Chapter XXIII (1)

Death of Mr. Thomas Grenville--Russian Measures in Poland--French
Overtures to England--The Confidential Correspondence on the
Spanish Marriage--Relations with France--Hostility of Lord
Palmerston to France--Visit to Paris--Princess Lieven's Version
of the Transaction--Lord Cowley's Opinion--Conversation with
M. Guizot--M. Duch‚tel's Opinion--The exact Truth as to the
Spanish Marriage--Conversation with M. Thiers--A Dinner at M.
Thiers'--Further Argument with M. Guizot--Character of Queen
Christina--Papers laid before the Chamber--Relations of the
British Embassy with the French Opposition--At the Tuileries--Mr.
Baring's Opinion--Debate in the Chamber of Deputies--Mrs.
Austin's Salon in Paris--Debates in England--Bad Effect of Lord
Normanby's Intrigues with Thiers--Another Misunderstanding--M.
de Tocqueville--Ball at the HÙtel de Ville--Animosity of Guizot
and Lord Palmerston--A Call at the Sorbonne and at the HÙtel
Lambert--Change of Government in Spain--Farewell Visit to M.
Guizot--Effect of the English Blue Book--Conversation with M.
Thiers.

[Sidenote: CHARACTER OF MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.]

_December 19th, 1846._--On Thursday evening at seven o'clock Mr. Grenville died, after a week's illness which was no more than a severe cold or influenza. If he had lived till the 31st of this month, he would have completed his ninety-first year. I had only known him with any sort of intimacy for the last five or six years, during which I saw a good deal of him. He was a remarkable man, not so much from great ability as from a singular healthiness of mind and body and the greenness of his old age. I never saw so old a man in possession of such mental and bodily faculties; his only infirmity was deafness; till about a year ago he used to walk vigorously; he never had an illness till the one with which he was attacked the year before last, and from which he recovered entirely though with strength somewhat impaired. His memory was remarkable; his cheerfulness, vivacity, and kindness of disposition delightful. He evinced an affection for his relations and a cordiality to his friends that were pleasant to behold, and he was not only entirely free from the moroseness and captiousness which so often attend old age, but he blended an extreme suavity of manner and sweetness of temper with the high-bred politeness of the more ceremonious age in which he had flourished. He was certainly the most amiable and engaging specimen of an old man I ever beheld. I do not conceive that his abilities were ever first-rate, and latterly (whatever may have been the case early in life) he entertained very strong prejudices and often very unreasonable ones; these prejudices caused him to act in some instances in a manner inconsistent with the urbanity of his disposition. He never could endure the Reform Bill or forgive its authors; he never would set his foot in Holland House after that measure; and he estranged himself from all his old political friends, even those with whom he had been the most intimate, not indeed absolutely quarrelling with them, but desisting from all intimacy. He was a scholar and a well-informed man, and he retained till the last all his literary tastes and habits; he loved the society of literary men, and to the last entered with zest and spirit and unimpaired intelligence into all questions both of literature and politics. It is difficult to say what the exact colour of his political opinions was. He used to be a Whig; but he was, at all events latterly, a moderate anti-reforming Whig, with a horror of organic changes and not fond of any changes, disliking free trade and disliking Cobden more; favourable to Catholic emancipation and the establishment of a Catholic Church, but abhorring O'Connell who was his _bÍte noire_, and in his eyes the incarnation of all evil and mischief. He never was married, but when he was young he was desperately in love with the Duchess of Devonshire, and he never married because her image remained enthroned in his breast, and he never could find any other woman to be compared with her. For many years he was a poor man, and he never became a rich one till the death of Lord Glastonbury, who left him an estate and a great deal of money; the estate, which was entailed on his nephew George Neville, he generously gave up to him at once. He lived hospitably and handsomely, and was, I am told, very generous and charitable. His greatest expense was in books; he had collected a library of extraordinary value, and which for the size of it has always been reckoned the most complete of any private collection. It continued to interest and occupy him to the last, and he never ceased to add to it as occasion offered; he was, indeed, one of the last of the great collectors, of the bibliomaniacs; he collated every book himself, and placed in the title-page of each, in his own handwriting, an account of the book, where purchased, and its history when of any interest. His society in latter years was restricted, and he was not fond of making new acquaintances unless he fell in with them by accident, when he was easily approachable and always disposed to carry them on. He had constantly dinners and very agreeable ones, and it was wonderful to see him at ninety years old doing the honours of his table with all the energy, gaiety, and gallantry of a man in the prime of life. A happier life and an easier death it would be difficult to discover; his life was extended to nearly a century without any intermission of bodily health, any decay of mental faculties, and, what is more extraordinary and more valuable, without any deadness or coldness of human affections. He was blessed with affluence, with the love of rational and elevating pursuits, and with ample leisure and power to enjoy them. He was a philosopher, a gentleman, and a Christian, and he lived in constant social intercourse with the relations to whom he was attached, or the friends of his predilection, to all of whom he was an object of the deepest respect and affection. A life so tranquil and prosperous was terminated by a death no less easy and serene; his indisposition was not such as to interfere with his usual habits; he rose at his accustomed hour and dressed himself to the last, even on the day of his death. He had always a book, latterly the Prayer Book, before him, and his mind was undisturbed and unclouded. He dined and went to sleep in his chair, and from that sleep he never awoke.

_December 20th._--On Friday morning an article in the 'Times' announced that the Emperor of Russia was going to annex Poland to his empire, putting an end to the last vestige of Polish nationality. Yesterday morning the 'Chronicle' declared this report was exaggerated, if not erroneous, and that all that was contemplated was the abrogation of custom-house regulations between the Russian and Polish frontiers. The history of these contradictory articles is this: On Wednesday at the Cabinet dinner Palmerston brought this piece of news, communicated to him by Bunsen, who was in a great state of alarm and indignation, and said that Metternich was equally alarmed and eager to do something. The Austrian and Prussian proposals were severally these: Metternich wished for a declaration that the annexation of Cracow should not be used as a precedent, but considered as an exceptional case. Bunsen suggested that a naval demonstration should be made in the Baltic by us, of course in conjunction with Austria and Prussia. These two Powers now begin to see what an egregious folly they have committed in the Cracow affair, and are filled with shame and terror. The next morning, Friday, Palmerston saw Brunnow, and he asked him whether this story was true. Brunnow said he was glad he had asked him, and that he could assure him he had never heard one word of it and did not believe it, that he believed it to be a mere fiscal regulation which would be advantageous to the Poles and not agreeable to the Russians, but that the reported political move he disbelieved. He had, however, written to Nesselrode to ask what the real truth was. Palmerston, without doubt, on this sent the article to the 'Morning Chronicle;' there is a phrase at the end of it about Guizot quite Palmerstonian. It is amusing to see the two papers moved by different ministerial interests. John Russell told me at Windsor yesterday that he believed the first account. It certainly seems to me that it is a very bad piece of policy of the Emperor's, if true; he has accomplished the absorption of Poland already in fact, and what can it signify to him to do so in form? By degrees he has stripped the Poles of almost all national distinctions, and he has only to go on as he has been doing for some time past to complete his work; nobody opposed, nobody remonstrated with him at each successive violation of those privileges which all Europe guaranteed; and now the Powers, who patiently and tamely endured the most flagrant violations in fact, are ready to explode with indignation at an announcement of them in form.

[Sidenote: RUSSIAN MEASURES IN POLAND.]

James Rothschild is come over here, partly on his own concerns, and partly on Louis Philippe's, who is very intimate with him and talks to him often and confidentially. He has been with our Ministers, at least with Lord Lansdowne and Lord Clarendon (I do not know if he has been with any others), and said a great deal about the King's intense desire to be well with England again, asked if we wanted to get rid of Guizot, and intimated that if his fall would facilitate the reconciliation he would be sacrificed without scruple. They have no doubt whatever that he is authorised by the King to convey this to our Government. Clarendon told him that Palmerston would not walk across the room to get rid of Guizot, and did not care one farthing whether he was in or out; but that he was not surprised that they should fancy he might desire it, knowing as he did that they had left no stone unturned to bring about his removal from the Foreign Office, so far as they were able to say or to do anything to that end.

_December 24th._--Jarnac was with me for three hours yesterday, and I am going to him to-day to see some of his papers. The whole of our conversation resolves itself into this: he said that they really had believed that the Coburg marriage was _imminent_; that they had given ample and repeated notice (especially in the note of February 27) that, if ever they saw this, they should act accordingly, consider the Eu engagement at an end, and take their own line; that they never could get Palmerston to put on paper distinctly that we did not and would not encourage this match. This, involved in a vast deal of phraseology, and many minute details, with a great deal of false reasoning, and facts contradictory of each other, made up his whole discourse. I endeavoured to pin him down to one or two points, from which he was always trying to escape, and to cover his retreat by verbiage.

I have made up my mind to go to Paris, Lady Normanby having offered to take me in at the Embassy: this temptation decides me.

_December 25th._--Yesterday I was with Jarnac for three hours and a half, reading papers. He showed me everything: the copy of the famous despatch of July 19 (Palmerston to Bulwer), which was (as they say) the _fons et origo mali_; all Guizot's private letters to him, and his to Guizot; _ditto_, between him and the king; his _procËs-verbaux_ of conferences with Palmerston; copy of the note of February 27 (on which they so much rely); the letter of Guizot's which was sent to John Russell, and John's admirable answer; Jarnac's own rejoinder; Guizot and the King on this correspondence: in short, he gave me to read all that was material, and that I had time to read in these three or four hours. At all events, I believe I am now as completely in the possession of the case on both sides as it is possible to be, and all this information and knowledge has not changed my opinion.

It is clear that we have been jockeyed by France in a very shabby, uncandid, underhand way. Guizot's private letters, admirably written, bear on them all the stamp of sincerity and conviction, and are calculated to impress anybody with the belief that he was sincere, and that he thought he was doing what he had a right to do as regarded England, and what it was his duty to do as to France. But where rights and duties are clear, there is no need of concealment; everything may be, and ought to be, open and above board; and besides the object of defeating a Coburg scheme and securing the Spanish bride, there was that of preserving the _entente cordiale_, which he could not expect to do, acting as he did.

[Sidenote: THE SPANISH MARRIAGES.]

When disentangled from all its envelopments of verbiage and mutual insinuations, the case resolves itself into one of two very simple points, and lies in a very narrow compass:--The new ministers came into office about July 7; it was then about a fortnight afterwards that Jarnac spoke to Palmerston about the Queen of Spain's marriage (not a word about the Infanta _de part ou d'autre_). Palmerston had written to Bulwer on the 19th, and he read this despatch to Jarnac, and gave him a copy of it (confidentially) to send to Paris. This was the despatch on which they ground their whole case. It treated of two subjects: the marriage of the Queen, and the internal government of Spain. It was very able, very sound, but it was extremely imprudent to communicate it to the French Government. The substance of it was this: that we always had considered the marriage as a Spanish question, in which no foreign power had any right to interfere. That there were three candidates left in the field (Trapani and young Carlos being out of the field), 'Prince of Coburg and two sons of Don Francisco;' that we only desired that the Queen might take whichever of them would most conduce to her own happiness and the good of Spain. We neither supported nor objected to any of them; that therefore there were no instructions to be given to Bulwer, as it was only necessary to refer to those of his predecessor, on which he would continue to act. Then came a severe criticism on the Spanish Government, and the overthrow of all law and constitutional rights, still desiring Bulwer not to interfere in any way, but not to conceal the sentiments of the English Government thereupon. This was very strong, very bitter, and necessarily very offensive to the Spanish Government, and to their abettors and protectors at Paris; however true, and however fit to be written by Palmerston to Bulwer, it was not wise to put it in the hands of the French Minister.

After the communication of this despatch, various letters and conversations passed with remonstrances, and not without some vague threats. Jarnac at once objected to what was said about the Prince of Coburg, complained it was different from the understanding with Aberdeen, and asked if it could not be _reconsidered_. The reply was that it was already gone. Guizot's reply to the receipt of this despatch was confirmatory of Jarnac's objections, and the latter made various attempts to obtain from Palmerston something on paper to the same effect as the verbal assurances which Palmerston gave him. Palmerston replied (as Jarnac reported) that he could not do this without consulting his colleagues. In the meanwhile (I don't exactly recollect the date), Jarnac spoke to the Duke of Bedford and Clarendon, and had an interview with John Russell. From all of these he admits, as well as from Palmerston himself, he received the most positive assurances that we did not, and would not, support the pretensions of the Prince of Coburg, and that we had no thoughts of departing from the principle laid down by Lord Aberdeen. It was certainly very imprudent of Palmerston to show this despatch of the 19th, and it is clear to me that he did it for the pleasure of provoking the French Government, and showing them what we thought of the whole management of Spanish affairs. It was, in fact, a covert and indirect but a bitter attack on them. Next, he was inexcusable for not giving them in writing that which they required, and for allowing nearly five weeks to pass away after their urgent demand for it, before he wrote (on August 28) the despatch, which did not reach Madrid till long after the marriages had been settled and proclaimed. The despatch of the 19th, which Bulwer was not desired to communicate to the Court of Spain, having been placed in Guizot's hands, he forthwith sent it to Bresson, who lost no time (but without Bulwer's knowledge) in communicating it to the Spanish Ministers, to whom it was sure to be most offensive. Taking dates into consideration, it is difficult to doubt that at the same time, or very shortly after, Bresson was ordered to settle the marriages of both princesses, for this despatch is dated July 19, and on August 28 the 'Gazette' at Madrid published the Royal announcement of the Queen's marriage. Not one word, however, was ever hinted to our Government of any such instructions being given or being contemplated. In one of Guizot's letters to Jarnac he gives him to understand that, much as he is dissatisfied, he shall do nothing fresh; and, during the whole of this interval, Jarnac continued to press Palmerston for some positive and written disclaimer--that is, he did when he had the opportunity, for during a considerable part of this time Palmerston was sailing with the Queen. There was, indeed, one letter of Guizot's hinting at his taking a line of his own, 'une politique isolÈe;' but this was too vague (if it were communicated, which is not clear) to excite any serious apprehension in anybody's mind. It is, however, clear that well-informed persons did think it imprudent of Palmerston not to give the French Government at once the satisfaction they demanded, and, as I have before said, both Normanby and William Hervey wrote over very strongly on the subject.

[Sidenote: BREACH OF THE ENGAGEMENT.]

At last, early in September, the news came like a thunderclap that both the marriages were settled and declared; and then began the feeling of indignation and resentment which broke up the intimacy between the two Courts, and infused such bitterness into our diplomatic relations. The war of notes began, and the world will judge whether Palmerston or Guizot had the best of it. The flimsiness of their pretext for breaking an engagement they admit to have made is the more obvious the more it is considered; and that it was a pretext, and one of which they wanted to avail themselves, is evident from the care they took to make no previous allusion to the note of February 27, which they have since endeavoured to turn to so much account. This was a note not delivered but read to Aberdeen, in which they said that, if the Coburg marriage appeared to be imminent, they should hold themselves disengaged from their pledges. They now pretend that they forgot this note was not delivered, and did not know that Palmerston was not cognisant of it, but they never took any opportunity of finding out whether he was, nor of renewing to him the menace or intimation it contained. This omission and their secret instructions to Bresson, while they not only kept us in the dark, but did their best to blind us, are sufficient to convict them of duplicity and bad faith. Palmerston, on his side, may be blamed for imprudence and negligence. The way in which it was taken up here, and especially the things Palmerston said, exasperated Guizot prodigiously, and no doubt the King still more; and it was under this irritation that he wrote his letter (September 15) to Jarnac, containing a bitter philippic against Palmerston, his whole character and policy, and a comparison between him and John Russell, much to the advantage of the latter. This letter Jarnac was instructed to send to John Russell. He told me that he was so well aware of its imprudence that he remonstrated against the order, and delayed several days to obey it. His remonstrance was disregarded, and he was desired to give the letter to John Russell. He took it, however, to Palmerston, told him he had a letter which he was charged to show to John Russell, but, as it contained matter relating to him (Palmerston), he thought it right to place it in his hands that he might read it first and forward it to Lord John after. Palmerston said he did not want to see it, and would not look at it. On this he sent it to Lord John, who showed it to Palmerston, and wrote Jarnac an admirable but very severe answer, commenting in strong terms on the conduct of France, and expressing his entire concurrence with Palmerston in every particular. This reply must have been gall and wormwood to Louis Philippe, and very disagreeable to Guizot. Jarnac wrote an answer to Lord John, rather a rigmarole, but defending the King. This answer seems to have had great success at Paris, whatever it may have had here, for there were letters from both the King and Guizot; the first thanking his champion in very warm terms, and the latter praising his zeal and eloquence.

[Sidenote: THE RUPTURE.]

The estrangement was now complete, and resentment openly testified. The two Courts were _brouillÈs_; the Ministers collectively, Palmerston individually, and Normanby at Paris, all put themselves in a cold and forbidding attitude. Our refusal to join with France in the Cracow affair was received as a hostile expression, and it is evident that the King and Guizot have been getting more and more uneasy at the estrangement, in which we persist. It is, however, not easy to discover how far the Monarch and the Minister are acting in real conjunction, and whether the former is faithful or false to the latter. Guizot's conduct and the tone of his letters do not entirely correspond; the latter evince a strong desire to obtain a sufficient security about the Coburg alliance, and certainly strenuous efforts were made by Jarnac to extract some document which might have been so considered; while, if we judge by his acts, it would seem that all the French wanted was a pretext for concluding the marriage, and such a written assurance as he kept demanding would have counteracted their clever scheme of deception and fraud. It strikes me as very possible that the King and Guizot were not acting together; that the intrigue was the King's, which Guizot did not dare or could not defeat or obstruct, but that while he was obliged to work out the King's design, he would have been really glad if we had given such clear and formal assurances as would have rendered the execution of the plan impossible. I did not conceal from Jarnac my opinion that he had failed to make his case any better; he was not a little mortified at the admiration I expressed of John Russell's letter, in which I in vain attempted to get him to join.

The next morning, just as I was setting off to Badminton, he came to me in consequence of letters he had received from Paris, in which he was informed that Normanby had openly said that the two countries could never be on good terms again till Guizot was turned out and we had obtained a renunciation from the Duchess de Montpensier; this they believed, and that it was the echo of sentiments entertained here. I told him I did not believe a word of it, either that Normanby had said it, or that anybody here wanted to turn Guizot out; that lies of this sort were always rife on such occasions, and I had just heard a story of Louis Philippe's abusing our Queen at the tea-table at Neuilly, which I had no doubt was just as false as the one he had told me, and they might be set against one another. He then asked if our Government were not going to lay papers before Parliament in which Guizot would be implicated, and if so, if they would not first give him a copy of them, and he glanced at the printed papers to which I had referred in my conversation with him. He said in Aberdeen's time such things were always done in concert, and each Government previously communicated to the other everything it meant to publish, but of course this could not be the case now. I told him I did not believe anything was decided about papers; I knew of none, and what he saw in my hands was nothing but the notes of the recent correspondence printed at the Foreign Office by the Government press for the exclusive use of the Cabinet, to whom it would have been too long a process to send written copies; that such was the practice here with regard to all important papers of any length.

_Broadlands, December 30th._--I came to town on Monday from Badminton, where I went to spend Christmas. When I got back I wrote a long letter to the Duke of Bedford giving him an account of my communications with Jarnac and my opinion of Palmerston's conduct of the affair. I told him I was going to Paris, begged he would show Lord John my letter, and said that if he (Lord John) wished me to say anything or to take any particular tone, to let me know. I received an answer this morning, cold enough. Lord John only replied that as I was coming here it was not necessary for him to see me. There was a very foolish passage about our relations with France, 'that there could be no reconciliation, and the spirit of Lord John's letter to Jarnac must be maintained.' The sort of disposition they evince, half desirous to make it up, and half to _bouder_ on, seems to me exceedingly little and unwise.

[Sidenote: PROPOSED REVIVAL OF THE SALIC LAW.]

Yesterday I found Clarendon at the Board of Trade, and had a very long conversation with him; he is now all for trying to make something of the proposal to get the Salic Law re-established in Spain, having in the first instance scouted it. It was first proposed to him by Baron Billing as a solution of the difficulty; he at once rejected it as impossible. Now he has changed his mind, and he wrote to Palmerston and Lord John to say so, and to propose writing to Billing to ask whether he had made this proposal with the knowledge and assent of Guizot, and if the French Government was prepared to assist in procuring such a settlement at Madrid. Lord John expressed doubts, and thought nothing would come of it but some fresh falsehood and deceit. Palmerston thought the plan a good one, and that it was worth while to write to Billing, which Clarendon had done, and he showed me the letter. I think the scheme utterly chimerical, and so I told him; in fact, it strikes me as one of the most absurd and impracticable that ever entered the mind of man. I stated the different objections that occurred to me, one (not the least) being that no Spaniard would be likely to support a measure almost sure eventually to produce another civil war. He said that before Olozaga left Paris he had been to William Hervey, who asked him if he would be willing to support such a measure. He replied that he would, and he thought all the Progressista party would likewise; but while he now looks to this as a possible solution of our difficulty, Clarendon is very anxious by some means to restore a good understanding, and he begged me to tell Guizot that if his language in the King's Speech and in the Chambers was moderate, he would compel a corresponding moderation here, but at the same time he informed me that it was Palmerston's intention to supply Thiers with information to use against Guizot; and he said this without any expression of disapprobation. It was at the end of our conversation, but the next day, upon reflecting on this, I wrote him a very strong letter denouncing the impolicy and the danger of such a communication to such a man. I might have also urged the immorality of it, and its inconsistency with the profession of not wanting to injure Guizot or turn him out; the more I think of this the more shocked I am. If it is done, and Thiers exhibits good information, the French Government will know well enough how he came by it.

[Sidenote: LORD PALMERSTON ON THE SPANISH MARRIAGE.]

Here I have had a long conversation with Lady Palmerston, from which I infer that Palmerston's fixed idea is to humble France and to make her feel her humiliation, and, in order to do so, to connect himself more closely with the three Powers, who appear to be ready to do anything for him if he will break with France. She abused Aberdeen, and said he had made his agents all over the world act in subserviency to the French; this system Palmerston considers it his mission to put an end to, and I gather that he means on the contrary to thwart and oppose France whenever and wherever he can. She told me that these Powers were now better disposed than ever to us, and regarding France as the most encroaching Power, only wanted to join us in keeping her down. I took an opportunity of telling Palmerston that Bunsen and Prince Albert want to have a pamphlet written about Cracow and German affairs, and that the former had proposed to Reeve to write it; Reeve said he had no objection provided Palmerston was first consulted and approved, and this he wrote to Bunsen.[1] I told Palmerston that Reeve wished him to be apprised of this. He said he was much obliged to me for giving him an opportunity of thinking of it, but that his impression was that it would be better not to write anything, as Cracow was now an affair settled and done, and it was not desirable to say anything offensive to the three Powers, whose co-operation with us was essential in the far more important concern of the Spanish marriages. From this I infer that he means to continue to wage war on the Montpensier marriage, and to form a sort of preparatory league against France. I am greatly alarmed at the spirit he evinces, and fully expect we shall sooner or later get into some scrape. This evening (31st) I had a long conversation with him, in which he discussed Jarnac's communications with me (which I had told Lady Palmerston) and with him. He declares he gave him the verbal assurances he asked for as strongly as possible, and he does not believe anything else he might have done would have produced any effect in arresting the progress of the intrigue at Madrid. The French pretend that the Spanish Court insisted on having Montpensier, and that the Queen only consented to marry her cousin on condition that the King gave his son to the Infanta; that this match was therefore a Spanish and not a French object. He said that Villa Franca (Montemolin's man) told him that when he was at Paris Louis Philippe said to him that he wished the Count de Montemolin to marry the Queen; that he had only to renounce his claims, which would be a mere form, as he would declare himself King as soon as he was married, and that he contemplated the restoration of the Salic Law, which at all events he should insist on, as far as the Infanta was concerned, whenever the Duke de Montpensier married her. Palmerston's present idea is that this restoration of the Salic Law may be effected, and that the Spaniards will adopt such a course. I pointed out the difficulty and the levity of such a proceeding: enacting a law one day which cuts off the contingent rights of Don Carlos and his family and lets in Ferdinand's two daughters; then abrogating this law and restoring the former course of succession, but preserving only one of the sisters thus let in and excluding the other, and excluding also the heir under the abrogated law now again to be restored, thus re-establishing the law but not re-establishing the rights which that law conferred. All this would make such a mass of confusion and contradictions, and abrogating some rights and creating others so partially, arbitrarily, and capriciously, that the certain result would be a future state of uncertainty, rivalry, and strife. He did not say a word to me of my journey to Paris, nor I to him.

[Footnote 1: [No pamphlet was written, but the substance of the Prince's views on the seizure of Cracow was published in an article in the 'Edinburgh Review,' vol. lxxxv. p. 261.]]

_London, January 2nd, 1847._--Returned from Broadlands yesterday; I had written from thence to Clarendon, and told him my impressions. He thinks that part of what was said of Aberdeen is true. English agents everywhere _were_ made subservient to the French, and to such an extent that they did not dare complain of any French misconduct, because they knew they should be reproved and run the risk of being humiliated in their public capacities, and he attributes to this _laissez faire_ of Aberdeen's much of Louis Philippe's success in his intrigues, and the uncomfortable state of things in Europe. He had been over to John Russell at Chorley Wood, and found him in no state of bitterness, but sick of foreign affairs and the plots and intrigues he had been so troubled with, and so absorbed with the much more important subject of Ireland that he could take no interest in the former. In short, Clarendon has in great measure succeeded in dissipating my alarm. He recommends that I should advise moderation, and give the French Government to understand that a moderate tone there will secure one here, and he has sent me a letter for Duch‚tel, with whom he wishes me to communicate confidentially.[2]

[Footnote 2: He endeavoured to tranquillise me about the information to Thiers, and said of course it would be given with great caution. It did not tranquillise me, however, and my soul was prophetic. What mischief has resulted from this false and profligate step! (February 21st).]

_January 3rd._--I saw M. de St. Aulaire and Jarnac yesterday, and had much conversation with both. St. Aulaire said he saw he had nothing to do but remain _les bras croisÈs_, and say as little as possible.

I go to-night.

[Sidenote: M. GUIZOT'S EXPLANATION.]

_Paris, January 6th._--Arrived here yesterday morning at half-past twelve o'clock, travelling all night from Boulogne. I had no sooner got here than Normanby put into my hands a box of papers, copies of his despatches to Palmerston, containing details he was anxious I should know, and filling up gaps in the history of the Spanish affair. The most essential of these papers are despatches to Palmerston, giving an account of two interviews with Guizot, and as to which there could be no mistake, as he read to Guizot his letter, giving the details of one of them (the most important). Guizot acknowledged its general accuracy, and made a verbal amendment or two in it. I take for granted these papers will be published. Normanby is very anxious they should, and justly considers that unless they are, the strength of our case will never be known. There are certain things contained in them which Guizot never can explain away satisfactorily, and which must leave a stain on his candour and good faith. On August 28 Normanby formally proposed to Guizot a joint action in favour of Enrique; he replied that this would suit him perfectly, and that he would write to Bresson and instruct him accordingly. On that very day the announcement of the two marriages appeared in the Spanish Gazette. Normanby of course subsequently asked for an explanation of this extraordinary conduct. Guizot seems to have lost his head in the excitement of his exploit, for he replied that hearing nothing to satisfy him, and on the strength of his note of February 27, 'J'ai agi'--that is, that he had already acted independently and hostilely long before the day on which he pretended that he would give instructions to Bresson to act conjointly with us. He endeavoured to excuse this duplicity by saying that Bresson had acted on general, not on particular instructions; but this was inconsistent with his 'J'ai agi.' Then about the time of the celebration of the marriages, he had said they would not take place at _the same time_; again, on being pressed on this point, he said he had meant that they would not take place _together_, and that such had not been the intention when he said so. Jarnac told me the other day that he had heard great stress was laid on this by us, and that we meant to make it a matter of grave charge. I said I did not believe it was so seriously considered, and doubted that much more was thought about it, though at first it had been considered as a proof of insincerity; but I find that it is of importance, for upon the expectation thus conveyed by Guizot rests Palmerston's defence for one of the weakest points of his case, his long silence after hearing of the marriages being settled. Palmerston's conduct and his delays throughout have been quite inconceivable, and certainly will, if not weaken his case, draw considerable censure upon him if it all comes out. There was, in the first place, his neglect and obstinacy in not giving in writing the assurances he had given verbally; next, as to the proposal of joint action, Jarnac came to him, intending to make the proposal, but in consequence of the despatch of July 19 he did not make it. He then went to Paris, and on his return he did make it. He could get no answer, and none was sent till August 22. Bulwer was then instructed to propose Enrique, and the French Government was invited to instruct Bresson to co-operate, but he allowed a month to elapse before he wrote this instruction; then when the conclusion of the marriages was imparted to him, he suffered three weeks to elapse before he took any notice, and then sent his protest. It never would have been effectual, but the only chance for him would have been an instantaneous remonstrance by return of post. All these delays, such tardiness, coupled with other slight circumstances, give some colour to the proceedings of the French Government, and, to a certain degree, help out their case. Normanby is fully conscious of the damage thus done to ours, and the only excuse for the last delay is, that Palmerston was reposing on the assurance that the marriage of the Infanta was not to take place at the same time with that of the Queen; but this, when examined, will appear hardly any excuse.

[Sidenote: PRINCESS LIEVEN ON THE QUARREL.]

I called yesterday afternoon on Madame de Lieven, who was very glad to see me, and we forthwith broke into the subject, without, however, any sort of agreement. She abused Palmerston, and said if Aberdeen had been in office it would not have happened. As to argument, she really had none to offer, but repeated over and over that 'we had departed from the agreement with Aberdeen;' and if not, 'pourquoi nommer le Cobourg?' She said all Europe was against us, that we had with little dignity knocked at the doors of the three Powers who turned their backs on us, and that we had done good to France and harm to ourselves by this useless appeal, as they were now more alienated from us and better inclined to the French, and that they all thought us in the wrong. She said much about Normanby, his _greenness_ as ambassador, and the follies he committed; asking advice of different people, and very incompetent people too; and she repeated the story Jarnac had told me of his saying we never should have harmony restored till Guizot was turned out and the Infanta had renounced, which, she said, had been told her by Apponyi, who had heard it from Normanby himself. She had got other stories of the same kind, and a heap of little charges of holding communications with Thiers, MolÈ, and others hostile to the Government. She said that the King was very angry with our Queen for having said that he had broken his word, and never would be reconciled to her till she had withdrawn that accusation. I said that between his word and hers I could not for a moment doubt, and that I suspected he would have a long time to wait if he did so till she withdrew the charge she had made. She said Guizot was very strong, the King very firm, the marriage very popular, and that they all desired nothing so much as to make known all that had passed, secure that in so doing they should have public opinion all the world over on their side. We parted wide as the poles asunder, but very good friends.

_January 7th._--Guizot appointed me at four o'clock yesterday, but when I went there he was not returned from the Council. I called again and saw him for a moment; but as he said he had his courier to despatch, and 'avait ‡ me parler sÈrieusement,' he begged me to go to him to-day at half-past four.

I called on Lord Cowley,[3] and had a long conversation with him. He is impatient for a reconciliation, and thinks that far too great importance has been attached to the question itself. He blames Palmerston severely for his despatch of July 19, and thinks that more warning and menace were held out than I had conceived;[4] that _his_ communications ought to have satisfied Palmerston that the French Government were in an excited state and prepared to do something unless he prevented them. This makes his delays still more inexcusable. He also fancies that it would never have happened if Aberdeen had remained in office.

[Footnote 3: [Henry, Lord Cowley, younger brother of the Duke of Wellington (born 1773), had been Ambassador at the Court of France under the late Government. He resigned on the fall of Sir Robert Peel's Administration, but remained as a private gentleman in Paris until his death, which took place in April 1847, shortly after this interview.]]

[Footnote 4: Miraflores came to Paris for (see _post_) the purpose of getting something settled. He told the King that Trapani was out of the question, the two sons of Don Francisco de Paula almost impossible from the Queen's dislike of both, especially of Don Enrique, on account of his insolent letter to her from Bayonne. If, therefore, His Majesty would not give them his own son, he entreated him to leave them alone and let them choose for themselves. The King answered very angrily, said he would not give the Duke de Montpensier, still urged one of the Spanish Princes, but above all recommended delay, and to take time for consideration. This Miraflores told to Lord Cowley, who wrote it home to Palmerston. This is the communication which Palmerston alludes to in his long note, but he is very incorrect in his allusion.]

At night to the Opera, where I met Thiers and was introduced to MolÈ. I am to call on Thiers to-morrow afternoon. MolÈ told Normanby that he was very uneasy about two things,--the arrest of Olozaga in Spain, and the intervention of the Austrians in Italy, which he expected to take place. MolÈ, by Normanby's account, speaks very disparagingly of Guizot, and, by Madame de Lieven's, very contemptuously of Normanby. It is amusing enough to hear all the stories the people here tell and the opinions they express of one another.

[Sidenote: DISCUSSION WITH M. GUIZOT.]

_At night._--This morning I called on Madame de St. Aulaire, whom I found, and Madame de Gontaut, whom I did not; then, Madame de Lieven. Much talk on the old subject, and the fire of my tongue extinguished the fire of hers, for, without the least convincing her, I reduced her to silence. The great gun I brought to bear on her was Aberdeen's despatch to the Duke de Sotomayor, which proved that Palmerston had in no way departed from the system of conduct pursued by Aberdeen. From her I went to Guizot, and was with him for an hour and a half. We began with an agreement that we should be mutually frank and sincere. He went through the whole case and exhibited all his causes of complaint and suspicion against Palmerston, that when he came into office he never said a word (in public or private) expressive of a desire to be on good terms with France, neither in his speech at Tiverton, nor in the House of Commons, nor to Jarnac; that he never alluded to the Spanish question nor sought to establish or confirm an understanding thereupon with France; that the despatch he wrote to Bulwer (19th), which contained instructions for his conduct, was not imparted to the French Government; and that when Jarnac spoke to him, and Palmerston showed him the despatch, it was already gone. All this apparent reserve and uncommunicativeness excited suspicions that he was not well disposed and, above all, not going to tread in the footsteps of Aberdeen. I defended him by saying that he ought to have considered Palmerston's situation--just come into office, encumbered with business, occupied with questions of much more urgent importance in the House of Commons. Nothing new having occurred about Spain, he contented himself with desiring Bulwer to abide by his predecessor's instructions, and really had nothing to say on the subject; that it was his habit to write in a rather familiar, offhand style, and his despatch to Bulwer, which was not intended to be published or communicated, was of that description, but that it meant nothing; and when asked, and the objection urged to the obnoxious passage, he gave the most positive assurance that no change of policy was contemplated. Guizot insisted that it did not signify what he meant; that the question was, what impression it was calculated to convey. Then he went into the various delays, and the impossibility of getting an answer from him; all of which served to confirm his suspicions that a different and hostile policy was already in active operation, that the note of February 27 gave him a right to act, _le cas ÈchÈant_, and that in a letter to Jarnac (which he gave me to read) he plainly indicated his intention by saying that if England adopted _une politique isolÈe_, he would adopt one also, and he asked me whether I would not have understood what this meant--and that it meant, what he afterwards did. I said I did not mean to acquit Palmerston of much negligence and tardiness; that I thought he ought to have at once come to a satisfactory understanding with France about the marriages; that he was greatly to blame in all his delays, but that he did him less than justice; that Palmerston was not the bitter enemy of France which he supposed, and that he was reposing all along on the faith of the engagements which Aberdeen had communicated to him, never thought the matter pressed, nor had the least idea that they took it so seriously; that he must remember we did not regard Spanish affairs with the deep interest and attach to them the same importance they did. He said he was convinced that Palmerston came into office with a resolution to overturn French influence all over the world; that he fancied (as many others did) that Aberdeen had sacrificed the interests or the dignity of England to the French Government, while he himself had continually been charged with doing the same thing in France: charges which destroyed each other. But that this was Palmerston's idea, and that he was resolved to oppose France everywhere, to display his independence; that this was especially his object in Spain, where he wanted to raise the Progressista and depress the Moderado party as the most effectual means of substituting English for French influence; that the real reason he supported Don Enrique, and called him 'the only fit husband,' was that he was the head of the Progressista party, and his being chosen as the Queen's husband would be a great encouragement and triumph to it; that this party was the enemy of Christina and of the present government, and for this reason our choice was obnoxious to them; that except for these reasons he had no objection to Don Enrique, and long ago had desired Bresson to get him recalled in a despatch which he showed me; that he was convinced that Palmerston not only had determined to act in the way he had stated, but that he thought he could intimidate France.[5]

[Footnote 5: I said that the idea of _intimidating_ France had never entered his head, that he was _un homme de coeur_ himself, and knew that France was too great and too powerful to be intimidated by anyone.]

[Sidenote: M. GUIZOT DEFENDS THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.]

I replied that he was entirely mistaken: that he exaggerated Palmerston's disposition and mistook his position; that in Melbourne's time he did what he chose in his own department, but that was not now the case; that all important affairs were decided by the Government, and that John Russell was far from having any bitter feeling against France, and had always entertained sentiments of esteem towards Guizot personally; that neither he nor anyone else (not even Palmerston) wished to see him out of office. It was true that they did think there had been on different occasions and in various places an undue succumbing to France, but that there was no desire to commence a general struggle against French interests; that they would certainly see with pleasure the Liberal party in Spain again lift up its head, and some such reaction as should promise a Government disposed to act in a constitutional manner, and put an end to the despotism that now prevailed. He said that he considered this the best and most constitutional Government that Spain had ever had; that it was far more so than Espartero's; that every change had been effected in a legal, constitutional manner by the Cortes itself; while all former changes, especially the expulsion of Queen Christina, had been effected by violence. I said I was amazed to hear him say so, and begged to ask him how the Cortes itself was constituted, and whether it had not been packed by stratagem and force, and by the most unscrupulous use of despotic power--the municipalities having been suppressed and all free opinion overborne. He only replied that the municipal question was made the instrument of the Queen's deposition, and that it had been voted by the Cortes.