Chapter XVI: Appendix: II (2)

The Signal Company’s share in the work was first to maintain direct touch between the Corps Staff and the advanced troops, for which purpose D.R.’s were attached to the cavalry, but by a special effort of B.E. section direct telephone communication was soon secured and maintained. Secondly, the main communication network had to be extended forward at the same rate as the advance, and, as a counter-attack was very possible, the full organization for position warfare accompanied the Corps. The Signal difficulties were doubled on the 25th March, by the sudden withdrawal from line of the XIV. Corps on the right and the consequent extension of the already wide Corps frontage which then stretched from Péronne to Le Transloy.

The Imperial Signal Sections attached for assistance at intervals during the winter had been withdrawn, and, worst of all, the needs of the fighting fronts northwards entirely shut off for a time the supply of line construction material. Consequently, before a single pole or wire could be erected, it had to be released from service in rear, salvaged, and transported forward by the company’s lorries over extremely bad and congested roads. Much heavy material had again to be relayed forward over tracks impassable to lorries by teams from the cable sections, and finally carried on the sappers’ shoulders over shell-shattered ground impassable even for wagons. Under such handicaps, and in the teeth of continuous blizzards of snow, sleet, and rain, which continued till the end of April, over forty miles of poled route, including much of a heavy permanent nature carrying twenty-four wires, was erected, and two successive moves of the Headquarters of Corps and all subordinate formations accomplished without any loss of communication. The skill, endurance, and ready zeal of the A.S.C. Motor Transport drivers attached to the Company played a great part in the results achieved. They had never failed to meet the severe calls made upon them from time to time during the Somme fighting, but now both the distances and the masses of material to be moved were greater, and the road conditions but little, if any, better.

Early in April the advance reached its limit, and was definitely held up in front of La Vacquerie and Havrincourt—outlying strong points of the Hindenburg Line. On the 17th, Corps Headquarters was established in hutments and tents near Haute-Allaines, after a short interval at P.C. Chapeau. Then the weather at last broke, and with a genial spring sun overhead, a rapidly drying country underfoot, and good news coming through from the Arras front, life under canvas, even in this devastated zone, became pleasant.

Little relaxation of effort was possible however. The Germans on their retreat had accomplished as thorough work in the demolition of signal communications as in their wanton spoliation of civilian property. As every house and every fruit tree was destroyed, so was every pole sawn through when not bodily removed. Scarcely a yard of usable line—cables or open wire—existed in the new area, and the whole of the immense network of communications for stationary warfare had to be reconstituted under continuing supply and transport difficulties, while the hasty work done in the advance had to be overhauled and made permanent.

Scarcely was this task well under way when orders were received to prepare signal plans for an offensive and commence the necessary works as early as possible. The position in regard to materials was alleviated in May by the organization of a temporary Corps Signal Salvage Unit, composed of B.F. section, a platoon of a Labour Company, and the necessary horse and motor Transport under Lieutenant Jack. This made it possible to push forward work on two heavy open-wire routes, running from Corps Headquarters, through Nurlu and Fins, and through Sève Wood, Liéramont, and Heudicourt respectively, with the necessary spur and lateral routes. To economize cable, which remained very short in supply, the subsidiary routes were run as far as possible in light iron wire (60 lb. to the mile), on air line or light hop poles, and considerable use was made of a light type of French cable with all copper conductors salvaged in the back area. This use of low resistance conductors, and the maintaining of good line conditions, made clear speech possible between O.P.’s and H.A. Headquarters, and on special occasions Corps Headquarters, a point of great value in securing rapid and effective counter-battery work. Up to this time all the British field cables, except D 5—too heavy and too scarce for ordinary forward use—had steel conductors, and were, therefore, of high resistance, and good speech could only be obtained on short lines. Plans were also elaborated for a buried cable scheme covering the area between the front line and heads of open wire behind Gouzeaucourt and Gonnelieu respectively. The permanent routes had progressed beyond Fins and Heudicourt, when, towards the end of May, orders arrived for the XV. Corps to hand over to the III. Corps and proceed to Villers-Bretonneux. The cable sections of the Company joined various divisions, and, at the end of May, accompanied them out of the area to unknown destinations.

The remainder of the Company reached Villers-Bretonneux on the 3rd June, and settled down very comfortably in this pleasant little town, destined to be the storm centre of the fighting for Amiens next spring. A small allotment of leave was obtained, making it possible to send away some of the men who had now been fifteen months continuously in the field. The usual refitting proceeded, and opportunity was taken to complete the reorganization necessitated by certain changes in signal establishments that had recently taken effect, and by the increasing numbers of valuable and experienced N.C.O.’s and men who left to take up Imperial commissions in the various branches of the service. The numbers so lost to the Company constituted a striking testimony to the high quality of its _personnel_, and aggregated over eighty before hostilities ceased.

The great and continuing growth in the demands on the Signal Service, particularly in connection with the Heavy Artillery, had for long unduly taxed the available _personnel_, and increase in establishments was overdue. To the Corps Signal Company was, therefore, now added a Heavy Artillery Headquarters Signal Section, with a strength of one officer and thirty-seven other ranks. The _personnel_ for this section was obtained from drafts built up on a nucleus of experienced men, mainly from R.E. section. At the same time, a signal sub-section of one officer and twenty-seven other ranks was formed for each H.A. Group, but as H.A. Groups were frequently moved from Corps to Corps, these sub-sections were organized from Imperial R.E. _personnel_. The Company Headquarters Section was also strengthened by the withdrawal of four telegraphists from each cable section, the vacancies being filled with additional pioneers. The Signal Section forming part of the Headquarters of S.A. Infantry Brigade was now affiliated to the Company, and thenceforward drew its reinforcements therefrom. This Section was originally formed by Lieutenant F. W. S. Burton of the Union Post Office and the 3rd Regiment from signallers selected from the infantry battalions. As, however, the Brigade only chanced to serve for two short periods in the same formation as the Signal Company, the story of this Signal Section is that of the Brigade and need not be separately recounted.

The signal instruction for infantry and artillery units, commenced at Long, and so abruptly suspended by the move into line, had during the spring become a permanent feature of the Company’s activities. Classes in Carrier Pigeon work had been immediately resumed at Etinehem, and were thenceforward carried on till the end of the war under Lieutenant Egleton and Corporal Jorgenson, with the most valuable results. In the middle of March the Corps Signal School was reconstituted at Chipilly, with a separate establishment, and Lieutenant Johnson was seconded as Commandant with a staff of four Sergeant-Instructors from the Company. The School then constituted continued to function till after the Armistice, moving with the Corps from point to point, and many hundreds of officers and men passed through the six weeks’ courses held at it with a most marked and beneficial effect to the efficiency of Signal work among the fighting troops. Lieutenant Johnson’s vacancy was filled by the promotion of C.Q.M.S. C. H. Ison, whose untiring energy had done much to help the Company through its difficulties in the past year.

The interlude at Villers was abruptly cut short by orders to move on the 10th June for a secret destination. As there were no cable sections to accompany, all _personnel_ travelled in lorries, and the move was accomplished in two days. The secret was extremely well kept, however, and not until the convoy actually entered Dunkirk on the 11th was it realized that the Corps was to take over the Nieuport Sector—the important bit of line running from the sea along the Yser, which had been held by the French since the momentous days of the first battle of Ypres. Corps Headquarters were established on the 11th in the Casino of Malo-les-Bains, a suburb of Dunkirk, and arrangements for the relief of the 36th French Corps at once put in hand.

THE BELGIAN COAST AND THE BATTLE OF THE DUNES—NOVEMBER 1917.

Though this sector had been for a long period a quiet one, the German artillery concentration opposite it was already great, especially in heavy long range guns, partly because the arc of many of their coast defence batteries covered more or less of the land front, and for the most part were already behind concrete emplacements. Normal trenches in this terrain were impossible, and both sides stood behind breastworks that in the dunes were merely gabions filled with sand; but here, as on the Ypres front, the liberal use of concrete by the enemy had given his front-line troops, as well as his batteries and command posts, the protection of many “pill-boxes” and concrete shelters of various forms. For a long period the French had held the sector comparatively lightly; consequently the whole of the titanic task of mounting a trench warfare offensive fell on the incoming corps. On such terrain the preparations presented extreme and unique difficulties, and those of Signals were enhanced by the fact that not only did the nature of the ground forbid deep cable buries, but very few shallow ones existed; while the existing communications—naturally inadequate—were almost entirely open wire to within four thousand yards of the front line, and sited along roads certain to be heavily shelled.

British divisions began to arrive in the area on the 15th, bringing the absent cable sections of the Company with them, and between the 20th and 23rd the French divisions in line were relieved by the 1st and 32nd Divisions. Thereafter the Corps Heavy Artillery commenced to move in, the H.A. Signal Section and B.E. Section proceeding to the late French Heavy Artillery Headquarters, D.C.A.L. to a small copse about two miles south of Nieuport, and B.G. Section to Coxyde to prepare for the establishment of a forward exchange.

After a rapid survey of the area, a communication scheme to meet the needs of Corps, Divisions, and the Heavy Artillery on a hitherto unprecedented scale was prepared. Meanwhile the various sections toiled at the familiar task of connecting up the units that were streaming into the area daily, and preparing the new Corps Headquarters at Bray-Dunes Plage—a small watering-place south of La Panne. The H.A. Section had, even with the assistance of B.E. Section, a particularly strenuous task in coping with the concentration of eleven groups of “heavies,” and found it necessary to endeavour to bring into use at once the incomplete French buries. By an evil stroke of luck, the material ordered for this purpose was delayed over a fortnight by the truck containing it being railed to Péronne instead of Dunkirk, owing to the extreme secrecy that enshrouded the movements of the Corps.

The movement of Corps Headquarters to Bray-Dunes was effected on the 29th June, having been somewhat expedited by one of the periodical shellings of Dunkirk by a German long range gun. On the morning of the 27th a twelve-inch shell dropped on the Corps Offices in the Casino at Malo, and inflicted a number of casualties—luckily for the Company, it just missed the Signal Office. A few days later the Heavy Artillery Quarters moved back to the village of Oost Dunkirk, about six thousand yards from the line, and occupied the Villa Rosarie. During the first week in July a considerable increase in hostile shelling was noted, but not to an alarming extent, though a direct hit on the H.A. sections’ store rooms put a few telephones _hors de combat_; and no immediate operations were anticipated.

The enemy, however, had decided to nip our attack in the bud by taking the initiative himself, and had only delayed to complete a crushing artillery concentration. Thus about 9.30 a.m. on the 10th July, when many batteries were not yet in position and many others not yet ready for action, an intense bombardment dropped over the whole Corps area up to nine thousand yards behind the front line. With the most admirable accuracy and thoroughness, every village and battery position was searched, and every road of approach swept by heavy shell fire. Forward communications failed almost at once, the bridges across the Yser below Nieuport were destroyed, the breastwork trenches melted away before the storm of high explosive, and when the infantry assault was delivered about 7 p.m. few survivors of the Brigade of the 1st Division that held the trenches across the Yser in front of Nieuport Bain, remained to resist, and the German front line was established on the Yser bank in this sector. On the other flank, at Lombartzyde, the 32nd Division managed by desperate fighting to retain most of the ground in front of Nieuport, but the main German object was achieved; the approaches to the bridgehead were now limited to the single entry of Nieuport, and the bridgehead itself was so reduced in area as to make a serious attack in force a very desperate venture.

This day was naturally a most trying one for the Signal _personnel_. Nearly all wire communication was lost in the first two hours, and all formations from Corps downwards had to fall back on despatch riders and runners. Very fine work was done by the Company’s despatch runners on the shell-swept roads, while the sections strove to patch up and keep going the vital command lines. Thanks to cool and quick repair work by the sappers, and to the use of a short piece of cable trench completed on the previous day, touch was kept with most of the Heavy Artillery Groups continually throughout the day. The observation lines could not, however, be kept going, and thus the batteries not put out of action were blinded, and could not effectively support the infantry across the river. Oost Dunkirk village suffered heavily, and after nightfall the H.A. Staff were forced to move into the sand dunes half a mile to the flank, when temporary cables were run back to the signal office at the Villa Rosarie, which enjoyed protection in a sandbagged shelter behind the house. As this shelter was the only place in the village enjoying any degree of protection, it became during that day and night a temporary aid post for wounded and a refuge for the few remaining villagers. Amid these conditions, and deafened by the crashing explosions of the shells among the houses, the telephonists managed to carry on with wonderful efficiency for twenty-four consecutive hours. Conditions at Coxyde Signal Office with B.G. section were very similar.

Much to the general surprise, the attack was not resumed on the following day, and while every nerve was strained to get the existing lines restored, work on the new communications began and was pressed forward night and day. The buried scheme originally planned provided for four forward trenches, one along the sea coast, one through the dunes, one partly French and already dug through the polder area, and one consisting of cable laid in the bed of the Nieuport Canal—all to be connected by a lateral trench running through H.A. Headquarters, which was to become the chief maintenance and test point. Lieutenant Collins with B.E. section and a rapidly increasing number of Imperial sections, loaned from Army Signals, was entrusted with this work, assisted by Lieutenant Dobson. In view of the experiences of the 10th, two additional trenches were added to the plan, one from a main open route junction point behind Coxyde, forward along the fringe of the dunes to H.A. Headquarters, and the other along the sea-beach above highwater mark from Corps Headquarters at Bray-Dunes to the same point.

This latter trench, which contained twenty-five pair dry core cable, was completed by Lieutenant Hill with skilled cable jointers from 51 Air Line. Labour was made freely available by the Corps Staff, and as material now came forward rapidly, up to two thousand men a day were employed on these works. The forward portion of the scheme presented great difficulty, as the area was now so sown with batteries that it was almost impossible to trace the trenches so as to avoid battery positions and the shelling which they attracted. The greater part of the work could only be done by night because of enemy observation; and, further, time did not admit of the usual detailed preparation for the working parties. Nevertheless, all works were completed for the attack; and taking into account the continuous heavy shelling, with light casualties.

The experiment made on the Somme of using a kite balloon to maintain communication with the front line, was now repeated; and as a separate balloon was now placed at the disposal of Second-Lieutenant Wilson and a visual signalling party, the result was satisfactory.

Though all other preparations were well advanced, including the seclusion of the 1st Division in a “hush” camp on the coast, where they were specially rehearsed in landing operations from the sea, the attack was postponed from date to date, until it finally became evident by the transfer of a large proportion of the heavy batteries to the Ypres front, that the slow progress made there owing to weather and “pill-boxes” was likely to postpone the Nieuport offensive indefinitely.

During the interval, the rival artilleries waged a furious and continuous duel. The forward buried system, unavoidably shallow from the nature of the ground, was continuously broken by shell fire. During September the cable trenches were blown up by direct hits on the average nearly twice a day. The repairs were most difficult and laborious owing both to the persistent shelling and the rise of the water level everywhere after the wet weather of August. Even with the sappers of three cable sections—B.F., B.E., and A.U. Imperial Cable Section,—and two area Signal Detachments from the Fourth Army, it became impossible to keep going satisfactorily the network of forty miles of trenches containing 1,200 miles of cable; and finally the assistance of the Corps Cyclist Battalion was obtained to dig diversion trenches in the worst shell areas, and a new trench in the Belgian area in substitution of the cable laid in the Nieuport Canal, the insulation of which began to fail soon after laying.

During this period the sappers stationed at the forward test points had a most trying experience. Owing to the frequent breakdowns, they were perpetually working on the cable trenches by day and by night, employed in testing and substituting lines. The frequent use of gas shell made it necessary that at their isolated points they should secure the gas blankets of their dug-out entrances at night, and this inevitably produced an atmosphere little inferior to the gas itself. Two concreted test points in the “polder” area, taken over from the French, were conspicuous after shelling had destroyed all arboreal cover. The Germans apparently decided that these were gun positions, and favoured them with special attention, managing finally to secure three direct hits—two innocuous, however unnerving to the inmates; but the third on P.C. 6 burst square on the roof, and though only slightly bending the steel rails embedded in the concrete, killed a sapper of B.F. section inside. One small dug-out on the canal bank, P.C. 18, disappeared altogether after an eleven-inch howitzer bombardment of a neighbouring battery, but fortunately there was no occupant at the time.

Corps Headquarters moved to La Panne at the beginning of September; but the location had evidently been given away by a spy, as it was heavily shelled by a long range gun a fortnight later, and consequently retransferred to Bray-Dunes. Though as the autumn drew on activity in the sector died down, all ranks had reason to welcome the relief of the Corps by the XXXVI. French Corps that commenced on the 19th November. On the 20th the Headquarters of the Company, under Captain Dingwall, who had been acting as A.W. Signals since September during Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison’s absence on sick leave, moved to Hinges near Béthune, and commenced to take over from the XI. Corps—then under orders for Italy—a sector between Béthune and Armentières.

THE LYS AREA.

After some readjustments of frontage in December, the XV. Corps settled down to hold the sector in front of the Lys, from Houplines to Laventie, with the Portuguese Corps on the right and the Anzac Corps on the left. In January 1918 Corps Headquarters were shifted from Hinges to La Motte-aux-Bois in front of the Forest of Nieppe, and Heavy Artillery, with the H.A. and B.E. sections, to Estaires, where 51 Air Line was already established. A further reorganization of the Company now took place. As cable sections rarely, if ever, performed the mobile work for which their horse transport was provided, the decision was reached to disband one cable section in each Corps, to reduce the strength of the Corps air line section to forty-two all ranks with one heavy and two light lorries, and with the surplus _personnel_ so accruing form an additional air line for each Corps. B.G. section was, accordingly, converted into the nucleus of the new 91 Air Line Section, to which Lieutenant Dobson was appointed. At the same time, “Q” Wireless Section became an integral portion of the Signal Company, and was taken over by Lieutenant McArthur, with 2nd Lieutenant FitzGeorge as second officer, the Imperial _personnel_ being rapidly replaced by South Africans. A second officer was also authorized for the Heavy Artillery Section, and Lieutenant M. Cohen, who had been attached to a brigade of the 8th Division since his arrival from England in November 1917, was appointed.

The communications here were such as would serve on a thinly held and lightly shelled front. Buries were few and becoming inefficient with age; the light open-wire routes which formed the bulk of the communication were run close up to the front line. The defection of Russia made it certain that the Allies would be thrown on the defensive in the spring; and as the Lys covered Hazebrouck and the direct route to Calais, it was probable that the sector would become a main front of attack. Ample and secure communications were, therefore, a first necessity, and a complete scheme was prepared on a scale of magnitude and thoroughness which surpassed any previous performance. All trenches were to be seven feet deep and carry no less than thirty pairs of wires.

Work could not be commenced before the 25th January, owing to the whole Lys Valley, which is very low lying, becoming water-logged by heavy rain. At first the labour available was very limited, owing to the urgent demands for defence works in the battle zone, and for the construction and wiring of a new emergency line of five trenches on the north bank of the river. Early in February the labour position improved, and frequently over one thousand five hundred men were employed simultaneously. The sappers had a strenuous time, and, but for the assistance of a party from the Corps Cyclists, who by long association with Signals had become relatively skilled, could not have kept up the pace. By unremitting effort the Corps Section of the trenches was completed by the beginning of March, and a portion of the work originally assigned to divisions taken over.

While the other sections were so engaged, B.F. was employed on another section of the scheme in and around Armentières itself. In this town a considerable underground sewer system existed, and though not comparable with the underways of Arras, yet these sewers proved extremely valuable as affording ready-made covered ways for cable. B.F. accordingly spent two months in laying securely many miles of cable. The new 91 Air Line Section meanwhile pushed on the necessary additions to the open-wire routes forward from Corps Headquarters. Hostile artillery activity began to increase considerably in March, and about the middle of the month became so marked that from this and other symptoms an immediate attack was expected. This cut off the supply of labour, but the sappers were busier than ever in bringing the cables already laid into use by temporary joints, without waiting for the construction of the test dug-outs.

This alarm proved for the time false, the offensive commencing instead on the Third and Fifth Army fronts on the 21st March. The immediate effect was the withdrawal of all the divisions in the Corps, and their replacement with exhausted divisions from the south—the 34th and 40th—who naturally could provide no labour. The greatest anxiety was now felt lest the communication should not be finished in time, and work was rushed day and night. With the assistance of the Corps Cyclists temporary sandbagged test points were erected where the concrete work was still lacking, and when the storm finally broke on the 9th April practically all cable laid had been joined up and was working, and three-quarters of the original scheme had been completed.

The attack began at 4.30 a.m. with an intense bombardment extending back to and beyond the river, followed by an infantry assault about 7 a.m., which immediately broke through the Portuguese on the Corps right. There were no reserves available to man effectively the new line dug on the northern bank, and during the afternoon the enemy crossed at Bac St. Maur, and by 7 p.m. had forced our firing line back behind the signal test point at Croix de Bac. Communications had held well so far; the 34th Division was still maintaining its ground on the left round Armentières, and there was hope of an immediate restoration of the situation by counter-attack. The lineman at this point—Corporal Shepherd of the H.A. section—was, therefore, instructed not to destroy the lines, but to leave them all through, and fall back on the next test point. He did so, but omitted to put through one of the lines. On ascertaining this when he reached H.A. headquarters, he voluntarily returned and managed to re-enter the dug-out, which was now in No Man’s Land, and put the line through. Though this dug-out passed into the enemy’s hands during the night, and after a temporary reversal of fortune again next morning, direct communication from Corps headquarters to troops in Armentières was maintained over the cables passing through it till afternoon on the following day, when the evacuation of the town began.

By next morning the Germans had forced the river to Estaires. This town had been intensely shelled all day, and B.E. Section billet was blown up early in the morning. Nevertheless, the Corps Exchange was kept going till a late hour that night by Lieutenant Hill with 51 Air Line and a party of operators from the Headquarters section.

During the following days, the 10th, 11th, and 12th, the Corps was steadily driven back by the heavy thrust made by the enemy for Hazebrouck. The 29th and 31st Divisions and the 4th Guards Brigade were successively thrown in, but their desperate fighting only succeeded in slowing the German advance, until the entry into line of the 1st Australian Division on the night of the 12th, when the enemy was finally brought to a stop on the edge of the Nieppe Forest. Thereafter the storm centre shifted gradually to the northward round Kemmel and Messines, while on the Corps front the battle died down to local combats.

The effort to keep up communications during these days tested every one to the limit. Units were changing location like figures in a kaleidoscope, and nearly the whole of the existing system of lines had passed into the enemy’s hands. However, by the most strenuous efforts, touch was maintained throughout the retreat, and the good work done was recognized by the Corps commander; for in a letter addressed to Colonel Harrison, he conveyed his appreciation of the work carried out by all ranks of the Company during the recent operations. He added that he realized that, owing to the untiring energy and devotion to duty shown by all ranks, a very high standard of communication was maintained, and thanked all for the efforts made and the results achieved. The general commanding the Heavy Artillery also made reference in a special order of the day to the particularly good work done by the H.A. Signal Section, under Lieutenant Collins, in the following words:—

“That the Heavy Artillery was able to cover the whole Corps
front with its fire during each day, and to withdraw to
fresh positions each night, testifies also to the excellence
of the staff work—especially in connection with telephonic
communication.”

On the 11th Corps Headquarters fell back to Wardrecques, between St. Omer and Hazebrouck, leaving an advanced Signal Office at La Motte until the evening of the 12th. During the next few days it became evident that the front was established again—at any rate temporarily—and the work of restoring the normal network of communication at once commenced, at first with great shortage of material, as all forward signal dumps had been captured.

Captain Dingwall, whose health had suffered under the continuous strain in France, now left the Company to join L Signal Battalion, and was replaced by Captain Ross, who was relieved of the Heavy Artillery Section by Lieutenant Collins. Lieutenant Hill took up duty at headquarters, and Lieutenant McArthur left the Wireless Section for 51 Air Line.

At this time also Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Ducane was summoned to replace Sir Henry Rawlinson on the Versailles Council, and the XV. Corps was henceforward commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir B. de Lisle. The departure of General Ducane was much regretted by the Company, as he had always taken a close interest in communications, and showed keen appreciation of the work done, as is shown by the following extract from a letter written by him to Colonel Harrison after the termination of hostilities:—

“In the many bright spots of the XV. Corps, I have always
maintained, and always will maintain, that the Signal Service
was far away the best Signal Service of any other organization
in France. Not only was there a very thorough grasp of the
work, but always—what was so pleasant to find—there was a
desire to go out of your way to help. It is with the greatest
pleasure that I write to say how much I always appreciate
having the South African Signal Company in the XV. Corps. They
were not only highly efficient in all departments of this
work, but I can honestly say they were the most energetic,
hard-working, well-disciplined, and courteous body of men that
I have come across in my experience of the Army.

“I always felt in dealing with you that nothing was ever too
much trouble for you or your men, and that no matter how
exacting the demands made upon you—and they were often very
heavy indeed—no effort would be spared to carry them through
successfully. Never were we let down during the most trying
times—on the Somme, on the coast, or on the Lys. During the
enemy’s attack on the Lys in April 1918, the truly remarkable
way in which all our communications held out for three days,
till we were compelled to abandon La Motte, greatly facilitated
the exercise of the command of the Corps during those difficult
days, and was an eloquent testimony of the thoroughness and
skill with which the work of preparation had been carried out.”

The final holding up of the Germans at Kemmel on the 28th April made it possible to commence effective work on the defences at Hazebrouck, and during the next few months successive lines of trenches and belts of wire came into existence, and seamed the country as far back as St. Omer. The Company’s share in these preparations was work on a buried cable scheme which started early in May, and gradually developed as labour and material were obtainable, until, when the advance began, a network of trenches extended across the whole Corps area for 13,000 yards in depth and 7,000 in breadth, embodying thirty miles of seven-foot deep trench and nearly 1,200 miles of pair cable. This work, though never tested by another offensive, was of great value during the prolonged artillery duel which followed the Battle of the Lys. The open-wire routes were continuously shelled or bombed down, for in this sector, as on the coast, aeroplane bombing was a nightly event.

The series of successful minor operations carried out by the Corps in July and August, including the capture of Méteren, and the devastating effect of our superior and incessantly active artillery, no doubt quickened the German decision to evacuate the Lys salient. This evacuation commenced at the end of August, and thenceforward all ranks were occupied in the rapid restoration of communications through the devastated area, now as broad as the old Somme battlefield. An attempt was made to utilize the old buries laid down by the XV. and other Corps before the retreat; but these were too effectively destroyed by the enemy to admit of rapid restoration.

After the successful attack of the Belgian and Second British Armies at the end of September, in which the XV. Corps co-operated on the right flank, headquarters were moved to St. Jans-Cappel on the 4th October, and on the 21st, to Mouvaux, near Tourcoing, following the rapid retreat of the enemy to the Scheldt. On this occasion a fast piece of work was done by 91 Air Line and B.E. Cable Section, two lines being completed across the Lys to the new headquarters—a distance of nearly twenty miles—in one day.

The Signal portion of the preparations for forcing the passage of the Scheldt filled the period up to the 10th November; but as the enemy retired during the night, and the Armistice was proclaimed the following day, they proved unnecessary.

The Corps was not selected to accompany the advance to the Rhine, and so it fell to the lot of B.E. Section on the 12th to lay the last and farthest forward cable in France, from the Scheldt, crossing at Pecq to an observation point on the eastern side.