Chapter XX: Isolation in Europe and the Irish Union (2)

The failure of the government in the Irish parliament was hailed with delight and rioting in Dublin. The prospects of the union soon began to brighten. The cabinet made it clear that the measure would not be abandoned. As it seemed likely that the protestants would offer the catholics emancipation in order to induce them to combine against union, Cornwallis was authorised to declare that the government would resist to the utmost any concession to the catholics so long as a separate parliament existed. No definite promise was made to the catholics, but their hopes were excited. In the autumn, Castlereagh, who came over for the purpose, represented to the cabinet the importance of gaining their support; he was told to inform Cornwallis that the cabinet was favourable to emancipation, and that without giving the catholics "any direct assurance," he might safely solicit their support. This he did with general success; and the catholic bishops and many of their clergy, allured by the prospect of a provision from government, were active on the unionist side. The unionist party was further strengthened by the state of the country. Many districts were infested by bands of men, survivals of the rebel armies, who murdered, robbed, and intimidated their neighbours, and mutilated cattle. A fresh outbreak of rebellion seemed likely in the spring; the large British force already in Ireland was augmented, and an act was passed giving the lord-lieutenant power to authorise the capital or other punishment of those convicted by court-martial of rebellion or attacks on the king's subjects. The opinion that Ireland needed a new system of government gained ground. Yet the feeling against union remained overwhelmingly general, specially among the protestants.

[Sidenote: _A MAJORITY SECURED._]

A majority in parliament had to be gained by the ministers. The county members, who were independent, for the most part were, and remained, anti-unionists. The preponderance of power lay with the 236 members for the 118 boroughs, of which only eight were free from all patronage. Nearly all the remainder belonged to borough-owners and were regarded as their personal property. A large number of them would be disfranchised by a union. Not to compensate the owners would have been contrary to the general moral standard of the age when uninfluenced by party feelings, and would have made union impossible. As Pitt in his reform bill of 1785 proposed to buy up the patronage of the English close boroughs, so the government determined to compensate those Irish borough-owners whose boroughs were to lose both members. The price of each borough was eventually fixed at L15,000, the market value, and as eighty-four were disfranchised, the sum paid for them was L1,260,000. This was not bribery; it was an open transaction, and the money was paid alike to opponents and supporters of the union. The services of great men were secured by peerages and other dignities. During and at the end of the struggle twenty new Irish peerages were created, sixteen peers were promoted, and five received English peerages. Most of these grants were mere bribes, and so too were the many places and pensions which helped to swell the unionist party in parliament. Some money, though the amount must have been small, was probably also spent in bribery. The government would not risk a general election; the union was to be carried by the existing parliament. Gradually sixty-three vacancies were created in the commons, some by death, some by acceptance of office, most of them doubtless by the resignation of members who would not follow their patrons by becoming unionists, and others, probably, through the purchase of seats by the government from sitting members. The vacancies were eventually filled by supporters of the union. While, then, the extent of the corruption practised by the government has been exaggerated, the union was undoubtedly carried by corrupt means.

Nevertheless, Pitt did not corrupt the Irish parliament; it was corrupt already: he merely continued the immemorial methods of dealing with it on a larger scale than before. Nobles and gentry chose to sell themselves, and, in order to rid Ireland of a source of trouble and danger, and Great Britain of a cause of weakness, he paid them their price. Cornwallis murmured at having to negotiate and job with "the most corrupt people under heaven"; but he did his share of the work. Castlereagh, personally not less honourable, who had much of it to do, did it without compunction, for it was, he said, "to buy out and secure to the crown for ever the fee-simple of Irish corruption, which has so long enfeebled the powers of the government and endangered the connection". It was essential to the welfare both of Great Britain and Ireland that the union should be effected, and that it should be effected without delay; and it could not have been effected by any other means than those which Pitt adopted. It was better by giving these greedy politicians their price to put an end to a system maintained by perpetual corruption, worked in the interests of an ascendant minority, distrusted by the mass of the people, incapable of affording the country the blessings of domestic peace, and dangerous to the security of the empire.

The Irish parliament began its last session on January 15, 1800, and the address was hotly debated. Grattan, who had not appeared there since 1797, spoke with extraordinary eloquence in support of an amendment on the side of legislative independence. Though the vacant seats were not nearly all filled up, the amendment was rejected by 138 votes to 96. The anti-unionists were furious; they raised a fund of L100,000, paid or promised, for the purpose of out-buying the ministers, bought some seats, and paid and offered bribes. The catholics, the yeomanry, and the Orangemen were urged to combine to withstand the union. Some rioting took place in Dublin, but there was no serious outbreak; for the Orange grand lodge kept the society quiet, and the mass of the people, except when excited by agitation, regarded the question with indifference. A fierce struggle ensued in parliament, and it was not until March 28 that the articles of union were carried and sent to England. They were debated at some length in both houses of the English parliament, but were carried by large majorities. They were next presented in the Irish parliament in the form of a bill. It was vehemently opposed. In the debate on the commitment, on May 26, Grattan delivered an oration against it, splendid in diction and inflammatory in tone, and was answered by Castlereagh who spoke, as indeed he spoke throughout these debates, with conspicuous dignity and moderation. The majority for committing the bill was 118 to 73. It was then passed by the English parliament and received the royal assent on August 1. A new great seal and a new royal standard were made for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and on January 1, 1801, the king's new title was proclaimed, from which the words "King of France," retained since the time of Edward III., were omitted.

By the act of union Ireland was to be represented in the united parliament, in the upper house by four spiritual lords sitting in rotation and twenty-eight temporal lords elected for life by the Irish peerage, and in the lower by 100 members.[313] The right of the crown to create fresh Irish peerages was restricted. The established Church of Ireland was declared one with the Church of England, and the preservation of the united Church of England and Ireland was to be "an essential and fundamental part of the union". Commercial interests were mainly settled in accordance with the proposals of 1785, and some Irish manufactures were temporarily protected from suffering by British competition. The debts of the two countries were to be kept separate for twenty years, or until they should be to each other in the same proportion as the respective contributions of the two countries; and until their amalgamation the annual contribution of Great Britain towards the expenditure of the United Kingdom was fixed at fifteen parts and of Ireland at two parts. The first session of the united parliament was opened on January 22, 1801, the members for Great Britain being the same as those of the previous parliament.

[Sidenote: _THE CATHOLIC QUESTION._]

The Irish catholics could have prevented the union. They made it possible, some by giving active help, others by maintaining neutrality; and though no definite promise had been made to them, they were led to expect that union would be followed by emancipation, a provision for their clergy, and the commutation of tithe. Pitt recognised this, and further held that his work would be incomplete without these healing measures, which would give "full effect to the great object of the union--that of tranquillising Ireland and attaching it to this country". Accordingly, in September, 1800, as soon as the union was effected, he called a meeting of the cabinet to consider these questions. He said nothing to the king on the subject, thinking, doubtless, that it would be less difficult to gain his consent if a complete plan was presented to him as the policy adopted by the cabinet. The risk was great, for in 1795 George, as we have seen, held that to consent to emancipation would be a breach of his coronation oath, and so lately as the autumn of 1799 he told Dundas that he hoped the government was "not pledged to anything in favour of the Roman catholics". Loughborough, the chancellor, saw an opportunity for ingratiating himself by betraying the prime minister. When he received Pitt's letter summoning him to the cabinet meeting on the catholic question, he was with the king at Weymouth, where George often resided in the summer since his recovery in 1789. He showed the king Pitt's letter, excited him against emancipation, and furnished him with arguments. Lord Auckland, the postmaster-general, who was allied with the chief Irish anti-catholics, was his cousin, and, probably at Auckland's suggestion, the Archbishops of Canterbury and Armagh wrote to the king to strengthen him against emancipation. When the cabinet met, Loughborough agreed to the commutation of tithe, but objected to any further concession, and the matter was adjourned.

Pitt again brought it before the cabinet in January, 1801. The king's feelings were then generally known, and the Duke of Portland and Lords Westmorland and Liverpool more or less decidedly joined Loughborough in opposing emancipation. On the 28th George attacked Dundas on the subject at a levee: "I shall," he said, "reckon any man my personal enemy who proposes such a measure". He requested Addington, the speaker, to remonstrate with Pitt. On the 31st Pitt wrote him a long letter setting forth the general grounds of his desire for emancipation, by the substitution of a political oath for the sacramental test, and for a provision for the catholic clergy, adding that if the king refused his consent, he must resign office. George, after taking counsel with Addington, replied that he was bound by his coronation oath to refuse his consent, and proposed that both he and Pitt should say no more on the subject. In answer Pitt wrote on February 3 that he must resign office as soon as a new ministry could be formed. George, who was incapable of appreciating his splendid services, and showed later that he must often have chafed under his control, invited Addington, a dull man after his own heart, to form a ministry. He consented, and on the 5th the king accepted Pitt's resignation. Dundas, Grenville, Spencer, and Windham decided to go out with Pitt, so did Canning and others who held minor offices, and Cornwallis and Castlereagh also retired. Pitt promised his help to Addington, whose father had physicked the Pitt family, and persuaded some of his followers to join the new ministry. As it was to be an anti-catholic ministry, his conduct has been held to prove that he was paving his way to a return to office, and that the change, so far as he was concerned, was, to use Fox's expression, "a juggle". It should be remembered that the country was engaged in a deadly conflict, and that its safety was always Pitt's first consideration. Emancipation was hopeless. He had felt bound in honour to break up a strong ministry because he could not carry it, and it was his duty to do what he could to strengthen the new ministry so long as it did not prove incapable of guiding the country in critical times.

[Sidenote: _PITT'S IMPENDING RESIGNATION._]

In this, as in every part of these transactions, his conduct was honourable and straightforward. He would not continue in office when thwarted by the king on a question of great importance, nor would he consent to disappoint hopes which he had encouraged and by which he had benefited. That he was influenced by any other motive, such as that his continuance in office would hinder peace, is a vain imagining. He has been blamed by an eminent historian for not having persevered in his attempt to overcome the king's determination, which on other occasions had yielded to pressure.[314] On none of these occasions had George's religious convictions been concerned. Some experience of the power exercised by religious prejudice in strengthening the resistance which a naturally obstinate person can make to reason, persuasion, and the force of circumstances, leads me to believe that Pitt was right in accepting the king's decision as final and in not engaging in a struggle which might, especially at that time, have had disastrous consequences. Short of such a struggle he did insist on his policy in the only way open to him; he resigned. Where he was to blame, and he acknowledged it, was in keeping his intentions secret from the king. Whether if he had communicated them to the king at an early date, he would have gradually won George over to his policy, it is impossible to say; he certainly went the wrong way to work in disregarding the right of the crown to be consulted on the policy which the prime minister hopes to carry out.

The impending resignations were announced in parliament, and Sir John Mitford, the attorney-general, was chosen speaker in place of Addington, but the completion of the ministerial arrangements was delayed, and Pitt remained _de facto_ prime minister. To prevent public inconvenience he brought forward his budget on the 18th. He announced a loan of L25,500,000 for Great Britain and L1,500,000 for Ireland, afterwards increased by another L1,000,000, which the commercial prosperity of the country, though then in the ninth year of the war, had enabled him to negotiate, at the rate of about 5-1/4 per cent., and he proposed fourteen new taxes to defray the interest. The budget was well received. The delay in the change of ministry was prolonged by the king's illness. He had been much excited and distressed by the late events, and on the 20th again became insane. The Prince of Wales approached Pitt on the subject of a regency, and Pitt told him that, if the necessity should arise, he should propose the restrictions of 1789. By March 6 the king's condition was materially improved and the question became of no further importance. George bade Willis, his doctor, tell Pitt that he was quite well, adding, "but what has he not to answer for who is the cause of my having been ill at all?" Pitt was much distressed. Would an assurance, he asked Willis, that he would not again trouble the king on the catholic question "be material to his health?" "Certainly," Willis replied, "and to his life also."[315] Pitt bade him give the king the assurance. George was much comforted. Pitt's surrender has been blamed in strong terms.[316] It cannot be defended completely. The question was of deep importance to Ireland, and he treated it as a personal matter. It is, however, unfair to represent his conduct as an attempt to resume office. His followers constantly urged him to invite Addington to retire, for they justly regarded him as incompetent, and when they heard of Pitt's message to the king, they expected that their wish would be fulfilled. But Addington had received his appointment, and was not likely to resign it willingly, and Pitt, as Canning complained, would not make any "forward movement towards the king". Nothing was to be got from him except that, if the king and Addington earnestly wished him to continue, he was ready to discuss matters. On the strength of this, Dundas and others went to Addington, who rejected their proposal that he should offer to make way for Pitt, and Pitt himself told them that their action was improper.

[Sidenote: _PITT RESIGNS OFFICE._]

Pitt would willingly have continued in office. He loved power, and he knew that England needed him and the strong ministry of which he was the head and soul, but he was not a man to barter principle for office. His message to the king is intelligible, as a prime minister of our own time has pointed out, without so mean an interpretation.[317] He recognised that while the king lived catholic emancipation could not be gained save at too high a price. George was sixty-two, and his life was thought to be precarious; no one could foresee that he would outlive Pitt, who was twenty years younger. An attempt to force the question on him would have again brought on insanity, and would perhaps have killed him. Pitt was deeply moved by the king's words, and yielded to feelings of pity and personal affection for the sovereign he had served for seventeen years. On March 14 he gave back the seal of the exchequer into the king's hands. Once again then, and not for the last time, did George defeat the policy of his ministers and drive them from office. In this case the blame chiefly rests on the traitor Loughborough, who, for his own purposes, happily to be foiled, interfered between the king and Pitt and excited the king's religious prejudices. But George's conduct at this crisis cannot be viewed wholly apart from his earlier attempts at personal rule, for it proves that he was unable to understand that his ministers were responsible for his political acts. His refusal to assent to emancipation deprived Ireland of the happy results which Pitt expected, and brought much trouble on the country. As regards its effect on the empire at large, it is enough to say that it took the helm of state out of the hands of Pitt.

FOOTNOTES:

[301] Grenville to Whitworth, Nov. 1, 1799, MS. Russia, R.O.

[302] Acton to Nelson, Aug. 1, 1799, _Nelson and the Neapolitan Jacobins_, p. 325.

[303] The latest discussions on this affair are in Captain Mahan's _Life of Nelson_, 2nd edition, 1899; _Engl. Hist. Rev._, April, 1898, July, 1899, October, 1900; _Athenaeum_, July 8 and Aug. 5, 1899; Mr. Gutteridge's _Nelson and the Neapolitan Jacobins_ (Navy Records Soc.), 1903, containing documents, with the _Diario Napol._ and the _Compendio di Micheroux_ from the _Archivio Storico per le province Napol._, xxiv. (1899), pt. iv.; Marchese Maresca's _Il Cavaliere Micheroux_, 1895; Madame Giglioni's _Naples in 1799_, 1903, and two articles by Dr. Hueffer in the _Revue Historique_, Sept.-Dec, 1903, and Jan.-April, 1904, to which I am indebted.

[304] Mahan, _Life of Nelson_, i., 439.

[305] Whitworth to Grenville, Nov. 1 and 13, and Dalrymple to Huskisson, Dec. 31, 1799, MS. Russia, R.O.

[306] Whitworth to Grenville, Dec. 5 and 24, 1799, MS. Russia, R.O.

[307] Whitworth to Grenville, Dec. 13, 1799, MS. Russia, R.O.

[308] Martens, _Recueil des Traites conclus par la Russie_, xi., 5-7.

[309] Whitworth to Grenville, March 18, 1800, MS. Russia, R.O.

[310] Same to same, April 2, 1800, MS. Russia, R.O.

[311] Whitworth to Grenville, March 6, 1800, MS. Russia, R.O.

[312] Mahan, _Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution_, ii., 17, 18.

[313] In 1801 the population of Great Britain was about 10,500,000, and of Ireland about 4,500,000; in 1901 the population of Great Britain was 36,999,946, and of Ireland 4,458,775.

[314] Lecky, _History_, viii., 512.

[315] Lord Colchester, _Diary_, i., 255-61. Malmesbury (_Diaries_, iv., 31-32) says that Pitt wrote a contrite letter to the king, which seems a mistake (see Stanhope, _Life_, iii., 303-4).

[316] Lecky, _Hist._, viii., 523. Pitt has been admirably defended by Lord Rosebery (_Pitt_, pp. 226-28).

[317] Lord Rosebery, _u.s._

APPENDICES.

I. ON AUTHORITIES.

II. ADMINISTRATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN, 1760-1801.

III. THE GRENVILLES.