Chapter XXXVIII: Appendix (1)

A.—THE COAL-CARRYING DECISION, U. S. SUPREME COURT.

Since this book was put in type the United States Supreme Court has sustained the Interstate Commerce Commission in an important suit brought by the Commission against the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, and the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad under the Elkins Act. The Chesapeake and Ohio agreed to deliver at New Haven 60,000 tons of coal at an aggregate cost which, after deducting the market price of the coal at the mines and the cost of transportation from Newport News to Connecticut, would leave the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway only about 28 cents a ton for carrying the coal to Newport News, while the published tariff was $1.45 per ton. Suit was brought by the Interstate Commission to enjoin the carrying out of this contract. The Government challenged the right of an Interstate carrier to perform a contract to sell and deliver merchandise (coal) whenever the price to be received by the railway is inadequate to cover its actual outlay, plus the published freight rates, upon the ground that the actual result would be discrimination and failure to collect the published tariff, in violation of the Interstate Commerce Law. The answer of the railway company was in effect that it charged the full rate for transportation, but sold the coal at less than market rates, at a price in fact which involved a loss, and that special circumstances justified it in so doing. The companies maintained that, when acting in good faith, they had, as dealers, the right to make contracts at a fixed price for sale and delivery extending over a series of years and then go into the market, buy the merchandise, and deliver it at destination, notwithstanding that what they received therefor might not be sufficient to yield them a net sum equal to the published freight rate, according to which shippers generally were charged.

In a strong decision rendered February 19, 1906, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of the Government, declaring that a carrier cannot deal in the goods it carries in such a way as to evade the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, and therefore a railway cannot buy and sell and underbid other owners of similar goods who are dependent on the railroad for the transportation of their goods to market. “The existence of such a power would enable a carrier, if it chose to do so, to select the favored persons from whom he would buy and the favored persons to whom he would sell, thus giving such persons an advantage over every other, and leading to a monopolization in the hands of such persons of all the products as to which the carrier chose to deal.... Because no express prohibition against a carrier who engages in interstate commerce becoming a dealer in commodities moving in such commerce is found in the act, it does not follow that the provisions which are expressed in that act should not be applied and be given their lawful effect.”

The Court quotes an English case, Attorney General v. The Great Northern Railway, in which the Vice-Chancellor decided on common-law principles that a railway could not deal in coal because such dealing was incompatible with its duties as a public carrier and calculated to inflict injury on the public.

The decision is important, and the railways, it is said, have already begun to part company with their coal mines. But it must not be expected that the evil at the bottom of this case can be so easily eradicated. It will be a simple matter to put the coal mines in the hands of special companies controlled by the same men who control the railways, and the coal company and the railway can together continue to do precisely what the railway alone has been doing in the double capacity of dealer and carrier.

Within a week of its decision sustaining the Commission in the coal-carrying case, the Supreme Court has reversed the Commission and the Circuit Court in the orange routing case. In 1899 all the railways of Southern California fixed a through rate of $1.25 per hundred on oranges from California to the Missouri River and the East, reserving the right to route the freight. The Fruit Growers Association complained of this as depriving shippers of their right to route their shipments and as virtually constituting a pooling agreement or combination in violation of the Interstate Act. The Commission and the Circuit Court sustained this contention, but the U. S. Supreme Court has now (March, 1906) sustained the railroad plea that they have a right to fix through rates on condition of determining the routing themselves.

B.—REGULATION OF RATES.

In the Boston _Transcript_ for February 24, 1906, President Hadley, of Yale University, criticises the Hepburn Bill because it makes “the decision of the Commission itself final on all questions of fact,” and he predicts that if such a bill is enacted into law it will be a failure, although he does not believe it practicable to obtain a better measure now.

President Hadley bases his prediction of failure on his interpretation of the experience of England. He says that the English Railway Act, 1873, “had many points of resemblance to the Hepburn bill. It provided for a commission which, besides ascertaining the rates charged by railroads and making reports to Parliament concerning their management, should also be empowered to investigate complaints concerning unjust rates of discrimination in facilities and give adequate and speedy relief. It was intended to have the quick jurisdiction of these Commissioners supplant the slow jurisdiction of the older courts.”

“The twenty-sixth section of the act undertakes to restrict narrowly the opportunity for appeal from the judgment of the Commission. The Commissioners themselves may state a case; on the case thus stated, and no further, the courts on appeal may decide what is the law. This was intended not only to shut out the retrial of questions of fact, but to give to the Commission, as far as the circumstances admitted, the power of deciding which were questions of fact and which were not.”

The Committee of 1883 is quoted as finding that “a case has been made out for granting to litigants before the Railway Commission a right of appeal,” and we are told that the Committee were “all agreed that the attempt to prevent appeals from the Commissioners’ decisions had been a complete failure.”

President Hadley further says: “Parliament has abandoned the theory on which the act (of 1873) was based, because the courts did not carry out the law, but insisted on retrying questions in their entirety, instead of acquiescing in the attempt to separate the law from the facts.”

And we are told that “the evil effects of the attempt to give the English Railroad Commission power of fixing rates did not stop here. The attempted performance of this duty took up so much of their time that they failed to perform other duties, which under more favorable circumstances they might have carried out efficiently and usefully. They did not have that influence on the formation of railroad tariffs which their experience and high position would otherwise have secured.”

Now as a matter of fact the English law never attempted to give the Railway Commission power to fix rates, except a very limited power in relation to through rates when the companies cannot agree, nor was it intended that the Commission should have anything to do with the “formation of tariffs.” Rates are fixed, not by the Commission, but by Parliament with the advice of the Board of Trade. When Parliament orders a revision of the maximum rates, the railways and the Board of Trade try to agree on new schedules, and the Board embodies its conclusions in Provisional Orders or rate bills which are passed by Parliament with or without amendment as it sees fit. This was true in 1873 and has been true ever since. The Commission’s duty in this connection was and is to hear complaints of undue preference, and rates alleged to exceed the maxima fixed by Parliament. If a through rate proposed by any company is objected to by any forwarding company, the Commission has power to allow or reject the rate subject to the limitation that it cannot require a company to carry at lower mileage rates than it is legally charging for like business on any other line between the same points. (Sections 11, 12, Railway Act of 1873.) The Commission may also determine the division of through rates if the companies cannot agree. Since the Railway Act of 1894 the Commission has jurisdiction under Section 1 to order a return to former rates charged by the company in case complaint is made of an increase above the rates charged in 1892 (the date of the last Provisional Orders or tariff revision), and the burden of proof is on the company to show that the increase is reasonable. This puts a limitation on the companies’ rate-making power in addition to the limit of the parliamentary maxima, for no matter how much below the maximum a rate in actual use in 1892 might have been, it cannot be increased if the Commission on complaint and hearing forbids it.

Further, it is not the case that Parliament “abandoned the theory of the act of 1873” in the sense the reader might gather from the statements made by President Hadley. On the contrary, the Railway Act of 1888 (which resulted from the investigation of 1882, quoted by Hadley) distinctly provides in section 17 that “no appeal shall lie from the Commissioners upon a question of fact.” Subject to this provision an appeal was given to a superior court of appeal, the change being that under the old law the case went up on a statement by the Commission, which could therefore itself determine what were questions of law and what were questions of fact, while under the new law the case went up on the record and the court above determined what questions of law were involved. But the new law is exactly like the old in making the judgment of the Commission final on all questions of fact.

The truth is that England never attempted anything like the system of regulation embodied in the Hepburn Bill; never delegated to any commission the power to fix reasonable rates or make reasonable regulations in place of rates or regulations found on complaint and hearing to be unjust, but she has done and continues to do the other thing that President Hadley gives us to understand she has tried and abandoned, viz., the intrusting of power to a Railway Commission to render final decision on questions of fact.

In the _Transcript_ of April 1, 1905, President Hadley says he “urged that a single hearing in the railroad court was better than two successive hearings by two different kinds of bodies. Mr. Hepburn’s committee desires to avoid the double hearing, but it undertakes to do it by eliminating the court instead of the Commission. There is reason to fear that this plan will not work.”

That may be true. There is reason to fear that no plan for government control of these giant interests will work so long as the ownership is divorced from the said control. As stated in the text, one of the ablest and most honorable of our railroad presidents, in answer to my question as to what would happen if the Interstate Commission were really given power to fix rates, replied, “The Commission would have to be controlled, that’s all.” And when I quoted this to one of the leading members of the Interstate Commission his comment was, “I always said the railroads would own the Commission as soon as it was worth owning.”

Even without owning the Commission the railroads can block it pretty effectually by secret practices, extensive forgetfulness on the witness stand, persistent persecution of shippers who make complaint, cunning evasions, and interminable litigation. It is quite likely the proposed regulation will not realize what is hoped for from it, but we cannot predict such failure from English experience as President Hadley does when he says, “The history of English railroad regulation shows that a similar measure, passed under closely analogous circumstances, failed to do the good which its advocates expected. The same failure is likely to be repeated in the United States.” The Hepburn Bill in its scope and directness is very different from anything that England has attempted. It is quite likely that England may try some more vigorous measure than she has yet adopted, but in spite of all her efforts at regulation Mr. W. M. Acworth, the classic railway writer of England from the railway standpoint, corresponding to President Hadley in this country, told me a few months ago that dissatisfaction with the railway situation is so great in England that “9 out of 10 would vote for public ownership of the roads if the question were submitted to-morrow.”

The general failure of regulation in England to accomplish what was expected of it, may suggest a broad conclusion as to this country, but a specific conclusion from any parallel to the Hepburn Bill is not possible, because no such parallel has been tried.

President Hadley thinks one hearing is enough, provided it is a hearing before a court, not before the Commission. Like the railroads, President Hadley has no use for the Commission. The reason perhaps is the conscious or subconscious appreciation of the fact that rate-making involves a vigorous _administrative_ element, which the Commission has shown a tendency to use with great effectiveness, while a body constituted as a court, by its very nature and traditions, is loath to exercise administrative power or in any way disturb its exercise by the companies except on the clearest kind of proof of the adequacy of the new rate or condition proposed, which cannot in many cases be obtained at all except by _bona fide_ trial of the new rate or regulation, since a rate that is even below the present operating cost may develop traffic enough to give it ample justification. Courts do not like to trust to future proof. If rates do not seem justified on existing facts as shown by accounts presented by the companies, the courts are apt to turn the new rates down without a trial, as the United States Supreme Court did in the Nebraska case when the law of that State fixing rates on local traffic was declared unconstitutional. The companies made the division between through local costs to suit themselves, and the Court not only accepted their figures, but neglected to take into account the fact that lower rates might easily develop new traffic enough to cover the slight additional margin needed even on the companies’ own showing.

President Hadley says: “What the United States needs is an act under which the Commission will take part in the making of tariffs and give effect to the public interest in the general questions of railroad management, leaving the specific cases of violation to be stopped or punished by the courts.” Very good. But how is the Commission to take part in the making of tariffs? If it is to do any more than to give advice (the efficacy of which is nil when it comes up against the Beef Trust, Standard Oil, or other big private interest), it must have authority, general or particular, to fix rates when the railways do not make them just and reasonable. In England Parliament fixes maximum rates on the basis of Board of Trade studies, and the commission acts as a court. The plan has not prevented either discrimination or extortion, but has taken the life out of the railways to a large extent. In this country it is proposed to try the plan of letting a public board fix individual maximum rates when injustice is shown. As there is an appeal to the Federal courts and as Hadley declares that the courts insist on retrying questions in their entirety, it would seem that the very system President Hadley advocates would really come into being under the Hepburn Bill,—the Commission will have a part in fixing the rates, and violations of law will really be determined by the courts.

INDEX

[References are to pages.]

A

ACWORTH, W. M., Appendix B.

ALABAMA MIDLAND CASE, 95.

ARMOUR CAR-LINES, 151, 174–207.
mileage, 175, 188, 190.
speed of cars, 177, 178.
passes, 180.
exclusive contracts, 177, 180, 182, 190.
icing charges, 181–186, 194–196.
espionage, 185.
fixing rates, 186–189.
lax inspection, 188–189.
low minimum carload, 189.
rebates and profits, 190, 191, 194.
cipher code, 197.

AUSTRIA, 315.

B

BACON, E. P.,
testimony, 111.

BAKER, RAY STANNARD,
on Beef Trust, 153.

BALTIMORE,
discriminated against, 226.

BARBED WIRE CASE, 88.

BASING-POINT SYSTEM, 98, 208 _et seq._

BEEF,
billed for export, 225.

BEEF TRUST. (See ARMOUR.)
controls rates, 152.
runs private cars, 176.
intimidates roads, 177.
discriminations, advantages, etc., 176–207.
shipments of, 179.
favored by rates, 186–187.
Boston books destroyed, 250.
packer and road director, 76.

BELGIUM, 315.

BIDDLE OF SANTA FE,
testimony, 114, 124 _et seq._
in salt case, 169.

BISMARCK, 316.

BLANCHARD, GEORGE R.,
quoted, 107.
on ticket scalping, 20.

“BLIND BILLING,”
Standard’s cars, 75.

BOOKS DESTROYED, 248–250.

BOSTON & ALBANY, 105–107.

BOWIE COMPRESS, 68.

BRICK CASE,
New Jersey to North Carolina, 157.

BROKERS, TICKETS, 20.

C

CALEDONIAN COAL CO., 126–129.

CALIFORNIA FRUIT TRANS. CO., 180.

CAMDEN IRON WORKS,
rebates, 122.

CANADA, 327.

CANNON FALLS CASE, 212.

CAPITAL CITY GAS COMPANY’S REBATES, 164.

CARLOAD, MINIMUM, 189.

CARLOADS & L. C. L., 156.

CAR-MILEAGE,
Pullman cars, express, refrigerator cars, etc., 58.
oil, 73.
Armour, 175, 188, 190.
Mr. Hill on, 178.

CARS DENIED, 66, 160.

CASSATT, A. J.,
rebates, 77.
testimony, 32–33.

CHAOS OF RATES, 156, 157.

CHARLOTTE, N. C., CASE, 208.

CHATTANOOGA CASE, 97.

CHESAPEAKE & OHIO,
discriminations, 64.
coal-carrying case, Appendix A.

CINCINNATI MAXIMUM RATE CASE, 218.

CIPHER CODE,
Armour, 197.

CITIES,
growth of, at expense of country, 219.

CLASSIFICATION,
flour and wheat, 70.
soap, Pearline, patent medicines, 71.
railroad ties and lumber, 72.
discrimination by, 70, 155.

COAL,
cars denied, 66, 160–162.
loading by tipple, 140.
Chesapeake & Ohio Case, Appendix A.

COCKRELL, COMMISSIONER,
on quantity allowances, 149.
appointed to commission, 290.

COLORADO FUEL & IRON CO.,
rebates, etc., 124–141.

COMMODITY,
rates, 70.
discriminations, 150.

COMMON LAW,
requires impartiality, 1.

CONFISCATION,
fears of, ungrounded, 290.

CONTRACTS,
Armour’s exclusive, 177, 180, 182, 190.

COOLEY, THOMAS M., 43.
as arbitrator, 152.

CORDELE, GA., 100.

CORRIGAN OF CLEVELAND, 34.

COTTON-SEED-OIL CASE, 162.

COYNE BROS., 183.

CUMMINS, GOVERNOR, 117, 211.

D

DANVILLE, VA., 209.

DAVIES OF CHICAGO,
strawberries carried free, 145.

DAVIS, C. WOOD,
passes cost $33,000,000, 12.

DEAD-HEAD,
passenger cars, 18.
passengers, 2–15, 46, 49, 50, 180.

DECADE OF FEDERAL REGULATION, 104–109.

DEFIANCE OF LAW, 238–240.

DEMURRAGE, 143.

DENMARK, 315, 328.

DENVER,
discriminated against, 92–94, 212, 297–298.

DEPEW, CHAUNCEY,
on pooling, 267.

DEPRECIATION OF LANDS CAUSED BY REBATES, 26.

DISCRIMINATION,
motives for, 23.
history and investigations, 24, 120.
early cases, 25.
varieties discovered by I. C. C. first year, 47.
H. F. Douseman, 54.
passes, 2–15.
reasons for, 2.
C. & O. coal, 64, Appendix A.
great number of, 2.
in facilities, 66.
by classification, 70, 155.
confiscates land values, 26.
Hepburn cases, 27 _et seq._
Standard Oil, 73–76.
beef, 76–83.
between localities, 87–94.
in favor of long hauls, 95–103.
Industrial Commission on, 108.
“all stopped,” etc., 113.
under Elkins Bill, 115–118.
Colorado F. & I. Co., 124.
various other forms, 142–149.
commodity, 150.
horses, cattle, and Jersey brick, 156–157.
to Beef Trust, 151–152.
oranges, 153.
hay and lumber, 154.
routing, 159–160.
refusal to furnish cars, 160–161.
cotton oil case, 162.
division of rates to fake terminals, 166–173.
in refrigerator charges, 181–186.
against independent oil, 201–205.
against non-competitive points, 208–215.
against New England, 217.
against rural points, 219.
against certain cities, 216–217.
in favor of foreign commerce, 221–226.
summary of methods and results, 228 _et seq._
$10 apiece for hams? 232.
defended, 233.
disturbance of business, 236.
“cannot be stopped,” 237.
difficulties of abolishing, 241–251, 272–273.
countries where there is none, 315, 317.

DISTANCE TARIFF, 287, 291, 293, 295.

DIVISION OF RATE. (See TERMINAL RAILWAYS.)

DOLLIVER BILL, 257.

DOLLIVER, SENATOR,
on recent rebates, 116.
non-competitive points, 219.

DOUGLAS, GOVERNOR,
pays his fare, 11.

DOUSEMAN, H. F., 54.

DRESSED MEAT,
rates, 151, 186–189.
billed for export, 225.

E

“ELASTICITY” IN RATES, 286.

ELEVATOR ALLOWANCES, 62, 148.
Industrial Commission on, 63.

ELKINS ACT,
effect, 110.
in Wisconsin, 121, 122.
discriminations since, 140.
opinions as to efficiency, 252, 253.
only one case under, 253.

ELKINS, SENATOR, 111–112.

EMPIRE CO., 31.

EMPORIA, KAN., 91.

EMPTIES,
returned free for Standard, 33.
Armours’, rushed back and paid for, 175.

ENGLAND, 318–327.

EQUALIZATION OF RATES, 291–296.

ERIE ROAD,
early cases, 28.

ESCH-TOWNSEND BILL,
supporters lost passes, 10.
provisions, 260.

ESPIONAGE, ARMOUR, 185.

EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS,
Armour cars, 177, 180, 182, 190.

EXPENSE BILL SYSTEM, 62, 143.

EXPORT RATES,
low, 84, 221–226.
not fair to all ports, 86.
on flour, 86.

F

FACILITIES DENIED, 66, 88, 160.

FALSE BILLING, 61, 144.

FERGUSON, E. M., 199.

FICTITIOUS CLAIMS, 143.

FINK, ALBERT, 267, 271.

FISH, STUYVESANT,
on scalping, 19.
discriminations, 237.

FLAT RATES, 291–295.

FLOUR AND WHEAT, 70.

FOLK, GOVERNOR,
on passes, 6.

FORAKER BILL, 258.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES, HINTS FROM, 313–330.
Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Hungary, etc., 313–315.
Germany, 313.
France, 317.
England, 318.
Canada, 327.
Holland, 328.
Norway and Sweden, 328.
New Zealand, 329.
Australia, 329.
South Africa, 330.

FOREIGN MANUFACTURES FAVORED, 84.

FRANCE, 317.

FREE CARTAGE, 59.
St. Louis cases, 142.

FREE FREIGHT, NO BILLS, 145.

FREE STORAGE, 60.

G

GEORGIA,
Railroad Commission cases, 98.

GERMANY, 316.

GLASGOW, 314.

GOVERNMENT,
rates not on mileage principle alone, 287, 291–295.
ownership of railways, 313–317, 328–332.

GOWAN, FRANKLIN B.,
on railway favoritism, 235.

GRAIN,
price controlled by roads, 63.

GRANGER LAWS, 26.

GRANT CHEMICAL CO.,
free cartage, 142.

GROSSCUP, JUDGE,
on discrimination, 233.

GULF PORTS, 225.

H

HADLEY, A. T., 14, 219–315.
on Hepburn Bill, Appendix B.

HARVESTER CASE, 135.
terminal road, 169.

HAZEN’S SWITCH CASE, 141.

HEARST’S BILL, 260.

HEPBURN BILL, 262, Appendix B.

HEPBURN REPORT, 27.

HILL, JAMES J.,
discrimination, 115, 237.
refrigerators, 175, 178.

HINTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, 313–330.

HOLLAND, 328.

HOPE COTTON OIL CASE, 162.

HORSES, CHAOS OF RATES, 156.

HUNGARY, 314.

HUTCHINSON SALT CASE, 167–169.

I

ICING CHARGES, 181–186, 194–196.

IMPORT RATE CASE, 85.

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 84.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
on discrimination, 108.
on exports, 221.
on elevator rebates, 63.
on passes, 228.

INGALLS, M. E., 104, 239.

INSPECTION,
of Armour cars, lax, 188–189.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, 41.
effects of, 49.
amendment of, 48, 89.
does not cover express companies, etc., 277.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
created, 41.
chapter on, 43.
first report, 43–46.
on long haul, 96, 102.
overruled by Supreme Court, 96.
orders disobeyed, 100, 153.
rates condemned by, 102.
ten years of regulation, 104–109.
complaints received since Elkins Act, 117.
on effect of Elkins Act, 118.
on terminal roads, 170.
railways public facility, 234.
bill before Congress, 261.
criticised, 276.
alleged errors of, 279.
work of, 280.
appointments to, controlled by Senate, 289.
on equalization of rates, 293.

INVESTIGATIONS, 24, 120.
(See INTERSTATE COMMISSION.)

IOWA LONG AND SHORT HAUL CASES, 211.

J

JAPAN, 328.

JUDSON & HARMON REPORT ON SANTA FE, 133.

K

KANSAS,
oil fight, 203, 283.

KAOLIN, 225.

KEARNEY, NEB., 90.

KELLOGG ELEVATOR CASE, 148.

KINDEL OF DENVER, 93, 297.

KNAPP, I. E., 204.

KNAPP, MARTIN A.,
government officials have passes, 13.
on government rates, 287.
on distance tariff, 295.

L

LA FOLLETTE, GOVERNOR,
investigations, 120.

LAKE SHORE,
cuts beef rates, 80.

LARRABEE, GOVERNOR, 27.

LAW, DEFIANCE OF, 238–240.

LAWSON, THOMAS W., 228.

LINCOLN (NEB.) PACKING CO., 82.

LOCALITY DISCRIMINATIONS,
barbed wire, 88.
Grinnell factory, 87.
Norfolk, Neb., 88.
ruining small towns, 89.
promoting towns, 89, 90.
Kearney & Omaha, 90.
St. Cloud, 90.
Emporia, 91.
Spokane, 91.
rails to Colorado, 92.
against Denver, 93.
(See CHAPTER ON LONG-HAUL DECISION, 95–103.)

LOMBARD, JOSIAH,
testimony, 32.

LONG AND SHORT HAUL CASES, 25, 27, 29, 47, 76, 87, 91, 92, 95–103,
208–215.

LONG HAUL,
decisions of Supreme Court, 95–103.
prohibition of abuse, 270.

M

MAINE,
legislators have passes, 8.

MASS. RAILWAY COMMISSION,
report on Boston & Albany, 106.

MAXIMUM RATE CASE, 218.

McCABE, A. C., 56, 77.

MEAD, J. D., & CO., 184.

“MEM. BILL” METHOD, 163.

MESSAGES,
President Roosevelt’s, 256.

MIDGLEY, J. W.,
testimony, 188, 199.

MIDNIGHT TARIFFS, 76, 147.

MILEAGE PAYMENTS ON CARS,
Pullman, etc., 58.
oil, 73.
Armour, 175, 178, 188.

MILK RATES,
flat, 294.

MILLING-IN-TRANSIT, 145.

MINER, D. W., 163.

MINNESOTA,
investigation, 122.

MISSOURI,
eliminating pass evil, 7.

MOFFAT, E. O.,
elevator allowances, 149.

MONOPOLY ELEMENT IN RAILWAY BUSINESS, 233.

MORAWETZ, VICTOR, 115, 131, 247.

MORGAN, J. PIERPONT, 64.

MORRIS, NELSON,
stock yards, 68.

MORTON, PAUL,
testimony, 81, 84.
reasons for passes, 13.
fuel and iron case, 131.
letter to Roosevelt, 132.
Chicago _Daily News_, 136.
letter from, 138.

N

NEWCOMB, H. T., 104, 282.

NEW ENGLAND,
high rates, 217.

NEW YEAR’S RESOLUTIONS, 79.

NEW YORK CENTRAL,
early cases, 28.

NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD,
on peaches, 150.
coal, 217.

NEW ZEALAND, 313, 329.

NORFOLK (NEB.) CASE, 88.

NORTHERN GRAIN COMPANY,
rebates $30,000 a year, 18.
fought La Follette, 122.

O

OIL. (See STANDARD OIL COMPANY, TEXAS OIL, KANSAS.)

ORANGE,
rate, 153.
routing case, 160, Appendix A.

OUTLOOK, THE,
quoted, 238.

P

PASSENGER REBATES, 17.

PASSES, 2, 15.
and politics, 3.
Pennsylvania Railroad, 3.
reasons for, 2, 9, 10, 13.
legislators, congressmen, etc., 3, 5, 8, 10.
refused, 5.
Governor Folk on, 6.
Governor Douglas, 11.
jurors, 8.
judges, 9.
auditors, etc., 9.
Missouri, 7.
Maine, 8.
Stickney’s sheriff story, 11; Washington address, 13.
Martin A. Knapp, 13.
Paul Morton on, 13.
A. T. Hadley, 14.
C. Wood Davis, 12.
in foreign countries, 14, 15.
held unlawful, 46.
within a State, 49, 50.
owners of private cars, 180.

PATENT MEDICINE CLASSIFICATION, 71.

PEARLINE CLASSIFICATION, 71.

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD,
passes, 3.
passes in 1906, 4.
rebate war, 31.
stand by any rate, 56.
favors foreign trade, 84.
cuts beef rate, 78.
milling-in-transit discrimination, 146.
sued for failure to accord car service, 160.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE CONSTITUTION,
prohibits passes, 3.

PHILADELPHIA,
passenger case, 217.

PHILADELPHIA NORTH AMERICAN,
passes, 4.
stop-overs, 217.

PLACE DISCRIMINATIONS,
long hauls, 208–215.
against St. Louis and other places, 216.

POOLING,
advocated, 265.
difficulties of, 266–270.

PRIVATE CARS,
to favored individuals, 18.
passenger, 58.
freight, 118.
abuses, 174.
advantages, 174–175.
increase of, 198.

PROCTOR & GAMBLE CASE, 155.

PROTECTIVE TARIFF,
for England, 86.
nullifying, 221.

PROUTY, COMMISSIONER,
on the Elkins bill, 112.
on Santa Fe case, 133.
on the Colorado F. & I. case, 139.
on free wheat, 145.
on train loads, 234.
railway officials would not tell truth, 243–247.
commission rates, 284.

PRUSSIAN CABINET STATEMENT, 316.

PUBLIC v. PRIVATE INTEREST, 308.

PULLMAN CARS,
mileage rate, 58.

R

RAILWAY OFFICIALS,
as law breakers, 238–240.

RATE REGULATION,
pros and cons, 253.
advocated by President Roosevelt, 256.
by Interstate Commission, 261, 274.
by 18 States, 275.
opposed by railroad men, 276, 278, 285.
merits of controversy, 299.

RATE SCHEDULES DECEPTIVE, 148.

RATES,
fixed to suit the Standard, 75.
condemned by I. C. C., 102.
on packing-house products and fruit, 186.
fixed by Government not strictly mileage, 287.
complexity of, 288.
making by “instinct,” 289.
all the traffic will bear, 289.
equalization of, 291–295.

REAGAN CASE, 285.

REBATES,
on tickets, 19.
substitutes for, 57.
New York investigation of, 27.
on beef, 76, 79.
Wisconsin investigation, 120.
to Armours from “C. & A.” and “U. P.,” 191.
Santa Fe car-line, 193–194.
cost to railways, 235–236.

RECORDS DESTROYED, 248–250.

REFRIGERATION CHARGES, 181 _et seq._

REFRIGERATOR CARS, 174–207.

REFUSAL,
to haul goods, 68, 162.
to furnish cars, 66, 160.

REGULATION OF RAILWAYS,
work of I. C. C., 104.
Texas Railway Commission, 105.
efforts at, 254–255.
difficulties of, 264–265, 272–273.
by State commissions, 254–255.
can it succeed? 306.
in England, 319–327.
in Canada, 327.

REMEDIES, 252, 300.

RICE, GEORGE,
story of, 34–36.
denied car-mileage, 74, 75.

RIPLEY, PRESIDENT E. P., 135.
in Chicago _Inter-Ocean_, 137.
letter from, 137.
on packing-house business, 187.
discriminations permanent, 237.

RIPLEY, PROFESSOR W. Z., 116, 208.

ROBBINS OF ARMOUR CAR-LINES, 192.

ROGERS COAL COMPANY,
denied cars, 66.

ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENT,
favors rate regulation, 115.
messages, 256.
ruling on Paul Morton, 135.
letter to Paul Morton, 136.

ROUTING,
fees for, 159.
orange routing case, 160, Appendix A.
by railroads unlawful, 160.

S

SALT LAKE CITY, 212.

SALT TRUST CASE, 167.

SANTA FE,
early management, 54.
Colorado Fuel Co. case, 124–141.
Hutchinson Salt case, 167–169.
car-line, 191–194.

SCALPING, 19–20.

SENATE COMMITTEE OF 1885, 37–41.

SENATE COMMITTEE OF 1905, 111–117.

SIMMONS HARDWARE COMPANY, 142.

SOAP CLASSIFICATION, 71, 155.

SOCIAL CIRCLE CASE, 100.

SOUTH AFRICA, 329.

SPECULATION IN LAND AND TOWN SITES, 90.

SPOKANE, WASHINGTON, 91, 213–215.

SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN,
Pennsylvania passes, 4.

STAMP MILL FROM CHICAGO TO SAN FRANCISCO VIA CHINA, 223.

STANDARD OIL COMPANY,
car-mileage, 73.
barrel discrimination, 73.
underbilling cars at East Boston, 74.
paint out old car-numbers, 75.
control of New England, 75.
shuts out Western oil, 75.
rebate of 1872, 29.
ten advantages, 30.
secures terminals, 31.
private cars, 176.
favored by rates, 200–201.

STATE OWNED RAILROADS,
comparisons, 308–311, 313–315.

STATE RAILWAY COMMISSIONS, 254–255.

STATE TRAFFIC, 142.

ST. CLOUD, MINNESOTA, 90.

STEEL RAILS,
export rates on, 222.

STEEL TRUST TERMINAL RAILROAD, 171.

STEWART, A. T.,
rebates, 28.

STICKNEY, A. B.,
quoted, 87.
story of passless sheriff, 11.
on midnight tariffs, 116.
on passes, 13.
on rebating, 187.

ST. LOUIS,
discriminated against, 216.

STOCK YARD GRAFT, 68.

STOPPAGE-IN-TRANSIT, 60.

STRAWBERRY CASE, 174–175.

“STRAW MAN” SYSTEM, 142.

STREYCHMANS, H. J.,
testimony, 195–198.

SUBSTITUTES FOR REBATES, 57.

SUMMARY OF METHODS AND RESULTS, 228.

SUMMERVILLE CASE, 99.

SUWANEE CASE, 208.

SWIFT AND COMPANY,
indicted, 76.

SWITCH DENIED, 163.

SWITCHING CHARGES, 140.

SWITZERLAND, 315.

T

TARIFFS,
1000 changes daily, 288.

TAX,
Wisconsin roads, 120.

TERMINAL CHARGES, 59.

TERMINAL RAILWAYS, 118, 166.
logging allowances, 146.
Hutchinson salt case, 167.
International Harvester Company, 170.
Steel Trust, 171.
division of rates, 171.
Illinois Glass Company, 172.

TEXARKANA CASE, 162.

TEXAS AND PACIFIC CASE, 84.

TEXAS OIL DISCRIMINATION, 201.

TEXAS RAILWAY COMMISSION, 105.

TICKET SCALPING, 19–22.
complaint of, by I. C. C., 50–51.

TIES,
shipment prevented, 150.
rebate on, 151.

TRAIN LOADS, 234.

TUTTLE, PRESIDENT,
on division of rate, 171.
cargo-of-flour story, 234.
on pooling, 267.
on the I. C. C., 276.
Worcester Wise case, 292.
on getting rebates, 303.

U

UNION PACIFIC,
steel rail rate, 72.

UNION STOCK YARDS BEATS RIVALS, 68.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,
Counselman case, 52.
discriminations, 59.
import rate decision, 85.
ruled that I. C. C. cannot fix rates, 92.
long-haul decisions, 95.
Social Circle case, 100.
maximum rates, 218.
on pooling, 270.
reversals of I. C. C., 283, Appendix A.
coal-carrying case, Appendix A.
orange routing case, Appendix A.

V

VANDERBILT, W. H.,
before Hepburn Committee, 28.
stockholder in Standard, 31.

W

WATSON OF PORTER BROS., 191.

WILLCOX, DAVID,
criticism of I. C. C., 279.

WISCONSIN,
railroads give passenger rebates, 17.
revelations, 120.

WORCESTER WIRE CASE, 292.

-----

Footnote 1:

See New England Exp. Co. _v._ Maine Central R. R., 57 Me. 188;
Fitchburg R. R. _v._ Gage, 12 Gray (Mass.), 393; Kenny _v._ Grand
Trunk R. R., 47 N. Y. 525; Messenger _v._ Penn. R. R., 8 Vroom (N.
J.), 531; Chicago, etc., R. R. _v._ People, 67 Ill. 11; Wheeler _v._
San Francisco R. R., 31 Cal. 46.

Footnote 2:

Pass discrimination alone, it is estimated, amounts to some 200,000
free transits a day, or over 70 millions in a year. And as for freight
discriminations, the reader who follows this history through will see
that like the leaves of the forest they defy computation. Just a hint
may be given here. Every day that one of the 300,000 private cars is
carried at the present mileage rates, a discrimination is made in
favor of the owner of the private car,—a hundred millions of unjust
discriminations, possibly, in this one item.

Footnote 3:

The New York Central, Baltimore and Ohio, and some other lines
announced the same purpose as the Pennsylvania in respect to passes
after January 1, 1906, but with them as with the Pennsylvania it
appears to be a case of more careful discrimination in the use of
discrimination, and an appreciation of the fact that it is very
important to make a good impression on the public mind just now, in
view of the widespread demand for drastic legislation in the direction
of railroad regulation.

Footnote 4:

A number of the States have laws against passes. The Interstate
Commerce law forbids them. And they are always against the moral law
whether they run beyond the State line or not.

Footnote 5:

In one case it appeared that a leading railroad attorney had been for
years in the habit of supplying jurors with passes. Opposing counsel
brought out the fact that all the jurors in the case on trial had
accepted passes from the railroad company which was the defendant in
the case, and that to have an equal chance for justice his client
would have to give each juror $50 to offset the railroad gifts. The
judge discharged the whole jury.

Footnote 6:

Condensation of statement of Texas Railroad Commission’s Report for
1898, p. 17. See, further, “Bribery by Railway Passes,” _North
American Review_, 138, p. 89; and _Public Opinion_, 26, p. 167, Feb.
9, 1899: “The Pass Evil in Three States” (Indiana, Minnesota, and
Washington).

Footnote 7:

“Railway Passes and the Public,” _Forum_, 3, p. 392.

Footnote 8:

Vol. iv, pp. 456–457.

Footnote 9:

American Railroads as Investments, p. 30.

Footnote 10:

See C. Wood Davis’ article in _The Arena_, vi (1891), pp. 281–282.

Footnote 11:

See the evidence cited below.

Footnote 12:

Report of U. S. Industrial Commission (1900), iv, p. 135.

Footnote 13:

Testimony before U. S. Industrial Commission (1900), iv, p. 490.

Footnote 14:

_Forum_, 3, p. 392.

Footnote 15:

Railroad Transportation, p. 109.

Footnote 16:

In order to test the attitude of the government roads, I did my best
to get passes, trying first through the American ambassadors in
Vienna, Berlin, and Brussels, and afterward by direct appeal to the
railway management. But it was of no use, although I had a letter from
the Chairman of the United States Industrial Commission saying that I
had rendered the government valuable service in connection with the
work of the Commission, and that any courtesies shown me or assistance
afforded me in my researches would be a public service. I had other
strong letters from men of high distinction in the United States and
England, and our ambassador at Berlin had been president of my alma
mater when I was in college, and was specially friendly and helpful;
but I was assured that no amount of influence or pull could secure a
pass or any other personal favor on the State railways.

Footnote 17:

See _McClure’s Magazine_, December, 1905, where Ray Stannard Baker has
stated the leading facts.

Footnote 18:

See, for example, the testimony of Stuyvesant Fish, President of the
Illinois Central, before the United States Industrial Commission,
calling attention to the fact that while railway officials could be
prohibited by law from selling tickets below published rates,
individuals could not be so prohibited, and that some railways sold
their tickets to competitive points to brokers, paying them a
commission for making the sale, out of which the brokers scalped the
rate. (Industrial Commission, 1900, iv, p. 334.)

Footnote 19:

Industrial Commission, iv, pp. 457–458.

Footnote 20:

Hudson, “The Railways and the Republic,” p. 42.

Footnote 21:

Hepburn Report, N. Y. Legislature Investigation, 1879, p. 120.

Footnote 22:

The facts appear at full length in the reports of the Hepburn
Committee, the Select Committee of the United States on Interstate
Commerce, 49th Congress, 1st Session, Lloyd’s “Wealth against
Commonwealth,” and Miss Tarbell’s “History of the Standard Oil
Company.”

Footnote 23:

Tarbell’s “History of the Standard Oil Co.,” pp. 185–190; Lloyd’s
“Wealth against the Commonwealth,” pp. 87–88.

Footnote 24:

The Standard paid nominally 60 cents a barrel, but got a rebate of 49
cents, so that their net rate was 11 cents per barrel against $1.90
for the independents. See report of the Hepburn Committee (N. Y.),
1879, and George Rice’s pamphlet on “The Standard Oil Trust.”

Footnote 25:

Quoted from a synopsis of the Report.

Footnote 26:

Railroad Freights, Ohio House of Representatives, 1879, pp. 159–163.

Footnote 27:

Hardy _v._ Cleveland & Marietta R. R., Circuit Court, Ohio, E. D.,
1887, 31 Fed. Rep. 689; Senate Select Committee on Interstate
Commerce, 49th Congress, 1st Session, p. 199.

Footnote 28:

Besides the references already given on the Rice affair, see the Trust
Investigation of Congress, 1888; the testimony in the Rice case before
the Interstate Commerce Commission, Nos. 51–60, 1887; Decisions of the
I. C. C., vol. 1, pp. 503, 722; vol. 2, p. 389; vol. 3, p. 186; vol.
4, p. 228; vol. 5, pp. 193, 660; State of Ohio _v._ Standard Oil Co.,
49 Ohio St. Rep. 317; Lloyd, chapters xv, xvi, xvii; and Tarbell’s
History.

Footnote 29:

I. C. C., First Report, 1887.

Footnote 30:

Passes (annual in this case) to persons not in the regular service of
the carrier held unlawful. State _v._ Northern Pacific, p. 359, vol.
2, Decisions, 1888.

Footnote 31:

Sale of 1000–mile tickets to commercial travellers at $20 while
charging others $25 illegal. Chicago & Grand Trunk, p. 147, vol. 1,
Decisions, 1887.

Footnote 32:

Paying commissions; selling tickets through brokers at reduced rates;
rate wars, etc. Pennsylvania, New York Central, Wabash, Chicago &
Alton, vol. 2, 1888, p. 513.

Footnote 33:

Discounts to shippers receiving more than 30,000 tons a year illegal.
Providence and Worcester, vol. 1, 1887, p. 170.

Footnote 34:

In many cases the direct rate between two points, X and Y, was found
to be greater than the combination of the rate from X past Y to a
competitive point Z and the local rate back from Z to Y. For example,
goods could be shipped from the Pacific coast to Kansas City and then
back to points west of Kansas City more cheaply than they could be
sent direct from the coast to these intermediate points. This enabled
a shipper informed of the combination rates to get an advantage over
one with less information who relied on the published tariffs stating
the rates between his place of business and the points to or from
which his shipments were to be sent. The Commission took up this
matter in 1887 and the traffic managers of the roads agreed to revise
their tariffs so that the direct local rate should in no case exceed
the through rate plus the local rate back from the terminus or
competitive point. This rule resulted in many material reductions of
the rates to intermediate points; for example, the points between
Denver and the Missouri River on the lines controlled by the Southern
Pacific. See Martin _v._ Southern Pacific R.R. I. C. C. Decisions,
vol. 2, 1888, pp. 1, 4.

Footnote 35:

A higher rate on oil in barrels than in tanks held unjust, vol. 2, p.
365. Report, 1888, p. 128.

Footnote 36:

Report, 1888, p. 112.

Footnote 37:

_Ibid._, p. 114 _et seq._

Footnote 38:

_Ibid._

Footnote 39:

_Ibid._

Footnote 40:

_Ibid._

Footnote 41:

The Commission’s reports, 1889 to 1891, dealt with numerous
discriminations between localities and persons through free
transportation, commissions on the sale of tickets, combination rates,
rebates, free cartage, payment of yardage charges, excessive car
mileage on private cars, discounts for quantity, unfair
classification, distribution of cars, special tariffs, advantage or
disadvantage to particular commodities or methods of shipment, low
rates on goods for export, etc., etc.

Footnote 42:

Report, 1889, p. 10.

Footnote 43:

5 I. C. C. Decis. 69, 1891.

Footnote 44:

_Ibid._; see also 5 I. C. C. Decis. 153, 1892. Case against the
Louisville and Nashville for granting passes to members of the city
council of New Orleans.

Footnote 45:

Investigation of the Commission, 1889.

Footnote 46:

Report, Interstate Commerce Commission, 1889, p. 14.

Footnote 47:

Pages 103–107, I. C. C. Rep. 1895.

Footnote 48:

Report, 1897, p. 61.

Footnote 49:

See p. 20 above.

Footnote 50:

Heard _v._ Georgia R. R., 1 I. C. C. Decis. 428, and 3 I. C. C. Decis.
111. But the United States Supreme Court decided against the
Commission on this point May 1, 1892 (145 U. S. 263), and the B. & O.
tickets for parties of 10 or more at ⅓ less than the regular rates
were sustained.

Footnote 51:

2 I. C. C. Decis. 649, and 3 I. C. C. Decis. 465.

Footnote 52:

This rule of exemption works great injustice under present conditions.
It was built into the common law when people were struggling against
oppressors in high places. But the conditions which made it useful
have long since passed away, and it is now simply a millstone about
the neck of justice.

Footnote 53:

Senate Committee, 1905, iv, pp. 2900–2901. Speaking of an
investigation of rebates on flour from Minneapolis and Duluth, the
Commission says (p. 8, Report for 1898): “All the railway witnesses
denied knowledge of any violation of the statute, and most of the
accounting officers testified to the effect that if rebates had been
paid they would necessarily know about it and that their accounts did
not show any such payments. It was nevertheless fully established by
the investigation that secret rate concessions had been generally
granted on this traffic and that the carrier had allowed larger
rebates to some of the flour shippers than to others.”

Footnote 54:

I. C. C. Rep. 1889, p. 75.

Footnote 55:

See I. C. C. Rep. 1889, pp. 15, 16, 126, 130, 132, 237, 239, 240–242;
Decisions, vol. 3, 1889, p. 89, 25% rebates on coal to certain points;
p. 137, low rates on goods marked for export (10 cents on one hundred
lbs. discount); p. 652, unlawful discount of 50% on emigrants’
movables; Rep. 1890, pp. 111, 190, 192, coal rates; 183, discount for
quantity; 189, export; 101, 192, hogs and hog rates; 184, stock yards;
99, 100, 185–187, oil; 112, 192, wheat and flour; 187, 190, private
cars; 188, special tariffs; and other unjust discriminations relating
to localities, privileges, etc., and not directly in point under the
head we are dealing with.

Footnote 56:

Testimony, U. S. Ind. Com. iv, p. 353.

Footnote 57:

I. C. C. Rep. 1890, p. 25.

Footnote 58:

I. C. C. Rep. 1896, p. 78.

Footnote 59:

_Ibid._, p. 82.

Footnote 60:

Industrial Commission, 1900, iv, p. 442.

Footnote 61:

I. C. C. Dressed-meat Hearing, December, 1901, p. 94; Chicago and
Alton manager to same effect for his road, p. 136.

Footnote 62:

I. C. C. Rep. 1898, p. 6.

Footnote 63:

4 I. C. C. Decis. 1891, p. 630. For example, on one line between
Chicago and New York, “200 stock cars more than paid for themselves
and all repairs, etc., in 2 years, and thereafter earned for the
owners upwards of $100,000 a year on no investment.” See Report Iowa
Railroad Commission, 1891, p. 30.

Footnote 64:

I. C. C. Rep. 1889, pp. 15–16.

Footnote 65:

9 I. C. C. Decis. 1, 1901 Rep., p. 36. As the circumstances were
substantially different in the two cases, the Commission said the
local charge to the drummer was “not necessarily unjust.”

Footnote 66:

An additional charge by the Santa Fe of $2 a car on cattle consigned
to the Union Stock Yards at Chicago, where the Santa Fe had for years
delivered cattle, was held unlawful by the Commission, and its
judgment was sustained by the United States Circuit Court, but
overruled by the Court of Appeals. I. C. C. Rep. 1896, p. 45.

Footnote 67:

Free cartage for a distant shipper and not for a nearer one is
equivalent to a rebate for the former. Hegel Milling Company v. St.
Louis, etc., Railroad, 5 I. C. C. Decis. 1891, p. 57.

Footnote 68:

The railway charged the same rates from the East to Grand Rapids as to
Ionia, although the former was 33 miles a longer distance point on the
same line of road, and in addition gave free cartage to Grand Rapids
companies. Complaint was made in September, 1888; April 26, 1890, the
Commission held the free cartage to be in effect a rebate, and ordered
the railroad to desist from giving free cartage in Grand Rapids. (3 I.
C. C. Decis. 60; I. C. C. Rep. 1896, pp. 37–39; 1897, pp. 94–95.) The
Circuit Court upheld the order October, 1893 (57 Fed. Rep. 1002), but
the Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the decision April, 1896 (74
Fed. Rep. 803), and the United States Supreme Court sustained the
Court of Appeals. (167 U. S. 633, May, 1897.) The Commission made the
mistake of resting the case on the 4th or long-haul section instead of
the 2d or 3d sections relating to undue preference, and the railway
should have been allowed the option of removing the discrimination by
giving free cartage in Ionia or making a lower rate there. The order
to discontinue free cartage in Grand Rapids was arbitrary and
unnecessary.

Footnote 69:

I. C. C. Rep. 1889, pp. 18–19.

Footnote 70:

Commercial Club _v._ Rock Island, 6 I. C. C. Decis. 1896, p. 647.

Footnote 71:

Pennsylvania Millers Association _v._ Reading R. R., 8 I. C. C. Decis.
1900, p. 531.

Footnote 72:

I. C. C. Rep., 1898, pp. 46–47; 7 I. C. C. Decis. 1898, p. 556:
Illinois Central, charging some shippers for storage while others are
not charged for it, unlawful.

Footnote 73:

Industrial Commission, iv, 541.

Footnote 74:

_Ibid._, 543.

Footnote 75:

Investigation of expense bill frauds on grain shipments from Missouri
River points to Chicago and other destinations. I. C. C. Rep. 1896, p.
75, on Santa Fe case. 7 I. C. C. Decis. 1897, p. 240, expense bill
system held illegal.

Footnote 76:

I. C. C. Rep. 1896, p. 79.

Footnote 77:

_Ibid._, p. 77.

Footnote 78:

_Ibid._, p. 80. The Commission has not felt able to declare such an
allowance unlawful (10 I. C. C. Decis. 1904, p. 309), but it seems
clear that substantial preferences may be given in this way.

Footnote 79:

Report, U. S. Industrial Commission, 1900, iv, p. 79.

Footnote 80:

I. C. C. Rep. 1896, pp. 46–48.

Footnote 81:

There is a statement concerning it in the I. C. C. Rep. 1896, p. 81,
but it does not bring out the facts at the core of the matter as
stated to me by the railway men.

Footnote 82:

8 I. C. C. Decis. 1898, p. 316.

Footnote 83:

I. C. C. Rep. 1894, p. 9.

Footnote 84:

It was held in the Nichols case (66 P. A. C. Rep. 768) that where a
shipper orders cars to be delivered at a certain date, the company’s
action in filling subsequent orders before complying with the first is
unlawful. (Oregon Short Line.)

Footnote 85:

Report, Texas Railway Commission, 1896, p. 11.

Footnote 86:

The Commission holds that the difference must not be so great as to be
destructive of competition between large and small dealers. (5 I. C.
C. Decis. 638, following Thurber _v._ New York Central, Delaware &
Lackawanna, B. & O.; and 3 I. C. C. Decis. p. 473, March, 1890; Rep.
1890, p. 87.) Many articles of groceries were so classified as to make
the difference between carload rates and less-than-carload rates
unjustly great in violation of the principles of the Interstate Act.

Footnote 87:

Industrial Commission, iv, 207.

Footnote 88:

Paine _v._ Lehigh Valley R. R., 7 I. C. C. Decis. 1897, p. 218.

Footnote 89:

9 I. C. C. Decis. 78; 1901 Rep. 38.

Footnote 90:

5 I. C. C. Decis. 663.

Footnote 91:

7 I. C. C. Decis. 43.

Footnote 92:

8 I. C. C. Decis. 214, 1898. See also 4 I. C. C. Decis. 417. and 7 I.
C. C. Decis. 481, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul case, held that a
higher rate on wheat than on flour is unjust.

Footnote 93:

8 I. C. C. Decis. 304. See also 3 I. C. C. Decis. 400, and 4 I. C. C.
417.

Footnote 94:

4 I C. C. Decis. 1891, p. 733: N. Y. Central, Pa., B. & O., C. B. &
Q., Wabash, Santa Fe, etc.,—a whole page full of railroads.

Footnote 95:

Rice cases, Nos. 51–60, I. C. C. Decis. 1887, 65, 131.

Footnote 96:

Rice _v._ R. R., 4 I. C. C. Decis. 131; 5 _ibid._, 193, 415. Railroads
commenced charging for barrel packages in 1888, and in a case tried in
1892 against the Reading, Boston & Maine, and other roads the
Commission ordered them to cease, but they did not, and damages were
awarded two years later from 1888 to 1894. A similar order to desist
from charging for the barrel was issued against the Pennsylvania in
September 1890 and it complied. I. C. C. Rep. 1895, pp. 33–35.

Footnote 97:

Trust Investigation, Congress, 1888, pp. 531–533, 646–647.

Footnote 98:

Testimony, Rice cases, 1 I. C. C. Decis. 28.

Footnote 99:

See Trust Investigation, Congress, 1888, pp. 598–599.

Footnote 100:

Lloyd’s “Wealth against the Commonwealth,” pp. 427, 480–481.

Footnote 101:

U. S. Industrial Commission, iv, 53.

Footnote 102:

4 I. C. C. Decis. 158.

Footnote 103:

Senate Committee, 1905, 3457.

Footnote 104:

Testimony of McCabe, Pennsylvania traffic manager, I. C. C. Beef
Hearing, Dec. 1901, pp. 101, 102, 103.

Footnote 105:

_Ibid._, pp. 101, 102.

Footnote 106:

Mr. Cost, traffic manager of the Big Four, I. C. C. Beef Hearing, Dec.
1901, p. 105.

Footnote 107:

I. C. C. Beef Hearing, Dec. 1901, p. 114.

Footnote 108:

_Ibid._, pp. 113, 119.

Footnote 109:

I. C. C. Beef Hearing, Dec. 1901, pp. 85, 86.

Footnote 110:

I. C. C. Beef Hearing, Dec. 1901, p. 107.

Footnote 111:

I. C. C. Hearing in the dressed-meat cases, Chicago, Jan. 7, 1902, pp.
152–154.

Footnote 112:

Evidence in the I. C. C. Hearing in the dressed-meat cases, Chicago,
Jan. 5, 1902, pp. 145, 148, 149.

Footnote 113:

Report, Industrial Commission, vol. iv, pp. 69, 493.

Footnote 114:

Import Rate Case. Texas and Pacific _v._ I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197,
March, 1896. The complaint was brought in December, 1889, by the New
York Board of Trade against the Pennsylvania Railroad and others. The
New York Central, B. & O., B. & M., Ill. Central, Union Pacific,
Southern Pacific, Northern Pacific, Texas & Pacific, etc., 33
railroads in all, were joined as defendants. The Commission held
(Jan., 1891) that import traffic is entitled to no preference. 3 I. C.
C. Decis. 417. (See also 4 I. C. C. 447.) The Circuit Court sustained
the Commission in Oct., 1892 (52 Fed. Rep. 187), and the Court of
Appeals in Oct., 1893 (57 Fed. Rep. 948), but the Texas & Pacific
carried the case to the U. S. Supreme Court and the majority of the
Court, reversing the Commission and the Circuit Court, interpreted the
Commerce Act of Congress in such a way as to render substantially
inoperative the main clauses relating to discrimination and the long
haul, and practically nullify another Act of Congress so far as it
imposes duties on imports for the purpose of protecting home
industries. The Court accomplished this by focussing its attention on
the phrase relating to dissimilar conditions, instead of aiming to
enforce the act according to its clear purpose and intent. Chief
Justice Fuller and Justices Harlan and Brown dissented, holding that
the Interstate Act requires railways to make the same charge for the
same service, whether the goods carried are domestic or foreign.

Footnote 115:

For many other facts along the same lines, showing rates on flour from
the West to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, etc., 6 to 8
cents higher than the rates on wheat, and much lower rates on the same
products for export than for domestic use, see Industrial Commission,
1900, iv, 70.

The Interstate Commerce Commission in 1899 found the export rates on
corn and wheat much lower than the domestic rates. I. C. C. Rep.,
1899, pp. 20–28, 31.

Footnote 116:

8 I. C. C. Decis. 214 n.

Footnote 117:

Lewis, “National Consolidation of Railways,” p. 101.

Footnote 118:

Industrial Commission, 1900, vol. iv, pp. 441–442. Shippers in
Norfolk, Nebr. for example, pay the local rate of 45 cents per cwt.
(on first-class goods) to Sioux City on the Missouri River, plus the
rate from Sioux City to Chicago, while Fremont, a rival town near
Norfolk, has the same rates as Sioux City, the local rate not being
added in this case to the Missouri River rate. This gives Fremont
manufacturers and shippers a decided advantage over those of Norfolk,
and tends to build up Fremont and stunt the growth of Norfolk. The
witness suggested that “if the rates were established by the
Government instead of at the will and pleasure of the railway
managers, it is a natural conclusion that points having the same
general conditions would receive equal benefits.”

Footnote 119:

Cator’s “Rescue the Republic,” p. 15.

Footnote 120:

“National Consolidation of Railways,” Lewis, p. 102.

Footnote 121:

“National Consolidation of Railways,” Lewis, p. 83.

Footnote 122:

Martin _v._ Southern Pacific, Central Pacific, and Union Pacific
Railroads. 1 I. C. C. Decis. 1.

Footnote 123:

8 I. C. C. Decis. 481. The Commission made an order that the Kearney
rate should not exceed the Omaha rate by more than 15 cents, but the
Southern Pacific refused to obey, and the Circuit Court declined to
enforce the order on the ground that the Commission had not found the
rate to Kearney unreasonable in itself, but only in comparison, citing
190 U. S. 273.

Footnote 124:

9 I. C. C. Decis. 17: Rep. 1901, 30.

Footnote 125:

I. C. C. Rep. 1899, p. 31.

Footnote 126: