Chapter XXIII (2)

It is very difficult to record accurately a conversation in which we often diverged and then returned to the same topic. I pressed him hard on his want of openness and confidence, and urged that when the two countries had been so long on such terms of amity, and the two Sovereigns also, that before he proceeded to act in so serious and decisive a manner and which could not fail to offend England, he ought to have left nothing vague, but have said distinctly and at once what he intended to do. He ought, if he took the note of February 27 as his justification, to ascertain that Palmerston was cognisant of that note. Why did he not as soon as he came into office renew to Palmerston the notice he had thought it necessary to convey to Aberdeen, and why not say frankly that he regarded the state of the case to be such that, acting on the right he had reserved to himself, he should send instructions to Bresson to conclude the marriages. His answers to this were very weak. He said that it was not his business to look after Palmerston's affairs, and that he had a right to conclude, since Aberdeen had communicated with him, that he had imparted to him this note; that he showed confidence to those who showed confidence to him, and that he did not think Palmerston had acted towards him in such a manner as to require such confidential communication on his part. His real reason was (though I did not think it necessary to charge him with it), that if he had given notice to Palmerston, the latter would have sent off to Madrid and probably counteracted his scheme. He insisted that his letters to Jarnac, and the conversation he had had with Lord Cowley (which he repeated to me word for word as Lord Cowley had done), were warning enough and were sufficient indication of his intentions. Besides that Bresson's instructions were general, he had had them above a year with a discretionary power to act upon them whenever he had reason to believe the Coburg marriage was _imminent_, which case he contended had arrived. I said if its imminence arose from our despatch, Bresson had himself created it, inasmuch as he had shown it to the Spanish Government. He said that was not true, that Bresson had given him his most positive assurance that though he had spoken of it to different people he had never shown it to the Spanish Ministers. He spoke with great energy of the King's feelings and of his own, especially at the strong language that had been applied to him personally, and of his having been accused in a formal document as well as in a letter, of _bad faith_; that it was impossible to transact business with any confidence and in a useful manner with those who charged him with bad faith. Such accusations were intolerable. He then spoke of his letter to John Russell; that he had only intended to call his attention to the difficulty of going on with Palmerston while he put such a tone into the discussions; that it was absurd to suppose that he had ever thought or dreamt of effecting Palmerston's removal from office. He excused this letter very clumsily, and said he had not expected any answer to it (being evidently to the last degree nettled at that which he had received). I admitted that this letter was very imprudent, that it was very strong, and spoke of Palmerston in terms he was likely to feel and not easily to forgive; that he should have recollected what a situation he placed John Russell in, who really was compelled to answer it as he did, or to quarrel outright with Palmerston; that if he had not answered it as he did, the indignation and resentment of Palmerston would have been very great, and he would probably have resigned; and that he might have found means of conveying his sentiments in some manner less dangerous and offensive. He insisted on the clear intention of Palmerston, from the despatch, the delays, and various circumstances, to depart from the engagement with Aberdeen. I said that we could prove that Aberdeen himself had laid down precisely the same rule of conduct on which Palmerston had acted, and expressed the very same sentiments; that they were recorded in a former despatch addressed to the Duke de Sotomayor for the information of the Spanish Government; that this was very different from the letter to Bulwer which was neither to be shown nor any thing done upon it, but was a reply to two important questions: the first, whether if the Spaniards chose a husband for the Queen not a Bourbon prince, such choice would be displeasing to England; and secondly, if France attempted to coerce their choice, whether England would support them. His reply was plain and decisive: viz. that their choice would not be objected to by England, whatever it might be; and that while it was impossible to conceive that France ever would attempt coercion, if she did, Spain would have the 'sympathy' of England and of all Europe. He said he had no copy of this despatch, and did not well recollect its contents. I said, 'But you have seen it.' He 'had not had it in his hands, it had been read to him.' He was evidently much put out by the citation of it.

[Sidenote: EFFECT OF LORD PALMERSTON'S DESPATCH.]

After a great deal more talk he spoke of his intentions. First, however, he complained of our refusal to join with him in the Cracow affair, and that we had done so in an offensive manner, giving him to understand that his breach of the Treaty of Utrecht made it improper to join with him in enforcing that of Vienna, but that, nevertheless, he was resolved to observe the greatest moderation and to evince no _rancune_; that he should lay the papers he thought necessary before the House of Peers, and make such a statement of the whole case as he was convinced would prove to demonstration to France, to Europe, and even to many people in England itself, that he was clear and blameless in the transaction; that he might deceive himself, but that such was his sincere belief; that he should, however, do this in language of moderation and with an earnest desire to avoid furnishing any fresh matter for irritation; that he should continue his endeavours to act towards England in a friendly spirit, and he should not be deterred by her past conduct from offering to communicate and consult with her on all those subjects which it was desirable they should consider with reference to their mutual or common interests. He said he had a great deal more to say to me, hoped to see me again, and that I would dine with him, and so we parted.

_January 10th._--On Friday I called by appointment on Duch‚tel. There is nothing of much interest to record of my conversation with him. He talked in the same strain as Guizot, expressed great desire for reconciliation, confidence in the goodness of their case, said their majority was stronger and more secure than ever, and any change of government impossible.

[Sidenote: LORD COWLEY'S VIEW OF THE CASE.]

Yesterday morning I went to Lord Cowley, who showed me his letters to Palmerston giving him an account of the state of the Spanish question and of his conversations thereupon with the King and Guizot. These communications ought certainly to have drawn Palmerston's attention to the subject, and have induced him to lose no time in coming to some understanding with the French Government. At the same time the anxiety of the King to gain time, and his urgent recommendations to Miraflores to have patience, may have misled Palmerston and made him think there was no danger. It is clear to me that what they took alarm at was Miraflores' communication; that they really did believe the Coburg alliance was _imminent_, and that when it was followed up by Palmerston's despatch of the 19th their fears were still more increased. They all along suspected both Palmerston and Bulwer; and they did, in truth, think that between Christina's impatience, the difficulty of finding an eligible Bourbon, the probable intrigues of Bulwer, and the suspected co-operation of Palmerston, unless they settled the matter themselves _somehow_ it would be settled in the way they most dreaded. They knew, or at least they thought, that their difficulty would be very agreeable to Palmerston, and that it was not likely he would help them out of it. In this state of things I have no doubt that Guizot wrote to Bresson and told him to settle the affair if he could, and that Bresson was furnished with fresh instructions on which he did act, and not on the old discretionary ones on which they now pretend that he acted. Lord Cowley thinks Christina told Bresson that if he would at once strike a bargain and give the Duke de Montpensier for the Infanta, Don Francisco should have the Queen; that he instantly accepted this proposal, sent it off to Paris by telegraph, where it was confirmed at once. Whether this was the exact mode or not, or whoever took the initiative, I believe this is the way it was done; certainly the King seemed anxious to put the question off. Lord Cowley thinks he expected to be able to bring back Trapani. Guizot's vehemence (for he spoke much more strongly than the King) ought to have alarmed Palmerston. The mischief has arisen from Palmerston being careless and thoughtless, Guizot suspicious and alarmed.

Yesterday morning at two o'clock I called on Thiers by appointment, found him in a very pretty apartment full of beautiful drawings, copies of Italian frescoes, pictures, bronzes, books and _cahiers_ of MS., the sheets (much corrected and interlined I could see) of his work. These he told me were his 'seul dÈlassement,' and that politics never interrupted his literary labour. We then talked about the present state of affairs, and very amusing he was, sparing nobody and talking with his usual abundance and openness. He said he had read the notes that had passed between Palmerston and Guizot; that his own opinion was that Guizot would break down on the _procÈdÈs_, but that at all events it was a quarrel _‡ outrance_; that each accused the other of bad faith, and could only justify himself by fixing that imputation on his antagonist; that moderation became impossible when such charges were bandied, and he had read with astonishment the strong things contained in these notes; that if Guizot had the worst of this encounter he would fall, not however by the desertion of the majority, not by this Chamber, but through the King. 'You must not,' he said, 'believe what you hear of the strength of the Government and of its security; don't believe all Madame de Lieven tells you; c'est une bavarde, une menteuse, et une sotte; vous l'avez beaucoup connue, vous avez ÈtÈ son amant, n'est-ce pas?' I defended myself from the imputation, and assured him that though she had had lovers when first she came to England I never had had the honour of being one of them. He then said he would tell me what would happen: the King _se faisait illusion_ that the Whig Government could not stand; but when he found out that this was an error _il aurait peur_; and if we continued to refuse to be reconciled, he would get rid of Guizot. The present Chamber would not overthrow him, but the King would. 'Savez-vous ce que c'est que le Roi? Le mot est grossier, mais vous le comprendrez. Eh bien, c'est un poltron.'[6] I said I was surprised to hear this, for we thought he was _un homme de coeur_, and had given proofs of his courage very often. 'Non, non, je vous dis qu'il est poltron, et quand il se trouvera dÈfinitivement mal avec vous il aura peur; alors il suscitera des embarras ‡ Guizot; il y a quarante ou cinquante hommes dans la Chambre, je les connais, qui tourneront contre lui, et de cette maniËre il tombera, pas par la Chambre, encore moins par vous.' He said the accusations had been so strong that each Minister was bound to prove his own case and the _mauvaise foi_ of his adversary, and Guizot would stand or fall by the result of the explanations. 'Vous pouvez Ítre s˚r que ce que je vous dis est la vÈritÈ, d'autant plus que ce n'est pas moi qui lui succÈderai, c'est MolÈ. Cependant je vous parle franchement, et je vous avoue que je serais enchantÈ de sa chute; d'abord parce que je le dÈteste, et aprËs, parce que l'alliance anglaise est impossible avec lui; c'est un traÓtre et un menteur qui s'est conduit indignement envers moi, mais je ne serai pas ministre.' However, he could afford to wait; he was forty-eight years old, and his health excellent. As long as the King was in no danger he would never send for him; as soon as he was he would send for him. The King could endure nobody who would not consent to be his tool; he would never take office without being his master, _et j'en viendrai ‡ bout_; he would rather continue in his independence than take office on any other terms. He told me he had seen the notes, and was amazed at the sharpness of their contents. We then went out together, and walked to the Faubourg St. HonorÈ, talking about his book, Napoleon, etc.

[Footnote 6: [Louis Philippe was certainly not wanting in physical courage, but in moral courage he appeared in his later years to be deficient. M. Thiers was in the habit of using exaggerated language, and he disliked the King; for M. Thiers' great defect was that he could not _serve_ anyone. The Revolution of February 1848 proved that there was a good deal of truth in these predictions. But the want of resolution which M. Thiers imputed to the King arose solely from his honourable and consistent aversion to violence and war.]]

[Sidenote: CONVERSATION WITH M. THIERS.]

_At night._--I have been dining with Thiers, and met Odilon Barrot, Cousin, RÈmusat, Duvergier de Hauranne, Mignet, and several others I can't remember. They were all prodigiously civil to me, and with Cousin and Mignet I had a great deal of conversation. Palmerston's note arrived this morning. It is very clever and well done, but too long, and his _polÈmique_ about the Treaty of Utrecht in my opinion _dÈplacÈe_ and mischievous. But he is determined to urge this point, and is endeavouring to get the Allied Powers to join with him in a protest or some formal expression of opinion upon it. I don't believe they will ever do this; but if they did, it would probably produce most serious consequences. His policy in this is perfectly inconceivable to me. Normanby read it to Guizot this afternoon, and at the same time offered him the despatch of the 19th July (to Bulwer), and Aberdeen's to Sotomayor to publish with the other pieces, _both or neither_, but he refused them. I had another furious set-to with Madame de Lieven, who is the most imprudent woman I ever saw; but we always part friends. Normanby has shown Thiers several papers, and MolÈ _many more_ he tells me. I have begged him to be cautious.

[Sidenote: FEAR OF THE COBURG MARRIAGE.]

_January 12th._--I called on Guizot yesterday by appointment; found him more stiff and reserved than the first time, and not apparently in good sorts. He did not appear to have anything particular to say, but reverted to the old topics; that he would not go again over the same arguments; but it was clear that from the beginning Lord Palmerston had a fixed policy which he had immediately begun to carry out: to raise the Progressista party in Spain, and destroy the Moderado and French influence with it; that we fancied ourselves obliged to substitute English for French influence there as an indispensable security for our power in the Mediterranean; and we appealed to the Treaty of Utrecht; that great changes had taken place since that time. It was true France had acquired Algeria, and through it a certain power in the Mediterranean; but that we had acquired Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu, which we had not been possessed of before, and which were quite sufficient to secure our power there. He said a great deal more of Palmerston, for he still insists, and either believes, or at all events pretends to believe, that Palmerston was bent on the Coburg marriage, and doing his utmost to bring it about. He really thinks it was sound policy on his part, and for that reason was pursuing it. I again and again assured him he was mistaken. 'You forget,' I said, 'that when this affair began, Palmerston had not been ten days in office, was overwhelmed with business, and had many other things more pressing to occupy his attention. He had found an understanding concluded with Aberdeen, which he accepted. He had no thoughts of doing anything; he knew of nothing urgent that had occurred, and the truth is, _il n'y pensait pas_.' 'Comment!' he said, rather angrily, 'il n'y pensait pas? Est-ce que vous nous prenez pour dupes que vous voulez nous faire croire cela? 'I said I believed it was so; that this Spanish question which was of such deep interest to them was of much less interest to us; and 'why,' I said, 'if you considered the matter so urgent, if you knew what was going on in Spain (which Lord Palmerston did not), and considered the marriage you so feared to be _imminent_, why did not you go at once to Palmerston and tell him so?' 'Ce n'Ètait pas ‡ moi,' he replied, 'de faire l'Èducation de Lord Palmerston.' 'No,' I said; 'mais c'Ètait ‡ vous de faire vos propres affaires, and to communicate frankly with him when you wanted his assistance.' He would not allow this. I said, since I had been here and had seen and heard a great many things I did not know before, I had become convinced that his alarm about the Coburg marriage was perfectly sincere, that he really did believe it was likely to take place, and that the real object of the King had been to get the Spanish Court to wait and not insist on an immediate marriage; that it was not the despatch of July 19, but the mission of Miraflores and what he had said to the King which had really alarmed them. He said this was not exact; it was not that which had given them the alarm, but from various circumstances they were convinced that the Coburg marriage would have been settled offhand if they had not taken decisive steps to prevent it; that this marriage it was impossible for France to tolerate. There was already a Coburg in England, another in Portugal, and to have had a third at Madrid would have been to make Spain a part of Portugal, and to have exhibited to all the world the triumph of English over French influence; that this combination which we wanted to bring about, they were bound to defeat, and then again assuming that _our Court_ was bent on it, he said: 'Le fait est que vous Ítes meilleurs courtisans que nous.' I told him that I was assured the Court had never sought this alliance, and that Prince Albert had long ago written to his cousin to say that he must not think of it, as it was impossible.

I then asked him why Christina had been so impatient to conclude a marriage of some sort, and why she could not wait as the King had advised. He said, for reasons partly personal and partly political; that Queen Christina was a very extraordinary woman--'trËs habile, avec un esprit trËs impartial'--that she had no prejudices, and he had heard her talk of her greatest enemies, of Espartero even, without rancour and with candour; that she had great courage, patience and perseverance, and never quitted a purpose she had once conceived; that royalty was irksome to her, and government and political power she did not care about except so far as they were instrumental to the real objects of her life, which were to live easily, enjoy herself, and amass money for her children, who were numerous, and whom she was very anxious to enrich; that she was aware of the precarious nature of her influence, and felt the necessity of connecting herself with, and obtaining the support of, one of the great Powers--England or France--the latter by preference, but the former if not the latter; that she had, therefore, always wanted the King to give her his son for the Queen, and when he refused this, she had got angry and turned to the Coburg alliance and the English connexion; that besides, the young Queen was impatient to be married, and that if they had not found her a husband, she would infallibly have taken a lover. 'Vous ne savez pas ce que c'est que ces princesses Espagnoles et Siciliennes; elles ont le diable au corps, et on a toujours dit que si nous ne nous h‚tions pas, l'hÈritier viendrait avant le mari.' For these reasons she was impatient to conclude, and she infallibly would have concluded the marriage with the Prince of Coburg if we had persisted in refusing the Duke de Montpensier, and had not effected some other arrangement. She trusted that the King, her uncle, would have accepted _the fait accompli_, and at all events that she should have been secure of English support.

[Sidenote: THE FRENCH PAPERS.]

I then said that after all what was now most important was to look to the future, that our quarrel must be fought out, but that a short time would bring those discussions to an end. What was to happen then? I believed and hoped that he was not likely to be _renversÈ_ here, and I was satisfied Lord Palmerston would not be in England, and how were the affairs of the two Governments to be conducted between them? If Spain, which had once been a military _champ de bataille_, was henceforward to be a political _champ de bataille_ between the two countries, I did not see how any _entente_ was possible. Must this last for ever? or was it impossible that the two Governments should unite in bringing about a better state of things in Spain, and giving to her in reality something of the freedom and independence which she possessed in name? He seemed by no means disposed to enter on this subject, and as I thought I observed in his manner some symptoms of a desire that our conversation should terminate, I rose and took leave of him. He was very civil, but rather formal and ceremonious on my going away.

_Paris, January 13th._--This morning we read in the newspapers the _piËces remises_ by Guizot to the Chamber of Peers, and among them, to our great surprise, an extract of Palmerston's despatch to Bulwer of July 19, Guizot having refused Palmerston's offer to place it (with Aberdeen's to Sotomayor) at his disposal. Normanby immediately wrote him a very strong note complaining of this publication after what had passed between them. In the afternoon I saw Madame de Lieven, who made very light of it, and treated it as a frivolous complaint. Bacourt, who was there, endeavoured to find excuses for Guizot, but was obliged to confess that he had no right to use this without our permission. When I got home I found Guizot's reply had come. He said he had given nothing more than he had quoted in one of his notes, and had done no more than produce the English version of what he had quoted in French, and he asserted his right to do this. He finished, however, by saying that if Normanby would send him the two despatches, he would add them to the other documents. Normanby wrote back word that he regretted he should have produced this extract in a manner calculated to give a false impression of the tenor of the despatch, sent him the documents, and hoped, as he was going to publish more, he would produce Palmerston's last note. There has been a schism here in the Opposition; Billault, Dufaure, and thirty or forty deputies have separated from Thiers, and are preparing to join MolÈ if Guizot falls. It seems clear that neither party will take our side on the marriage question, and that the Government will not be attacked at all in the Peers, and very probably very feebly in the Deputies.

_January 16th._--For the last two days I have been sightseeing, HÙtel Cluny, Churches, Notre-Dame, Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois, the Gallery of the Louvre, and all day yesterday was at Versailles. I had not seen it for above thirty years, and was struck with the vast dimensions and the ugliness of the building; it is, however, interesting on the whole.

I dined with Guizot on Friday; had very little talk on politics. He came into one of the rooms where Bacourt and I were talking and joined us. I then said that though I had come here without any mission I had come not without the hope of being able to take back with me something which promised a renewal of good understanding. Guizot said he was ready to be on good terms with us, but he could _do_ nothing of any sort or kind, and this he repeated in a very peremptory tone. He was probably (though very civil to me) not in the best of humours in consequence of the article which had appeared that morning in the 'Constitutionnel' (Thiers's paper), with a circumstantial and quite accurate account of what has recently passed between Guizot and Normanby about the despatches. This, which could only come from the Embassy, has shocked I suppose everybody, and made Guizot and his friends indignant. Normanby was himself very much annoyed when he read the article, and at once perceived the bad effect it would have. He said he did not know how it got there, but he suspects Thiers who probably sent it or caused it to be sent; however, both William Hervey and Craven are so hot and so unreserved that the Opposition paper might very easily get over it. Normanby has told Thiers and MolÈ everything, and Thiers came twice in three days to the Embassy. All this is well known, and Normanby passes for an ambassador in constant and confidential communication with the enemies and rivals of the Ministers. In spite of all this, within the last two days I have found a less excited tone. We had, however, our own complaint to make, which probably kept them more quiet about the 'Constitutionnel.' When all the papers came out it appeared that Guizot had published another fragment that he had no right to do of one of Palmerston's despatches, about 'the only fit husband.' This had been read to him, but no copy given to him, and he took the words down with his pencil at the time. These words he published in a formal official shape. His excuse is the same, that the words had been quoted in one of his notes.

[Sidenote: AT THE TUILERIES.]

_January 19th._--Went last night to the Tuileries; the King was very civil, but did not talk to me on any subject. We were there only twenty minutes. I saw all the Princesses, the Duchesse de Montpensier decidedly the best; she is a pretty, plump little thing, and looks three or four years older than she is. The Duchesse d'OrlÈans is still in mourning. The King looks very well, and is grossly caricatured by 'Punch;' he is a very good-looking old gentleman, and seems to have many years of life in him still.

Normanby saw Guizot on Sunday about the affairs of the Plate, when he took the opportunity to speak to him about his second extract (from the despatch which was not communicated to him); he made the same sort of excuse as for the other, and reminded him that he had taken the words down in pencil.

Went last night to a ball at the Duchesse de Galiera's, where I met Francis Baring,[7] who told me a good deal about French politics. He says Thiers is quite out of the question, and that his own errors and the schism in his party hare demolished him. Billault and Dufaure are making a second opposition. He thinks Guizot has more to fear from the effects of the very grave financial embarrassment which exists, and that if he got the country into any political difficulty in the midst of it he might be sacrificed, but MolÈ is a man without courage; the majority is the King's majority on the whole, but still Guizot has many followers and is not without power. It would not, therefore, be quite so simple and easy to dismiss Guizot unless some good opportunity presented itself. Everybody here will support the Government in its present contest with us. He said he should not dare to speak a contrary language to his wife, who would tear both his eyes out if he did. He thinks we were right to decline joint operation in the affair of Cracow, but that it is an enormous blunder to make so much of the Treaty of Utrecht; that it would have been wise to have made a protest, the more vague and general the better, but reserving to ourselves to take any course we thought fit in respect to Spanish marriages and successions, keeping all treaties and laws bearing on the subject in reserve, to be used or not according to our discretion. This is what I have always thought: the Treaty of Utrecht, the renunciations, the laws of Spain, and the other treaties between Spain and Austria furnish materials for a very good argument such as an astute counsel might turn to excellent account; but Palmerston has made the Treaty so prominent, and has been so decisive and peremptory, that he has got into a position where he can neither advance without danger nor recede without discredit. I saw the other day his protest at Madrid against the marriage in which he declared that England would _never_ acknowledge the issue of the Duchesse de Montpensier as heirs to the crown of Spain.

[Footnote 7: [Mr. Francis Baring had married Clara, the daughter of Maret, Duc de Bassano, and was well versed in French affairs.]]

[Sidenote: THE DUC DE BROGLIE'S SPEECH.]

_January 21st._--Was at Madame de Lieven's on Tuesday afternoon when Guizot came in from the Chamber. He said the Duc de Broglie had spoken for an hour and a half _avec un grand succËs_. The next morning I read this successful speech, which was as bad as it well could be, and calculated to make matters worse with us. The Queen's Speech arrived yesterday, and was thought very moderate, as it is, but very ill written. In consequence of the passage about Cracow none of the Ambassadors of the three Courts would appear at the _sÈance royale_. Yesterday Guizot spoke for two hours, and certainly very adroitly in reference to his position and his object; being quite sure of whatever he said being accepted as all-sufficient by the Chamber, he could afford to glide over the difficult points and not attempt to grapple with them, and he carefully abstained from saying anything irritating or offensive to us, sparing even Palmerston as much as he could. I went to Madame de Lieven to-day, when she asked me what I thought of the debate. I said, 'If you want my candid opinion, I will give it you. Le discours du Duc de Broglie a ÈtÈ mauvais; il est indigne de lui et de la rÈputation qu'il s'est acquise; il n'est ni juste, ni vrai, ni sage. S'il avait eu le dÈsir d'envenimer l'affaire, ce que je ne crois pas, il n'aurait pas pu parler autrement.' I then said that the speech of M. Guizot was of a very different character, that I did not attach much value to his argument, and that he had eluded all the real difficulties of the question, but that he had contrived to make a defence which was quite sufficient for his purpose here (though if it had been addressed to an English Parliament or court of justice it might have been easily answered), and to do so with a perfect reserve and moderation, and without allowing one word to escape him of a violent or offensive character; that it was very clever, very adroit, admirably adapted to the occasion, and I thought would produce a salutary effect _chez nous_. She was much pleased, and expressed her satisfaction that I thought this; when I said she must not forget that I said so always with a reserve as to the argument, and that I only meant to speak of the tone; that as to the value of the speech in reference to the question at issue, I agreed entirely with the 'Constitutionnel.' She laughed at this, affected to treat it with derision, and said that all the world knew the articles in that paper came from the Embassy, which I treated with derision in my turn. Guizot then came in, but only stayed a moment; she told him that I admired his speech, but would tell him more of what I had said when he came to her in the evening. I then told her of the absence of the Ambassadors at the House of Lords, which struck her prodigiously, and she would hardly believe it. We afterwards talked of the future and how matters could be got right, and we both agreed that where 'la confiance avait ÈtÈ ÈbranlÈe' entirely, it was very difficult to restore it. I said the only way I knew was to act with mutual truth and good faith, to have no _dessous des cartes_ on either side, and then by degrees each party would discover that the other really was doing so, and by degrees confidence might revive. But the notion of Palmerston's hatred of Guizot is so strong, of his independent power in the Government and his disposition to use it, that it is very difficult to bring them into anything like a quiet and confiding state of mind. I told her it was an error to suppose Palmerston was so powerful and that he could drag his colleagues with him unreasonably, and that if they found him wantonly and unfairly endangering the peace of the two countries, they would force him to desist or to go. Guizot's speech seems to have been received very favourably by most people for one reason or another, and it certainly was very able and judicious.

I dined to-day with Madame Graham (a dull party), and went afterwards to Mrs. Austin's, where I met M. de Tocqueville, Mignet, Alfred de Vigny, M. de Circourt, Mr. Wheaton, and several others whose names I cannot recollect. There was also a Mr. Schwabe, who has been travelling all over Spain with Cobden, and has a great deal to say about the country and the people. He says there is a sprinkling of Free Trade tendencies, but not at Barcelona. They were well received everywhere, and by nobody better than by the French consuls (especially Lesseps at Barcelona), whom they found advocates of Free Trade. The country appeared miserably desolate and depopulated, but they were told that the improvement within the last ten or twelve years was prodigious. The Infanta's marriage was unpopular, French influence on the wane, and he is convinced that if the country is only left alone, the feeling of Spanish independence will be enough to provide an opposition to French influence.

[Sidenote: THE DEBATE IN ENGLAND.]

_January 24th._--On Friday the newspapers brought the English debate on the Address, which has made a great sensation here. The speeches, especially Lord Lansdowne's, all so moderate and expressive of an earnest desire for a reconciliation with France. Everybody, those who hoped and those who feared, were astonished; Guizot delighted, but taking it coolly. We think that Lansdowne's tone was too low, that he was too _empressÈ_, and that it will be misunderstood at Paris. Then the 'Times' has been writing articles abusing Palmerston and giving out that public opinion is all against him, and inclines to Guizot, doing all the mischief it can. These articles were received with a great deal of chuckling by Guizot and his people, and the low tone taken by Government and others corroborated their impressions. John Russell spoke very properly, very conciliatorily, but with more of firmness. There was a ball here on Friday night, where I had some conversation with MolÈ, Cousin, Duvergier, and Francis Baring. All are struck with our discussion. MolÈ, who wishes for reconciliation and rejoices at the spirit that has been evinced, told me he thought Broglie's speech very bad, and Guizot's very good and discreet, but that the latter was already triumphing. 'Avez-vous vu,' he asked him, 'les journaux anglais? Eh bien, vous voyez qu'on recule.' Cousin said that it was impossible for them to say anything for us in the Chamber when we did not seem disposed to say anything for ourselves. Duvergier said the same thing, and he with Thiers and his people are excessively disgusted and disappointed at the ground appearing to be taken from under their feet. M. de Beaumont said to me last night, 'Il paraÓt que vous avez mis bas les armes.' They now write from England that it is probable there will be no discussion in either House, a conclusion so impotent and discreditable that I hope it will not end thus. Palmerston can never permit this; both he and the Embassy and Thiers will cut a ridiculous figure enough.

With great imprudence and impropriety, in my opinion, Normanby, with Palmerston's concurrence, has been in confidential communication with Thiers for the purpose of enabling the latter to attack the Government in the Chamber, it being of course expected and understood that we were to make a strong case against Guizot at home. All the world here knows of this connexion and blames it. Guizot is of course indignant at it, and it renders all communication between him and Normanby as cold and distant as possible. Thiers is as sulky as a bear; he knows that his alliance with the Embassy has done him no good, and now it seems unlikely to enable him to do anybody else any harm. It is clear to me that we are in great danger of cutting a contemptible figure and something more, for nothing can be so impolitic as to create a belief here that the people of England are resolved to submit to anything rather than go to war, and that the French Government may follow their own devices without hindrance, for if the Minister for Foreign Affairs (especially Palmerston) remonstrates and complains he will probably not be supported at home. The fact is, Palmerston's mismanagement of his case and his most unwise persistence in his argument about the Treaty of Utrecht have ruined him and given _gain de cause_ to Guizot. I must say that I begin to think no reliance is to be placed on him, and that he really is a very bad and dangerous Minister. It appears that before the Session opened Lansdowne wrote to Palmerston and desired to know what he meant to do, what to insist on, and, in short, how they stood. He wrote back word that he had no thoughts of insisting on any renunciations, as it was clearly impossible to obtain them, and that he was ready to go on with France amicably and frankly on all matters of common interest, though of course there could not be the same confidence as heretofore. On this Lansdowne made his speech. But yesterday morning in the midst of all these honeyed words there arrives a letter from Palmerston to Normanby desiring him to go and complain formally of the affair of the extracts, and particularly that what he did publish was not textually correct, and that Guizot's _excuses_ were not satisfactory. Normanby never told me of this till the evening when he had done it. He went to him and read the letter, and Guizot was very angry and said _excuses_ was not a proper word between gentlemen, and that it was difficult to carry on communications when such expressions were used. Normanby said he could only answer for the English word in which sense he ought to have understood it.

[Sidenote: M. DE TOCQUEVILLE.]

_Evening._--I saw the despatch this morning; it was short enough, but it would have been better not to have read it to Guizot. This evening, however, Normanby met him at Madame de Lieven's, when he told him he thought it not worth while to write to Palmerston what had passed between them yesterday, as he had misunderstood the meaning of the _English_ word. Guizot said as that was the case he had nothing to say, and thought too it would be as well to say nothing to Palmerston about it. So this matter is in a manner blown over, but the same _animus_ will probably generate fresh things of the same kind.

This morning I called on Tocqueville and sat some time with him and his wife, an Englishwoman. He looks as clever as he is, and is full of vivacity, and at the same time of simplicity, in his conversation. He gave me an account of the state of parties in France substantially the same as I had heard before; the schism of Billault and Dufaure, to whose section he belongs; they could not go on any longer with Thiers, who, he says, does not command above twenty or thirty votes, and is out of the question. He had formerly belonged rather to Odilon Barrot than to Thiers; said the marriage question was most decidedly popular in France, because considered as having given us a check which had paid off old scores, and that the being now _quits_ had rendered a future good understanding more easy; and never did he remember so general a disposition to be on friendly terms with us, and to act in concert with us; he thinks the King could turn out Guizot and make another Government, but that he is not likely to do it.

I went last night to a ball at the HÙtel de Ville, where amongst many fine people were all the _bourgeoisie_. It was a magnificent ball and very well worth seeing, many of the women very good-looking and all well dressed. There must have been two thousand people there, and the house extraordinarily fine. From thence to a ball at Madame Pozzo di Borgo's, the most beautiful house I ever saw, fitted up with the greatest luxury, and _recherchÈ_ and in excellent taste. There were to be seen all the exquisitely fine people, the cream of Parisian society, all the Faubourg St. Germain, the adherents of the old and _frondeurs_ of the new dynasty who keep aloof from the Court, and live in political obedience to, but in social defiance of, the ruling powers. They are knit together by a sort of compact of disloyalty to the _de facto_ sovereign, and if any one of them suffers himself or herself to be attracted to Court the offender immediately loses caste, is treated with the utmost scorn and indignation, and if a man very probably does not escape without some personal quarrel and is sure to be deserted by his friends.

[Sidenote: M. GUIZOT AND LORD NORMANBY.]

_January 26th._--Yesterday morning the 'Morning Chronicle' came with a bitter and violent article against Guizot's speech in the Chamber; the courier at the same time brought copies of our printed papers, and I took one to Madame de Lieven. There I found Guizot furious at this article, which he said he was sure had been dictated by Palmerston himself. I said I was as much shocked at it as he was, and that Normanby regretted it very much, but that I was persuaded Palmerston had had no hand in it, and no knowledge of it; that he had written to Lord Lansdowne the day after his speech saying he entirely approved of it and agreed in all he said, and it was impossible he should have at the same time written such a letter and sanctioned such an article, but that I was sorry he had not taken means to prevent such diatribes, and inspired the 'Chronicle' with a better spirit. It was preaching to the winds. His dislike of Palmerston is so great, and his conviction of the reciprocity of the sentiment so rooted, that he will not allow himself to doubt. I left them because I was engaged, and promised to return in the afternoon to her. When I did return I found the perusal of the papers had made a great impression on her. She said there were many curious things she did not know before. I said 'Certainly, so I told you,' and I then pointed out to her certain letters and asked her if they did not prove to demonstration, first, that the proposal of a Coburg came entirely from Madrid and was the desire of the Spanish Court; secondly, that we had constantly refused to lend ourselves to it; and thirdly, that if we had answered the appeal to us according to the disposition they always had imputed to us, the marriage might have been made. She was obliged to own that it was so, but then again returned to the old question 'Why, then, did you name him?' I said once more for the fiftieth time that it never had entered into the head of Palmerston or of anybody else that _the mention of his name_ would have raised such a notion or suspicion in them or in anybody, and that it was wonderful they would not see that if he had had the intention and that this letter contained the expression of it, the last thing he would have done would have been to show it to them. She then talked again about the 'Chronicle' and the difficulty of going on, of the unsatisfactory relations between the Foreign Office and the Embassy, and of the great difficulty of ever restoring them to such a condition as they ought to be in for any useful purpose. 'How,' she asked, 'could M. Guizot open his mind to Normanby, or talk confidentially to him, when he knows he is intimately connected with the Opposition, and that what he says may be repeated the next moment to Thiers and appear in the "Constitutionnel" on the following morning?' This is the real embarrassment, and it is not easy to see how it is to be got over. Guizot and Normanby are on civil terms, and that is all. When they meet on business they discuss the particular matter in hand, and never anything more; to William Hervey Guizot does not speak at all; when they meet at Madame de Lievens, Guizot appears not to see him. She says that I am the only Englishman to whom he can talk openly, and consequently they are very sorry for my departure.

After I left her in the morning I drove all over Paris: to the University to see Cousin, who lives up a staircase just like a Bencher or a Collegian. He was not at home, nor anybody there to answer the bell, so I stuffed my card through a crevice in the door. He is a Peer. Then to Prince Czartoryski's, who lives in a great old house in the Isle St. Louis, close to the Pont d'Austerlitz. The establishment is curious and interesting. The Princess told me she wanted a house which was spacious and cheap, and not therefore in the fashionable and dear part of the town. They were fortunate enough to find this, which exactly suits them. It was the hotel of the Duc de Sully, and there was formerly a subterraneous passage with a communication to the Arsenal. It afterwards fell into the hands of Lambert, a great financier, and is still called the HÙtel Lambert. Madame du Ch‚telet had it, and they show the apartment which Voltaire occupied for many years. At the Revolution it became a shop or _magasin_, I forget of what, but no change was made in the building. The Czartoryskis found it all _dÈlabrÈ_ and dirty, bought it very cheap, and spent twice as much as the purchase-money in restorations. It is a great fine house, handsome staircase and gallery, very vast, with court and garden, and a delightful airy prospect towards the river and the Jardin des Plantes. The thick coat of dirt which was cleared away had preserved the original painting and gilding, which have come out, not indeed bright and fresh, but still very handsome, and they have furnished it in a corresponding style. It is not, however, for the purpose of being well lodged that they have thus provided themselves, but to perform a great work of beneficence and charity. The Princess has converted the whole of the upper stories into a great school for the daughters of distressed Polish officers and gentlemen, where they are lodged, fed, clothed, and educated, and what is left of their fortune they spend in this manner. She took me all over the apartments; they are like those in a very well-regulated pauper school, clean to an extreme nicety, but modest and economical. The girls crowded about her to kiss her hand. There they are prepared to become governesses; the Princess's daughter is their 'Professeur d'Anglais,' she told me. It is a very striking sight and well worth support. I went from thence to the Place Royale; then to where the Bastille formerly stood, and down the whole length of the Boulevards, which is the way to see this curious town.

[Sidenote: FALL OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.]

_Wednesday._--Yesterday morning news came that the Spanish Ministry was out; a majority in the Cortes on the question of the Presidency, composed of Progressistas and discontented Moderados, turned them out. The movement is anti-French and said to be brought about by a coalition of the two brothers against the Queen-mother. Guizot is evidently disconcerted by it; Madame de Lieven affects a supreme indifference; she told me that Sotomayor was making a Government, a _Moderado_ Government, that he had proposed to Mon to remain. Mon would not without Pidal (his brother-in-law), and the others were willing to have Mon, but would not have Pidal, because the two would make the Cabinet too French. They now acknowledge that 'sans contestation vous n'avez jamais voulu ni rien fait pour le Cobourg.' I asked her whether this was Guizot's opinion, and she said 'parfaitement.' This is incomparably cool. After having had the most reiterated assurances _before the fact_, which they utterly disregarded, and did not choose to believe, now that the fact is accomplished, and it suits their purpose to make it up, they acknowledge that they were in error, and acted on a mistaken notion.

I went last night to Madame de Circourt, who has a brilliant salon, but I knew none of the people; then to Madame de Girardin, where were people of a totally different description.

_Thursday._--I prevented Normanby from going to Thiers' salon the night before last, and yesterday morning I gave him to understand as delicately as I could that all his communications with him and others in opposition to the Government were noted, reported, and much resented. He is, however, still impressed with the notion that Guizot may be got out, and that his connexion with his opponents may conduce to that object, in my opinion a dangerous error.

Kisseleff gave me an account of what had passed between him and Guizot about the despatch which he read in the Chamber. Kisseleff said it was very irregular and improper, but he did not think it had done any harm. Kisseleff received it the morning of the debate in the Peers, and took it to Guizot, telling him it might be of use to him to know the contents. Kisseleff left it with him to read at his ease, and begged him to return it directly, giving him no authority to produce it. Guizot read it _in extenso_. He said afterwards that he believed it was the best thing he could do for France and Russia too. Strange that a man so formal should be so loose in his transaction of business.