Chapter XIX: The Battle of the Somme (1)

A new stage, and a very distinct and important stage, in the Allied operations in the West was marked by the battle of the Somme.

It was at last understood, in the summer of 1916, that spasmodic attacks on the German trenches did little to gain any real and comprehensive success, and that, in order to prevent the enemy moving his reserves from one front to another, a simultaneous assault by all the Allies was necessary.

In accord with this view the Allies at the beginning of the year accepted the principle of an offensive campaign, and as the objective for the British and French advance Sir Douglas Haig and General Joffre selected the Somme area. All idea of “breaking through” had by now been abandoned. Such a thing was no longer regarded as possible in the West, and the plan adopted was one more suited to modern conditions of war and more economical of human life. The objects of the offensive were to relieve Verdun, to prevent the transfer of German troops elsewhere, and to wear down the resistance of the enemy on the Western front.

Conditions had changed, too, in other ways. The British Army had been slowly gaining strength, and the old Army had given place to the new. There were now fifty divisions in the field. At the same time, the supply of ammunition had been steadily increasing, and, thanks to the patriotism of the trade unions and the splendid performances of the workers, immense quantities of guns and shells were pouring into France. Consequently there was no reason why a general attack should not be made on the Western front, although, as Sir Douglas Haig pointed out in his despatch, he considered it advisable to postpone it as long as possible.

During the gigantic battle, which began on July 1 and lasted till November 18, the fighting was continuous. The German positions were amazingly strong. First came a network of trenches, well provided with bomb-proof shelters and protected in front by wire entanglements, many of which were in two belts forty yards broad and built of iron stakes, interlaced with barbed wire, often as thick as a man’s finger. Behind these lines the enemy’s strongholds had been reinforced with every device of military ingenuity――woods and villages turned into fortresses, cellars filled with machine-guns and trench mortars, dug-outs connected by elaborate passages. The enormous power of modern weapons of defence had been used to the utmost. In fact, the whole line was as nearly impregnable as Nature, art, and the unstinted labour of close on two years could make it. And undoubtedly the Germans believed it impregnable.

The first phase of the battle took place at the beginning of July, and although the attacks in the northern sector were unsuccessful, the armour was pierced; while in the south our troops secured Mametz, Montauban, Fricourt, Contalmaison, and Trônes Wood. On July 14 and the three following days, the capture of the enemy’s second line on a front of three miles gave us possession of the main plateau between Delville Wood and Bazentin-le-Petit.

The long and severe struggle, which was the second phase, began on July 18 and culminated on September 15 with the fall of Ginchy, after Pozières, Delville Wood, Guillemont, Falfemont Farm, and Leuze Wood had been taken in succession. But although the main ridge from Delville Wood to the road above Mouquet Farm was secured, Morval on the right and Thiepval on the left remained in German hands.

In the third phase Flers, High Wood, Martinpuich, Courcelette, and the Quadrilateral came into our hands one after another, and on September 25 Morval, Lesbœufs, and Gueudecourt were secured by the British Army, while the French took Combles. During October Thiepval was taken, and also Eaucourt l’Abbaye and Le Sars, while in November, as the outcome of an advance on both sides of the Ancre, we captured St. Pierre Divion, Beaucourt, and Beaumont-Hamel.

Thus all our principal objects were achieved, in spite of the fact that the Germans were able to mass more than half their army upon this part of their front. The British Army took 38,000 prisoners, including over 800 officers; also 29 heavy guns, 96 field-guns and field-howitzers, 136 trench mortars, and 514 machine-guns.

The battle was marked by the sudden appearance of the Tanks. So well had their secret been kept that until they came upon the battlefield the Germans had no idea of their existence. “The Machine-gun Corps, Heavy Section” was the official title of these heavy armoured cars which could move anywhere, over trenches and through wire entanglements, pushing down walls and even houses; they contained a garrison of six men with machine-guns and 6-pdr. guns. So many legends had grown up of their supernatural powers that their actual début caused a certain disappointment. But although in some parts of the battlefield they failed us, some of them did wonders, and many of the strongholds in the German line could never have been taken without their help.

The net result of the battle was a brilliant victory for the British Army, for not only was a large tract of ground captured from the enemy, but the three objects which we had set out to gain were fully attained. Verdun was relieved of pressure, the main portion of the German Army was detained on the Western front, and a crippling blow was struck at the enemy forces. It was clearly shown that, on anything like equal terms, the British could drive back the German Army, sheltered even by the strongest entrenchments.

As the area and duration of modern battles are immense, a long time naturally elapses before their effects are felt by the losing side. Formerly battles lasted only a few days, and their results were seen immediately in the retirement of the beaten army. After the battle of the Somme, however, nothing happened at first, and it was not until six months later that the Germans found that their positions had become untenable, and a general retirement was advisable.

THE GUARDS DIVISION AT THE SOMME

[Sidenote: Sept.]

Nothing has ever been done by battalions of the Guards finer than the part they took in the battle of the Somme. It was not until the beginning of September that the Guards Division arrived in the Somme area, so it was not present at the first two phases of the battle. But in the attacks of September 15 and 25 the men covered themselves with glory; their discipline and coolness under fire were magnificent, and they captured lines which had up to then been considered impregnable. The final assault of Lesbœufs was one of the most successful operations of the war.

Not only were the staff arrangements admirable, but the co-operation between infantry and artillery proved in every way perfect. Against the unflinching attack of the Division nothing could stand; the mass of shells poured over by the German artillery, the hail of bullets from their machine-guns, and the rifle-fire of their infantry in the trenches, were all powerless to check it. The men were splendid: it made not a scrap of difference whether they had officers or not, whether they were with their own units or mixed up with other regiments. Nothing could stop them. When the 3rd Brigade went up, the battle had already been raging for over two months; and the Germans were then busily but vainly carrying out counter-attacks, in the hope of re-taking some of the ground that had been wrested from them. Consequently the two battalions sent forward came in for some very stiff fighting, especially the Welsh Guards, who went through some anxious moments owing to the advanced position they were occupying. They were fiercely attacked by large bodies of the enemy, but, with the help of one company of the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, managed to hold their own. Meanwhile the 4th Battalion Grenadiers――the other battalion sent up from the 3rd Brigade――held an uncomfortable position near the Quadrilateral, to the right and in rear of the Welsh Guards.

Parts of the line had also to be straightened, and “pockets” of Germans to be cleared away before the general attack of the 15th; and for this task were detailed those battalions from the 1st and 2nd Brigades which would not be in the front line on the 15th. There were some closely-contested bombing fights, supported by artillery, in the parts of the line that needed straightening, and these operations were all successfully carried out.

On the 12th Major-General G. Feilding issued the following orders:

THE GUARDS DIVISION ORDER, NO. 76

1. The Fourth Army will attack the enemy’s defences between
Combles Ravine and Martinpuich on Z day with the object of
seizing Morval, Lesbœufs, Gueudecourt, and Flers, and to break
through the enemy’s system of defence.

The French are undertaking an offensive simultaneously on the
South and the Reserve Army on the North.

2. The attack will be pushed with the utmost vigour all along the
line until the most distant objectives are reached. The failure
of one unit on the flank is not to prevent other units pushing on
to their final objective, as it is by such means that those units
who have failed will be assisted to advance.

3. _Preliminary Bombardment._――(_a_) Commencing on the 12th
September a bombardment and wire-cutting on the hostile defensive
system will take place from 6 A.M. to 6.30 daily.

(_b_) The preliminary bombardment on the day of the attack will
be similar to that of previous days, there being no further
increase of fire previous to zero.

(_c_) At 6.30 each evening from the 12th September inclusive
night firing will commence, and continue till 6 A.M., lethal
shells being used.

4. (_a_) The Sixth Division is to attack on the right and the
Fourteenth Division on the left.

(_b_) The 2nd Guards Brigade will attack on the right of the
Division, the 1st Guards Brigade on the left. The 3rd Guards
Brigade will be in Divisional Reserve.

5. _Forming-up Areas._――Forming-up areas are shown on attached
maps. The 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades will allot a forming-up
area for the 75th and 76th Field Companies R.E. respectively in
their forming-up areas.

Instructions as to movements of troops to their forming-up areas
will be issued separately.

6. The objectives allotted to the Guards Division and
neighbouring divisions are shown on attached map.

First objective is marked Green.
Second ” ” Brown.
Third ” ” Blue.
Fourth ” ” Red.

7. (_a_) 50 per cent Field Artillery covering the Division will
be used for creeping barrage, and 50 per cent for stationary
barrage.

(_b_) Details of the stationary barrages will be issued later. In
all cases the stationary barrage will lift back when the creeping
barrage reaches it.

(_c_) At zero the creeping barrage will open 100 yards in front
of our front trenches, and will advance at the rate of 50 yards
per minute until it is 200 yards beyond the first objective, when
it will become stationary. At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage
will become intense on the line 200 yards in front of first
objective, and will creep forward at the rate of 50 yards per
minute in front of that portion of the 1st Guards Brigade which
is to advance to the second objective.

(_d_) At zero + 1 hour and 10 minutes the creeping barrage will
become intense on a line 200 yards in front of the first
objective as far north as T.86.4.6, thence on a line 200 yards in
front of the second objective, and will advance at the rate of 30
yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the third
objective, when it will become stationary.

This barrage is to cover the advance of the tanks. There will be
no creeping barrage in front of infantry during their advance to
third objective, which commences at zero + 2 hours.

(_e_) At zero + 3 hours and 30 minutes the creeping barrage will
become intense on a line 200 yards in front of third objective,
and will advance at the rate of 30 yards per minute until it has
passed 200 yards beyond fourth objective, when it will become
stationary. This barrage is to cover the advance of the tanks.
There will be no creeping barrage in front of the infantry during
the advance on the fourth objective, which commences at zero + 4
hours and 30 minutes.

(_f_) In the attack on the first and second objectives gaps of
100 yards wide will be left in the creeping barrage for the
routes of the tanks.

8. The flow of troops to the 2nd Guards Brigade and 1st Guards
Brigade must be maintained so as to ensure a strong attack being
pressed against each successive objective. Sufficient men will be
left in each line captured to clear it of the enemy. No troops of
the 2nd and 1st Guards Brigades will be detailed to remain behind
in objectives after they have been passed for purposes of
consolidation.

The task of the two leading Brigades is to press the attack
through to their ultimate objectives with every means at their
disposal.

9. The 3rd Guards Brigade will advance at zero + 1 hour and 30
minutes until its leading troops reach the south-western
outskirts of Ginchy, when the Brigade will halt and await orders.

Special instructions as to action of Reserve Brigade will be
issued.

10. Tanks will be employed to operate with the attack;
instructions as to their movements are attached.

(Remainder of orders related to R.E., R.A., Aircraft and
Transport.)

C. HEYWOOD, Lieut.-Col.,
General Staff, Guards Division.

_September 12, 1916._

So great was the danger of battalions being practically annihilated in an attack that orders had been issued for a certain nucleus of officers and N.C.O.’s to be left with the Transport, whenever a battalion went into action, so as to make sure of a sufficient number surviving to carry on the work. Accordingly on this occasion the Second in Command, the junior Captains of companies, the Battalion and Company Sergeant-Majors and Quartermaster-Sergeants in each battalion were left behind.

At 6.20 on the morning of the 15th the artillery bombardment ceased, and the Guards Division advanced, preceded by a creeping barrage, with Pereira’s Brigade on the left and Ponsonby’s Brigade on the right, while Corkran’s Brigade remained in reserve. In the front line were the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the Coldstream and the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers. The advance of the three Coldstream battalions was a wonderful sight, and they carried everything before them, but in their eagerness to reach the enemy lost direction and went too far to the left. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right kept straight on, so there was a considerable gap between it and the three battalions of Coldstream. Coming up through the German barrage, the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, which was in support of the 2nd Coldstream, completely lost sight of the Coldstream battalions. In accordance with its orders it advanced with its right on the Ginchy――Lesbœufs road, but on reaching the first objective it found it occupied by the enemy instead of by the Coldstream, as it expected, and suffered heavy loss. Under the impression that it was following in the wake of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream, it was advancing in artillery formation, and had to form line when within a few yards of the enemy’s trench, which was untouched, as the Coldstream battalions had passed farther to the left.

When the first objective was secured, the order from right to left was as follows: the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalion Coldstream. Between the first two objectives there were several intermediate lines of trenches, all of which were most confusing for the battalions in front. The Coldstream battalions mistook these intermediate lines for objectives, and thought that they had reached the third objective when they were really between the first and second objectives. Their real position, however, was correctly reported by the air scouts.

Meantime the Quadrilateral――a powerful system of redoubts――on the right had made any advance by the Sixth Division impossible, and on the left also the Fourteenth Division had been held up by some strong points in the enemy’s line. The result was that the Guards Division had both flanks in the air, and was subjected to a withering fire almost from the start. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right and the 3rd Battalion Coldstream on the left were obliged to throw out protective flanks, and so had some difficulty in keeping pace with the battalions in the centre.

It was some time before the two brigades were firmly established in the first objective, as there were parts of the line in which some Germans had been left, more especially in the space reserved for the tanks, which unfortunately never arrived. However, the 1st and 2nd Battalions Coldstream in the centre pushed on and gained the second objective, while the battalions right and left threw back protective flanks. The second objective was a trench running into the first objective, and only concerned the Coldstream battalions on the left.

On the next day, the 16th, Corkran’s Brigade was ordered to advance through the leading brigades and continue the attack. But it did not start till the middle of the day, and after having gone some distance was held up by machine-gun fire and the men were told to dig themselves in where they were.

The whole Division was taken out of the line on the night of the 18th and remained resting in bivouacs until the 20th, when each brigade sent battalions into the front line to dig assembly trenches and straighten parts of the line. On the 22nd Major-General G. Feilding issued the following orders:

GUARDS DIVISION ORDER, NO. 82

1. (_a_) The Fourth Army will renew the attack on Z day in
combination with attacks by the French to the South and the
Reserve Army to the North.

(_b_) The objectives of the Fourteenth Corps include Morval and
Lesbœufs, and those of the Fifteenth Corps Gueudecourt.

(_c_) The attack of the Fourteenth Corps will be carried out by
the Fifth Division on the right, the Sixth Division in the
centre, and the Guards Division on the left. The Fifty-eighth
Division will form a defensive flank to the south of the Fifth
Division. The Twenty-first Division will be attacking on our
left.

2. The 1st Guards Brigade will attack on the right and the 3rd
Guards Brigade on the left.

The 2nd Guards Brigade (less one Battalion) will be in Divisional
Reserve.

1st Battalion 2nd Guards Brigade will be in Corps Reserve; 2nd
Guards Brigade will notify Divisional Headquarters the name of
the Battalion detailed.

3. _Preliminary Bombardment._――A steady bombardment of hostile
positions will be commenced at 7 A.M. on Z day, and will be
continued to 6.30 P.M.; it will recommence at 6.30 A.M. on Z day.

The ground in front and rear of the German trenches which are
being bombarded will be searched occasionally with 18-pdr.
shrapnel and H.E. shell.

There will be no intensive fire previous to the hour of zero.
Night firing will be carried out nightly between the hours of
6.30 P.M. and 6.30 A.M.

4. Forming-up areas are shown on the attached map. The 1st and
3rd Guards Brigades will allot forming-up areas to the 75th and
55th Field Companies R.E. respectively, within their areas.

Instructions for movements to forming-up areas will be issued
separately.

5. Objectives allotted to the Guards Brigades and neighbouring
Divisions, also the dividing lines, are shown on attached map.

First objective is marked Green.
Second ” ” Brown.
Third ” ” Blue.

6. The infantry will advance to the attack on the Green line at
zero; to the attack on the Brown line at zero + 1 hour, and to
the attack on the Blue line at zero + 2 hours.

7. _Barrages_――

(_a_) 50 per cent of the Field Artillery covering the Division
will be used for the creeping barrage and 50 per cent for
stationary barrage.

(_b_) In all cases the stationary barrage will lift when the
creeping barrage meets it.

8. (_a_) At zero the creeping barrage will commence 100 yards in
front of our front trenches. It will advance at the rate of 50
yards per minute until it is 200 yards beyond the Green line,
when it will become stationary.

(_b_) At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage will commence 200
yards in front of the Green line and will advance at the rate of
50 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the
Brown line, when it will become stationary.

(_c_) At zero + 2 hours the creeping barrage will commence 200
yards in front of the Brown line, and will advance at the rate of
50 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the Blue
line, when it will become stationary.

9. (_a_) The task of the two leading Guards Brigades is to press
the attack through to the Blue line. A sufficient flow of troops
must be maintained by the 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades from zero
onwards to ensure that the attack made from the Brown line is
strong and well supported.

(_b_) Special arrangements must be made to deal with resistance
in Lesbœufs and thus prevent any possibility of the enemy getting
round our troops who have gained the Blue line.

(_c_) The 1st and 3rd Guards Brigades will garrison and
consolidate the Brown line with a portion of their reserves when
the attack goes forward to the Blue line.

(_d_) On gaining the Blue line, Battalions will be sent forward
to any ground from which observation can be gained; such points
will be consolidated and eventually joined up with our line.

On the 24th the Battalions that were to lead the attack took their place in the line ready for the next day. The order of attack was for the Fifty-sixth Division to form the right flank guarding Combles, the Fifth Division to capture Morval, the Sixth Division to occupy the southern end of Lesbœufs, and the Guards Division to take Lesbœufs.

In Pereira’s Brigade, which attacked on the right, the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Irish Guards were in the front line, and were supported by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream. In Corkran’s Brigade on the left the 4th Battalion Grenadiers and 2nd Battalion Scots Guards led, supported by the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards. The orders of the two brigades differed. In the 1st Guards Brigade the leading battalions were to take all the objectives, and when they passed on the battalions in support were to consolidate each line. In the 3rd Brigade the two leading battalions were to take the first two objectives and then throw out a defensive flank; the battalions in support were then to advance through them and secure the third objective, one of these again throwing out a defensive flank.

At 12.35 P.M. on the 25th the attack started, and in spite of the wire, in some places intact, the first objective was secured. At 1.30 the advance to the second objective began. The battalions in front suffered heavily, especially in officers, but by 1.45 the second objective was in our hands. All this time the Twenty-first Division on the left had been held up, and the left flank of the Guards Division was consequently in the air. The 4th Grenadiers had therefore to throw out a defensive flank to the left, which eventually became so long that not only that battalion but also the Welsh Guards were employed to guard it. Major-General Feilding regarded this defensive flank as of the utmost importance, since it was from this quarter that a counter-attack was expected. In some parts of the line the wire was uncut, and the advance was retarded, but this did not prevent the objectives being secured by the times specified in the orders.

As soon as we had gained the second objective, the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards passed through the leading battalions of Corkran’s Brigade and attacked Lesbœufs, while the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Irish Guards continued their advance.

Thus with the 4th Battalion Grenadiers on the defensive flank there were three Grenadier battalions engaged in the attack on the third objective. The capture of Lesbœufs itself fell to the lot of the 1st Battalion, and news was at once sent back that all the objectives had been secured. The battalions in front appear to have been so elated by their success that they asked for the cavalry to be allowed to go through. But Lord Cavan, the Corps Commander, realised that it would be madness to employ cavalry on such a limited front, and gave orders that the leading battalions were to consolidate their position.

THE 2ND BATTALION

[Sidenote: 2nd Batt.]

Detached from the 1st Guards Brigade on August 31 the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers had been sent up to Carnoy to dig in rear of the Twentieth Division. It returned on September 3rd to Méaulte, where it underwent a thorough course of training, something in the nature of a dress rehearsal. Expert bombing officers gave instruction to every company in the Brigade, so that each man had an opportunity of learning the latest developments in bombing. All the battalions practised deploying in artillery formation, attacking an imaginary line of trenches, and then moving on immediately to a second objective. A great deal was learned in the way of signalling, and trials were made of a system of organising a single main trunk line, as central as possible, so as to avoid having a number of defective lines to each unit. This line was to consist of telephone or visual or relay posts――or, if possible, of all three. Careful consideration was given to the difficult task of getting the men across No Man’s Land, and every detail was rehearsed. Later the whole Brigade was practised in the attack, and in maintaining constant communication during an advance.

[Sidenote: Sept. 9.]

After a week the 1st Brigade received orders to proceed to Carnoy, and all surplus kit and equipment were left behind in store. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers marched to Carnoy, and bivouacked not far from the place where it had been at the beginning of the month.

[Sidenote: Sept. 11.]

On the 11th orders were received for the 1st Brigade to relieve the left half of the 3rd Guards Brigade, while the 2nd Guards Brigade was to take the place of the other half. These orders (given below) were communicated to commanding officers at a conference held at Brigade Headquarters.

Brigadier-General Pereira issued the following orders:

1ST GUARDS BRIGADE ORDER, NO. 73

1. The Fourth Army will attack the enemy’s defences between
Combles Ravine and Martinpuich on Z day with the object of
seizing Morval, Lesbœufs, Gueudecourt, and Flers, breaking
through the enemy’s system of defence.

The French are undertaking an offensive simultaneously on the
south and the Reserve Army on the north.

2. The attack will be pushed with the utmost vigour, all along
the line, until the most distant objectives are reached.

The failure of a unit on a flank is not to prevent other units
pushing on to their final objectives, as it is by such means that
these units, which have failed, will be assisted to advance.

3. _Preliminary Bombardment._――(_a_) Commencing on the 12th
September bombardment and wire-cutting on hostile defensive
system will take place from 6 A.M. to 6.30 P.M. daily.

(_b_) The preliminary bombardment on the day of the attack will
be similar to that on previous days, there being no increase of
fire previous to zero.

(_c_) At 6.30 P.M. each evening from the 12th September
inclusive, night firing will commence and continue till 6 A.M.
Lethal shells will be used.

4. (_a_) The 2nd Guards Brigade will attack on the right of the
Division――the 1st Guards Brigade the left, and the 3rd Guards
Brigade will be in divisional reserve.

(_b_) The 4th Brigade of the Fourteenth Division will attack on
the left of the 1st Guards Brigade.

(_c_) Boundaries are shown on attached map.

5. _Forming-up Areas._――Forming-up areas are shown on attached
maps.

Instructions as to movement of troops to their forming-up areas
will be issued separately.

6. Objectives allotted to Guards Brigades and neighbouring
Divisions are shown on attached map.

First objective is marked Green.
Second ” ” Brown.
Third ” ” Blue.
Fourth ” ” Red.

7. The infantry will advance to the attack of the Green line at
zero.
To the attack of the Brown line at zero + 1 hour.
To the attack of the Blue line at zero + 2 hours.
To the attack of the Red line at zero + 4 hours and 30 minutes.

8. _Artillery Barrages_――

(_a_) 50 per cent of Field Artillery covering the Division will
be used for creeping barrage, and 50 per cent for stationary
barrage.

(_b_) Details of stationary barrages will be issued later. In all
cases the stationary barrages will lift back when the creeping
barrage reaches it.

(_c_) At zero the creeping barrage will open 100 yards in front
of our trenches, and will advance at rate of 50 yards per minute
until it is 200 yards beyond the first objective, when it will
become stationary.

At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage will become intense on a
line 200 yards in front of the first objective, and will creep
forward at rate of 50 yards per minute in front of that portion
of the 1st Guards Brigade which is to advance to the second
objective.

(_d_) At zero + 1 hour and 10 minutes the creeping barrage will
become intense on a line 200 yards in front of the first
objective as far north as T.8.b.4.6, thence on a line 200 yards
in front of second objective, and will advance at rate of 30
yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the third
objective――when it will become stationary.

This barrage is to cover the advance of the tanks.

There will be no creeping barrage in front of the infantry during
their advance to third objective, which commences at zero + 2
hours.

(_e_) At zero + 3 hours 30 minutes, the creeping barrage will
become intense on a line 200 yards in front of the third
objective――and will advance at rate of 30 yards per minute until
it has passed 200 yards beyond fourth objective, when it will
become stationary. This barrage is to cover the advance of the
tanks.

There will be no creeping barrage in front of the infantry during
the advance to the fourth objective, which commences at zero + 4
hours 30 minutes.

(_f_) In the attack on first and second objectives gaps of 100
yards wide will be left in the creeping barrage for the routes of
the tanks.

9. The attack will be carried out as follows:

(_a_) The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards will attack
and capture the first, second, and third objectives. The dividing
line between these battalions is shown on attached maps.

(_b_) The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards will move in rear of the
2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards. When the latter advance
to the assault of the second objective the 2nd Battalion
Grenadier Guards will occupy the first objective until the 1st
Battalion Irish Guards have passed through them; they will then
follow and support them in their attack on the fourth objective.

The rôle of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards is to form a
defensive flank, if necessary, and to support the attack of the
1st Battalion Irish Guards in their attack on the fourth
objective, with such troops as are not required for a defensive
flank.

(_c_) 1st Battalion Irish Guards will attack the fourth
objective.

(_d_) Machine-gun Coy. One section will accompany each battalion
in the assault, and will be under the orders of the O.C.
Battalion.

(_e_) Stokes T.M. Battery. Four guns will accompany the 2nd
Battalion Grenadier Guards in case it is necessary to form a
defensive flank. They will not go farther than the second
objective. They will act under the orders of the O.C. Battalion.

The remaining four guns will be in the trench in which advanced
Brigade Headquarters is situated, S.24.b.6.2.

(_f_) The 75th Field Coy. and the four work platoons will remain
in their forming-up area until further orders are received.

10. _Formation of Attack._――The formation for the carrying out of
the attack is shown on attached sketch.

The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 1st Battalion Irish Guards
will move into line or small columns according as to whether they
are under rifle-fire or not.

11. The flow of troops will be continuous. This is to ensure a
strong attack being pressed against each successive objective.

Officers commanding battalions will call for support, if
necessary, from the battalions immediately in rear of them. If
necessary, men will be left in each line captured to clear it of
the enemy, but troops will not be detailed to remain behind in
objectives for purposes of consolidation, except that the 2nd and
3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards will remain in the third
objective ready to support the troops attacking the fourth
objective.

The task of the Brigade is to press the attack through to their
ultimate objectives with every means at our disposal.

12. Tanks will be employed to co-operate with the attack.
Instructions as to their employment are attached.

Instructions will be issued as to movement of tanks to their
departure positions, and as to time of their advance to the
various objectives.

13. _Royal Flying Corps_――

(_a_) 9th Squadron, Royal Flying Corps will have one Contact
aeroplane in the air from zero to dark on Z day, and again from
6.30 A.M. to 9 A.M. on Z + 1 days.

(_b_) Flares will be lit as follows:
(1) On obtaining each objective.
(2) At 12 noon and 5 P.M. on Z day by leading troops.
(3) At 6.30 A.M. on Z + 1 day by leading troops.

Red flares will be used by infantry, Green flares by Cavalry.

14. An orderly with a watch will visit all Battalion H.Q. about 1
P.M. and 7 P.M. on Y day, so that time may be checked.

15. Special instructions will be issued on the following subjects:
(_a_) Medical arrangement.
(_b_) Supply of rations, water, S.A.A., Light T.M. ammunition
and hand grenades.
(_c_) Communications.

16. All transport will be packed up and ready to move forward at
one hour’s notice after zero + 4 hours.

The Brigade Transport officer will remain at Divisional
Headquarters, Minden Post, from zero + 2 hours onwards.

On Y day after 7.30 P.M. the road running north from cross-roads
S.28.d.4.2 will be clear of all wheeled traffic.

17. As soon as the final objectives have been captured by the
infantry the cavalry will advance and seize the high ground
Rocquigny――Villers-au-Flos――Riencourt-les-Bapaume――Bapaume.

The Fourteenth Corps will be prepared to support the cavalry on
the above line at the earliest possible moment.

18. Prisoners will be sent _via_ Brigade Headquarters to
Divisional Collecting Station at Crater Post A.8.a.6.3, where
they will be taken over and searched under A.P.M. arrangements.

Receipts will be given for prisoners and escorts will return to
their units.

All captured documents should be sent with prisoners to
Divisional Collecting Station, whence they will be forwarded
under Divisional arrangements.

19. _Dumps._――R.E. dumps of sand-bags and wire have been
established along the Guillemont――Waterlot Farm road in the
Brigade area. A water dump is being established at Advanced
Brigade Headquarters at S.24.b.6.1½.

Dumps of bombs and S.A.A. are also being established along the
Guillemont――Waterlot Farm road in the Brigade area.

20. Brigade Headquarters will be established at S.24.b.6.1½ from
9 P.M. to-night.

M. B. SMITH, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 1st Guards Brigade.

_September 13, 1916._

_S.A. Chandler & Co. Southampton, photographers_ _Emery Walker ph. sc._ _Lieutenant-General The Earl of Cavan. K.P., K.C.B._]

[Sidenote: Sept. 12.]

By September 12 the whole Brigade was fully equipped. To every battalion had been issued bombs, sand-bags, distinguishing arm-bands, rockets, flares, wire-cutters, etc., and all that remained to be done was to fix the hour and the day of attack.

The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers took over the left half of the line occupied by the 3rd Guards Brigade on the night of the 12th, while the 1st Battalion Irish Guards moved up in support to Trônes Wood and Bernafay Wood. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream, which were to carry out the assault, remained resting at Carnoy till the last moment, and the Brigade Headquarters moved up to a dummy trench between Trônes and Bernafay Woods.

The following message from Lieut.-General Lord Cavan was circulated:

The Corps Commander knows that there are difficulties to be
cleared up on the left and in front of the 1st Guards
Brigade, and on the right of the 2nd Guards Brigade, but the
Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the general situation
is so favourable that every effort must be made to take
advantage of it and that tanks should carry out a special
programme before zero to deal with these unsatisfactory
positions. The Commander-in-chief states that there were
only two German divisions in reserve on a large front, and
that one of them had recently had enormous casualties, and
the other heavy casualties.

The French operations yesterday have been most successful,
and they have captured Bouchavesnes, which was their
objective.

[Sidenote: Sept. 13.]

Next night the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, which was holding the northern sector of the Ginchy line, was instructed to go out and straighten the line, so that the battalions which were to attack on the following day should not be held up at the very start. Lieut.-Colonel C. de Crespigny issued these orders:

1. In order to have a good “jumping-off” place for X day it is
essential to gain ground forward and dig a trench running from
T.13.b.4.9. to T.14.a.2½.2½. It will be necessary to establish a
post at the top of the cutting at T.13.b.4.9 and to drive the
Germans from the trench T.13.b.6.4. point of orchard T.14.a.5.5.

2. No. 4 will carry this out to-night. Time given later.

3. Two Stokes guns and one Lewis gun will report to you about 9
P.M. to-night. The Stokes gun will be used previous to the
attack. If possible a position will be chosen by O.C. No. 4 in
readiness.

4. No. 3 Company will be in readiness to move up to No. 4
Company’s present position, and the route should be reconnoitred
by daylight if possible. No. 2 Company will watch the left flank
of No. 4.

5. No. 3 Company will detail small parties after dark to carry up
fifty boxes of bombs from H.Q. to No. 4. A party will also be
required to carry up S.A.A., but this will be called for when
S.A.A. is available.

6. No. 2 Company will be prepared to dig through the sunken road
and join up with the new left of No. 4.

7. O.C. No. 2 Company will send up one Lewis gun after dark to
report to O.C. No. 4.

8. All companies will detail two men to report at H.Q. as guides
for ration parties after dark.

9. O.C. Nos. 2 and 3 Companies will meet C.O. at H.Q. of No. 4
Company at 8.0. P.M.

W. R. BAILEY, Captain and Adjutant,
2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards.

As it was known that the enemy held the point of the Ginchy orchard, and that they had machine-guns in the Ginchy――Flers sunken road, about four hundred yards north of that village, Captain G. Harcourt-Vernon, who commanded No. 4 Company, detailed two platoons under Second Lieutenant T. W. Minchin for the operation, while No. 2 was to protect their left flank and keep touch with them. Lieutenant M. H. Macmillan was ordered to bring up two platoons from No. 3 Company to support No. 4 Company and take over the line evacuated by Lieutenant Minchin’s platoons.

The enterprise was difficult, as the left flank had to advance farther than the right in order to form a line facing north-east. By way of artillery preparation, thirty or forty shrapnel shells were fired at the German trench just north of the orchard, but this had the effect only of putting the enemy on his guard. Unfortunately, too, it was a bright moonlight night, and the attacking party showed up distinctly.

The two platoons under Second Lieutenant Minchin advanced, and cleared the orchard of all Germans, in spite of a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, which caused several casualties. Not content with this, they tried to push on farther, but were fiercely resisted by the Germans, and failed to make good any more ground. As it was imperatively necessary to have a trench dug before daylight, Second Lieutenant Minchin decided to hold a line on the edge of the orchard, and the trench was completed by the next morning. The task assigned to the party had been carried out, and there seemed no necessity to attempt anything further.

That evening the following confidential message was received:

Day of attack (Z day) will be 15th Sept. Zero hours will
probably be in the early morning.

[Sidenote: Sept. 14.]

All next day the 2nd Battalion remained in the front trenches, where it was very heavily shelled. One shell pitched on the headquarters of No. 1 Company; Company Sergeant-Major Percival was mortally wounded and died later, and Captain A. F. R. Wiggins was so severely shaken that he retired suffering from shell shock. Company Sergeant-Major Gudgeon of No. 3 Company was buried by another shell, and had to be sent back. These losses were particularly regrettable, just as the Battalion was going into action.

The Battalion was relieved in the evening by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream, and went into bivouac just behind Ginchy, where rations and rum were served out. The men had been three days in the trenches, and Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny and the Adjutant, Captain Bailey, hardly had a moment’s sleep during that time. It was bitterly cold at night, and the men, who had no greatcoats, suffered very much.

The time appointed for the attack was revealed during the afternoon, in this message: “Zero hour to-morrow, September 15, will be at 6.20 A.M.” As shown in the above orders, four successive objectives had been allotted to the Brigade. The first was about 1200 yards distant, and the second 1500――but this concerned only the left battalion of the Brigade. The third was 2500 yards off, while the fourth or final objective, which included the northern outskirts of Lesbœufs, was no less than 3500 yards away. The infantry were to advance to attack the first objective at 6.20 A.M., to the second at 7.20, the third at 8.20, and the final objective at 10.50. The front allotted to the Brigade was 500 yards.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream were to assault the first, second, and third objectives. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was to follow them, and form a defensive flank to either side, if required. On reaching the first objective the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was to remain there until the Irish Guards passed through them, and if the flanks were all secure was to follow on and support them. The 1st Battalion Irish Guards was to pass through the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream at the third objective, and take and consolidate the fourth objective.

Each battalion had a section of machine-guns attached to it, and was told to place two guns on the flanks of the battalion and two at the Battalion Headquarters. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers had four Stokes guns, while four more were kept in reserve. Three tanks were to start on the left outside the Brigade area, and were to pass into it north of the cutting, which was known to be a troublesome place, on the left flank.

Detailed instructions for the attack were issued in the following operation orders by Lieut.-Colonel C. R. C. de Crespigny, Commanding 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards:

1. The Battalion will be relieved to-night by the 2nd and 3rd
Battalions Coldstream Guards and part of the 41st Brigade on the
left, and will form up on the assembly area S.W. of Ginchy.

2. Companies will detail guides as follows to be at H.Q. at 7.30
P.M.:

No. 1 Company, 4 guides.
No. 2 ” 4 ”
No. 4 ” 8 ”

No. 3 Company will not wait to be relieved, but will move off to
place of assembly east of the Waterlot――Guillemont road. On
relief, Nos. 1, 2, and 4 Companies will march to H.Q. of No. 3
Company, where they will draw rations and water. They will then
move on to their positions in assembly area, where fresh meat,
sandwiches, and rum will be issued.

3. The assembly march will be carried out in absolute silence,
and there must be no smoking, and no lights shown. Between dawn
and zero (about 6 A.M.) there will be no movement.

4. Companies will each detail one N.C.O. to report at H.Q. of No.
3 Company at 6 P.M. to get rations ready for issue, also one
officer to be at H.Q. No. 3 Company at 4 P.M. to be shown
forming-up positions. Companies are responsible for reconnoitring
the route to H.Q. No. 3 from their present positions.

5. _Dress._――All men will carry two bandoliers S.A.A. and two
Mills bombs. This must be made up before leaving the trenches.
Every third man will carry a shovel, every fourth man a pick. Two
days’ rations will be carried.

6. _Forming-up._――Companies will form up as under on the assembly:

_350 Yards Frontage_
No. 1 Coy. No. 2 Coy. A.
100 yards.
No. 3 Coy. No. 4 Coy. B.

Line of platoons at forty yards’ intervals. G.G. lines are A and
B. Lateral pegs on the company frontage at ten yards apart.
Forward direction time boards are five yards apart, one central
line and two on tanks.

7. The Brigade will attack at zero on the morning of 15th on the
left of the Division. Six tanks will co-operate on this
Divisional front.

First objective T.8.a.2.5――T.8.d.3.7.
Second objective T.2.a.9.4――T.8.b.2.3.
Third objective T.3.a.5.9――T.3.L.2.6.
Fourth objective N.3.a.0.9――N.34.C.9.0.

8. Infantry will advance to the attack of――

The first objective at zero.
The second objective at zero + 1 hour.
The third objective at zero + 2 hours.
The fourth objective at zero + 4 hours 30 minutes.

9. The attack will be carried out as follows:

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream will attack and capture the
first, second, and third objectives. The 2nd Battalion Grenadier
Guards will move in rear of the two Coldstream battalions. When
the latter advance to the assault of the second objective this
battalion will occupy the first objective until the 1st Battalion
Irish Guards has passed through them. They will then follow and
support the Irish Guards in their attack on the fourth objective.
The rôle of this Battalion is to form a defensive flank, if
necessary, and to support the attack of the Irish Guards. The
Irish Guards will attack the fourth objective.

10. The Battalion will advance in the same formation as it forms
up (two lines at 100 yards’ distance of two companies each in
lines of platoons at 40 yards’ interval). If it comes under rifle
or machine-gun fire it will deploy into extended order.

11. When the Coldstream have captured the first objective the
Battalion will halt until zero + 1 hour, probably in the old
British front line.

12. Battalion Headquarters will move about the centre of the two
rear companies. A dressing-station will probably be established
in the old British front line.

13. As soon as the final objectives have been captured by the
infantry, the cavalry will advance and seize the high ground
ahead.

14. The first line transport will be packed up and ready to move
forward at one hour’s notice after zero + 4 hours.

W. R. BAILEY, Capt. Adjt.,
2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards.

_September 14, 1916._

The officers of the 2nd Battalion who took part in the operations from September 15 to 17 were:

Lieut.-Colonel C. R. C. de Crespigny, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. Viscount Lascelles Second in Command.
Capt. the Hon. W. R. Bailey Adjutant.
Capt. C. N. Newton No. 1 Company.
Lieut. P. M. Walker ” ”
Lieut. A. T. A. Ritchie, M.C. ” ”
2nd Lieut. C. C. Cubitt ” ”
Capt. A. K. S. Cunninghame No. 2 Company.
Capt. M. K. A. Lloyd ” ”
Lieut. T. Parker Jervis (Pioneer Platoon) ” ”
Lieut. N. McK. Jesper ” ”
Capt. W. H. Beaumont-Nesbitt No. 3 Company.
Lieut. H. F. C. Crookshank (Lewis Guns) ” ”
Lieut. M. H. Macmillan ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. Arbuthnott ” ”
2nd Lieut. A. Hasler ” ”
Capt. G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. T. W. Minchin ” ”
2nd Lieut. D. Harvey ” ”
Capt. J. Andrews, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.

[Sidenote: Sept. 15.]

At 5 A.M. on the 15th the tanks were seen moving slowly forward on the left flank of the Brigade, but they apparently aroused no suspicion, and did not attract any fire. Punctually at 6.20, the zero hour, the two Coldstream battalions started off, and immediately came under a terrific fire from the enemy’s machine-guns. The unevenness of the “jumping-off line,” and the total absence of any recognisable landmarks in that desert of shell-holes, made a certain loss of direction inevitable. The leaders of the assault were mown down, but the remainder, undeterred by losses, pushed on until they were within twenty yards of the sunken road. It was a red-letter day in the history of the Coldstream, for with the 1st Battalion Coldstream from the 2nd Brigade there were three battalions of Coldstream all in line.

When they reached the sunken road there was a momentary check, as the leading companies had lost a large number of officers or non-commissioned officers. Lieut.-Colonel J. Campbell saw that to pause for a moment in the attack would mean failure, and dashed forward. Knowing that in the infernal roar of rifle and machine-gun fire no commands could possibly be heard, he had provided himself with a hunting-horn, which he now blew. The familiar sound, piercing the din, instantly arrested the attention of the men, and they at once followed their Colonel. Straight into the midst of the enemy they went with an irresistible rush, and got to work with the bayonet.

Large numbers of Germans were killed or taken prisoner, and four machine-guns were captured, in addition to a number of trench mortars. The casualties in the 2nd Battalion were considerably increased by the fact that the tank, which should have passed over the place where the machine-guns were posted, never reached its objective, and consequently a gap of 100 yards was left where it should have gone.

On reaching the road the Coldstream battalions did not halt, but swept on down the valley, where they found another entirely unexpected German line. Their losses had been very heavy, especially among the officers; in the 2nd Battalion Coldstream there were only two officers left besides the Commanding Officer. Yet so splendid were the rank and file that they “carried on” as if they still had officers at their head. The fact that the whole Coldstream Regiment was in line leading the Guards Division undoubtedly lent an additional impetus to the whole attack. When they reached what they thought the third objective, Lieut.-Colonel Campbell reported their position to General Feilding, but Lord Cavan, who had received reports from aeroplanes, discovered that it was not the third but the first objective that the Coldstream were occupying, and sent back at once to say so.

Again the three Coldstream battalions had to go forward in the face of a withering fire, and were joined soon after they started by No. 2 Company 2nd Battalion Grenadiers under Captain Cunninghame and parties from the Irish Guards. But with a heavy barrage from the enemy’s artillery, in addition to the machine-gun and rifle fire, an advance was no easy matter. It was asking a great deal even of a regiment like the Coldstream to face such a terrible ordeal a second time, but when they were clear of the German barrage the note of the hunting-horn once more rang out and warned them that Lieut.-Colonel Campbell was in front, calling upon them to follow. Without hesitation the line again swept forward, and the second objective was reached.