Chapter IV: Armentières Up to Gas Attack (2)

During these days in billets the presence of the Battalion Orchestra made itself felt, with excellent results. The instruments had been brought over for us by the Division. It was a considerable item for regimental baggage, consisting as it did of ten instruments. Sergeant Lawton, battalion sanitary N.C.O., was in charge of the orchestra, and played the trombone when his duties permitted. Rifleman Garrod, the first violin, was a player of exceptional merit from the Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra. As a soloist he was particularly fine. The remaining members of the party, all well above the average, were--violins, Lewin, Hardacre, and Lance-Corporal Hume; viola, Edmondson; 'cellos, Kaye and Kennedy; bass, Lance-Corporal Buckley; trombone, Williams; drums, Burden; and librarian (self-styled and self-appointed), Rifleman King. Lance-Corporal Bell, from the Quartermaster's Stores, occasionally performed on the oboe. Rifleman Collins, an excellent violinist, had been left behind, unfortunately, in England suffering from influenza.

By arrangement with the other units of the Brigade, our contribution to the recently formed Brigade Pioneer Company was reduced by the strength of the orchestra. In return for this, the latter was always loaned to another battalion while we were in the line, and also for special occasions when we were out. In addition, it used to play for our own mess on guest nights, and very delightful it was; and also occasionally for the Divisional Concert Party's performances, and for the Brigade and Divisional Commanders. It was in great demand everywhere, and there can be no doubt that the results more than justified the employment of the personnel thus utilized. Another invaluable asset was Rifleman Kessen, a very prince of conjurers. He seemed to have an infinity of excellent tricks, and he fooled you under your very nose in the most baffling fashion.

On May 31st the battalion once more relieved the 2/7th K.L.R. The arrangement of companies--"A," "B," "D," "C" from the right--was due to the forthcoming raid, to be carried out by parties from "A" and "B" Companies on Centaur Trench, opposite the Pont Ballot salient. This necessitated "A" and "B" Companies being as near the proposed area as possible. Colonel Fletcher arrived in the line from leave at midnight, and with characteristic energy proceeded at once on a tour of inspection.

This spell in the line was one of exceptional activity. To begin with, there was the impending raid, which, being our first, occupied nine-tenths of our thoughts. There were innumerable special patrols to examine the wire and the approaches to the points of entry; the artillery wire-cutting operations had to be settled; the incessant visits to observation posts and the selection of forming-up places, raid headquarters, regimental aid posts, etc., to be arranged for. In addition to all this, the Battle of Messines took place during the tour. Immediately after that came orders for following up the enemy, if he voluntarily evacuated his trenches; and before we were half through that came schemes for the defence of Armentières in the event of an attack by the Germans. But we must take things in order.

The morning after relief (June 1st, 1917) the enemy dropped a "pineapple" into a Lewis-gun post of "C" Company, killing three men and wounding two. His activity in this direction was now so great that steps had to be taken to cope with it. Two light trench mortars were permanently established in the front line, and for every "pineapple" we returned a number of Stokes shells. The teams did not have a pleasant time of it, as the Germans made every endeavour to knock them out; but they stuck to it gallantly, and by the end of the time their efforts had become singularly effective, although the enemy later retaliated by producing a medium "minnie."

A slight scare was caused by the alleged appearance of a German near "C" Company's cook-house, at the left extremity of the subsidiary line, and patrols spent several nights down by the river trying to catch the supposed intruder. Whether there was anything in the rumour or not was never satisfactorily settled, but it would have been perfectly simple for him to get there. Between our left and the river there was a gap of a couple of hundred yards, which after weeks of fine weather had become dry and hard, and, as subsequent investigations after the Armistice proved, there was ample cover for a whole battalion to come up unseen. Moreover, the German raids on the left sector must have revealed to them the absence of any serious opposition in that part of the line. In fact, the liability of the battalion to be outflanked on the left was the subject of a strong memorandum from Colonel Fletcher, but nothing was done except that some wire was erected later, and a Lewis gun post located in the cellar of a ruined house close to the river and in line with our support line. The presence of fresh earth on a footbridge crossing a branch of the Lys, which was discovered by the patrol, certainly gave some colour to the story of "C" Company's cook.

June 4th, 5th, and 6th produced barrages on the Messines Ridge; they took place each afternoon, and lasted for about an hour. It was understood that barely half of the guns to be employed on the day were in action, but it was a wonderfully awe-inspiring sight to watch the effect of the mass of shells crashing down on the slopes of the ridge. The heavies in Armentières and our own 18-pounders took part in these preliminary barrages, with the result that the shelling of Armentières by the enemy became intense, and particularly in the vicinity of battery positions, which constant firing had now revealed to the enemy, and produced the most severe counter-battery work on his part. Our trenches, too, received marked attention. The enemy seems always to have been suspicious of an attack on Frelinghien, and he set to work on the left and left-centre company sectors with great determination. Shells of a calibre not usually employed in ordinary trench warfare began to plough up our communication trenches, Irish Avenue especially. Cambridge House was frequently shelled intensely, and, in fact, there was no part of our sector that did not receive considerable attention daily. The wire-cutting on the right provoked the enemy terribly, and each time it was carried out severe retaliation took place. Houplines road was now shelled regularly with great bursts of 5·9's and heavy shrapnel. One 4·2 battery kept up such an incessant fire into the vicinity of Tissage Dump that we used to call it the "rising tide," the noise of the stream of shells as they passed over sounding not unlike the steady onrush of the sea.

Quesnoy, nearly opposite to us, we used to bombard heavily, and some part of it was usually on fire. Frelinghien was frequently almost hidden in red dust, while Wytschaete Ridge for long periods at a stretch looked as if it were enveloped in a sandstorm. Every night north of the Lys one or both sides were raiding, and the rumble of barrages, the red bursts of shrapnel, and the stream of coloured rockets continued well on into the daylight.

SERGEANTS' MESS--WOKING, FEBRUARY, 1917.]

At 3.10 a.m. on June 7th the Battle of Messines opened with the most tremendous mine explosions and the most magnificent barrage that can be imagined. It was a lovely morning, and there was not a cloud in the sky. With a stupendous roar and upheaval that baffles description the mines exploded. Simultaneously the whole weight of the artillery gathered together for the occasion, and hidden away in every conceivable place, opened on the enemy. From their trenches lights of many colours shot into the air, mutely appealing for assistance from their gunners. These were not long in replying, but our counter-battery work, which had left them in false security during the preliminary barrages, was dealing faithfully with them now. For a few moments the ridge stood out clear and distinct. Then clouds of smoke and dust shut out the view, and it was only by the alteration in the sound that we knew that the barrage was creeping forward, and we waited anxiously for the telegrams announcing the result.

During the first few hours we were unmolested. A 4·2 battery opened on Houplines ten minutes before zero, but switched as soon as the barrage opened. About 7 a.m., however, "whizz-bangs" came down in a regular barrage on the front line, and then high explosives up and down the subsidiary line for about a couple of hours. Between two and six in the afternoon the enemy concentrated on Tissage Dump, putting over 300 high explosive shells into that locality during the four hours. Aeroplanes were very busy, and a German machine dropped two bombs about fifty yards from Battalion Headquarters. The enemy balloons were in a state of great excitement, being hauled down whenever a plane appeared, till at last one of them apparently got tired of this, broke away, and sailed off out of sight. One thing that greatly interested us was that both this day and the next the enemy shelled his own front line opposite the Brewery. Up to the end of this tour the Germans continued intensely active, the left sector and Irish Avenue receiving the lion's share of the shelling.

One very necessary piece of work was completed before we quitted the trenches--the cutting of the grass in front of the parapet. It was now so high and so close to the parapet that it entirely obstructed the view through the periscope, and made it quite possible for a man to work his way unseen right up to the trenches. Sickles had to be obtained and parties went out nightly to "cut the hay crop." To do this just in front of the posts alone would, of course, have revealed their exact position to any inquisitive airman, and a strip had therefore to be cut along the whole length of the front line.

At 9.30 p.m. on June 9th the leading company of the 2/7th K.L.R. began to arrive. At the last moment, owing to the continued harassing fire of the Germans on to the Houplines road, we decided to proceed out by Lunatic Lane in the right battalion sector. This was a long and winding communication trench which so far had sustained little damage. It brought you out by the Lunatic Asylum, and from there you went up the Rue Gambetta and so on to the Rue de Lille. "C" Company remained in the subsidiary line.

On arrival in billets we were somewhat astonished to learn that we were under orders to move at one hour's notice, and that guides to bring up reinforcing troops were always to be kept in readiness at Battalion Headquarters. The retirement of the enemy, after the Battle of Messines, from his remaining trenches north of the River Lys had caused the Higher Command to think that a partial retirement might be effected opposite our front also. Consequently some most elaborate schemes to meet this emergency had been issued, and we were now in the throes of trying to draw up, in conjunction with the 2/7th K.L.R., a scheme of movement in the event of the enemy's voluntary withdrawal. We were therefore not a little surprised to find signs that an attack by the Germans might now be expected. The mental effort required to concentrate your attention simultaneously on an advance and a defence--and both had to be fully provided for--and at the same time to attend to the all-absorbing orders and arrangements for the raid, proved somewhat exhausting. For clearness' sake we will take them one by one, but it should be remembered that three sets of orders, and in addition a salvage scheme (a kind of corollary to the advance orders), were all drawn up at the same time, and the difficulty of remembering which you were working on at any particular moment was by no means imaginary.

Operation Order No. 22, dated June 15th, 1917, began with the words: "In the event of the enemy voluntarily evacuating his present front line system opposite the battalion frontage, companies will be ready to move forward and occupy the sectors of the enemy line with minimum of delay." The orders ran into fifteen headings with seven appendices and, it need hardly be added, three pages of subsequent amendments, dated July 1st. As the orders, fortunately, were never put into operation, it will be sufficient to deal with them quite briefly. Each company was allotted an area in the enemy front line, and on the word "floreat" fighting patrols, consisting of one officer and twenty-four men, were expected to dash across No Man's Land "at ten minutes' notice." The difficulty of this initial part of the proceedings did not at first occur to the higher authorities, but some weeks later the time allowed was suddenly increased to six hours!

A consolidating platoon, armed with picks, shovels, sand-bags, etc., followed as a carrying party; and, finally, Company Headquarters moved into the German front line, and Battalion Headquarters moved up to Edmeads Farm. The Brigade Pioneer Company, assisted by working parties from the reserve battalion, were responsible for digging communication trenches from Fiji Road on the right and Hobbs Farm on the left, to the enemy's front line. The Reserve Battalion Headquarters and two remaining companies moved up to the subsidiary line.

To assist in these operations advanced dumps, containing vast quantities of R.E. stores and bombs and small-arms ammunition, were gradually accumulated in the vicinity of the front line, to the great delight of the Germans, who shelled them cheerfully. An elaborate system of flags and identification marks was also evolved. In addition to this, it being now presumed that we had to all intents and purposes occupied the German trenches, the collection of salvage from our old trenches became a matter of considerable moment, and comprehensive orders were issued for that work also; but these we may pass over.

To change for a moment from the offensive to the defensive, it was also considered possible that the enemy was likely to make an attack on Armentières, in the hope of obtaining a good headline, "Capture of Armentières," for his newspapers, which might divert attention from the rumour that Messines had fallen. Moreover, his possession of Armentières would have made our tenure of Messines Ridge extremely uncomfortable, if not impossible. Consequently, an extensive system of routes for reinforcing troops was worked out, and guides instructed for this purpose. Men not required to carry bombs and R.E. material to the front line dumps were now collecting similar material in Armentières itself. Others were busily engaged wiring up the streets, building machine-gun emplacements, and generally trying to make up in a few weeks for the total neglect of the old defences, which during the last two years had decayed to a degree almost beyond repair. A Major was appointed O.C. Armentières Defences, and the place began to hum with life and movement. Throughout the proceedings the foe kept up continual shelling with every description of gun, and made life in the town anything but comfortable. The swimming-baths, which had been so acceptable, had to be abandoned owing to the fact that they only had a glass roof, and shells came perilously near it. Training was confined to the vicinity of billets, or more often to the cellars. The destruction of the big brewery near Pont de Nieppe, whence came our beer supply, so needed in those scorching hot days, helped to complete our unhappiness. The baths near Erquinghem were also destroyed, thanks to the action of the Heavy Artillery Commander, who had placed some 60-pounders just in front of them. The sight of the soldier bathers, in every kind of dress or undress, running wildly across the fields in the company of the French laundry-maids certainly produced considerable merriment; but the price paid for this piece of humour, the entire demolition of the only bathing-place reasonably handy, was thought to be excessive.

The only people who really appreciated the spell out of the line were the raiding party. Captain Steward, Captain Parker, Lieutenant Clarke, 2nd-Lieutenant Moseley, and 100 men were comfortably installed close to Croix du Bac in the quarters of the old Divisional Reinforcement Camp, which had recently been moved to Steenwerck, the present railhead. Division Headquarters had removed from the White Chateau at Sailly, and were now in Croix du Bac; and a field close to their offices was secured for the training-ground. Here a replica of the enemy trenches was made with tapes and turned sods, care being taken to add sufficient "duds" to mislead the aerial photographer should he chance to wander over. Aeroplane photos were studied till the head nearly swam to ensure that the reproduced line corresponded as exactly as possible with the original. Throughout these proceedings Captain Glyn, G.S.O.3, was most helpful in procuring photographs and maps. The choice of the sector to be raided was limited by the necessity of having reasonable approaches to our own front line, and these the right sector alone provided. Moreover, the old road passing through the Pont Ballot salient made a fine natural guide, and was selected as such for the right flank. Centaur Trench and support, with their two communication trenches, Centaur Lane and Centaur Row, formed roughly speaking the area of operations. There were three parties--Captain Parker and twenty men of "D" Company, who were to enter on the right; Lieutenant Clarke and sixteen men of "A" Company in the centre, though Clarke himself was to remain on the parapet with a 'phone to our own front line to Captain Steward, O.C. Raid; and 2nd-Lieutenant Moseley and thirty-one men of "B" Company, who were to enter on the left. The route up to the gap in the wire was to be indicated by tapes. Bridges were to be laid and the parties formed up in No Man's Land between sign-boards by zero minus three minutes. The barrage was to lift and the raid commence at zero plus two minutes. The duty of the blocking parties, etc., was worked out to the smallest detail and rehearsed again and again.

The co-operation of medium trench mortar batteries, light trench mortar batteries, and machine guns was on a large scale both for barrage and neutralizing purposes. The artillery consisted of 18-pounders and 4·5 howitzers, fourteen pieces in all. All this time the Quartermaster was busy collecting revolvers, knobkerries, torches, and all the other minor but necessary articles of equipment, and many were the alarums and excursions.

During this period in billets the reorganized seniority of the Territorial Force was published, all temporary rank being cancelled. We suddenly found ourselves with no Majors and only four Captains, while several of our Company Commanders fell to 2nd-Lieutenants. The system of promotion to acting ranks was, however, at once instituted, and we resumed most of our original ranks, though Major Charles Wilson lost his majority, only one Major being allowed instead of two. About this time Captain Bowring took over command of "A" Company.

On June 12th "A" Company relieved "C" Company in the subsidiary line, and on the 15th the battalion relieved the 2/7th K.L.R. The route chosen was Buterne Avenue, the common communication trench between ourselves and the right battalion. Owing to the destructive shooting of the enemy, Irish Avenue had more or less ceased to exist; and "C" Company, who once more found themselves in this unhealthy sector, had to use Cambridge Avenue and Regent Street, which made their relief a slow and tedious process. "B" Company was on the right, and then came "A" and "D" Companies. Owing to the raiding detachment being left out of the line, "D" Company had to be assisted by a loan of men from "C" Company; while "A" and "B" Companies were supplemented by various employed men--buglers, grooms, etc.--normally left out of the line.

The sector was again full of gas, and the persistent efforts of the R.Es. to discharge it seriously hampered the patrolling that had to be carried out nightly in the vicinity of the area to be raided, and which was of vital importance. The real nature of the bridge over the ditches, which eventually proved to be a brick culvert, had long been in dispute, and Lieutenant Royle, the Intelligence Officer, spent every night while we were in Armentières with the Battalion scouts in No Man's Land up to and including the night of the raid. In spite of his multifarious duties as Intelligence Officer and his two daily summaries, he never spared himself in his efforts to make certain that the gaps were open and the routes beyond dispute. The enemy activity had meanwhile still further increased. Irish Avenue was reduced to a mere chain of shell-holes and débris, while every communication trench, and in fact every part of the sector, was well hammered. We were surprised and pleased to find how well the gas cylinders stood being knocked about.

On June 20th a practice disconnection of all telephones was ordered by the Division. The result as far as we were concerned was highly satisfactory, Battalion Headquarters getting a brief respite from those in authority. As regards the internal routine work it made no difference, as telephone messages had been reduced, at any rate during the daytime, to the lowest possible figure. The repeated warnings that the enemy could pick up messages, and later the presence of a Police Listening Set in the subsidiary line, had greatly cooled our enthusiasm for this form of communication. The daily report of conversations picked up by the Listening Set was, in fact, a source of much merriment, the angry remarks of Major Brookes one day to someone at his battery causing special amusement. We also received a rather futile complaint from the authorities, so to prevent a repetition of similar rebukes we made a suitable arrangement with the Listening Set personnel, who were located in a dug-out they had long coveted; and after that our conversations, when picked up, were treated with more discretion.

The enemy evinced considerable nervousness at night, possibly owing to our active patrolling. On more than one occasion he bombed his own wire. His apparent unpreparedness when our raid took place was therefore the more surprising.

On the morning of June 20th a serious loss was sustained by the Division. Lieutenant-Colonel Short, C.M.G., the artillery Group Commander, had arranged to visit our Headquarters to discuss certain details in connection with the barrage for the raid. His departure from our Brigade Headquarters happened to synchronize with the arrival of General Broadwood, who decided to walk up with him. They stopped for a few minutes on a rather exposed bridge in Houplines to examine the lie of the land. Whether they were observed or whether it was simply bad luck will never be known, but the bridge at this moment received a direct hit from a 5·9, and both officers were badly wounded. Their orderlies at once carried the General to a place of comparative safety, but while this was being done a second shell arrived, killing the Group Commander on the spot. General Broadwood was taken straight to Estaires, but his wounds proved mortal, and he only lingered for a few hours. He was buried in the cemetery at Sailly. The whole affair was a most unhappy tragedy, and the loss of the General was keenly felt throughout the Division. Colonel Short had been indefatigable in his efforts to ensure adequate support to our raid, and his cheerful disposition and amusing stories had made him very popular at Battalion Headquarters.

THE BATTALION, WOKING, FEBRUARY, 1917.]

June 21st was a busy day for all. The final preparations for the raid, which was to commence early in the morning of June 22nd, were now in full swing. The bridges had been brought up overnight, and were duly concealed in the front line. Raid Headquarters, the advanced regimental aid post, and all the other details, were now being finally completed. The raiding party were brought up in lorries to the Houplines Level Crossing after dark, each man with his face blackened and his label, bearing number and name, tied to the top button of his jacket. All other traces of identification had been removed. About 11 p.m. the party was moving down from the subsidiary line with many a handshake and a "Good luck, boys!" The men were all as keen as could be. The official report has been reproduced as it stands. It gives a faithful account of what happened. That the raid was not so successful as we had hoped--that is to say, that no identification was obtained--was due to several causes. First, Captain Parker himself and several of his party were knocked out at the very start by pressing too close on the barrage and being caught in a short burst of shrapnel. Next, Lieutenant Clarke's party ought to have had an officer actually in the trench with them; the men were willing enough in all conscience, but lacked the controlling influence of the officer's presence. Then Lieutenant Moseley's party missed their way, owing to fresh guides having to be substituted at the last moment. Although we did not claim it as a successful raid, yet there is no doubt that the effect on the battalion was good, and the men who had taken part in it were keen to make another attempt. Colonel Fletcher's disappointment was great, as he had slaved from morning till night to make the raid a success. Captain Parker's wounds were more serious than had at first been realized, and at one time nearly proved fatal. His reception at the Casualty Clearing Station was typical of his luck. He was, of course, wearing a "Tommy's" jacket, and so by mistake was put into a "Tommies'" ward, and was welcomed on his arrival by the words: "Gawd, Bill, here comes a b---- nigger!"

P. G. Jones, a Battalion Scout, who fell on this occasion, was one of our best and keenest young soldiers, and very popular with everyone. His death was a real personal loss to all who knew him.

* * * * *

REPORT ON MINOR OPERATION CARRIED OUT IN HOUPLINES SUB-SECTOR ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 21ST-22ND, 1917.

"_Strength of Party._--Three officers and 97 other ranks.

"_Point of Exit._--C.29.a.35.80--C.23.b.96.34.

"_Points of Entry._--C.29.a.48.17--C.29.a.62.41.

"_Time._--1.6 a.m. Entry reported by telephone.

"_Object._--(_a_) To continue a harassing policy and prevent the enemy from withdrawing troops.

"(_b_) Killing and capturing as many of the enemy as possible.

"(_c_) Obtaining identification and gaining information regarding the enemy's system of defence.

"_Narrative._--Minus five minutes zero: Bridges laid across ditch.

"Minus three minutes zero: All parties formed up across ditch.

"Zero: Barrage commenced exactly on time. All parties commenced moving on objective.

"_Right (Parker's) Party._--This party was so keen to get into enemy's trenches that they followed the barrage too closely, and in consequence suffered the following casualties:--

"The leading scout was killed, and the officer who was close behind him was wounded in the leg and neck and could not go on. The N.C.O. in charge of the leading party was fatally wounded, and two of his men were incapacitated. The N.C.O. in charge of the second party was hit, and one of his men was killed and another wounded.

"The remainder of the party carried on and entered the enemy trench as arranged. The party who were detailed to work along the trench to the right found a concrete dug-out, fitted with iron doors, in the front-line trench as anticipated, at about C.28.a.48.10. There was a light in the dug-out, and three men were seen inside wearing blue uniform with Red Cross brassards. They were summoned to come out, but refused, and a bomb was therefore thrown into the dug-out just before the men inside had time to slam the iron door. The bomb exploded, and groans and cries were heard, and also a noise which sounded like a trapdoor being shut. Our men tried to force the door open, but were unable to do so. The muzzle of a revolver was then put through a loophole in the iron door and six shots were fired.

AREA RAIDED 21·6·17.]

"Efforts were again made to open the door, but proved unsuccessful. Whilst trying to force this door, fire was opened on our party from the traverse next beyond; this was replied to, and the Huns ran away. Much valuable time was spent trying to get into the dug-out for the purpose of obtaining identification, and owing to this, and also the casualties already suffered, this party were unable to get on to their farthest objective.

"In the meantime the party working along the trench to the left were bombed by the enemy, and when they retaliated the enemy climbed out of the trench and disappeared to the rear.

"Progress was then continued along the trench, and a dug-out was found, but on examination it proved to be empty. Shortly after this some of the Centre Party were met and connection established.

"Just after the withdrawal signal had gone up--zero plus 22 minutes--two Germans were seen approaching the front line over the top from the direction of their support line. Shots were fired at them and they withdrew. It is not known whether either of them were shot.

"Parker's party then left the enemy trench, bringing with them a rifle and bayonet which were found in the trench.

"On the way back those men who had been hit on crossing No Man's Land were all brought in except one man, who could not be found. It is believed that this man was killed. On reaching our trenches it was found that another man was missing. He was last seen soon after leaving the enemy's trench.

"At zero plus 33 minutes the N.C.O. i/c Right Party observed one green light and one golden rain rocket fired apparently from the enemy's subsidiary line in C.23 or C.24.

"The trench is very deep and narrow, and no duck-boards were found.

"_Centre (Clarke's) Party_.--This party crossed No Man's Land in the order practised. They found the ground much torn up by shell-holes, over which it was impossible to proceed quickly. They found the gaps in the wire, but had to zig-zag a good deal to get through. There was a considerable quantity of cut wire lying about, which further delayed their progress. They entered the enemy's trench at about C.20.a.44.21 (_i.e._, about 30 yards farther to the right than had been intended).

"2nd-Lieutenant C. W. Clarke established telephone communication with O.C. Raid at zero plus 7½ minutes, and sent a message to the effect that his party 'had entered enemy's trench.'

"The trench was deep, and in getting in the leading man stumbled and lost his rifle, which he was unable to find in the darkness. Thereupon another bayonet man was brought up to take his place. The first party then proceeded along the trench to the right, and immediately found a dug-out, into which a bomb was thrown. After the bomb had exploded the dug-out was entered and two dead Germans found. An effort was made to tear a button off the tunic of one of those men, but it was on too tight. At this moment a scuffle was going on outside the dug-out with a Hun who had come running down the trench, shouting 'Surrender,' and our man inside the dug-out hurried out to see what was happening, and picked up a German rifle on his way. The Hun was placed in charge of two men, to be passed out of the trench as soon as the two men waiting on the parapet had been called to the spot. Whilst the two men were holding the prisoner, one of them was wounded and let go. The prisoner thereupon wrenched himself free from the other man and escaped to the left. One of our men chased him along the trench, but, going over strange ground, was unable to catch him; he came to a communication trench (Centaur Lane), and, hearing footsteps, threw a bomb into this trench. As by this time the withdrawal signal had gone up, he withdrew and joined his own party.

"In the meantime the rest of this party had started working along the trench to join up with the right party, which they did. This party was followed by a small party which had been detailed to proceed along Centaur Lane and block it. They expected to find this communication trench to the right of where they entered the front line, but owing to the fact that they had unconsciously entered the trench farther to the right than had been intended, this trench was not found until too late.

"A bomb store was found and blown up as the party were leaving the trench.

"This party had one casualty (referred to above), and he was brought back to our trenches.

"No S.O.S. signal was seen and no artillery fire was opened until this party were half-way back across No Man's Land.

"_Left (Moseley's) Party_.--Moseley's party failed to enter enemy's trench. The two scouts who had reconnoitred the gaps and knew the ground well were sick four days before the raid took place. The new scouts did not know the ground as well, possibly, as some of the other members of the raiding party; also their reconnaissance was made difficult by enemy working at their gaps, and having covering parties out; also they had not the same opportunity of rehearsal as they should have had in laying tapes, etc. In consequence, after passing through the first gap, a doubt arose as to direction owing to other members of the raiding party thinking that they knew best, with the result that several parties tried to get through impassable wire. The main party moved to the left eventually, followed by other parties, and lost direction. While this was going on one of the scouts found the proper gaps, dashed after the party, who reorganized, and the leading men reached enemy's trench when return signal went up. In this Rifleman Bamber was wounded; he was found by Rifleman F. Taylor, who bound up his wounds, and as he was not certain of his direction, he waited for daylight, and brought the wounded man in the same morning at 10 a.m. This party had three rows of wire to negotiate, the second and third rows consisting of heavy knife rests, etc., and, the grass being very long, gaps were not easy to find.

"_Casualties._--Two killed; Lieutenant Parker and six other ranks wounded; one missing believed killed.

"_Action of the Enemy._--There is no doubt the enemy had no idea he was going to be raided. His action was extremely weak and slow in beginning.

"It is very doubtful if he inflicted any casualties on us.

"His barrage did not start until about zero plus 10 minutes, and then increased in intensity by degrees. His fire was directed chiefly on our front line (the shells falling just short of and just over our trench) and partly on our support line and subsidiary lines.

"The enemy's resistance in his trenches was very weak. Several men were seen running away.

"_Summing up._--The raid, unfortunately, failed in its chief objects, for no prisoners or identifications were obtained, though there is little doubt that four, and probably several more, Germans were killed or wounded. Had the left party succeeded in entering the enemy's trench, there is every probability that more damage would have been done, and identifications, if not prisoners, obtained.

"The support of the artillery was excellent, the wire had been well cut, and the barrage started precisely at the time arranged.

"The medium and light trench mortar batteries were also most effective, and completely stopped all enemy machine-gun fire.

"The machine-gun barrages were all that could be desired.

"The reconnaissance had been well done. Enemy posts were found where they had been expected. Suspected machine-gun emplacements were adequately dealt with either by artillery beforehand or by my trench mortars during operations.

"Signal communication worked well. Three special lines had been laid to Raid Headquarters. The raiding party established telephone communication from near the enemy's trench with commendable speed.

(Sgd.) "W. A. L. FLETCHER, _Lieutenant-Colonel_,
"_Comdg. 2/6th (Rifle) Bn. Liverpool Regiment_.

"_June 24th, 1917._"

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At 9.15 a.m. two men missing from the raid suddenly appeared in our line, one of them wounded. This showed how easy it was to get into our trenches unobserved. Artillery was very active against us all that day. In the course of two hours and a half Hobbs Farm and the detached post received over 120 rounds from a 4·2 battery, while at times it seemed as if our wire in that vicinity was the real target. Spain Avenue, the Orchard, Panama, Pretoria, were all singled out in turn; but probably this was merely a cloak for the German activities on the left.

The following night the Brigade north of the Lys carried out a raid, and the enemy seemed very uneasy opposite our left company front, sending up innumerable Véry lights, letting off bursts of rifle fire, and industriously bombing his own wire.

The early morning of June 23rd found the German 'planes extremely active. There was a flight of scarlet machines, which performed various evolutions for our benefit, and at intervals swooped down and fired into our trenches. Rifle grenades were fired at one very low-flying 'plane, and at another a light trench mortar shell with a shortened fuse and a full charge. The latter must certainly have surprised the pilot when it exploded in the air.

Every part of the left sector, front line, support, subsidiary, and communication trenches was heavily shelled for long periods throughout the day, while a regular box barrage was put round the detached post. Even the new drain between Irish and Cambridge was regularly bombarded. The wire in front of our trenches, never very good, was now reduced to a mass of shattered fragments, and the impression that a raid must be expected in the near future grew apace. Down to the day of the relief this extreme activity continued, and it was difficult to keep Edmeads, Wessex, and Cambridge clear of blocks. Irish was still being heavily hammered, but, except for occasional repairs to keep up appearances, we had long since ceased to use Irish as an avenue. 2nd-Lieutenants E. E. Paul and J. N. Blake were slightly wounded in Fry Pan. On the evening of June 26th the relief took place. We were fully expecting the raid, and precautions were taken accordingly to prevent any sort of congestion in communication trenches, all of which had now been accurately registered. However, it turned out a wet night and as black as pitch, and the relief was completed viâ Buterne Avenue at 12.37 a.m. without molestation. "B" Company remained in the subsidiary line.

We found Armentières, as indeed we had expected, hardly less noisy than the trenches. The Rue de Lille had become more of a storm centre than previously, and the Quartermaster's staff were frequently compelled to make a hasty descent to the cellar. The battalion mess, which had been held in a magnificent house opposite, its ceilings decorated with fat cherubs flying in a bright blue sky, was abandoned, as it seemed too risky to have all the officers congregated together in such a shelled area. The usual working and wiring parties, made none the pleasanter by the double journey up the Houplines road, and the same efforts to carry out training under difficulties were resumed. On the 29th "D" Company replaced "B" in the subsidiary line.

RUE DE LILLE, ARMENTIÈRES.]

June had seen an increase in our monthly total of casualties. Four officers, of whom one was the Padre (at duty), had been wounded; fourteen men had been killed and sixty-three wounded. In addition, 2nd-Lieutenants Dugdale and Rule were at the Base marked "T.B." (_i.e._, Temporary Base). Captain Gilling, who had for several months been attached to the R.E., had now been invalided to England. Our "effective strength" was reduced from 33 Officers and 744 other ranks to 28 officers and 656 other ranks; and from the latter numbers had to be deducted Lieutenant Parkinson and a number of men with the Brigade Pioneer Company, Lieutenant Huntley at Brigade, and several parties of men otherwise employed, but whom we were not permitted to strike off our effective strength. Our total strength in France on June 30th was 36 officers and 800 other ranks, a disparity in totals which is eloquent of the number of "employed" on extra-regimental duties or on courses. Leave had not yet begun seriously to affect our numbers.

July 3rd found us back in the trenches in order "A," "D," "C" and "B" from the right. Relief was complete at 2.25 a.m. on July 12th. We found that the enemy was systematically destroying the left company sector, especially the communication trenches and the support line. The latter, standing as it did on the forward slope of a ridge, presented a splendid target, and it was impossible to keep pace with the damage being done. The constant bombardment of communication trenches threatened to isolate the left company altogether, and work was accordingly commenced on a new cut from Cambridge Avenue to the front line, called "Peter's Cat." The Heavy Artillery were also persuaded to do some serious shooting on the enemy main communication trenches, Celia Row and Celt Drive; but though this may have annoyed him, it did not damp his enthusiasm in the least.

At 1.30 a.m. on July 11th the gas cylinders were opened and the projectors discharged simultaneously. The noise of the latter was tremendous, just like a mine explosion, while a huge black cloud of great density drifted away from the scene of discharge. Unfortunately, these projectors had been so long in the ground that a large number fell in No Man's Land; two fell almost on the top of a post in "A" Company's front line, while one landed practically on the top of "A" Company's Headquarters. In spite of precautions, a number of gas casualties occurred, and the usual kind of correspondence followed between ourselves and the Higher Command. Only a case of "trench foot" could exceed a gas casualty in the excitement it caused.

The patrols which had again been ordered to follow the discharge were once more countermanded. It was most unlikely that they would have achieved anything but casualties, though it would have been interesting to know something of the results. Certainly an inspection of the enemy line after the Armistice revealed frequent remains of projectors. These, and detonated but unexploded medium trench mortar bombs, were to be found everywhere. The same day the enemy vented his wrath on us in no small measure, so we hoped we had done him some harm.

To give an idea of what patrolling was like in this sector, the following account may be quoted as an example. The narrative was written by a member of the patrol who took part in it:--"The patrol, which left our trenches shortly after midnight, was composed of Riflemen Bolshaw, Matchett, and Corkill, with the section sleuth, Rifleman Dixon, in charge. The front line to the left of the head of Irish Avenue was only held to within about two hundred yards of the River Lys, the remainder of the trench from that point up to the river being rendered untenable by the marshy condition of the ground and the enemy command. Judging the Boche lines opposite to be similarly governed, it was obvious that this deserted area formed an excellent approach to Frelinghien. About this time a Boche withdrawal was expected opposite. The object of our patrol was to advance as far, and learn as much, as possible. The music encountered _en route_ for the front line speedily dispelled any idea as to a Boche retirement. A relief was in progress at the time, and Fritz must have spotted it, for we ran into a veritable nightmare inferno. Rifle and machine-gun bullets whined and snipped, 'pineapples' cracked, shells crashed, and 'minnies' crumped! Added attractions were a dense fog and the choking fumes of the explosions. Through it all the fitful glare of the Véry lights grew and waned, and the _tout ensemble_ created in me a stronger desire to enter No Man's Land than I had ever experienced before. There, at any rate, we would miss some of the 'hate' floating around. With due caution we made our way along the deserted trenches to the bank of the Lys. We then struck out sharply to the right some distance and lay down to listen. Barely distinguishable amid the din, we could hear a knocking, rattling, and clanking to our immediate front. A surmise that a Boche wiring party was at work was confirmed a few minutes later by the location of its covering party at no great distance from us. Our batteries about then commenced to retaliate for the "strafe," and a breeze, till then absent, commenced to carry the fumes from the Boche shells back home. Fritz's nerves were evidently not at their best that night, for almost immediately the musical tinkle of his gas alarms rippled south down the sector, incidentally causing us no little amusement. Having discovered that, far from being absent from Frelinghien, the Boche was busy improving his position there, and further progress on our part being impossible, we emptied our rifles into the darkness in the direction of the wiring party and withdrew."

During this tour Captain Charles Wilson left us for the three months' Senior Officers' Course at Aldershot. There were not a few who imagined the war would be over before his return. Lieutenant Burton took over command of "D" Company.

On July 11th the battalion was relieved, and proceeded once more (less "B" Company) to Armentières. One company was now required nightly to press on with the new Peter's Cat Trench; and as this meant a long journey and a night in the trenches, it may be doubted whether the men welcomed the change from the line to the billets. If anything, the Germans were still more active with their artillery, and movement within the town was limited to what was absolutely necessary. The one pleasure of mounted officers was a gallop along the banks of the Lys from Armentières to Bac St. Maur. If you were energetic you could follow the towpath as far as Estaires. Between Armentières and Bac St. Maur there were some fine shell-holes, and the farm at the wooden bridge by the Jute Factory had been gutted. Bac St. Maur bridgehead was not infrequently shelled, and our old Battalion Headquarters was found to have received a direct hit. Shrapnel used to be put over the Bac St. Maur road even beyond Erquinghem, and the latter place itself used to be shelled intermittently. For the battalion as a whole there was little recreation, except that afforded by the estaminets and an occasional concert.

The morning after relief (July 12, 1917) a 12-inch shell landed in the Rue Gambetta next to the school where "C" Company were billeted; and before there was time to do anything another one, most unluckily, crashed right in and down as far as the cellar, where it exploded with a terrific detonation. It was followed by a third, which fortunately missed the building, but produced a crater which filled the whole width of the street. The shell which entered "C" Company's billet unfortunately killed five men and wounded six. It was a pleasant greeting for Lieutenant Penrice and a draft of thirty men who had arrived the previous evening. "C" and "D" Companies were now moved more to the back of the town to a less exposed position. This move had been under consideration for some time, as the vicinity of the Rue de Lille was far from ideal. It was also decided to bring "A" Company from the Rue Jesuit into a more "salubrious" neighbourhood. Brigade Headquarters had already moved to the Rue Sadi Carnot by order of the Corps Commander, who visited them one day during a period of enemy activity; and certainly their former situation was far from pleasant--a feature, however, in which it resembled most other parts of the town.

The Quartermaster, going down to make some arrangements, was unfortunately badly wounded by a 5·9 which burst just in front of the entrance to "A" Company's billet. His left thigh was damaged, and two pieces of shell entered his stomach, one lodging in the muscles of the back near his spine. He was hurriedly taken to the regimental aid post, where Captain McHugh did his best for him, and thence to the Advanced Surgical Centre, Estaires. No one thought he could possibly live, but, with his usual determination, he won through; and though his health was badly impaired,[1] he became in due course an S.O.3 in the Air Force after the Army had finally thrown him out. For his services with the battalion he was Mentioned in Dispatches. His place was taken by Regimental Quartermaster-Sergeant Wallas, for whom we tried in vain to obtain a Quartermaster's commission.

[1] He died in June 1920, to the great regret of all who knew him.

At 11 p.m. on July 14th the sound of a heavy barrage disturbed us, and shortly after one company was ordered to stand-to. We thought the German raid had come off, but except for the heavy barrage nothing further happened. The next night "C" Company relieved "B" Company in the subsidiary line, and were probably not sorry to leave the "peace" of reserve billets for a while. The post of extra company in the subsidiary line was undoubtedly very popular. The area they occupied was seldom shelled, and work could only be done by them at night and in the vicinity of their posts. In the early hours of the morning, just as "B" Company had got clear of the line, the barrage fell once more, and after rolling the length of the front line from right to left formed a box barrage on the left company front. It was a really heavy barrage, and two working parties from our "A" Company, who were just stopping work in Peter's Cat and had begun to arrive in Cambridge Avenue, suddenly found themselves in the centre of a tornado of exploding high explosives. 2nd-Lieutenant McWilliam, who was in command of one of the parties, was, however, equal to the occasion, and with great gallantry got the parties under cover, and then proceeded to reinforce the front line. A number of Germans were seen coming across towards Cambridge Avenue, and were called on to surrender. This they seemed quite prepared to do, but an N.C.O. suddenly appeared, and they all fled back together. One prisoner, however, was captured by Rifleman Mills.

The 2/7th were not sorry to see the arrival of our men in the front line. They had suffered heavy casualties, and their position had become none too pleasant, as the Germans had come round the left flank and they were being bombed from behind as well as in front. Colonel Slater and Captain Drakeford, his Adjutant, were in the left post of all when the raid commenced, and had a pretty lively experience. Our men and the men in the posts got in some useful shooting at the enemy as he fled back to Frelinghien by the river road, and a dozen dead Germans were found, in addition to the live prisoner. It proved on the examination of the latter to have been a big raid; and had the enemy shown a little more enterprise, they might have made the position of that left company extremely dangerous. There is no doubt that the accidental presence of our working party, with McWilliam to make full use of it, proved of great service to the 2/7th K.L.R. In connection with the operations Rifleman Mills and Rifleman J. Bailey were awarded the M.M.

The Light Trench Mortar Battery suffered severely, their S.O.S. positions having apparently been well registered by the enemy, with the result that in more than one case the team was buried, together with their gun. "C" Company dug them out, and spent over six hours cleaning up this part of the line, so great was the damage done.

During this period in billets our new Divisional Commander, Major-General R. W. R. Barnes, C.B., D.S.O., called at Headquarters, and was introduced to the Commanding Officer and others present.