Chapter XV: Appendix: II (1)

THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIGNAL COMPANY (R.E.)

INCEPTION AND ORGANIZATION—AUGUST-OCTOBER 1915.

At the beginning of the war the service of communications in the Imperial Army was organized as the Signals Branch of the Corps of Royal Engineers. This provided and maintained all communications, comprising Telegraphs, Telephones, Visual Signalling, and Despatch Riders (Horse, Motor-Cycle, and Cycle). A Signal Service Company, suitably equipped and organized for its multifarious duties, was provided in war establishments as a part of the headquarters of each of the higher formations—Division, Corps, and Army. The development of scientific trench warfare on the Western Front vastly increased both the importance and the complexity of the communications of the contending armies; and when, towards the close of the campaign in German South-West Africa, the composition of the Union Oversea Contingent was decided, the offer of a Divisional Signal Company was willingly accepted by the Imperial authorities.

The raising of this Company was entrusted to Major N. Harrison, Engineer-in-Chief of the Union Post Office, who had acted as Director of Signals to the Union Forces during the Rebellion and the German South-West African Campaign. For the acceptance of his recruits Major Harrison set such a high standard of specialized knowledge, character, intelligence, and military experience, that the assembling of the two hundred and thirty men of the original Company occupied the whole of August and September 1915. Eventually a magnificent body of picked men were assembled in Potchefstroom Camp fully representative of all South Africa, from the Zambesi to Cape Town. In view of the technical nature of the new unit’s duties, it was natural that a high proportion of the recruits should come from the Transvaal, and particularly the Witwatersrand. The relative figures were—

Recruited in Transvaal 53.7 per cent.
(Of these, 64 per cent. from Johannesburg.)
Cape 25 ”
Natal 12.7 ”
Orange Free State 6.6 ”
Rhodesia, etc. 2 ”

The standard of physique was very high, and fully correspondent to the maturity shown by an average age of 28.4 years. The backbone of the Company consisted of skilled telegraphists and linemen from the Union Post Office, the majority of whom had served in German South-West Africa, and in previous wars. The drivers, whose excellent horsemanship impressed every one at the training centre in England, were recruited mainly from the farming population, and included many young Dutchmen.

By the beginning of October all the officers, who had been selected from officials of the engineering branch of the post office and electrical engineers of the Witwatersrand, had joined, and on the 17th October the unit, in company with the S.A.M.C. and details of the South African Brigade and S.A.H.A., sailed for England on the _Kenilworth Castle_, with a strength of six officers—Major N. Harrison commanding—Lieutenants J. A. Dingwall, R. H. Covernton, J. Jack, F. H. Michell, F. M. Ross—and 229 other ranks. The Company arrived at Bordon Camp, Hants, on 4th November.

REORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF THE COMPANY IN ENGLAND—NOVEMBER 1915-APRIL 1916.

Owing to the demands of the German East African Campaign, in which the Union Government was now engaged, there was no prospect of infantry units for the Western Front beyond the one brigade already in England. As the South African Brigade would, therefore, constitute only one-third of the infantry of some Imperial division, the Company could not serve with the Infantry Brigade in the capacity of a divisional signal company, as originally contemplated. On the other hand, new army corps were in course of formation, and corps signal companies had to be raised and trained for them. A corps signal company requires a high proportion of skilled technicians in the ranks, and as, owing to the commanding officer’s care in selecting his recruits, the company possessed such a proportion, the War Office decided that it should be reorganized in order to form a Corps Signal Company, and proceed to the Signal Service Training Centre in Bedford for the necessary specialized training. The Company accordingly entrained for Hitchin on the 23rd November, and during the next few days was reorganized.

A Corps Signal Company exists primarily to provide communication between the headquarters of an army corps and the infantry divisions with their associated divisional field artilleries which constitute a corps. For this purpose it staffs and equips a Corps Headquarters Signal Office, including telephone exchange, telegraph and despatch rider offices; constructs such telegraph and telephone lines to divisions as may be necessary or possible; provides operators at the divisional ends of the lines, and runs and maintains local telephone lines to the different sections of the corps staff, and to the different units of the corps troops. The corps troops—which are those units directly commanded by corps headquarters—though negligible at the beginning of the war, increased enormously with the development of the Heavy Artillery, the Flying Corps, and the rest of the complicated technique of modern position warfare, until finally their communications dwarfed all others. In addition, the Corps Signal Company acts as a repair workshop, and issue store for the signal material and apparatus required by all units and formations within the corps; assists with and correlates their signal arrangements, and provides electric lighting for corps headquarters.

To provide for the night and day working and the manning of an advanced headquarters, the Headquarter Section was organized in three reliefs, each under a sergeant superintendent. To increase the number of lines which can be simultaneously run out during a general move, both Air Line and Cable Sections were divided into two detachments, each under a sergeant or corporal. Each air line detachment carried material for five miles of poled line on its lorries, and, after training, became capable of erecting this line at the rate of a mile an hour. Each cable detachment carried nine miles of cable, and learned to lay this out at the gallop when necessary, or at a normal rate of three miles an hour along roads where precautions for the preservation of the line had to be taken.

On January 17, 1916, all sections were concentrated in order to continue their training as a company, and billeted in the small villages of Clifton, Shefford, and Broome, a few miles from Haynes Park. The following months were spent in continuous unit training, interspersed with periods of combined training, known as “Signal Schemes.” In these “schemes” numbers of signal units awaiting their turn for oversea were organized as armies—imaginary in all except their communications—and flung a moving network of lines across the Eastern Counties. It was an extremely valuable and realistic training for mobile warfare. The drawing of the Company’s mobilization equipment and the completion of the motor transport, with the A.S.C. _personnel_ to operate it, followed the news of Verdun, and the day of embarkation for France was eagerly awaited. The men grew restive at the idea that the Infantry Brigade had already been in action in Egypt while they were still training in England.

Towards the end of March Major Harrison went to France in order to acquire the atmosphere of the trenches. During his absence the great blizzard of 1916 destroyed much of the post office and railway telegraph systems in the Midlands. All experienced men in the Company were turned out to assist in repairs, and the order to move to Southampton for France arrived when 51 Air Line and portions of all cable sections were scattered on this work up to a radius of forty miles from headquarters. Nevertheless the Company was assembled in a few hours, and was ready to move off at noon next day, with its mass of stores packed complete in all respects. The headquarters and 51 Air Line moving by road in their lorries, and the cable sections by train from Hitchin, reassembled at Southampton on the 10th April, and, sailing in the S.S. _Investigator_ with one of the S.A.H.A. batteries, landed at Havre on the 21st.

IN FRANCE: THE FRICOURT SECTOR—APRIL 1916.

After a day at Havre the move was continued—motor transport sections by road and cable sections by train—to Vignacourt. At this village in the Somme Valley, between Abbeville and Amiens, the headquarters of the newly constituted XV. Corps was concentrating under Lieutenant-General Horne, and Major Harrison, on the 23rd April, was appointed Assistant Director of Army Signals—_i.e._ Staff Officer for Signals to the Corps Commander. The Company now became the XV. Corps Signal Company, and served continuously with that Corps throughout the remainder of the war. A few days later the Corps moved into line between the III. and XIII. Corps, becoming a part of the Fourth Army under General Sir H. Rawlinson, and took over the sector fronting Fricourt and Mametz, between Bécourt and Carnoy. On the 30th April the Company took over from the XIII. Corps Signal Company at Heilly, a village on the Ancre, near Corbie. B.F. and B.G. sections were sent to join the headquarters of the two divisions in line—the 7th and 21st respectively—and B.F. section proceeded to Ville-sur-Ancre, where Brigadier-General Napier, commanding the Corps Heavy Artillery, had his headquarters, and took charge of the Heavy Artillery’s communications on the 27th April.

The experience of previous battles had shown that, next to an adequate artillery, the primary technical condition for a successful offensive was good and reliable communication between the assaulting infantry, the directing staffs, and the supporting artillery. Overground wires, no matter how multiplied, failed immediately under the counter-barrage. Visual signalling, slow at the best, was generally ineffective because of the smoke and dust of the barrage, the exposure of the _personnel_, and the unsuitability of the terrain, so faith was now pinned on cables laid in deep trenches for thousands of yards in rear of the front line, carrier pigeons, and runners. As soon as the area could be thoroughly surveyed, a programme of work was drawn up covering:—

(_a_) Reconstruction of and additions to the inadequate open
wire routes in the back area, from Corps headquarters up
to behind Méaulte, Morlancourt, and the Bois des Tailles,
sufficient to cope with the number of units and formations
to be thrown in for the battle, and suitably designed and
located for rapid extension along the probable roads of
the anticipated advance.

(_b_) A complete network of cable trenches extending from the
heads of the open wire routes to the front line, providing
telephone communication down to company and battery command
posts and artillery observation posts.

In the early part of 1916 the deficiencies of technical equipment, in the supply of materials and of labour, were still great. The Signal Sections were then equipped for mobile warfare only, and found themselves carrying out heavy semi-permanent work with scarcely any of the usual tools and appliances. The work of the Ministry of Munitions had not yet produced its full fruits in supply, and though the Deputy-Director of Army Signals—Colonel R. G. Earle—did everything possible to meet the Company’s requirements, signal material—particularly cable—was scanty, and deliveries of a hand-to-mouth order. The Labour Corps was then a thing of the future, and, therefore, the whole of the massive works required for the offensive—roads, railways, dumps, dug-outs, etc.—had to be performed by the infantry in their turns out of the line. In such circumstances there was never enough labour to go round, and it required all the commanding officer’s tact and persuasiveness to secure the minimum of digging labour required for the cable trenches; all other unskilled work had to be thrown on the skilled sappers of the Company, and to free the outdoor men for construction, the telegraphists, after a long day at their instruments, had often to spend half the night loading and off-loading in the forward area masses of cable, poles, and line material.

Labour for the Heavy Artillery cable trenches was not secured till June, when two battalions from each division were placed under the direction of Lieutenant Ross for this work. Digging the trenches and laying cable were then pressed forward continuously night and day. Much of the work was only possible at night, as the ground was under direct observation, and the few skilled sappers available, after working most of the night with infantry digging parties, had to be turned out again at dawn, day after day, to take charge of scratch cable-laying parties made up from the signallers of batteries. The Heavy Artillery allotment for the XV. Corps in the coming battle was twenty-three batteries, organized in five groups, and an independent railway battery. The tactical conditions made the communication problem one of peculiar difficulty, because they enforced the siting of the batteries in two main clusters—one in the valley of the Ancre and the other in Happy Valley—both on the extreme flanks of the Corps’ frontage. Further, owing to the enemy’s tenure of the Fricourt salient, many batteries, to carry out their work, had to establish communication with observation posts sited on the opposite flank of the Corps area to the position of the batteries, and the most favourable O.P. positions lay far outside the Corps boundaries. The fact that many of the batteries only took position and settled on their O.P.’s in the last few days was an additional complication.

When these difficulties had been more or less successfully disposed of and laying commenced, a minor but vital detail in the material threatened disaster. The cable coming forward proved to be mainly single D 5—_i.e._ the standard army cable as supplied for overground use in mobile warfare, when few lines are laid and there is no objection to the earth constituting the return circuit. The results already known to have been obtained by the enemy in picking up our messages through earth by means of sensitive listening telephone apparatus, had already caused the issue of stringent orders that all lines within 1,600 yards—later increased to 3,000 yards—of the front line must be metallic circuits—_i.e._ each line had to consist of a pair of insulated wires. Also, owing to inductive effects when a number of pairs of wires are laid closely parallel to each other, as in a trench, a conversation over one pair will be heard in the other circuits unless each pair is twisted. The use of the single cable, therefore, not only doubled the work of laying (as each line necessitated two separate wires), but the untwisted pairs so formed would render the lines noisy and possibly entirely unworkable. Utilizing the frame of a cable wagon trail, and one of its wheels as a foundation, a machine was rapidly improvised by the section on which the drums of single cable were mounted as received, spun into twisted cable, and simultaneously reeled off on other drums for the laying parties. This apparatus was kept going and running at high pressure by the section wheeler, Sapper Page, with a few Artillery Headquarters’ grooms and batmen as his only available assistants.

By such strenuous efforts the programme was completed, and when the preparatory bombardment opened, 500 miles of cable had been laid and joined up in over twenty miles of cable trench, and every battery had excellent and reliable communication forward to its observation posts and back to its group commander. Two dug-outs had been constructed on each flank, into which all O.P. lines were led and terminated on special switchboards, designed and made up at the Company Headquarters.

Through these O.P. exchanges any battery could be connected to any O.P. for control of fire, which proved most valuable in the changing circumstances of the fighting. At that date the establishment of neither groups nor batteries included switchboards for metallic circuit lines. The necessary number—over thirty—were improvised in a few days at the Company workshops out of electric light fittings purchased in Amiens.

Meanwhile the other sections working at similar high pressure had completed the main communications from Corps Headquarters to the Battle Headquarters of the divisions, the 7th in dug-outs near Groveton, and the 21st in dug-outs on the edge of the plateau above Méaulte, and B.F. section had established and staffed a Corps Advanced Exchange at Morlancourt. The Carrier Pigeon Service had been organized and arrangements made for the systematic distribution of pigeons to the assaulting brigades from the main lofts in Heilly, Albert, and Méaulte, and the most rapid circulation from the pigeon lofts to all staffs concerned of information contained in messages brought by the birds returning from the front line.

A wireless detachment was supplied from Fourth Army Signals, and the _personnel_ completed by skilled operators selected from the Company. The Headquarters Station was fixed on the high ground near the Bray-Albert road on the cable trench between the two O.P. exchanges, and provided with direct communication to Corps through the underground system, and mobile stations were attached to the Signals of the attacking divisions. The Corps Staff Observation Posts in Péronne Avenue trench and the Grand Stand above Bonte Redoubt were connected by direct lines to the General Staff at Headquarters in Heilly, about ten miles off, and the special linemen provided to look after these lines kept them through without interruption during the attack.

THE SOMME BATTLE—JULY-NOVEMBER 1916.

In the early morning of the 1st July, after a continuous bombardment from the 25th June, the XV. Corps attacked with the 7th Division on the right, the 21st on the left, and the 17th in support. Hopes of a decisive victory ran high, and all signal arrangements for a rapid advance were in readiness, including the lines necessary to divert communications to Vivier Mill, outside Méaulte, which was to be the first bound of the Corps Headquarters, while the cable sections stood by with wagons packed during the morning. In spite of the gallantry of the infantry assault—which several of the Company were privileged to witness from the advanced trenches—by the evening it was clear that no great depth would be attained.

The village of Fricourt was still holding out, and had repulsed a frontal attack with heavy loss, while the converging attacks of the 7th and 21st Divisions on the flanks of the salient, which were to have pinched it out, had carried Mametz, but just failed to link up behind Fricourt. The III. Corps on our left had taken La Boisselle and entered Ovillers, but had been driven out again; Montauban had fallen to the XIII. Corps on the right, but heavy fighting continued. Fricourt was bombarded all night by heavy howitzers, and deluged with a new gas shell by a brigade of French 75’s, which, together with an additional brigade of heavies, had been attached to the Corps Heavy Artillery shortly before the battle. When the infantry advanced next morning the village was found evacuated, and a party from B.E. section were able to make a preliminary reconnaissance for pushing forward the artillery routes. Our tenure of the high ground between Mametz and Montauban was now sufficiently secured, and the roads Méaulte-Fricourt and Carnoy-Mametz repaired to such an extent as to permit the advance of the heavy batteries to positions about our old front line. The artillery moves having thus begun, B.E. section thenceforward found itself taxed to the limit to keep pace with them. There were now seven groups to keep in touch, including the two attached French groups.

It was evident from the map that while the fighting for Mametz Wood continued, the new centre of observation would be about Pommiers Redoubt—the highest point of the Mametz-Montauban ridge—and after a hasty reconnaissance which located our advanced line down the forward slope about Caterpillar Wood, it was decided to lay a few pairs of armoured cable up the old German trenches from the new battery positions about Carnoy and Fricourt. The only armoured cable to be obtained was a portion of that already laid in the trench between the two O.P. exchanges. A few signallers having been collected from the batteries, this heavy armoured cable was recovered from the trench, conveyed forward by wagon, and again laid out up to Pommiers Redoubt. In doing this work the effect of the appalling road and traffic conditions which clogged all effort throughout the Somme was first clearly appreciated. The XV. Corps was unfortunately placed, in that no main road ran forward through its front. From beginning to end of the battle, the only traffic artery was the narrow country by-road from Méaulte to Fricourt, and thence by Mametz to Montauban.

Such transport conditions bore more hardly on signals than any other service. With activities spread over the whole area, a very limited _personnel_ and transport, and ever-changing conditions, which often stultified by nightfall all the laborious effort of the day, the difficulty of getting parties to a given spot at a given time, co-ordinating the supply of materials and labour, controlling the working parties and switching them to meet emergencies as they arose, was a splendid schooling in patience, temper, and too often in resignation to fate. This remained the paramount factor in the Company’s experience throughout the Somme. As an example, a cable wagon of B.E. section took its place in a melancholy queue at 7 a.m., and arrived at its working point near Montauban at 2 p.m., to lay a short line required urgently at noon, and involving about half an hour’s work. The party returned via Carnoy in accordance with the traffic circuit, and encountering similar conditions, reached headquarters near Méaulte at 10 p.m., with horses and men exhausted. Under the same difficulties, 51 Air Line Section was engaged in following up the advance with a light open wire route up to Fricourt, and B.G. and B.F. Sections were worked with the 21st Division Signals and the Corps Observers respectively.

The commencement of active operations brought the work of the operators and the despatch riders at headquarters and with the heavy artillery to a point of extreme pressure, which was maintained with little variation throughout the following months. Up to two thousand telegrams, and a larger number still of D.R.L.S. packets, were received or despatched daily. The telephone exchanges at Corps and Heavy Artillery Headquarters, with over sixty and thirty connections respectively, worked hard day and night, handling urgent priority calls; but so keen and expert were the operators that a service was maintained equal, if not superior, to the highest civilian standard. The destruction of lines by hostile shelling and traffic was met by the skilful use of alternative routes and by the quickness and energy of the maintenance linemen. However, the incessant strain to which the operators were subjected soon began to affect their nerves, and before the Company was withdrawn men resting off duty could be heard answering imaginary calls in their sleep.

On the 10th July B.G. Section, under the command of Lieutenant Covernton, did a notably fine performance in laying and maintaining lines through the intense barrages surrounding Mametz Wood. One of the first Valve Amplifying Listening Sets supplied to the British forces for use in intercepting enemy messages, by picking up weak leakage or induced currents through earth or along parallel conductors, had been issued to the Company for trial. As a large number of enemy cables ran through Mametz Wood, and some extended to enemy territory behind it, favourable results seemed probable. Lieutenant Collins took up the set, and tracing the cables into No Man’s Land, tapped in there. Though, owing to the excellent discipline of the enemy in obeying the limitations prescribed for use of wire communication in the front line, no tactical messages were obtained, this officer afterwards obtained recognition of his courageous and enterprising efforts.

On the 14th July another general assault secured the line along the ridge between Bazentin-le-Petit and Longueval. Accordingly, heavy batteries were moved up as far as Caterpillar Wood in the valley in front of Montauban, and on the 15th a party of B.E. section reconnoitred for lines to Bazentin-le-Petit, in which village it was proposed to establish H.A. Headquarters. The German reaction had, however, already begun, and the party found the conditions in the village highly unsuited for a headquarters, so much so that a warm infantry combat was proceeding in the outskirts. High Wood had to be evacuated as too advanced to hold, and the memorable struggle of the South African Infantry Brigade for Delville Wood had begun. Nevertheless, over a mile of ground had been gained, and the corresponding extension of communications necessarily taxed all sections to their limit. The advanced headquarters of divisions moved up to the famous dug-outs in the chalk under the ruins of Fricourt Château, in which, thirty feet underground, with the amenities of electric light, panelled walls, and artificial ventilation, the German Staff had dwelt during the bombardment of the village. A twenty-four wire heavy route was rapidly constructed by the 4th Army Signals from Méaulte to this point, and thence to Mametz, in readiness for the advance, and the wire light route built by the Company was extended by the Air Line Section past Fricourt, up Death Valley, to Mametz Wood. The next deep advance was not, however, to occur till two months later, as the corps front was now becoming a salient, and it was necessary to clear the flanks and broaden the base of the attack. Therefore, while the Anzac Corps and III. Corps on the left, and the XIII. Corps succeeded by the XIV. Corps on the right, hammered away round Pozières and Ginchy respectively, the XV. Corps was engaged in continuous auxiliary attacks, and its heavy artillery co-operated largely with the operations of the flanking corps.

This situation did not bring any relaxation to the Signal Company. The German artillery, whose work behind the front line had been feeble immediately after the 1st July, had now been heavily reinforced, and the salient position of the Corps inevitably drew much enfilade fire. One of the effects was the continuous destruction of lines back to points thousands of yards from the front. In moving up after the 14th July, all units had finally passed beyond the buried cables laid down for the battle. Forward lines were now entirely overground, and if not blown up by direct hits, were cut by the smallest splinters.

As the month of July wore on the demand for additional forward communication and the strength of the hostile fire increased. It was obvious that no satisfactory communication could be secured beyond Fricourt except by burying, and Major Harrison finally succeeded in securing a small labour party from the Corps Cyclist Battalion for this purpose. It was decided to commence by burying sixteen pairs of armoured cable from the head of the open route at Mametz to Pommiers Redoubt dug-outs, where there were now Brigade Headquarters and Divisional Report Centres. The work was entrusted to B.G. Section and proved difficult, not only because of the maze of old trenches, barbed wire, and shell-holes through which the cable trench had to go, but also because of the frequent shelling of Mametz and along the ridge. On the 28th Lieutenant Covernton, while superintending this work, was badly wounded. Lieutenant Baker took over B.G. Section, completed the trench, and subsequently extended the cables to Caterpillar Trench. At the same time, 51 Air Line Section diverted the open wire route between Fricourt and Mametz, by constructing a substantial pole route skirting both villages, which carried eight pairs of twisted D 5 cables hung in slotted boards. This cable route was not only much less frequently shelled down—a daily occurrence with the open route—but could be quickly repaired, as the cable when cut could be rejointed and worked, even if lying on the ground.

This method of substantial poled cable routes could and would have been used to a greater extent but for the deficiency of material. The consumption of cable by units in line was appalling. Artillery Observation Post Lines, laid overground, were badly cut about by shell fire, and had to be renewed every few days, and sometimes daily. In the case of the heavy batteries, these lines were often of great length, and ran to more than one O.P. For instance, the 34th Siege Battery, sited to the left of Fricourt, had about this period lines out to O.P.’s at Longueval and at the windmill in front of Bazentin-le-Grand, a total line length of over eleven miles.

During the comparative lull towards the end of July the shelling of the Fricourt area became so pronounced that, pending the next general attack, the headquarters of the divisions in line were moved back to Bellevue Farm—between Méaulte and Albert—and the opportunity was at once taken to transfer the Corps Exchange in Fricourt into the dug-outs so vacated. The Armstrong hut had luckily escaped so far, but several shells had pitched within a few yards of it, and the operators deserved great credit for the way they stuck to their duties without the slightest protection through the periodical shellings. A new route was built by 51 Air Line from Bellevue Farm to link up this new position with the main forward route at Vivier Mill, and was calculated on a scale sufficient to meet requirements in the event of the headquarters of the Corps moving to Bellevue Farm when the advance resumed.

Throughout the war, but particularly in this earlier period, the difficulties of Signals did not arise exclusively from the terrain and from enemy action, but to a great extent from careless and thoughtless conduct on the part of the other arms. Much damage to lines was done by cross-country traffic at night, largely unavoidable but much also avoidable, if a better understanding of the importance of communication had existed in the non-technical units. When an infantryman found himself in reserve a few thousand yards behind the front line, and lacking a piece of cord to fix up his bivouac, cut a few yards out of a cable which had been strung across the ground in his vicinity, he did not realize that the line so put out of action might well be the observation line of a heavy battery, that the damage he had done in a few seconds might take an over-worked lineman hours to locate and repair, and that meanwhile the battery would be blinded and his comrades in the front line deprived of its instant and effective support. A typical instance occurred on the night of the 3rd July. The group of French 75’s attached to Corps Heavy Artillery had moved suddenly late in the evening to support operations at Mametz Wood next morning. Communication was established through one of the buried trenches by 10 p.m., but an hour later this and other lines in the trench went full earth. At 3 a.m., after tracing the cable inch by inch through a dark night, and tapping in at intervals as he progressed, the exhausted lineman found that a company in support had decided that the cable trench would make a good temporary cook-house, and, of course, had burnt all the twelve pairs of wires in the trench. To the infinite relief of the H.A. Signal Officer, this proved to be the only damage done, and the wires were set going again before dawn and in time for the operations.

Long before the Somme Battle, the exigencies of trench warfare had altered the original organization of army corps. The corps had ceased to be a unit composed of specific divisions, and divisions were no longer affiliated permanently to one corps, but moved at frequent intervals from quiet sectors to active ones to take part in an offensive, and after a short period of heavy losses and extreme exertion would be again withdrawn to another quiet sector or a training area for rest, recruitment, and refit. Therefore, on a front like the Somme, a continuous stream of divisions passed through the corps, each taking its share of the fighting and being in turn relieved. As the Corps Signal Company, like the brook, “went on for ever,” it had to fit each fresh division into the frame of the existing communications as they chanced to stand at the moment, and assist the divisional signals to pick up and utilize the available lines. The organization had, also, to be elastic enough to meet the requirements of administering anything from two to seven divisions simultaneously. During the Somme, nineteen different divisions passed through the XV. Corps, and as many of them went through the furnace more than once, there were altogether fifty-three divisional changes. What work this involved to the Corps Signal Company in the transferring of lines, the directing of traffic, the continuous alteration of records, and the supply of material can be readily imagined.

The excellence of the work of the B.E. Section with the Heavy Artillery was recognized in a communication addressed to Major Harrison, in which the Corps commander stated that he much appreciated the work done by Lieutenant Ross and his party, and considered that the work of this section was typical of the whole South African Signal Company. When General Horne himself left the Corps at a later date, to take command of the First Army, he had evidently seen no reason to alter his opinion of the Company, for in taking leave of the A.D.A.S. he congratulated him on commanding a unit second to none in France.

The operations continued to be hampered by rain at each of the critical phases, but by the beginning of September the flanking corps had made the necessary progress and everything was in readiness for the great attack of 15th September. The vital importance of secure communication being fully appreciated by the Staff, the necessary labour was made available for a considerable buried scheme. A buried water-pipe laid by the enemy between Longueval and Montauban had been located, and considerable effort was expended by B.F. section in investigating the possibility of using this pipe for running cable through. It was finally decided that its exploitation would not be justified in view of the small depth of the bury, and the extensive damage already done by shell fire. The first section of the new bury consisted of a six-foot-deep cable trench, extending from Pommiers Redoubt _via_ the famous Cosy Corner, where the Carnoy and Mametz roads join outside Montauban, and thence to York Trench on the left of Longueval. This trench had nine framed test points let into the walls every four hundred and forty yards, and contained forty-five pairs of cable. The accumulation of the necessary quantities of cable suitable for the work presented great difficulty, and the trench probably set up a record for the number of different varieties it contained—from nineteen pair V.I.R., as thick and heavy as a hawser and supplied on drums weighing over half a ton each, to one pair G.P. Twin about as stout as a double boot-lace. The actual digging was done by a battalion of the 7th Division, the work being under the charge of Lieutenant Collins, assisted by Lieutenant Baker, with B.G. section and most of the sappers of B.E. and W.W. sections. The mud of the Somme will go down to history: and as the line of the trenches included some excellent samples of it, the distribution along the trench of the heavy cable drums and the pipes for crossing under tracks presented great difficulties. The jointing, terminating, and testing of the wires had to be completed against time, and with a limited number of expert men, as the maintenance of the widespread network for which the Company was responsible had absorbed many of the best men out of all sections. The lines were, however, ready in time for the divisions who had moved Headquarters up again to Fricourt and Pommiers Redoubt, with Advanced Headquarters at York Trench, and also for the Heavy Artillery, most of whose batteries took positions along the Mametz-Montauban ridge and in folds of the forward slope towards Caterpillar Wood and Longueval. To cope with the steady forward drift of the Corps units, and to provide another advance maintenance point, a new Corps Forward Exchange was established in a dug-out at Pommiers, and after the attack B.E. section staffed this exchange and maintained the area.

The attack on 15th September proved highly successful and not too costly in life, a depth of over a mile being made good, including the villages of Courcelette, Martinpuich, and Flers. Communications held well throughout the day, and the good liaison between infantry and artillery so secured played an important part in the result. The recently introduced Power Buzzers for transmitting high-power buzzer signals through earth to be picked up by Valve Amplifying Receivers at distances up to three thousand yards, were used with fair success in the advance. These sets were controlled by the Wireless Section, but the forward stations were manned by signallers of the attacking battalions. The comparative inexperience and lack of special training of these signallers prevented the best being got out of the instruments, but the limited establishment of the Signal Service prevented any other procedure.

The advance rendered a further extension of the cable trench urgent, but for the moment suitable cable for a permanent bury was not available. Another section of trench, however, was dug immediately in order that units might have the benefit of its protection in running temporary field cables forward. This section extended from York Trench through the corner of Delville Wood to Switch Trench, and the digging proved a gruesome task, as Delville Wood and neighbourhood was a huge graveyard. In the sides of the trench were visible more than one pitiful reminder that our heroic comrades of the Infantry Brigade had fought and died there. To prevent confusion and facilitate maintenance, the left-hand side of the new trench was assigned to divisions and the right to the Heavy Artillery, the Headquarters Signals of which prepared and erected along the trench fixtures for cables in the shape of angle iron high-wire entanglement pickets, each having a piece of two-inch by two-inch wood screwed to it with a dozen diagonal slots cut in it for the cable. The cutting and slotting of so many pieces—upwards of one thousand five hundred—was a task beyond hand methods, but was accomplished in three days by obtaining a power-band saw from a factory in Albert, and connecting it up with the water wheel at Vivier Mill by a belt extemporized from the driving bands of the cable wagon winding gears.

During this period occurred a noteworthy performance in rapid repair of cable routes. The main cable trench about midnight received a direct hit from a large shell, severing all communication; but fortunately a party of B.E. section was returning down the trench from forward work, and came on the shell crater soon afterwards. Though already worn out with a long day’s work and struggling through the mud, they at once started to dig up the cable ends, sending a man to summon assistance by tapping in at the next test point in the trench, and succeeded in getting all the forty-five pairs of wires rejointed and working again in _three hours_.

Liaison lines had grown formidably in numbers. Direct lines were now demanded not only between Heavy Artillery Headquarters and the Artillery Headquarters of all divisions in line, but between the divisional artilleries and the majority of the Heavy Artillery Groups. There had been a great development of the service of Observation in the shape of artillery aeroplanes, kite balloons, of which there were now three sections attached to the Corps and Observation Groups of the R.E. Survey battalion. Whenever possible lines were now required from these units, not only to the artillery groups, but to the batteries specially assigned for counter-battery work. To co-ordinate and render fully effective this work of the systematic location and destruction or neutralization of hostile batteries, a special staff, commanded by a colonel, had been added to the H.A. Headquarters, and this staff, in its turn, required additional direct lines and communication facilities to enable it to function promptly and effectively.

The evil luck that, except in the initial push, caused every successful attack to be followed by broken weather, still held good and hampered all preparations for the assault on the next entrenched line; but by herculean efforts the necessary organization for another general attack on the 25th September was completed. Road conditions up to a certain point forward were now beginning to improve under the triple influences of the introduction of Décauville tramways for the conveying of the heavy ammunition in the forward area, the extension of broad-gauge ammunition railheads to Fricourt and Caterpillar Wood, and the removal of water lorries from the roads by the completion of a vast system of pipe lines extending back to the Ancre and the Somme through which the river water was pumped after treatment in chlorinating plants.

On the 25th the intermediate German line, including Morval, Lesbœufs, and Gueudecourt, succumbed, and the Corps front again advanced over a mile. On the 26th the victory was completed by the Fifth Army’s capture of Thiepval, and once again the roseate prospect of a great victory and of reaching Bapaume before winter cheered the tired troops, and kept the Signal Company’s hands full with preparations for forward moves of all headquarters. The weather, however, intervened on the side of the Germans, and breaking decisively on the 26th, remained miserably cold and wet thenceforward, and largely stultified the heroic efforts repeatedly made throughout October.

During this period, the heavy batteries of some of the H.A. Group Headquarters moved up to and in front of Longueval, necessitating the running of many new cable lines. Permanent cable was laid in the second section of the main cable trench up to Longueval, and a third section of trench was dug forwards to the sugar works at Factory Corner in front of Flers. An experimental trench was started near Longueval, with a trench excavator loaned by the French, which was, in effect, a small land dredge mounted on a motor lorry chassis and driven by its engine. This machine could excavate a cable trench eighteen inches wide and up to seven feet deep in ordinary soil with ease, but it was immobile on the terrain of the Somme, and could not be manœuvred except with the assistance of an artillery caterpillar tractor. Consequent on this trial improved machines were ordered from America for next year’s campaign, but the Corps Signal Company did not have the opportunity of using them.

At the end of October the Anzac Corps, under General Birdwood, relieved the XV. Corps commanded by Sir John Ducane since the departure of General Horne. As there was then no other Corps Signal Company in France formed from Colonial troops, it appeared possible that the Company would be retained in line with the Anzacs. It is no disparagement of the spirit of the men to state that every one heaved a sigh of relief when it became known that “K” Corps Signal Company was to take over. In truth, nearly all were bone-weary and temporarily played out, and every section badly needed a spell out of the line to reorganize and refit. There had been no leave granted in the line, and those with ties in England eagerly anticipated its reopening.

In view of the extensive system to be taken over, the relief by “K” Corps Signal Company was conducted gradually, and B.E., the last section to leave the line, did not reach the new headquarters at Long until the middle of November. Long proved to be a tiny old-world village on the left bank of the Somme a few miles upstream from Abbeville. A liberal allotment of leave permits was soon issued, and a batch of men were sent off daily, while the less fortunate ones overhauled, cleaned, and repaired equipment, improved billets and horse standings, and carried out the signal work still required. For Signal Companies in the field there is no such thing as “complete rest,” even in the rest area.

On Major Harrison’s promotion, Captain Dingwall now assumed the executive control of the Company, but scarcely had the sections completed their refit, when orders were suddenly received for the Corps to take over a portion of the French front in the Péronne sector, with the 4th, 8th, 33rd, and 40th Divisions then in rest.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN ON THE SOMME—16TH DECEMBER-17TH MARCH.

The move into line commenced on the 3rd December, and was completed on the 6th. The cable sections, so depleted by the large numbers on leave that they were unable to fill the saddles of the mounted men, moved with the Divisional Signal Companies, and were directed—B.E. and B.G. on Bray, and B.F. on Maricourt.

Headquarters and the air line section joined the Corps Headquarters at Etinehem, a village on the right bank of the Somme, a mile or so west of Bray. In their weakened condition all sections had a most strenuous time taking over communications as released by the French, testing the routes out, reorganizing the lines and connecting up units as they arrived. The Corps front extended from the XIV. Corps boundary on the north at Combles, previously the extreme right of the British line, to near Bouchavesnes, and ran in front of St. Pierre Vaast Wood, where the most desperate French attacks in the autumn had, like our own in the north, been stifled in the mud. The terrain as a whole was of similar nature and condition to that in the Longueval sector, but the roads were better, Décauville tramways existed, and best of all, from a signal point of view, a very fair network of deep cable trenches had been dug in the forward area. Though the cable used in these “buries”—mainly one pair lead covered with impregnated paper insulation—proved unreliable in insulation, and much trouble was caused and many circuits lost thereby, yet the “buries” proved very useful, and, supplemented by the construction system of several new open routes in rear, enabled a communication system to be rapidly completed, sufficient for the needs of the defensive winter campaign. Corps forward exchanges were established with the Heavy Artillery Headquarters in excellent French dug-outs at Bois Louage in front of Maurepas, as at Maricourt, in charge of B.F. section, and with B.G. section at Bray, where the horse lines of all cable sections were shortly concentrated. The sappers of B.E. section remained with H.A. Headquarters under Lieutenant Collins, who replaced Captain Ross as H.A. Signal Officer, while the latter did duty at Headquarters during the successive sick leaves of Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison and Captain Dingwall.

Etinehem proved a most miserable headquarters. The village was much overcrowded, and the billets so wretched that some of them did not even afford an adequate shelter from the weather of the most severe winter known in France for over twenty years. The only redeeming feature of the place was that its situation on the river enabled the many tons of heavy signal stores now in the Company’s possession to be brought up the Somme from Long by barge, so releasing the lorries for urgent construction work. The pressure of duty on the limited numbers of men available, as well as the shortage of material, fuel, and of daylight, made it difficult for some time to improve conditions. Authority for additional blankets and for the issue of waterproof clothing to the linemen was obtained, but the poor conditions, the severity of the weather, and the lowered vitality, due to the lack of a sufficient recuperative period after the summer campaign, resulted in a heavy and increasing sick list, reaching forty daily, and the evacuation of considerable numbers to hospital with pulmonary complaints. This state of affairs, coupled with difficulties experienced in obtaining reinforcements, kept the Company much below normal strength for several months.

During December it was understood that the French contemplated launching an attack against Mont St. Quentin and Péronne, and to this end they retained a frontage on both banks of the Somme. However, early in January 1917 the project was abandoned, and orders were received for the XV. Corps to extend its front to the right, taking over to the river by Cléry, and simultaneously handing over a divisional frontage on the left to the XIV. Corps. The divisional sectors were taken over successively, and the move completed by the 22nd January without interference by the enemy, the Headquarters of divisions in line being established at P.C. Chapeau and P.C. Jean, ex-French divisional command posts judiciously and inconspicuously sited under the high bank running parallel to the Somme bank. H.A. Headquarters with B.E. section moved also to P.C. Chapeau, and the Corps Forward Exchange at Maricourt was transferred with B.F. section to Suzanne. This change of frontage was a nasty jar to the Company, as nearly all the new routes, on which the sections had toiled early and late to complete the communication scheme for the winter, were now outside the Corps area, and the same work had to be started afresh in the bitter frosts of January. The weather, that had been vilely cold and wet from the beginning of December, now turned to snow and hard frost. The latter penetrated the ground to such an extent that by the end of the month all digging became impossible, and work on a buried cable trench between Ouvrages and Oursel, to provide forward communications for the 33rd Division, had to be suspended. The ex-French bury forward of P.C. Jean proved very faulty, and a section of twelve pair open-wire heavy route was put in hand early in February, running forward to Monac, partly to supplement the bury and partly to carry forward the head of the main route in anticipation of the advance next spring. The ground was found to be frozen as hard as concrete to a foot from the surface, and after ineffectual struggles with picks and crowbars, excavations for the pole holes were finally blasted with gun-cotton. As the forward end of this route came under direct observation, the last few hundred yards were run in cables hung on short stakes, each cable from a small bobbin insulator nailed to the side of the stake. This method was copied from the French, who had used it extensively in the area, and proved very satisfactory in this instance.

In the meantime, aeroplane night-bombing and the shelling of back areas by long range guns, initiated in the latter stages of the Somme Battle, had developed to an unpleasant extent. Rarely did a day pass without some main route suffering from one or other of these agencies, and the consequent necessity for diverting the limited working parties from urgent construction to still more urgent repairs. The railheads of Maricourt and Bray were favourite targets, and again and again the unfortunate sappers were turned out of their blankets to stumble along a route in the pitch black night, and then struggle for hours with numbed fingers to evolve order out of a chaos of tangled wire and broken poles.

This hostile aeroplane activity caused a rapid increase of anti-aircraft units. Batteries and searchlights were now dotted over the area, and the installation and maintenance of a separate and complete system of communication for the Anti-Aircraft Defence of the Corps area was now added to the Company’s duties, and the H.A. Signal Officer found himself occupied with communications for the Survey Groups and the installation of lines to their O.P.’s, and to the Microphone positions of the Sound Ranging Section now added to the H.A. Counter Battery organization.

Though the duties of the H.A. Signal Officer were somewhat reduced by the appointment, in January, of a R.E. Signal Officer to each H.A. Group, the commencement by the enemy of systematic counter battery work, in imitation of the British methods initiated in the previous year, made it more than ever difficult to keep the forward lines in continuous operation. A scheme for the forward extension of the buried system, till recently used by the French, was prepared under the greatest transport difficulties, the drums having to be man-handled about half a mile across country by night, and a portion of the material was got up to Marrières Wood, next year the scene of the South African Brigade’s fine stand in the March retreat. But the deep crust of frozen ground prevented digging, and the important local attack of the 8th Division on the 4th March on Fritz Trench above Bouchavesnes had to be carried through without the assistance of the new buried communication, and as most of the above-ground cables were cut, the first news of the assaulting troops was brought by pigeon to the Corps Loft at Etinehem. The attack was fully successful, and the effective use made by the artillery of the excellent observation secured by it, no doubt expedited the general retirement of the enemy in this sector.

A few days later symptoms of this retreat became obvious in the shape of villages burning and large transport movements in the enemy back area. The general withdrawal began on the 15th March, the enemy falling back on the Corps front across the Canal du Nord. As the Fourth Army was not destined to play a part in the spring offensive, it had been heavily depleted both to swell the concentration northwards in preparation for the coming Arras battle, and to take over additional ground from the French, the sector on the XV. Corps right south of the Somme having been occupied by the III. Corps during February. Apart, therefore, from the tremendous transport difficulties due to continuous wet weather succeeding the frost, and the methodical destruction of bridges, roads, and railways, there was not sufficient strength to press the enemy closely, but the advance was conducted methodically, touch with the enemy rearguards on the Corps front being maintained by the Wiltshire Yeomanry and the Corps Cyclist Battalion until a Cavalry Division could come up.