Chapter XXXIX: Appendix (2)

The Commission ordered the roads to discontinue this practice. They
refused. And the United States Supreme Court sustained them in their
refusal. (4 I. C. C. Decis., July, 1890, p. 104; Rep. 1901, p. 25.)

Footnote 127:

Nov. 1895, the Commission ordered that the rates from Pueblo to
California should not exceed 75 percent of the rates from Chicago to
California. The railroads refused to obey. Proceedings in court were
begun by the Commission to enforce their order. Then the railroads
yielded. They kept the rates down about 2 years, till Oct. 17, 1898.
Then the Southern Pacific increased the rates. The Colorado Fuel &
Iron Company on whose complaint the investigation and order were made,
sued for damages and an injunction, Oct. 1898. The Circuit Court
enjoined the railroads from charging more than the rates fixed by the
Commission. But April 16, 1900, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the decision on the ground that the United States Supreme Court had
ruled that the Commission cannot fix rates. (I. C. C. Rep. 1895, pp.
41–43; and Rep. 1900, pp. 55–61); also (101 Fed. Rep. 779) an appeal
to the Supreme Court was dismissed per stipulation, Nov. 1901 (46 L.
Ed. 1264).

Footnote 128:

Ind. Com. iv, 257.

Footnote 129:

Ind. Com., iv, 257.

Footnote 130:

_Ibid._, 67.

Footnote 131:

_Ibid._

Footnote 132:

Ind. Com. iv, 252.

Footnote 133:

_Ibid._, 257.

Footnote 134:

Alabama Midland Case. Decis. of U. S. Supreme Court, Nov. 8, 1897, 168
U. S. 144; Behlmer Case, 175 U. S. 648, 676; 181 U. S. 1, 29; Dallas
Case, I. C. C. Rep. 1901, p. 27. Actual and controlling competition of
any sort is now held to justify a less charge for the longer than for
the shorter haul. 10 I. C. C. Decis. 289, June, 1904. See also Senate
Committee, 1905, 3339, where Chairman Knapp of the Interstate
Commission declares that the courts have interpreted the law so that
if the circumstances substantially differ, no matter what the reason,
the prohibition does not apply. Brooks Adams says, “The Supreme Court
is antagonistic to that clause,” (the long and short haul clause) and
does not intend to enforce it. “They have simply thrown out every
suitor but one who came in under that clause.” (Sen. Com., 1905, p.
2922.)

Footnote 135:

I. C. C. Rep. 1887. Nearly a hundred pages are filled with both the
statements and petitions of railroads relating to the long-haul
clause. See also Rep. for 1895, pp. 24–28. Exemption from the
long-haul clause was allowed in the case of passenger fares to the
World’s Fair at Chicago.

Footnote 136:

_In re_ Louisville and Nashville, 1 I. C. C. Decis., 1887, p. 31. See
also Ga. Rd. Commission _v._ Clyde Steamship Co., 5 I. C. C. Decis.
326.

Footnote 137:

Alabama Midland or Troy Case, 168 U. S. 144, 164, 166. Reference was
made to 31 Fed. Rep. 315, 862; 50 Fed. Rep. 295; 56 Fed. Rep. 925,
943; 71 Fed. Rep. 835, Behlmer Case; 73 Fed. Rep. 409, I. C. C. _v._
Louisville and Nashville.

Footnote 138:

I. C. C. Rep. 1899, pp. 66–68; 85 Fed. Rep. 1898, p. 107; 99 Fed. Rep.
1899, p. 52.

Footnote 139:

181 U. S. 1, April, 1901.

Footnote 140:

_Ibid._, 29, 1901.

Footnote 141:

Rep. 1895, p. 29. See Louisville & Nashville Case, 1 I. C. C. Decis.
31; C. B. & Q. Case, 2 I. C. C. Decis. 46; Krewer Case, 4 I. C. C.
Decis. 686; Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis R. R. Co., 6 I. C. C.
Decis. 343. See also 8 I. C. C. Decis. 503.

Footnote 142:

H. P. Newcomb, _Popular Science Monthly_, p. 815, Oct. 1897.

Footnote 143:

I. C. C. Rep. 1894, p. 19; 1900, p. 52. The Railways declined to obey;
the Circuit Court ruled against the Commission (71 Fed. Rep. Jan.
1896, p. 835); the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court
decision (83 Fed. Rep. Nov. 1897, p. 898); and finally, in Jan. 1900,
the U. S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and sustained
the railroads. (Behlmer Case, 175 U. S. 648.)

Footnote 144:

I. C. C. Rep. 1895, p. 29; 1896, pp. 16–23. In March, 1896, the U. S.
Supreme Court considered the case on appeal, and apparently accepted
the decision of the Commission on the question of similar conditions,
but overruled another part of its order, requiring the railroad not to
charge more than $1 per hundred on first-class goods from Cincinnati
to Atlanta. The Court placed its decision on the ground that the
Commission has no authority to fix rates, maximum, minimum, or
absolute. It may determine that a past rate is unreasonable, but
cannot fix a rate for the future. Interstate Commission _v._
Cincinnati, New Orleans, and Texas Pacific, 162 U. S. 184; and 167 U.
S. 479. I. C. C. _v._ Texas and Pacific, 162 U. S. 197.

Footnote 145:

6 I. C. C. Decis. 343; and Rep. 1895, pp. 29–31.

Footnote 146:

Rep. 1895, p. 31.

Footnote 147:

I. C. C. Rep. 1899, p. 68; 7 I. C. C. Decis. Dec. 1897, p. 431. The
Commission ordered that the charge to La Grange should not exceed the
rate for the longer haul to Atlanta, and two years later the Circuit
Court sustained the order (102 Fed. Rep. 709), but the Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the decision in May, 1901 (108 Fed. Rep. 988), and
in May, 1903, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of
Appeals against the Commission (190 U. S. 273).

Footnote 148:

I. C. C. Rep. 1902, p. 48; 7 I. C. C. Decis. 431; 8 I. C. C. Decis.
377; 118 Fed. Rep. 613; Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 2316, 2317, 2926. No
appeal appears to have been taken from the Circuit Court.

Footnote 149:

8 I. C. C. Decis. Feb. 1900, p. 409; Rep. 1900, p. 34.

Footnote 150:

8 I. C. C. Decis. 93, reversed by the Circuit Court, August, 1902 (117
Fed. Rep. 741), and by the Court of Appeals, May, 1903 (122 Fed. Rep.
800); now on appeal to U. S. Supreme Court.

Footnote 151:

8 I. C. C. Decis. 142.

Footnote 152:

I. C. C. Rep. 1895, p. 39.

Footnote 153:

See 6 I. C. C. Decis. 257, 361, 458, 488, 568, 601; 7 I. C. C. 61,
224, 286; 8 I. C. C. 93, 214, 277, 290, 304, 316, 346. See also vol. 9
of the Decisions, and Rep., 1898, pp. 33, 246; 1899, p. 28; 1900, p.
40; 1901, pp. 57, 65; etc. Wherein conditions substantially differ the
exemption is applied. For example, the Santa Fe is justified in
charging lower rates from the Pacific to the Missouri River than to
Denver on rice, hemp, blankets, books, boots, etc. (9 I. C. C. Decis.
606); and a higher rate on lumber to Wichita from Western points than
to Kansas City is approved (9 I. C. C. Decis. 569).

Rates of an individual road cannot be compared with joint rates made
by that road with others. Osborne Case, 52 Fed. Rep. 912; Tozer Case,
52 Fed. Rep. 917; Union Pacific Case, 117 U. S. 355.

Footnote 154:

_Popular Science Monthly_, Oct. 1897, p. 816.

Footnote 155:

M. E. Ingalls, before National Convention of Railway Commissioners,
1898, p. 14.

Footnote 156:

Rep. 1897, p. 6; and 1898, p. 15.

Footnote 157:

“The exaction of the published rate is the exception.... Men who in
every other respect are reputable citizens are guilty of acts which,
if the statute law of the land were enforced, would subject them to
fine or imprisonment.” See Rep. 1898, pp. 5, 6, 18, 19; Rep. 1899, p.
8.

Footnote 158:

Report, vol. iv, 1900, p. 625.

Footnote 159:

Ind. Com. iv, pp. 6, 349, 359.

Footnote 160:

Testimony, p. 25.

Footnote 161:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 2912.

Footnote 162:

Judge Clements of the Interstate Commission, Senate Committee, 1905,
p. 3238. When the reader examines the facts that follow in this book
he may wonder what the railroads will do when they are not under a
good resolution, in view of the record they have made while under a
good resolution.

Footnote 163:

See “Rebates” and “Discriminations” in index to Hearings of the Elkins
Committee, 1905.

Some of these witnesses who do not know of any discriminations or
unreasonable rates declare in other parts of their testimony that if
the proposed legislation were enacted the Interstate Commission would
be deluged with complaints. And this is probably true, since
complaints of excessive rates and discriminations have been more
numerous in the last two or three years than in any other equal period
before. (Testimony of Judge Clements of the I. C. C., Senate
Committee, 1905, p. 3242.)

Footnote 164:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 1331.

Footnote 165:

_Ibid._, pp. 2253, 2284.

Footnote 166:

_Ibid._, p. 3140.

Footnote 167:

_Ibid._, p. 1652.

Footnote 168:

On the question whether or no rebates and discriminations exist, the
testimony of credible witnesses who say they know of these secret
favors far outweighs the proving power of the negative statements of
witnesses who say they do not know of the said phenomena. Lots of
people did not know till recently that the Equitable paid a famous
railroad senator $20,000 a year for “advice.” And the statements of a
multitude that they did not know of it would weigh nothing against the
testimony of 2 or 3 well informed men who positively stated the facts.
Discriminations may go on without the railroad directors or principal
officers knowing about them. They may not know about them on purpose.
Where ignorance is protection ’tis folly to be wise.

Railway men have told me that in many cases leading officers of a
railroad are purposely kept, or keep themselves, in perfect ignorance
of all discriminations and other wrongdoing in order that such
officers may appear in legislative and interstate commerce hearings
without knowledge of any facts that would be prejudicial to the
railroad.

Footnote 169:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 1474.

Footnote 170:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 819, 820, 842.

Footnote 171:

_Ibid._, pp. 2122, 2123.

Footnote 172:

_Ibid._, p. 951.

Footnote 173:

_Ibid._, p. 2329.

Footnote 174:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 2083.

Footnote 175:

In illustration of his statement the witness referred to the
prevalence of abuses in respect to terminal railroads, private cars,
purchasing agents, switching charges, special tariffs, milling in
transit, etc., describing a number of cases that have come under his
personal observation in the year 1905. Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 2432, 2434.

Footnote 176:

More complaints per annum have been filed with the Commission since
the Elkins Act took effect than were filed before the act was passed.
The reports of the I. C. C. show 145 formal complaints filed in 1903
and 1904, carrying the total to 789, and 888 informal complaints,
carrying the total to 3223, making the whole number 1033 in the two
years, and 4012 since 1887—more than 25 percent of the complaints
having been filed in the last two years which constitute only 11
percent of the time covered by the reports of the Commission. Out of
the 62 suits entered in 1904, 50 charge unjust discrimination of
serious character, and nearly all the rest involve discrimination in
some form. The complaints entered for amicable adjustment also relate
in large part to cases of discrimination between persons and places,
refusal to furnish cars, unreasonable delay, unfair classification,
discrimination in track facilities, unfair estimate of weights,
allowing competitors to underbill, refusal of the Transcontinental
Passenger Association to grant the American Federation of Labor the
usual special convention rate for their meeting at San Francisco,
refusal to route shipments as ordered by shippers, relatively
excessive rates on vegetables, lumber, lead, drugs, corn products,
coal, iron, shoes, leather, etc., violations of the long and short
haul clause, and outright refusal to accept shipments, besides a
number of complaints of overcharges, and rates alleged to be
unreasonable per se.

Adding the figures for 1905, which have come to hand since the above
was written, we find that more than double the number of complaints of
discrimination have been made to the Interstate Commerce Commission in
the last three years, since the Elkins Law was passed, than in any
equal period before. The complaints filed in 1903, 1904, and 1905
constitute more than a third of the whole number of complaints from
the beginning of the Commission in 1887. The average number of
complaints per year from 1887 to 1902 inclusive was 186, while the
yearly average for 1903–1905 is 534—more than double, nearly
threefold—and five-sixths of the suits entered charge facts that
constitute discrimination of serious character, and nearly all the
rest involve discrimination in some form.

Footnote 177:

In the report for 1905, p. 13, the Commission refers to the fact that
in the reports for 1903 and 1904 some favorable comments were made on
the effect of the Elkins Law upon the practice of paying rebates, and
says: “Further experience, however, compels us to modify in some
degree the hopeful expectations then entertained. Not only have
various devices for evading the law been brought into use, but the
actual payment of rebates as such has been here and there resumed. [It
never stopped in a good many places, judging by the La Follette facts
and other evidence, including the statements of many leading railroad
men.] Instances of this kind have been established by convincing
proof. More frequently the unjust preference is brought about by
methods which may escape the penalties of the law, but which plainly
operate to defeat its purpose.”

Footnote 178:

Judge Clements of the Commission, Sen. Com. 1905, p. 3238.

Footnote 179:

See the admirable summary of the investigation by Ray Stannard Baker
in _McClure’s Magazine_ for December, 1905.

Footnote 180:

The Interstate Commission says: “While giving rebates to the fuel and
iron company from tariff rates, it (the Santa Fe Railroad) charged the
full tariff rates on interstate shipments of coal by other shippers in
not only the general coal region involved, but in the same coal field.
This practice of the railway company resulted in closing markets for
coal to shippers competing with the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company.”
10 I. C. C. Decis. 473, February, 1905.

Footnote 181:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 475.

Footnote 182:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 476–480. While the Caledonian Company was trying to
get to market on equal terms with the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company,
they got a letter from the Santa Fe traffic office, Nov. 15, 1900,
saying that they could sell their coal to the Colorado Fuel and Iron
Company, or keep it. Mr. Biddle, however, when shown the letter and
questioned about it, admitted the authorship, but said he did not
construe the letter as saying anything of the kind. (I. C. C. Santa Fe
Hearing, Dec. 1904, p. 154. The text of the letter is not given.)

Footnote 183:

There was a dispute about the relative steam power of the coals from
the different localities, but the point doesn’t seem to be material.

Footnote 184:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 3072, 3073. The Caledonian had a good market
before the agreements between the Santa Fe and the Colorado Coal
Company were made, and it had many orders afterwards, but could not
fill them except at a loss because of favoritism in freight rates.

Footnote 185:

I. C. C. Hearing, Dec. 1904, pp. 135, 148, Biddle.

Footnote 186:

Mr. Biddle says the coal rate circular was issued by his authority and
continued a practice that was in effect when the Santa Fe operated the
mines, but he could not say whether it was “simply continued at the
time the Colorado Company acquired the mines or whether there were
negotiations under which it was done” (I. C. C. Hearing, Dec. 1904,
pp. 135, 136, 147, 148).

Footnote 187:

A copy of this circular bearing the name of the traffic manager of the
Santa Fe was taken without permission by a dealer at El Paso from the
Santa Fe office there.

Footnote 188:

I. C. C. Santa Fe Hearing, Dec. 1904, p. 8.

Footnote 189:

I. C. C. Santa Fe Hearing, Dec. 1904, pp. 146–148.

Footnote 190:

Sen. Com., 1905, p. 848.

Footnote 191:

Mr. Morton’s letter to President Roosevelt, June 5, 1905. Secretary
Morton continues: “The tariff covering this arrangement was published
so as to show the freight rate to be $4.05 per ton instead of the
delivered price at El Paso and Deming, and did not separate the
freight rate from the cost of the coal at the mines, as it should have
done. Until the investigation of the case by the Interstate Commerce
Commission I did not know personally how the matter was being handled,
so far as the publication of the tariff was concerned. My own
connection with the case was to see that the traffic was secured to
the Atchison rails, and after that details were left to subordinates.”

Footnote 192:

Mr. Biddle testified that the same thing had been done for other coal
companies, and in one instance at least it was shown that it had been
done for the Victor Fuel Company, but in this case “the price of the
coal and the rate of freight were kept entirely separate, the price of
coal being treated in the nature of an advance charge.” The Commission
says further “If the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company had in all cases
paid the published tariff rate which was exacted from other shippers,
the fact that the price of the coal and the freight were included in a
single item would have worked no practical advantage to that company
so far as we can see. Neither, apparently, would there have been any
reason for this arrangement if the purpose of the parties had been
honest. If, however, there existed upon the part of the Santa Fe
Company an intent to charge the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company less
for the transportation of its coal than the published rate, it is
evident that this method of billing would afford a ready means for
concealing the transaction. In point of fact, during the entire period
covered by this investigation (July 1899 to Nov. 27, 1904) the Santa
Fe Company did transport coal for the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company
for less than its open tariff rates, and these concessions amounted in
many cases to the price of the coal itself.” (10 I. C. C. Decis. 482,
Feb. 1905.)

Footnote 193:

See 10 I. C. C. Decis. 473, 487, 488, Feb. 1, 1905.

Footnote 194:

“Strategy of Great Railroads,” 1904, p. 167.

Footnote 195:

I confess, however, that I do not see how, in the light of the records
in the Colorado Case, the Santa Fe counsel could tell the Senate
Committee this year that his road had made no discriminating rates
(see above, p. 114). Neither is it easy to see how Mr. Biddle could
testify that he had not known of the payment of any rebates for 12
years. The Commission says the Santa Fe paid rebates to the Fuel
Company till November, 1904, and other preferences have been
unearthed, as we shall see hereafter. Some shippers and some
consignees have had better terms than others. Mr. Biddle does not call
these preferences rebates. The Commission sees that when the Santa Fe
collected the published freight rate, $4.05, from the El Paso people
and paid for the coal out of that, instead of collecting the $4.05 as
freight and leaving the El Paso folks to pay for the coal in addition,
the effect was the same to the El Paso people as the payment of a
rebate equal to the value of the coal, and the same to the Fuel
Company in respect to securing a monopoly of the market, and so the
Commission, looking at the substance of the matter and the form too so
far as could be judged from the published tariff, called the payments
rebates, or payments out of, or deductions from, the regular tariff
rates.

Footnote 196:

Commissioner Prouty to the Boston Economic Club, March 9, 1905.

Footnote 197:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 3607.

Footnote 198:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 226, and Rep. 1904, pp. 58–59.

Footnote 199:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 367. Testimony of E. M. Ferguson, representing 12
organizations of shippers, State and national.

Footnote 200:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 2432.

Footnote 201:

I. C. C. Decis. 735, March 25, 1905.

Footnote 202:

Ind. Com. iv, 54.

Footnote 203:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 2284, 2429.

Footnote 204:

_Ibid._, p. 2432.

Footnote 205:

_Ibid._, p. 18.

Footnote 206:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 2484, 2490.

Footnote 207:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 2912.

Footnote 208:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 675, April 11, 1905; Rep. Dec. 1905, p. 39.

Footnote 209:

Under the milling-in-transit privilege grain may be shipped into the
mill from the West, ground, and shipped out from the mill to New York
or other destination at a total cost but little greater than the
straight through rate from the West to New York. But a mill without
this privilege must pay the rate from the West to Philadelphia, and
then the local rate from Philadelphia to New York, making the total
cost very much greater.

Footnote 210:

Some strong statements about this case may be found in the
Philadelphia _North American_ August 12, August 20, and other dates
during August, 1903.

Footnote 211:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 2434. See 10 I. C. C. 1905, p. 505.

Footnote 212:

This trick was resorted to by the oily people many years ago, but the
railroads, realizing its potency in eluding the rebate prohibitions,
have lately extended its sphere of usefulness and it is becoming quite
frequent. See Sen. Com. 1905, p. 2123.

Footnote 213:

Ind. Com. iv, 544. The name “midnight tariff” by which this scheme is
known probably fits the case, but “flying tariff” is perhaps still
more appropriate.

Footnote 214:

_Outlook_, July 1, 1905, p. 579.

Footnote 215:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 2911, 2912, Commissioner Prouty; 2123, President
Stickney. See also p. 3231, and 10 I. C. C. Decis. 317.

Footnote 216:

Mr. Moffat was asked if he thought the allowances ought to be made. He
said: “I think that it ought to be made to the big shippers. I think
the man who ships 100,000 bushels a month ought to get a little better
deal than the man who ships only 1,000 bushels a year.”

Commissioner Cockrell replied: “There is where I think you are
entirely wrong. No government could live under such a condition. The
rich would soon absorb everything and the small man would be wiped out
of existence. The whole business we are on now started from a railroad
giving a man a rebate. The minute the railroad does a thing like that
it opens the way to a swindling petty graft and bigger grafting and
crooked work. It is wrong, all wrong. It is so wrong that nobody knows
what to call it. Down in Louisville they call it a ‘swag.’ Here you
call it an ‘allowance.’ It is all wrong.”

Footnote 217:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 274, June 4, 1904.

Footnote 218:

_Ibid._, 255, June 4, 1904. The practice was held unjust.

Footnote 219:

_Ibid._, 489, Feb. 2, 1895. Duluth Shingle Co. _v._ Northern Pacific,
Great Northern, Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul, and other railroads.

Footnote 220:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 452, Jan. 7, 1905.

Footnote 221:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 2432, 2433.

Footnote 222:

11 I. C. C. Decis. 104.

Footnote 223:

10 _ibid._, 428, Jan. 1905.

Footnote 224:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 3426, 3427. S. H. Cowan, attorney of Cattle
Growers’ Interstate Committee; Chicago Board of Trade _v._ C. & A. R.
R., 4 I. C. C. Decis. 158.

Footnote 225:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 428. Chicago Live-Stock Exchange _v._ Chicago and
Great Western. See also I. C. C. Rep. 1905, pp. 42, 63.

Footnote 226:

The United States Circuit Court has refused to enforce the order of
the Commission on the ground that the Chicago Great Western reduced
the rate for competitive reasons to get its share of the tariff. The
Commission justly says: “If the decision of the Circuit Court in this
case is sound any carrier is justified in making the widest
discriminations in rates as between competing commodities, regardless
of the effect upon non-favored industries, by simply asserting the
existence of general competition and the desire to increase the
traffic in particular commodities over its line.”

I. C. C. Rep. December, 1905, p. 64. It is to be hoped that the case
will go up on appeal and a reversal of the Circuit decision be
obtained.

Footnote 227:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 590, Feb. 11, 1905; Rep. 1905, p. 31.

Footnote 228:

Cannon Falls to St. Louis, 10 I. C. C. 650, March, 1905.

Footnote 229:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 1775. Mr. Bacon of Milwaukee, speaking for a
convention of shippers.

Rates to Texas also from Kansas and Missouri points are 5 cents per
hundred higher on flour than on wheat, and this differential is not
applied on shipments in any other direction from those points. (10 I.
C. C. Decis. 1904, 55.)

Footnote 230:

I. C. C. Cases, 707, 1905.

Footnote 231:

Proctor and Gamble Case, I. C. C. Rep., 1903, pp. 57–61; 1905. Rep. p.
63.

Footnote 232:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 346.

Footnote 233:

_Ibid._, p. 2742.

Footnote 234:

_Ibid._, p. 18.

Footnote 235:

Business Men’s League of St. Louis _v._ many railroads, 9 I. C. C.
Decis. 319, Nov. 17, 1902.

Footnote 236:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 333, June 25, 1904.

Footnote 237:

_Ibid._, 327, June 25, 1904.

Footnote 238:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 1925.

Footnote 239:

I. C. C. Dressed-meat Hearings, Dec. 1904, Biddle.

Footnote 240:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 351, 354, 364, 818, 2496. The routing instructions
to agents of the St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad Company were
introduced. The circular contained a list of the roads over which
shipments were to be routed unless shippers insisted on a different
routing. Agents were cautioned that “these instructions are
confidential and must not be made public. Under no circumstances must
representatives of foreign roads or fast lines be allowed to examine
the instructions contained in the circular.” (p. 351.)

Footnote 241:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 818.

Footnote 242:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 354. The witness derived his information as to the
sale of tonnage and reciprocal routing agreements from high officials
of the railroads, pp. 354, 364.

Footnote 243:

10 I. C. C. Decis., 1904, p. 47.

Footnote 244:

_Ibid._, 422, Jan. 7, 1905.

Footnote 245:

_Ibid._, 630.

Footnote 246:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 226, April 28, 1904; Rep. 1904, p. 58,—held
unlawful discrimination. See also p. 78, complaint against W. Va.
Northern for refusing due proportions of coal cars.

Footnote 247:

134 Fed. Rep. 196; I. C. C. Rep., Dec. 1905, p. 65.

Footnote 248:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 699.

Footnote 249:

_Ibid._, 47, 663. The favored party in this case was an agent for the
railroad. No relief could be given.

Footnote 250:

11 I. C. C. Decis. 104. Rep. 1905, p. 45. Citing Wight _v._ United
States, 167 U. S. 512, and the Midland Case, 168 U. S. 144.

Footnote 251:

The Commission holds that the division agreed on must not be excessive
(10 I. C. C. Decis. 1905, p. 385. Harvester Trust and Steel Trust
Cases). But there is nothing in such granting or refusing of rate
concessions that necessarily violates the interstate law, provided the
little roads are common carriers for the public subject to the Act to
regulate commerce. If not, the division is held unlawful (10 I. C. C.
Decis., March 19, 1904, pp. 193, 505, 545, 546. Lumber).

The plea that the division is accorded to the little road because it
controls the business of its routing does not explain cases of
division between a private railroad that brings logs, etc., to the
mill, and the railroad that takes the lumber, etc., from the mill. But
through the milling-in-transit principle a division may be arranged
between the common carrier by rail that brings the logs to the mill
and the carrier that takes the lumber away (10 I. C. C. Decis. 194).

Footnote 252:

I. C. C. Rep. 1903, pp. 18–22.

Footnote 253:

Testimony of Mr. Biddle, General Traffic Manager of the Santa Fe,
Hutchinson Salt Case. I. C. C. Hearing, Dec. 5, 1903, p. 35.

Footnote 254:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 385, 392, Nov. 3, 1904. The Commission held that
$3.50 a car to the Illinois Northern, and $3 a car to the West
Pullman, would be reasonable for switching charges, and that switching
charges in excess of these sums amount to unlawful preferences in
favor of the International Harvester Company.

Footnote 255:

I. C. C. Rep. 1904, p. 21.

Footnote 256:

I. C. C. Rep. 1904, p. 21; 10 I. C. C. Decis. 385, Nov. 1904. The
Commission held that “the divisions are grossly excessive for the
services rendered and afford unlawful preference for the U. S. Steel
Corporation, which owns the Ill. Steel Co.”

Footnote 257:

10 I. C. C. Decis., March 25, 1905, pp. 661, 667–669 _et seq._

Footnote 258:

_Ibid._, p. 661.

Footnote 259:

I. C. C. Decis., 664, March 12, 1904.

Footnote 260:

_Ibid._, 707, Feb. 7, 1905; also p. 681, March 19, 1904.

Footnote 261:

The oil cars, dressed-meat cars, etc., of course are in use the year
round, and even fruit and vegetables need refrigerator cars in the
winter to keep them from freezing as well as in summer to keep them
from spoiling. (Sen. Com., 1905, p. 370.)

Footnote 262:

The present system, however, does not always give good service. In
April and May, 1905, for instance, hundreds and hundreds of cars of
strawberries rotted at the stations in North Carolina for want of
cars. The Armour Car-Line could not, or at least did not supply the
needed cars, and as they have an exclusive contract with the Atlantic
Coast Line no other cars are in the field. At one station only 4 cars
were furnished in two days and 125 carloads of berries were left on
the platform and the ground to spoil. The loss this season to the
truck growers of this one section from insufficient car service is
estimated at $600,000. (Sen. Com., 1905, pp. 2596, 2619.)

Footnote 263:

Some railroads have refrigerator lines of their own; the Pennsylvania,
for example, and the Vanderbilts, the Goulds, the Santa Fe, the
Northern Pacific, the Great Northern, etc., but they carry the private
refrigerators also. Packers and other shippers owning cars insist on
sending their goods in their own cars, and making the roads pay
mileage. If the road refuses, the freight goes by some other line.
“They compel us to take it in their cars and pay them for the use of
them while our own cars stand on the side track, or else some other
road gets the business.” (Testimony of James J. Hill, Sen. Com., 1905,
pp. 1504–1505.)

Footnote 264:

See above, pp. 57, 58.

Footnote 265:

This mileage rebate system began long ago. Way back in the seventies
the Erie and other roads allowed the Standard Oil Company to put tank
cars on their tracks and paid it a mileage sufficient to pay back the
values of the cars in less than 3 years.

Footnote 266:

The 1 cent rate applies to 15 to 25 percent of the total mileage of
the cars and the ¾ cent rate to the remaining mileage. (Bureau of
Commerce Rep. on Beef Industry, March, 1905, p. 273.)

Footnote 267:

Evidence in I. C. C. Hearings on private car-lines, April 28, 1904, p.
8. The Beef Trust report of the Bureau of Commerce, 1905, presents
some conflicting evidence and sums up the case with a conservative
estimate which places the average daily run of _all_ the cars owned by
Armour and his associates and used in the beef business at 90 to 100
miles. In the same report, however, the refrigerator cars of the
National Car-Line Company, and of the Provision Dealers’ Dispatch are
reported as running 300 miles a day, and the cars of Swift and Company
are estimated to make 373 miles a day in Iowa. (“Report of
Commissioner of Corporations on the Beef Industry.” March 3, 1905, pp.
274–281.)

Footnote 268:

I. C. C. Rep. 1903, p. 23.

Footnote 269:

National Congress of Railway Commissioners, 1892, statement of the
Committee on Private Cars, p. 52 _et seq._ The Lackawanna Line Stock
Express Co., for example, netted 50 percent a year, or $343 per car.
See also 4 I. C. C. Decis. 630.

Footnote 270:

I. C. C. Rep. 1903, p. 24. Sometimes the payment for a refrigerator
car is much more than $1 a day. James J. Hill says: “If we take
another railway company’s car, we pay 20 cents a day for it for the
time we have had it, and we are in a hurry to get it back; and we load
the other man’s car back if we have anything to put in it. That is
always understood. But they do not want anything put in their cars.
They say: ‘Hurry it back; get it around quickly, and pay us, in place
of 20 cents a day, three-fourths of a cent a mile.’ They used to ask a
cent a mile, but I think that has been abandoned.”

“SENATOR NEWLANDS. How much does that amount to a day, say at the rate
of a cent a mile?

“MR. HILL. If they got a cent a mile and we hurried that car through
to the coast, we would take it about 300 miles a day, so that they
would get about $3 a day for the car.

“SENATOR NEWLANDS. So that in the one case you pay 20 cents?

“MR. HILL. And in the other we pay $3.

“SENATOR NEWLANDS. And the private car-lines you pay $3.

“MR. HILL. Yes—well, $3 would be the extreme figure. We will say
$2.50.” (Sen. Com. 1905, p. 1505.)

Footnote 271:

A refrigerator car costs $900 to $1000, as a rule. A first-class
steel-framed freight car costs about the same. Private stock cars of
good build cost about $800 each. (See evidence in Hearings on Private
Cars, I. C. C. April, 1904, pp. 19, 100; I. C. C. Rep. 1904, p. 14.)
The contracts provide that the railroads are to carry no perishable
goods except in Trust cars if the Trust cares to furnish the cars. If
by chance the railroads use their own or any other refrigerator cars
than those of the Trust they are to charge the full Trust rates and
turn over the said charges to the car-line just as if its cars had
been used.

Footnote 272:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 776: 49,807 total, 15,269 railroad and 34,538
private refrigerators; 14,792 tank cars; 11,357 stock cars; 325
poultry cars; vehicle cars and furniture cars, 1,621. These with coal
and coke cars and other private cars make a total of 127,331 private
cars. The entire freight car equipment belonging to the railroads is
about 1,700,000 cars.

Footnote 273:

The Beef Trust is one of the largest shippers in the world. Its
packing-house shipments from Chicago are said to amount to some three
thousand million pounds (3,000,000,000 lbs.) a year. Its shipments
from Kansas City, Omaha, St. Joe, St. Louis, etc., are also enormous.
There is also a vast traffic in poultry, eggs, dairy products, fruit,
and vegetables, that is controlled by the Trust. Is it any wonder that
a railroad president or manager should refrain from action that might
lose him his share of this huge business? It would make a sad hole in
his receipts. Dividends would be emaciated and might vanish or appear
with a minus sign. His stock would sink in Wall Street. Angry
directors, bankers, investors, and stockholders would assail him and
attack his management. And as a result of defying the Trust he would
put himself out of office and his road perhaps in the hands of a
receiver.

Footnote 274:

C. B. Hutchins was the inventor of an improved refrigerator car. He
built five cars in 1886, and in 1890 he had the California Fruit
Transportation Company operating $200,000 worth of cars. In two years,
1890 and 1891, the profits amounted to $250,000 or more than the total
investment, and the company thought they had something better than a
gold mine. But the Beef Trust undermined them by railroad favoritism
and compelled them to sell out to the Swifts.

While the California Fruit Transportation Company was fighting for its
life with the Armour lines, it presented the Southern Pacific Railway
Company with $100,000 of its stock on condition of receiving an
exclusive contract. The contract was made, but the Armour cars
continued to go. An influence was at work stronger than the exclusive
contract and the power of the California Fruit Transportation Company.

Footnote 275:

Evidence, pp. 101, 133, 134, 146, etc. For example the manager of the
“Missouri River Despatch” operating 250 refrigerator cars testified
that the Erie paid 12½ percent commissions on the freight rates in
addition to the mileage. And the manager of the Santa Fe car-line said
the B. & O. paid them 12½ percent commissions on dairy products in
addition to the ¾ cent mileage, etc. etc.

Footnote 276:

Evidence, pp. 54–55, Armour Cars.

Footnote 277:

National Congress Railway Commissioners, above cited.

Footnote 278:

_Ibid._

Footnote 279:

I. C. C. Rep. 1904, p. 14. Aug. 1, 1904 the Armour lines made an
exclusive contract with the Pere Marquette Railroad, the fruit carrier
of Michigan. Before that the railroad iced carloads of fruit free of
charge. On the date named icing charges went into effect as follows:

$25 to Chicago, Detroit, Grand Rapids, and other Michigan points.

$30 to Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and other points
in Ohio and Indiana.

$35 to Buffalo, Bloomington, and various other points in New York,
Illinois, and Wisconsin.

$40 to Des Moines, Minneapolis, Nashville, and other points in Iowa,
Minnesota, Tennessee, etc.

$45 to Duluth, Lincoln, Wichita, etc.

$50 to New York City, Baltimore, Washington, Denver, etc.

$55 to Boston, Hartford, Mobile, New Orleans, etc.

$60 to Spokane, etc.

From $25 to $60 for what a year ago the railroad gave free of charge.

Footnote 280:

Rep. 1904, p. 15, 10 I. C. C. Decis. 1904, p. 360. Dealers have
protested against paying 4 or 5 or 6 times the fair charge for ice,
and have now and then refused to pay, telling the companies they could
sue for the charges. But the car companies knew a better way. They
ordered the cars of the disobedient dealers delayed and notified them
that in future icing charges must be prepaid on all shipments to them
or from them. These orders were enforced by the railroads and the
kicking dealers were helpless. (Evidence, etc., 201–203.)

With a commission business such as that involved in the case referred
to, an order for prepayment of icing charges or freight rates or both
means ruin. For farmers and other producers will not prepay charges on
perishables, and will not therefore ship to commission merchants to
whom the railroads do not give credit that permits the payment of
charges at their end of the line, _i. e._, on delivery.

Footnote 281:

Evidence, etc., 206, 207.

Footnote 282:

_Ibid._, 207.

Footnote 283:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 2596; and the next item in the text.

Footnote 284:

11 I. C. C. Decis, 129, and Rep. 1905, p. 30, holding the Pere
Marquette Armour charges excessive and approving the Michigan Central
charge of $2.50 per ton on interstate shipments by the car.

Footnote 285:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 369.

Footnote 286:

I. C. C. Beef Hearing, 1904, p. 165 _et seq._ It is a physical
impossibility for a man to inspect the loading of 75 or 100 cars a
day, and if an inspector is overzealous and conscientious in watching
the cars he can attend to, the Trust has the railroad dismiss him.

Footnote 287:

_McClure’s_ for January, 1906, p. 323.

Footnote 288:

See testimony before the I. C. C. April, 1904, p. 27. Mr. Watson’s
memory was very hazy. He could not remember what he had formerly
testified on this subject before the referee. Neither could he tell
what “U. P.” meant nor recognize the clear meaning of “C. & A.” in the
car-line account books, though every one familiar with railway matters
knows that “U. P.” stands for Union Pacific and “C. & A.” for Chicago
and Alton. Mr. Marchand, counsel for the Commission, drew some curious
non-information and mal-information from Mr. Watson, the former head
of Porter Brothers, who were large shippers of fruit in Chicago.

“MR. MARCHAND. What commission did you receive from the railroads on
account of Porter Brothers up to that time?

“MR. WATSON. I told you that was all stopped about four years ago, to
the best of my recollection.”

“MR. MARCHAND. Do you remember receiving from the Union Pacific
Railroad Company $1,400 in 1898—January 25, 1898?

“MR. WATSON. I do not.

“MR. MARCHAND. You have no recollection of that?

“MR. WATSON. No, sir.

“MR. MARCHAND. In 1899 there appears upon the ledger of Armour & Co.,
or rather the Fruit Growers’ Express, an item of $47,000, a credit. Do
you know where that came from?

“MR. WATSON. I do not know anything about the books of Armour & Co.

“MR. MARCHAND. Do you remember having received from C. & A. as on the
books of Armour & Co., on the 10th of October, 1899, the sum of
$45,219?

“MR. WATSON. I do not. I guess if you look it up you will find it is
‘credits and allowances.’

“MR. MARCHAND. ‘C. & A.’ stands for ‘credits and allowances’? What
does ‘U. P.’ stand for?

“MR. WATSON. I do not know.

“MR. MARCHAND. Does that stand for ‘Union Pacific’?

“MR. WATSON. I do not know whether it does or not.”

Mr. Robbins, vice-president and manager of the Armour Car-Lines, was
also afflicted with loss of memory, which was specially unfortunate in
view of the fact that the Trust had destroyed the accounts some time
before the Hearing.

“MR. MARCHAND. Can you explain the item of $14,000 paid to the Union
Pacific?

“MR. ROBBINS. No, sir; I can not.

“MR. MARCHAND. Is there anybody in your employ that can?

“MR. ROBBINS. I do not think so.

“MR. MARCHAND. You say you have destroyed your records.

“MR. ROBBINS. Yes, sir.”

Footnote 289:

I. C. C. Hearing on Private Cars, 1904, pp. 147–149. Mr. Brown,
counsel for the Santa Fe, said to the Senate Committee, 1905, that he
wished to put on record a sweeping denial that the A. T. & S. F. Co.
has made any discriminatory rates or paid any rebates. The next
moment, in answer to a question about the reduction of $25 a car below
the published tariff, to which Mr. Leeds testified as given by the
Santa Fe car-line, Mr. Brown said: “It was a rebate given to every
one.” (Rep. Sen. Com. on Interstate Commerce, May, 1905, p. 3140.) He
first said the road did not give any rebates, and then admitted it did
give rebates, but said it gave the same rebate to every one that
shipped. The coal mines that paid the Santa Fe $4 against $2.90 paid
by the Colorado Fuel Co. would hardly agree to that statement. But Mr.
Brown had in mind the car-line case in which they said the same rebate
was given to every shipper. Mr. Leeds said it was a secret rate, and
that he went to California and solicited business from various
shippers. Under such circumstances, the fact that every one who
shipped got the rebate does not eliminate discrimination but
accentuates it. The discrimination is against the man who does not
ship, the man who is not informed of the secret rebate. The Santa Fe
car-line informed such dealers as it chose. No others could afford to
ship on the Santa Fe. The instructed dealers could easily hold the
market at prices that would prevent the uninstructed from thinking
about shipping such goods.

Footnote 290:

Rep. 1904, p. 13.

Footnote 291:

Mr. Streychmans has been accused of stealing this code book and also
certain letters and papers, but in fact he took no original papers,
but only carbon copies of letters and statements he wrote for the
company, and the code book was put into his possession for use in his
work by the secretary of Armour’s general manager. If any charge of
stealing or any other criminal charge could be made, Streychmans would
long ago have been prosecuted by the Beef Trust people. When he began
giving publicity to the facts in his possession the general manager
tried to buy him off. He was shamefully treated by some of the Armour
officers, and partly in revenge, probably, and partly in gratitude to
the editor of the San Francisco _Examiner_ for helping him out of
California and the Armour grip, he gave the editor copies of letters,
etc., the publication of which led to his examination by the
Commission.

Footnote 292:

Testimony of J. W. Midgley, for over 20 years commissioner, chairman
and arbitrator for various Western railroads. I. C. C. Hearing, April,
1904, p. 8. The reader who is specially interested in the Beef Trust
and its doings should send for a copy of this Hearing, and those of
1901–1902. The report of the Bureau of Commerce Mar. 3, 1905, and Mr.
Baker’s articles in _McClure’s_ for Jan. 1906 and following months,
are also of the deepest interest.

Footnote 293:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 311. The organizations represented by Mr. Ferguson
are the Western Fruit Jobbers’ Association; the National Retail
Grocers’ Association; the Minnesota Jobbers’ Association; Wisconsin
Retail and General Merchandise Association; Wisconsin Master Butchers’
Association; Minnesota State Retail Grocers’ Association, Superior,
Wis.; Lake Superior Butchers’ Association, Duluth, Minn.; Duluth
Commercial Club; Duluth Produce and Fruit Exchange, and the Iowa Fruit
Jobbers’ Association.

Footnote 294:

Rep. U. S. Industrial Commission, iv, p. 53.

Footnote 295:

The Standard has the tanks and private sidings all over the New
Haven’s territory while few are owned by the independents. Persons
without these facilities must pay 2d-class rates, while the Standard
Oil pays 5th class. The 5th class rate between Boston and New Haven is
10 cents per hundred, while the 2d class is 20 cents, the difference
probably representing several times the profit in handling one hundred
lbs. of kerosene. (Commissioner Prouty, in Annals of American Academy
of Political and Social Science, January, 1900.)

Footnote 296:

Ind. Com. iv, p. 53.

Footnote 297:

Sen. Com., 1905, pp. 2740, 2742.

Footnote 298:

See _The Outlook_, July 1, 1905, p. 578.

Footnote 299:

See Miss Tarbell’s vigorous description of what the Standard did to
Kansas in _McClure’s_ for September, 1905.

Footnote 300:

Ind. Com. vi, pp. 663–665. The seaboard pipe line was completed in
1884.

Footnote 301:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 2322, Professor Ripley.

Footnote 302:

_Ibid._, p. 48. A member of the Florida State Commission says the
roads also show favoritism in the supply of cars and by giving rebates
to large shippers. (_Ibid._, p. 47, R. H. Burr.)

Footnote 303:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 3339, 3340, Commissioner Fifer.

Footnote 304:

_Ibid._, pp. 1816–1820, 3439, 3440.

Footnote 305:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 342, June 25, 1904.

Footnote 306:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 3441. Other witnesses agreed as to the oppressive
freight rates, and said the town had subsidized two roads, both of
which are now controlled by the Southern Railway, but they did not
think town values had decreased or that population had diminished (pp.
2006, 2018).

Footnote 307:

_Ibid._, pp. 1761, 1762.

Footnote 308:

_Ibid._, p. 3294.

Footnote 309:

_Ibid._, p. 1878.

Footnote 310:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 2040.

Footnote 311:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 34.

Footnote 312:

_Ibid._ See 10 I. C. C. Decis. 650, and Rep. 1905, p. 36.

Footnote 313:

Complaint of Denver Chamber of Commerce, Sen. Com. 1905, p. 3257.

Footnote 314:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 3336.

Footnote 315:

Question of Mr. Fifer of Interstate Commission to Sen. Com. 1905, p.
3337.

Footnote 316:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 2930, 2940.

Footnote 317:

_Ibid._, p. 2914.

Footnote 318:

See statements of Chamber of Commerce of Spokane and testimony of its
representative, Brooks Adams, Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 2917, 2928.

Footnote 319:

Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 2527–2529.

Footnote 320:

Senator Dolliver, Sen. Com. 1905, p. 2094.

Footnote 321:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 1870.

Footnote 322:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 456, Jan. 13, 1905.

Footnote 323:

See the series of broadsides on these subjects in the Philadelphia
_North American_ during August, 1903, and the early part of 1904. An
excursion ticket from Washington to New York and return allowed 10
days in New York. Formerly a southern buyer going north on such a
ticket could stop over in Philadelphia. But in 1903 this stop-over
privilege was revoked, and if the buyer stopped in Philadelphia and
then bought an excursion to New York he could only stay five days in
New York. The result was that southern buyers began to leave
Philadelphia out in the cold and merchants found that “the present
tariff arrangements are working incalculable injury to wholesale
houses in Philadelphia,” and some of them had to open houses in New
York.

Footnote 324:

Ind. Com. ix, p. 133.

Footnote 325:

4 I. C. C. Decis. 593. The order was made May 29, 1894, on petition of
the Freight Bureau of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce _v._ 23
railway companies, and the Chicago Freight Bureau _v._ 31 railways and
5 steamship companies. The companies refused to comply and the Circuit
Court dismissed the bill for an enforcement, October, 1896, 62 Fed.
Rep. 690; 76 Fed. Rep. 183.

Footnote 326:

I. C. C. _v._ Railway, 167 U. S. 479, May, 1897, reaffirming 162 U. S.
184 and citing 145 U. S. 263, 267. Justice Harlan dissented.

Footnote 327:

“Railroad Transportation,” p. 114.

Footnote 328:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 844.

Footnote 329:

_Atlantic Monthly_, vol. 73, p. 803, June, 1894.

Footnote 330:

E. P. Alexander in “Railway Practice,” p. 8.

Footnote 331:

Ind. Com. iv, p. 194.

Footnote 332:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 1904, p. 58.

Footnote 333:

Sen. Com., 1905, p. 19, Bacon.

Footnote 334:

_Ibid._, p. 19.

Footnote 335:

J. C. Wallace of the American Shipbuilding Co., June 28, 1904, to the
Congressional Merchant Marine.

Footnote 336:

See Wright’s letter printed in the speech of Senator Bacon of Georgia,
_Congressional Record_, April 25, 1904.

Footnote 337:

Testimony of James J. Hill before the Marine Commission.

Footnote 338:

10 I. C. C. Decis. 1904, p. 81.

Footnote 339:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 919.

Footnote 340:

_Ibid._, p. 20. Glass, for example, costs 53 cents a hundred from
Boston to Chicago, while it will go all the way from Antwerp to
Chicago for 40 cents, and the railroads get only a fraction of the
through charge.

Footnote 341:

Ind. Com. iv, p. 194.

Footnote 342:

I. C. C. Beef Hearing, Dec. 1901, pp. 106–107; see also pp. 87, 88.

Footnote 343:

Sen. Com. 1905, p. 1462.

Footnote 344:

See evidence adduced in Chapter II. The words of the Industrial
Commission are still true: “There seems to be a general agreement that
the issue of free passes is carried to a degree which makes it a
serious evil.... Passes are still frequently granted to the members of
State and national legislatures and to public officers of many
classes.... And stress is often laid on the opinion that the issue of
passes to public officers and legislators involves an element of
bribery.” (Vol. iv, p. 18.)

Footnote 345:

Salaries are paid to favored persons; stock is given to influential
people; and tips on the market are given to congressmen and others
whose favor may be of advantage. And the railroads act against those
they dislike as vigorously as they act in favor of their friends. A
curious illustration of the extent to which railways will sometimes go
in their breaches of neutrality occurred in connection with the recent
trip of Thomas W. Lawson in the West. During the Chatauqua exercises
at Ottawa, Kansas, the Santa Fe advertised specials to run every day.
The day that Lawson was to speak, however, no specials ran, and
thousands of people were unable to go, as they had expected, to hear
the man who was attacking Standard Oil and its allies. The specials
ran as advertised every day up to “Lawson Day,” and began running
again the day after. The Santa Fe may not approve of Mr. Lawson’s
statements and in common with all other citizens it has the right to
oppose him with disproof, but isn’t it a little strange in this land
of liberty, free speech, and equal rights, for one of the best
railroads in the country to boycott a Chatauqua day because a man it
does not approve of is to speak?

Similar experiences with the railroad service are reported from the
Chatauqua at Fairbury, Neb., when Lawson spoke there.

Footnote 346:

Mr. Appleton Morgan, writing in the _Popular Science Monthly_ for
March, 1887, said (p. 588): “Rebates and discriminations are neither
peculiar to railways nor dangerous to the ‘republic.’ They are as
necessary and as harmless to the former as is the chromo which the
seamstress or the shopgirl gets with her quarter-pound of tea from the
small tea-merchant, and no more dangerous to the latter than are the
aforesaid chromos to the small recipients.”