lieutenant I. C. Gascoigne, Second Lieutenant D. B. Topham, Lieutenant R. D. Lawford, Second Lieutenant A. H. Forbes, Second Lieutenant C. Cruttenden, and Lieutenant H. G. Wiggins. Captain H. H. Castle, R.A.M.C., also arrived to take the place of Captain P. H. Wells, R.A.M.C. While the Battalion was at Zudroue, the Colonel of the Regiment, Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, paid them a visit.

On November 9 the move south began, and the 1st Battalion marched to Enquin-les-Mines, continuing its march on the following day to Fabain Palfart, and then on to Foolinricametz. Second Lieutenant S. J. Hargreaves joined from the base on the 15th. The march was continued on the 17th through Ivergny Pommier to Achiet-le-Petit, where the men had twenty-four hours’ rest. The greatest secrecy was preserved, and no orders were issued to the Company Commanders till the last moment, though from the great concentration of troops it seemed clear that some big move was impending. The 1st Battalion was brought up in buses to Beaumetz-les-Cambrai, and from there it marched with the rest of Seymour’s Brigade to Flesquières. Though two Battalions of the Brigade were sent up to support the Fortieth Division, which was taking Bourlon Wood, the 1st Battalion did not take part in these operations. On the night of the 27th the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, assisted by two Companies from the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, relieved the 2nd Guards Brigade in the front line. The following officers took part in these operations:

Lieut.-Colonel M. E. Makgill-Crichton-
Maitland, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. L. G. Fisher-Rowe, M.C. Second in Command.
Lieut. W. H. Lovell, M.C. Acting Adjutant.
Lieut. L. de J. Harvard King’s Company.
Lieut. J. A. Lloyd ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. H. Frere ” ”
Capt. A. T. G. Rhodes No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. L. G. Byng ” ”
2nd Lieut. E. G. Hawkesworth ” ”
2nd Lieut. W. U. Timmis ” ”
Capt. P. M. Spence, M.C. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. H. G. Wiggins ” ”
Lieut. S. J. Hargreaves ” ”
2nd Lieut. C. Cruttenden ” ”
Capt. R. D. Lawford No. 4 Company.
Lieut. the Hon. P. P. Cary ” ”
2nd Lieut. C. C. Mays ” ”
Lieut. N. G. Chamberlain ” ”
Capt. H. H. Castle, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.

Conditions were favourable for carrying out the relief, and the next day passed without incident, although the enemy continued to shell the valley south of Bourlon Wood. On the evening of the 28th the 3rd Guards Brigade, having been relieved by the Fifty-ninth Division, marched to the reserve trenches south-west of Ribecourt. Next day it proceeded to Havrincourt Wood. A camp was pitched, and to make way for the tents it was necessary to clear away the undergrowth, which so delayed matters that it was not till 10 P.M. that every one had settled down.

[Sidenote: Nov. 30.]

Barely had the officers finished breakfast on the morning of the 30th, when rumours reached them that the Germans had broken through the line. At first no one believed this possible, and, as the camp was quite five miles from our front line, a further report that the Germans were not far off was received with incredulity. But soon small parties of men were seen coming over the hill, as well as gunners and horses without guns. By degrees these isolated parties became a mob, and the road was blocked by a torrent of transport and men. A few shells pitched not far from the camp, and confirmed the news of the approach of the Germans. At the same time there arrived a warning order to be ready to move at a moment’s notice, and soon the whole camp was filled with bustle and excitement.

The first warning said that Seymour’s Brigade was to be ready to take up a defensive position on the ridge of Havrincourt Wood. This was cancelled later, and the Brigade was told to concentrate at a point near Metz. As soon as the order was confirmed, the 1st Battalion moved off to join the rest of the Brigade on the Trescault――Metz road. The march was trying, as the road was blocked with traffic, all moving in the opposite direction. At some points the Brigade encountered as many as three limbers abreast. Sometimes, therefore, the troops had to go in single file through a mass of vehicles and men, and then to double so as to keep touch with those in front. Being on a hill, the road was clearly visible for miles, and the Germans soon started hammering it with high-explosive shells, which added to the general confusion. It requires a very highly disciplined force to move quickly against such a stream as this was, but the men never checked their pace for a moment. Spades and shovels were drawn in Metz, and the whole Brigade was soon ready to advance in artillery formation. The 1st Battalion followed the Welsh Guards across country in the direction of Gouzeaucourt and Villers Plouich. Brigadier-General Lord Henry Seymour rode on in front with his Staff.

ATTACK ON GONNELIEU

The position taken up by the Brigade was just under the crest of the ridge, running north from Gouzeaucourt Wood, and the 1st Battalion bivouacked for the night within half a mile of the camp in Havrincourt Wood, where the stores and transport had remained. As the night was bitterly cold, one blanket per man and the officers’ trench kits were fetched, and eventually, when the cookers came up, tea and porridge was given out to the men.

[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]

At 4 A.M., after the Company Commanders had returned from reconnoitring, orders were issued for the 1st Battalion to move by Companies in artillery formation, and take up a line on the railway between Gouzeaucourt on the right and Villers Plouich on the left. By 9 A.M. the Companies were in position: No. 2, under Captain Rhodes, on the right and in touch with the 4th Battalion Grenadiers; No. 3, under Captain Spence, in the centre; No. 4, under Captain Lawford, on the left; and the King’s Company, under Lieutenant Harvard, in reserve.

Both the railway and a sunken road which ran parallel with it were shelled incessantly by the enemy, while machine-gun bullets also swept down the line from the direction of Gonnelieu. The 4th Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards were ordered to undertake the attack, while the 1st Battalion was to be in support, and guard the left flank as the advance progressed. At 6.20 A.M. the attack began, and a rather feeble bombardment was continued for ten minutes by three Brigades of R.F.A. Twenty-two tanks had been allotted to the Division, eight of which were to co-operate with Seymour’s Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel Maitland summoned the four Company Commanders to Battalion Headquarters, and they started off just as the Germans were putting down a heavy barrage on the railway. As they made their way along the embankment, shells were pitching among the men, and causing groups of casualties. As soon as any reinforcements were wanted, Captain Rhodes was to take his Company up the sunken road from Gouzeaucourt to Gonnelieu. No. 3 and No. 4 Companies were to advance across the open, so as to be near at hand when called upon. The Company Commanders scrambled back to their Companies, and explained the general idea to their Platoon Commanders as far as time would permit. It was a trying time for the men, who had to sit still as mere targets for the German gunners, and watch their comrades again and again being blown to pieces. They felt that even an advance under machine-gun fire would have been preferable.

As soon as the attack started, the 1st Battalion advanced under a hail of bullets, although there was no artillery fire, and many men fell at once. The 4th Battalion Grenadiers, which it supported, was at first so successful that it outstripped the troops on the left, and consequently had that flank in the air. Lord Henry Seymour sent orders to the 1st Battalion to secure the high ground to the north of Gonnelieu, hoping that by this means it would not only secure the left flank of the 4th Battalion, but also materially assist it to hold the village. The 1st Battalion had therefore to advance half left, and after going about 600 yards it was joined by men of various regiments.

Complete success attended the first part of the attack, and the three leading Companies, by a free use of the bayonet, captured the first German trench they reached. It was then necessary to “mop up,” and clear all possible hiding-places where any Germans might be lurking. Apparently the enemy had been taken unawares, and there were traces everywhere of surprise and precipitate flight. One German officer was caught while changing his clothes, and had nothing on but a shirt. The men stood up, and fired their rifles from the shoulder at the retreating Germans, and the Lewis gunners did their work well. A large number of the enemy were killed, and 110 prisoners were taken. No. 3 Company, under Captain Spence, was on the right, in touch with the 4th Battalion, and No. 4, under Captain Lawford, on the left, in touch with the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards. No. 2, under Captain Rhodes, in the centre, had the most difficult task, as it had continually to swing round to keep up with the Companies on either flank.

Having succeeded so well with the first trench, the 1st Battalion continued its advance until it arrived at a well-wired trench north of Gonnelieu. The three leading Companies managed to get through gaps in the wire, and push on, but when they topped the ridge they were met with a terrific machine-gun fire, which staggered them, and caused many casualties. It seemed madness to advance in the open against well-posted machine-guns, and orders were therefore given to withdraw to the trench they had already gained. In the meantime five tanks were seen advancing up to the ridge south of Gonnelieu; three of them were put out of action before they reached the village, and none were able to enter the village itself. Captain Spence, finding that his Company had run short of ammunition, sent back a small party to fetch some from Battalion Headquarters.

During the last advance Lieutenant Chamberlain, who had gone on too far, had been either cut off or killed, and half of No. 2 Company, having gone astray, was nowhere to be seen. The whole line in fact had been bent to a semicircle, and needed reorganising. Lieutenant Wiggins was sent by Captain Spence to get touch with No. 2, which should have been on his right, and, after hunting about for some time, reported that he could find no trace of this half-Company. At the same time Second Lieutenant Cruttenden went off to find Lieutenant Chamberlain, and after a fruitless search was shot through the lungs by a sniper. By degrees every one got into his right place, and the missing half of No. 2 Company was retrieved by Captain Rhodes.

As soon as it became dark, began the difficult task of collecting the wounded and getting them down to the dressing-station. The stretcher-bearers worked indefatigably all night, and were assisted by any men who could be spared. Another search-party, under Sergeant Porter, went out to find Lieutenant Chamberlain, but was no more successful than the first.

Next day the Battalion remained in the same position, but two platoons were sent off to reinforce the line held by the 4th Battalion. That night the 1st Battalion was relieved, partly by the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, and partly by a battalion of the 183rd Brigade, and was sent off to relieve the Welsh Guards. As the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards did not arrive till dawn, Nos. 3 and 4 Companies had to hold on all night. There was a rumour that Seymour’s Brigade would continue the attack on Gonnelieu the next day, but nothing came of it. On December 3 the whole position was severely shelled, and there were several casualties, including Lieutenant Bevan, who was wounded.

In the evening the Battalion was relieved, and retired to Gouzeaucourt, where it remained in reserve. On the 6th it moved to Etricourt, where Second Lieutenant F. H. Ennor and Second Lieutenant R. C. Bruce arrived, and on the 11th it retired to Arras, where it remained till the end of the month. Second Lieutenant A. Forbes and Second Lieutenant V. A. N. Wall rejoined from the Reinforcement Battalion on the 16th.

THE 2ND BATTALION

[Sidenote: 2nd Batt.]

For the rest of October the 2nd Battalion remained at Tournehem in the area between St. Omer and Calais, carrying out training of all kinds. Lieutenant O. Martin Smith and Lieutenant S. T. S. Clarke arrived on the 18th.

[Sidenote: Nov.]

On November 11 the Battalion with the rest of De Crespigny’s Brigade started their march south, through Herbelle, Lairs, and La Thieulloye. A Divisional Reinforcement Battalion was now formed. This was a new idea, which had gradually come to be adopted, whenever an attack was impending, and which had been rendered necessary by the large numbers of all ranks who were left behind whenever offensive operations were undertaken. Companies at that time neither attacked nor went into the line with a greater average strength than 32 other ranks per platoon and 3 officers per Company, and the Reinforcement Battalion was designed to take charge of the remainder. Though some such scheme was doubtless necessary, its application inevitably proved chaotic, for a hurriedly improvised Battalion Staff administered by the A. and Q. branches, who were themselves always at their busiest time, when the Reinforcement Battalion came into existence, hardly made an ideal administrative machine. From the Battalion point of view the result was desperate. All ranks returning from leave were usually detained at the Reinforcement Battalion, so that it was never known from day to day what officers, N.C.O.’s, and men would be available for duty, nor was it possible to obtain appropriate substitutes to fill deficiencies caused by sickness.

On the 13th there was a Divisional Conference, which was attended by the Brigadiers and Commanding Officers, when Major-General Fielding outlined the future operations. After four days spent at La Thieulloye the Battalion marched to Manin, and on the 18th went into camp between Blaireville and Hendecourt. There the Commanding Officer held a conference, at which he explained the scope and intention of the forthcoming operations. On the 19th the Battalion marched by night from Blaireville, through Hamelincourt and Ervillers, to a tented camp at Gomiecourt. A full moon lit the road, and the Battalion was in great spirits, all the companies singing on the march, and all ranks feeling the suppressed excitement which precedes an attack. The road passed through an area which the Battalion was to know very well four months later, when it was called upon to stem the German onslaught.

After two nights in this camp the Battalion proceeded in buses to huts near Barastre, where it was quartered in very comfortable billets. It was nearly dawn by the time the troops settled down, as the journey had been slow and laborious owing to the congestion on the roads, which, though deserted by day, were crowded with men and vehicles from dark to dawn.

November 23rd was one of the most remarkable days in the Battalion’s experience. Starting from camp near Barastre in the dark at 5.30 A.M., it marched through Velu to a field on the western outskirts of Doignies, which was reached about 9.30 A.M. Here the men drew bivouac-sheets, and set to work to make provision for the night, having been told that no move would be undertaken that day, whilst the Commanding Officer and most of the Company Commanders went out to reconnoitre various routes. Early in the afternoon an order was received that the Battalion would be required to move at short notice, and that it would relieve a Battalion in the line that night. Marching orders were issued, and bivouac-sheets returned. Shortly after 7 P.M. an order was received that the Battalion was to march off immediately; it was not known what Battalion was to be relieved, nor where it was, but it was said that definite orders would be received at the Canal du Nord. General de Crespigny had gone off to reconnoitre the forward area, and had not returned.

The whole of De Crespigny’s Brigade and part of Seymour’s Brigade were found to be on the same track, and as it was already congested by the passage in both directions of ammunition limbers, ambulances, and traffic of every description, progress was slow and wearisome. During the course of the march, the Lewis-gun limbers, which had started with the Battalion, but had become slightly separated in the press of the traffic, were diverted by a Staff Officer. The Battalion Headquarters were not informed of this, and consequently it was not until some time after their departure that the absence of the guns became known. On reaching the Canal crossing at Lock 7 the Battalion halted, and the men fell out on the side of the road to snatch a few minutes’ sleep, while Captain A. Penn, the Adjutant, rode forward to meet Lieutenant-Colonel Follett, who was commanding the Brigade in the temporary absence of General de Crespigny. From Colonel Follett it was learnt that the Brigade to be relieved was in the neighbourhood of Cantaing. Lieut.-Colonel Rasch thereupon rode forward to find the outgoing Battalion, to arrange for guides, and to borrow Lewis guns, while the Battalion wearily followed the road through Graincourt. The men who were not required to take part in the operations were diverted from the main body, and sent off under Lieutenant Drummond and Lieutenant Layland-Barratt, to find their way to Ribecourt. The march was undisturbed, and the night quiet, save on the hill crowned by Bourlon Wood, which all night was intermittently shelled.

Near Brigade Headquarters at La Justice Farm, north of Orival Wood, the Battalion met guides from the 9th Battalion Royal Scots (152nd Brigade), which was holding the first line on the eastern outskirts of Cantaing. Thanks to the admirable arrangements made by this Battalion, which had been heavily engaged for some days past, the remainder of the relief passed off without difficulty. Just before daylight the Battalion completed a relief, which the Royal Scots at any rate believed to be impossible of achievement, in view of the demands it made on the endurance of the men, who had been on the move almost unceasingly for twenty-four hours.

When once the relief was complete, the tour passed without incident, except that Lieutenant Alexander was wounded in the hand, whilst throwing from the slit he was occupying an enemy grenade, which had fallen unexploded among his men.

No. 2 Company was on the right, stretching towards Bois Neuf, and in touch with the 8th Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment; No. 4 on the left held a line of posts just east of the Cantaing――Fontaine road, facing La Folie Wood, and in touch with the 1st Battalion Irish Guards, which stretched towards Bourlon Wood; No. 1 was in support, and No. 3 in reserve. Everywhere there were signs of the rapidity with which the British attack had swept the enemy from his trenches, and derelict and charred tanks, scattered in all directions, bore evidence of the stubborn resistance with which our advance had been met. The country was open and undulating, and the spires of Cambrai were distinctly visible in the clear wintry light. On the 26th the Battalion was relieved, and marched back in a blinding snowstorm to Ribecourt, passing the Battalions of the 2nd Guards Brigade, on their way to carry out the attack on Fontaine-Notre-Dame. The night spent at Ribecourt was one of the most miserable passed by the Battalion. Soaked by the snowstorm, through which they had marched from Cantaing, and sodden with mud from the line, the men, whose blankets and greatcoats had been stored when the advance began, found no accommodation but a few leaky shelters in the Hindenburg Line. All the dug-outs with any possibilities of comfort had already been occupied by the swarm of troops following the advance. In the afternoon of the 28th, orders were received to march to billets in Metz, and thither the Battalion went in the evening, finding on its arrival rather cramped but quite comfortable quarters.

THE CAPTURE OF GOUZEAUCOURT

At daybreak on 30th November the sound of a heavy bombardment on a wide front made it clear that the enemy was undertaking a counter-attack. At the same time a long-range gun began to drop shells into Metz, where the Battalion was resting, causing casualties to the troops billeted there. The village street was quickly choked with a miscellaneous rabble of soldiers of every kind, all streaming back in hopeless confusion, and spreading rumours of a break-through by the enemy. Soon after 9 A.M. a message was received from General de Crespigny that the Third Corps was being heavily attacked at Gonnelieu, about four miles away, and ordering the Battalion to move at short notice. At 10.30 Lieut.-Colonel Rasch was told to march the Battalion towards Gouzeaucourt, and to clear Metz by 12.25 P.M. He handed over the command of the Battalion to Captain Harcourt-Vernon, and rode off to the Brigade Headquarters to get as much information as possible.

The following officers took part in these operations:

Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon Second in Command.
Capt. A. H. Penn Adjutant.
Lieut. J. C. Cornforth, M.C. No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. P. A. A. Harbord, M.C. ” ”
2nd Lieut. S. H. Pearson ” ”
Lieut. F. A. M. Browning No. 2 Company.
Lieut. F. H. G. Layland-Barratt, M.C. ” ”
2nd Lieut. F. H. J. Drummond, M.C. ” ”
Lieut. A. W. Acland, M.C. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. F. A. Magnay ” ”
Lieut. R. Y. T. Kendal ” ”
Lieut. G. R. Westmacott No. 4 Company.
Lieut. W. H. S. Dent ” ”
Lieut. F. P. Loftus ” ”
Capt. J. A. Andrews, M.C. Medical Officer.

Half a mile from Metz, Lieut.-Colonel Rasch and the Company Commanders, who had preceded the Battalion, rejoined, with the news that De Crespigny’s Brigade was to advance immediately towards Gouzeaucourt, which was reported to be in the hands of the Germans: the 1st Battalion Irish Guards on the north of the Gouzeaucourt――Metz road, the 3rd Battalion Coldstream in the centre, and the 2nd Battalion Coldstream on the right; the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers in Brigade support.

The whole countryside was by this time dotted with men retiring, and the A.P.M. at the Metz cross-roads was busily engaged in dealing with stragglers; throughout the advance of the Brigade no trace was seen of any defending infantry. On clearing the village, the Battalion assumed artillery formation, and advanced to Gouzeaucourt Wood, a low scrubby plantation crowning the ridge which bisects the ground lying between Metz and Gouzeaucourt. Here the Battalion waited full of anxious curiosity. Shelling caused a few casualties, but the protection of the rising ground sheltered it from the rifle and machine-gun fire, directed at the leading battalions, which were now advancing towards Gouzeaucourt village. The capture of Gouzeaucourt was a fine achievement carried out with wonderful precision. So successful was it that the Battalion was never required: by nightfall the village had been completely cleared of the enemy, and all British stores had been recovered. When it was known that the Battalion was not likely to be called upon until the next day, cookers were brought up, and provision for the cold night was made as far as possible.

CAPTURE OF GAUCHE WOOD

[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]

At 2.30 A.M. General de Crespigny received orders to attack and capture Gauche Wood, in co-operation with Seymour’s Brigade on the left, and the cavalry on the right. The objective of the Battalion was the eastern edge of Gauche Wood, and the 3rd Battalion Coldstream was to be on the left. This wood was oblong in shape, and measured approximately 700 by 300 yards; its nearest corner was about 1200 yards from the line which the Brigade had taken up the night before. Orders were written and explained to the Company Commanders. The Battalion was to form up behind a sunken road on the eastern outskirts of Gouzeaucourt village, which then constituted the front line. Twenty tanks were allotted to the Brigade, but as there seemed grave doubt as to whether they would be able to reach their rendezvous at so short notice, companies were ordered not to wait for them.

In the 2nd Battalion the attack was undertaken by No. 1 Company under Lieutenant Cornforth on the right, and No. 3 under Lieutenant Acland on the left, each in two lines of two platoons, followed at a distance of 250 yards by No. 4 under Lieutenant Westmacott, and No. 2 under Lieutenant Browning, in similar formation. Lieut.-Colonel Rasch went on ahead with the Company Commanders to reconnoitre the forming-up ground, whilst the Battalion followed after breakfast, and picked up tools on the way. At 6.30 the artillery support, which was most attenuated, opened and searched the wood and the ravine behind it. No tanks had yet put in an appearance, and, after giving them ten minutes’ grace, the attack was launched without them.

The enemy retaliated with a heavy barrage, most of which fortunately fell behind the advancing troops, but the machine-gun fire made it doubtful whether any one would ever reach the wood. When the attack opened, all four companies advanced at a great pace over the intervening grass land, which rose in a gentle slope up to the wood. It is difficult to understand why, with the machine-guns posted at the edge of the wood, the enemy did not wipe out the whole Battalion. Ignoring all regulations about short rushes, both officers and men went straight for the wood as fast as they could. They instinctively felt that the only chance was to cover the mile of naked slope in the shortest possible time. In all probability the German machine-gunners in the half-light of the morning became flurried, at seeing this formidable attack sweeping over the ground, for, although the fire was very hot, the bullets passed over the men’s heads, and it was not until they had nearly reached the wood that casualties occurred. Here the fringe of German machine-guns, established at the edge of the wood, began to take heavy toll, and then began perhaps the fiercest fighting of all. When the leading companies reached the wood, it became a struggle of man to man. But the Germans soon found that with the bayonet they were no match for the Grenadiers. Back into the wood they were forced, and then-down into a hollow in the centre of it. Their machine-guns were all captured, and, although some fought stubbornly, most of them were driven slowly up the incline on the far side into the corner of the wood. Second Lieutenant Pearson was killed as he went through the wood, and Second Lieutenant Harbord, whilst most gallantly rushing a machine-gun, received wounds from which he died later in the day. Lieutenants Cornforth, Drummond, Dent, Kendal, Acland, and Magnay were all wounded, and the Battalion lost many valuable N.C.O.’s.

This left Lieutenant Browning and Lieutenant Westmacott responsible for the whole Battalion front, and to them the success of the attack was largely due. Between them they reorganised and controlled the whole line, making their dispositions with great skill. On reaching the wood, Lieutenant Westmacott faced part of his company to the right flank, to guard against a counter-attack from the south. Hardly had he done so when about seventy Germans appeared; they were met with steady rifle-fire from the wood, and wavered for a moment, uncertain as to what they should do, but they finally made for the wood. Our fire, however, was too steady for them, and accounted for all but a handful of men, who were taken prisoners. Soon afterwards another party of sixty appeared from the same direction, but they also were met with so well-directed a fire that they were staggered, whereupon the men of No. 4 Company charged them with the bayonet.

Lieutenant Westmacott now decided that he must push his men farther forward on the right flank of the wood, so as to command the valley, which lay between the wood and the village of Villers Guislain. He had just moved forward his company, and prolonged the right with two platoons of No. 2 Company, when some dismounted cavalry, consisting of the 18th Bengal Lancers and a detachment of the 7th Dragoon Guards, appeared from the same direction as the enemy attacks. Their orders had not enabled them to attack simultaneously with the 2nd Battalion, and it was in all probability this delayed advance that precipitated the two unfruitful attempts of the enemy to gain the wood. Their arrival was of the greatest value, and at Lieutenant Westmacott’s suggestion they proceeded to reinforce the other companies, which were meanwhile fighting their way through the wood. Several tanks had by now put in an appearance, although the majority had been knocked out before they reached the wood, by a most accurate shell-fire directed by a low-flying aeroplane. The lack of any particular trench for the surviving tanks to attack made their fire ineffectual, and their presence seemed to attract the shells of all the German batteries in the neighbourhood, causing many casualties in the Battalion.

Lieutenant Layland-Barratt, who had been assisting Lieutenant Browning to reorganise the companies in the wood, was wounded by a splinter of a shell, and had to retire to a dressing-station. This left only Lieutenant Browning in the wood, and Lieutenant Westmacott and Lieutenant Loftus outside.