Chapter V: A Defense of the Battle of Sand Creek

Few events in American history have been the subject of so much misrepresentation as the battle of Sand Creek. It has gone down into history as an indefensible massacre of peaceable Indians, and perhaps nothing that can now be said will change this erroneous impression of the world at large, notwithstanding the fact that the accusation is unjust and a libel upon the people of Colorado. Worst of all, it was given wide publicity through the reports of two Congressional committees following unfair, one-sided, and prejudiced investigations. Unfortunately, at that time, Colorado, being a Territory, had no Senators or Representatives in Congress to defend the good name of its people, and to add to the bad features of the situation, its people at home realized but dimly what was taking place at Washington, until after the mischief was done; consequently to a great extent the Congressional investigations went by default, so far as the people of Colorado were concerned.

It should be kept in mind that Colorado, comparatively speaking, was more remote from the rest of the world at that time than Alaska is to-day, and the means of disseminating news throughout the Territory were exceedingly limited. From early in November of 1864 until March, 1865, the coaches that carried the mail between the Missouri River towns and Denver ceased running on account of the hostility of the Indians, and all this time Colorado was cut off from the rest of the world, except for a limited telegraph service that did not reach any point in the Territory outside of Denver. Consequently, the enemies of Colonel Chivington and the Third Colorado Cavalry, had full sway in their efforts to blacken the reputation of these representative citizens of Colorado. I wish to emphasize the fact that a large majority of the members of the Third Colorado Cavalry were high-class men, whatever may be said to the contrary. Colorado had been settled less than six years and most of its inhabitants had come to the Territory in 1860, only four years previously. These people were from every part of the United States, many of them farmers, merchants, and professional men, and the men who enlisted in the Third Colorado were largely of this class.

The accusations on which the various Congressional and military investigations were based had their origin in the jealousy of military officers. It was the same kind of spirit that caused the loss of more than one battle in the Civil War. However, at Sand Creek, on account of the secrecy of preparations, the victory could not be prevented, but the good effects could be, and were, completely nullified, to the great detriment of the people of Colorado; and this was done by officers who had been former residents of the Territory and were indebted to it for their official positions. But fully to understand the animus of these officers, it is necessary for the reader to know something of their personality, as well as that of the other officers involved in the controversy.

Colonel John M. Chivington, who was in command at the battle of Sand Creek, and who was the principal target throughout the various investigations, was the Rev. John M. Chivington, who from 1860 to 1862 was in charge of the Methodist missions in the region now forming the State of Colorado. He was a member of the Kansas-Nebraska Conference, and had been selected for this mission work because of his unusual energy, ability, and force of character. The commanding position that the Methodist Church early assumed in the Territory under his administration confirmed the wisdom of his appointment.

Upon the organization of the First Colorado Volunteer Cavalry in the early part of 1862, Mr. Chivington resigned his position as presiding elder of the Rocky Mountain District, and was commissioned Major of the new regiment. He at once became the regiment's most influential officer. He was the most prominent figure in its wonderful march to New Mexico, and the remarkable victories won by it over the invading Confederates were largely due to his brilliant leadership. By the end of the active campaign, which was a short one, Major Chivington had become so popular with the officers and enlisted men that upon the resignation of John P. Slough, the Colonel of the regiment, soon after, he was promoted to that position over Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel F. Tappan on petition of every commissioned officer of the regiment. Here was the beginning of all his troubles, as will be seen farther along in my narrative. Later, Colonel Chivington was appointed by General Canby to the command of the military district of Southern New Mexico, and was afterward transferred to the command of the military district of Colorado, which position he held at the time of the battle of Sand Creek.

Colonel Chivington was a man of commanding personality, and possessed marked ability both as a preacher and as an army officer. I can do no better than quote what General Frank Hall says of him in his _History of Colorado_:

Though wholly unskilled in the science of war, with but
little knowledge of drill and discipline, Major Chivington, of
Herculean frame and gigantic stature, possessed the courage
and exhibited the discreet boldness, dash, and brilliancy in
action which distinguished the more illustrious of our volunteer
officers during the war. His first encounter with the Texans
at Apache Cañon was sudden and more or less of a surprise.
The occasion demanded not only instantaneous action, but such
disposition of his force as to render it most effective against
superior numbers and the highly advantageous position of the
enemy. He seemed to comprehend at a glance the necessities
of the situation and handled his troops like a veteran.
His daring and rapid movement across the mountains and the
total destruction of the enemy's train, simultaneously with
the battle of Pigeon's Ranch, again attested his excellent
generalship. It put an end to the war by forcing the invaders
to a precipitate flight back to their homes. He hesitated at
nothing. Sure of the devotion and gallantry of his men, he
was always ready for any adventure, however desperate, which
promised the discomfiture of his adversaries.

We cannot but believe that had his application for the transfer
of his regiment to the Army of the Potomac, or to any of the
great armies operating under Grant, been acceded to, he would
have made a still prouder record for himself, the regiment,
and the Territory. That he was endowed with the capabilities
of a superior commander, none who saw him in action will deny.

I fully concur in General Hall's estimate of Colonel Chivington's marked ability. I knew him well, as he was a frequent visitor at our house in the mining town of Hamilton, in the early days. The overshadowing reputation made by Colonel Chivington in the campaign against the Texas invaders of New Mexico, and his subsequent promotion to the colonelcy of the regiment over Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel F. Tappan, although apparently acquiesced in at the time, aroused a spirit of jealousy, envy, and antagonism against him on the part of a small group of officers headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Tappan and Major E. W. Wynkoop, which was participated in by Captain Soule, Lieutenant Cramer, and other subordinates. This antagonism manifested itself on every later occasion. It was the jealousy of mediocrity manifested against superior ability and worth; for one can search the records of the First Colorado in vain for anything noteworthy ever accomplished by either Tappan, Wynkoop, or Soule. After their return from New Mexico, these officers never allowed an opportunity to pass for discrediting and injuring the "Preacher Colonel," and after the battle of Sand Creek they never tired of referring to it as an evidence of his unfitness.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tappan had been a professional newspaper correspondent before entering the army, consequently, he had no trouble in filling the Eastern publications with exaggerated and distorted accounts of the battle. In his crusade he had the active aid of Major Wynkoop, of S. G. Colley, the Indian agent at Fort Lyon, and of all the Indian traders, interpreters, half-breeds, and others of similar character congregated around the Indian agency. He also had the support of the Indian Bureau at Washington, which usually took the sentimental side of every question affecting the Indians.

Prior to 1864 Indians who had been on the warpath during the summer were permitted to make peace in the fall, remain unmolested during the winter, receive annuities, rest up, and accumulate ammunition for the coming summer's raids; but in that year the overtures of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were rejected, except upon the condition that they deliver up their arms and submit to the military authorities. This they not only refused to do, but continued their depredations at places convenient to their winter camps, and received from Colonel Chivington's command the punishment they so richly deserved. Naturally this meant great financial loss to the Indian agents, traders, and hangers-on around the Indian agency; and, as a result, these people actively joined in the attack upon Colonel Chivington.

This crusade resulted in two Congressional investigations of the battle, and also in a hearing by a military commission. Before the Joint Special Committee of the two Houses of Congress the principal witnesses were Major Wynkoop, Captain Soule, Lieutenant Cramer, two Indian agents, two Indian traders, two half-breeds, and one interpreter to sustain the accusations, and only Governor Evans and three minor officers of the Third Colorado regiment for the defense. Aside from Governor Evans and the three minor officers just mentioned, the witnesses were extremely hostile to Colonel Chivington and were ready to go to any length in their testimony in order to blacken his reputation and that of the Third Colorado. In the investigation before the Joint Special Committee, neither Colonel Chivington nor Colonel Shoup was present or represented in any way. In the hearing before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Colonel Shoup was not represented, and Colonel Chivington only by means of a deposition. As a result of these partial and one-sided investigations, both committees condemned Chivington and pronounced the battle a massacre. The most unjust and absurd investigation of all was that made by the military commission, which was composed of three officers of the First Colorado Cavalry, all subordinates of Colonel Chivington, headed by his inveterate enemy Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel F. Tappan.

The accusation made at each hearing was that the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians attacked by Colonel Chivington's command at Sand Creek were not only friendly to the whites, but were under the protection of the military authorities at Fort Lyon, and that the battle was, by the consent, if not by the direction of Colonel Chivington, an indiscriminate massacre. All of this I believe is proved to be untrue, to the satisfaction of any reasonable person, by the facts related in my account of the battle, and of the hostilities in El Paso County and elsewhere preceding it. In corroboration of my statements as to the hostile character of the Indians punished at Sand Creek, and to show the conditions existing elsewhere in the Territory previous thereto, I quote from Governor Evans's reply to the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, dated August 6, 1865.

In the Territorial days of Colorado, the Governor was ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs. At the time of the Sand Creek battle, the Hon. John Evans, formerly of Illinois, was Governor of Colorado, and had held that office since the spring of 1862. Governor Evans was a personal friend of President Lincoln, and had been appointed Governor because of his high character, great ability, and efficiency in administrative affairs. Governor Evans's supervision of Indian affairs in Colorado during 1862, 1863, and 1864 made him a better qualified witness as to the conditions existing among the various tribes during these years than any man living. The following extracts from his reply to that part of the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, which, under the heading, "Massacre of the Cheyenne Indians," refers to his responsibility in the matter, tells of the attitude of the Indians towards the whites during that period and of his own strenuous efforts to avert hostilities.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND SUPERINTENDENCY OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, C. T.

DENVER, August 6, 1865.
TO THE PUBLIC:

I have just seen, for the first time, a copy of the report of
the Committee on the Conduct of the War, headed, "Massacre of
Cheyenne Indians."

As it does me great injustice, and by its partial, unfair, and
erroneous statements will mislead the public, I respectfully
ask a suspension of opinion in my case until I shall have time
to present the facts to said committee or some equally high
authority, and ask a correction. In the meantime, I desire to
lay a few facts before the public. The report begins:

"In the summer of 1864 Governor Evans, of Colorado Territory,
as acting Superintendent of Indian Affairs, sent notice to the
various bands and tribes of Indians within his jurisdiction,
that such as desired to be considered friendly to the whites
should repair to the nearest military post in order to be
protected from the soldiers who were to take the field against
the hostile Indians."

This statement is true as to such notice having been sent,
but conveys the false impression that it was at the beginning
of hostilities, and the declaration of war. The truth is, it
was issued by authority of the Indian Department months after
the war had become general, for the purpose of inducing the
Indians to cease hostilities, and to protect those who had
been, or would become, friendly from the inevitable dangers to
which they were exposed. This "notice" may be found published
in the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864,
page 218.

The report continues:

"About the close of the summer some Cheyenne Indians, in the
neighborhood of the Smoky Hill, sent word to Major Wynkoop,
commanding at Fort Lyon, that they had in their possession,
and were willing to deliver up, some white captives they had
purchased of other Indians. Major Wynkoop, with a force of
over one hundred men, visited these Indians and recovered the
white captives. On his return he was accompanied by a number
of the chiefs and leading men of the Indians, whom he had
brought to visit Denver for the purpose of conferring with
the authorities there in regard to keeping the peace. Among
them were Black Kettle and White Antelope, of the Cheyennes,
and some chiefs of the Arapahoes. The council was held, and
these chiefs stated that they were friendly to the whites and
always had been."

Again they say:

"All the testimony goes to show that the Indians under the
immediate control of Black Kettle and White Antelope, of the
Cheyennes, and Left Hand of the Arapahoes, were, and had always
been, friendly to the whites, and had not been guilty of any
acts of hostility or depredations."

This word, which the committee say was sent to Major Wynkoop,
was a letter to United States Indian Agent, Major Colley,
which is published in the report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs for 1865, page 233, and is as follows:

"CHEYENNE VILLAGE, August 29, 1864.

"MAJOR COLLEY:

"We received a letter from Bent wishing us to make
peace. We held a council in regard to it. All come
to the conclusion to make peace with you, providing
you make peace with the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes,
Apaches, and Sioux. We are going to send a messenger
to the Kiowas and to the other nations about our
going to make peace with you. We heard that you have
some [prisoners] in Denver. We have seven prisoners
of yours which we are willing to give up, providing
you give up yours. There are three war parties out
yet, and two of Arapahoes. They have been out some
time, and expected in soon. When we held this council
there were few Arapahoes and Sioux present.

"We want true news from you in return. This is a
letter.

"BLACK KETTLE and the other Chiefs."

Compare the above extract from the report of the committee
with this published letter of Black Kettle, and the admission
of the Indians in the council at Denver.

The committee say the prisoners proposed to be delivered up
were _purchased of other Indians_. Black Kettle, in his letter,
says: "We have seven prisoners of yours, which we are willing
to give up, providing you give up yours." They say nothing
about prisoners whom they had _purchased_. On the other hand,
in the council held in Denver, Black Kettle said:

"Major Wynkoop was kind enough to receive the letter and visited
them in camp, to whom they delivered four white prisoners,
one other (Mrs. Snyder) having killed herself; that there
are two women and one child yet in their camp whom they will
deliver up as soon as they can get them in; Laura Roper, 16
or 17 years; Ambrose Asher, 7 or 8 years; Daniel Marble, 7
or 8 years; Isabel Ubanks, 4 or 5 years. The prisoners still
with them [are] Mrs. Ubanks and babe, and a Mrs. Norton who
was taken on the Platte. Mrs. Snyder is the name of the woman
who hung herself. The boys were taken between Fort Kearney
and the Blue."

Again: They did not deny having captured the prisoners, when
I told them that having the prisoners in their possession was
evidence of their having committed the depredations when they
were taken. But White Antelope said: "We (the Cheyennes) took
two prisoners west of Kearney, and destroyed the trains." Had
they _purchased_ the prisoners, they would not have been slow
to make it known in this council.

The committee say the chiefs went to Denver to confer with
the authorities about _keeping the peace_. Black Kettle says:
"All come to the conclusion to _make peace_ with you providing
you will _make peace_ with the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes,
Apaches, and Sioux."

Again the committee say:

"All the testimony goes to show that the Indians under the
immediate control of Black Kettle and White Antelope, of the
Cheyennes, and Left Hand, of the Arapahoes, _were, and had
been friendly to the whites, and had not been guilty of any
acts of hostility or depredations_."

Black Kettle says in his letter: "We received a letter from
Bent, wishing us to make peace." Why did Bent send a letter
to _friendly_ Indians, and want to make peace with Indians
_who had always been friendly_? Again they say: "We have held
a council in regard to it." Why did they hold a council in
regard to making peace, when they were already peaceable? Again
they say: "All come to the conclusion to _make peace_ with
you _providing_ you make peace with the Kiowas, Comanches,
Arapahoes, Apaches, and Sioux. We have seven prisoners of
yours, which we are willing to give up, providing you give up
yours. There are three _war_ [not _peace_] _parties_ out yet,
and two of Arapahoes."

Every line of this letter shows that they were and had been at
war. I desire to throw additional light upon this assertion of
the committee that these Indians "were and had been friendly
to the whites, and had not been guilty of any acts of hostility
or depredations"; for it is upon this point that the committee
accuses me of prevarication.

In the council held at Denver, White Antelope said: "We [the
Cheyennes] took two prisoners west of Kearney and destroyed
the trains." This was one of the most destructive and bloody
raids of the war. Again, Neva (Left Hand's brother) said: "The
Comanches, Kiowas, and Sioux have done much more harm than we
have."

The entire report of this council shows that the Indians had
been at war, and had been "guilty of acts of hostility and
depredations."

As showing more fully the status and disposition of these
Indians, I call your attention to the following extract from
the report of Major Wynkoop, published in the report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864, page 234, and a letter
from Major Colley, their agent; same report, page 230. Also
statement of Robert North; same report, page 224:

"FORT LYON, COLORADO, Sept. 18, 1864.
"SIR:

"... Taking with me under strict guard the Indians I
had in my possession, I reached my destination and
was confronted by from six to eight hundred Indian
warriors, drawn up in line of battle and prepared
to fight.

"Putting on as bold a front as I could under the
circumstances I formed my command in as good order as
possible for the purpose of acting on the offensive
or defensive, as might be necessary, and advanced
towards them, at the same time sending forward one
of the Indians I had with me, as an emissary, to
state that I had come for the purpose of holding a
consultation with the chiefs of the Arapahoes and
Cheyennes, to come to an understanding which might
result in mutual benefit; that I had not come desiring
strife, but was prepared for it if necessary, and
advised them to listen to what I had to say, previous
to making any more warlike demonstrations.

"They consented to meet me in council, and I then
proposed to them that if they desired peace to
give me palpable evidence of their sincerity by
delivering into my hands their white prisoners.
I told them that I was not authorized to conclude
terms of peace with them, but if they acceded to my
proposition I would take what chiefs they might choose
to select to the Governor of Colorado Territory,
state the circumstances to him, and that I believed
it would result in what it was their desire to
accomplish—'peace with their white brothers.' I had
reference particularly to the Arapahoe and Cheyenne
tribes.

"The council was divided—undecided—and could not
come to an understanding among themselves. I told
them that I would march to a certain locality,
distant twelve miles, and await a given time for
their action in the matter. I took a strong position
in the locality named, and remained three days. In
the interval they brought in and turned over four
white prisoners, all that was possible for them
at the time being to turn over, the balance of the
seven being (as they stated) with another band far
to the northward.

* * * * *

"I have the principal chiefs of the two tribes with
me, and propose starting immediately to Denver, to
put into effect the aforementioned proposition made
by me to them.

"They agree to deliver up the balance of the prisoners
as soon as it is possible to procure them, which can
be done better from Denver City than from this point.

"I have the honor, Governor, to be your obedient
servant,

"E. W. WYNKOOP,
"Major First Col. Cav. Com'd'g
Fort Lyon, C. T.

"His Excellency, JOHN EVANS,
"Governor of Colorado, Denver, C. T."

"FORT LYON, COLORADO TERRITORY, July 26, 1864.
"SIR:

"When I last wrote you, I was in hopes that our
Indian troubles were at an end. Colonel Chivington
has just arrived from Larned and gives a sad account
of affairs at that post. They have killed some ten
men from a train, and run off all the stock from
the post.

"As near as they can learn, all the tribes were
engaged in it. The colonel will give you the
particulars. There is no dependence to be put in any
of them. I have done everything in my power to keep
the peace; I now think a little powder and lead is
the best food for them.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,
"S. G. COLLEY,
United States Indian Agent.

"HON. JOHN EVANS,
"Governor and Superintendent Indian Affairs."

The following statement by Robert North was made to me:

"November 10, 1863.

"Having recovered an Arapahoe prisoner (a squaw) from the
Utes, I obtained the confidence of the Indians completely. I
have lived with them from a boy and my wife is an Arapahoe.

"In honor of my exploit in recovering the prisoner, the Indians
recently gave me a 'big medicine dance' about fifty miles
below Fort Lyon, on the Arkansas River, at which the leading
chiefs and warriors of several of the tribes of the plains met.

"The Comanches, Apaches, Kiowas, the northern band of
Arapahoes, and all of the Cheyennes, with the Sioux, have
pledged one another to go to war with the whites as soon as
they can procure ammunition in the spring. I have heard them
discuss the matter often, and the few of them who opposed it
were forced to be quiet, and were really in danger of their
lives. I saw the principal chiefs pledge to each other that
they would be friendly and shake hands with the whites until
they procured ammunition and guns, so as to be ready when they
strike. Plundering to get means has already commenced; and the
plan is to commence the war at several points in the sparse
settlements early in the spring. They wanted me to join them in
the war, saying that they would take a great many white women
and children prisoners, and get a heap of property, blankets,
etc.; but while I am connected with them by marriage, and live
with them, I am yet a white man, and wish to avoid bloodshed.
There are many Mexicans with the Comanche and Apache Indians,
all of whom urge on the war, promising to help the Indians
themselves, and that a great many more Mexicans would come up
from New Mexico for the purpose in the spring."

In addition to the statement showing that all the Cheyennes
were in the alliance, I desire to add the following frank
admission from the Indians in the council:

"Governor Evans explained that smoking the war-pipe was a
figurative term, but their conduct had been such as to show
that they had an understanding with other tribes.

"Several Indians: We acknowledge that our actions have given
you reason to believe this."

In addition to all this, I refer to the statement of Mrs.
Ewbanks. She is one of the prisoners that Black Kettle, in
the council, said they had. Instead of _purchasing_ her, they
first _captured_ her on the Little Blue, and then _sold_ her
to the Sioux.

Mrs. Martin, another rescued prisoner, was _captured_ by the
_Cheyennes_ on Plum Creek, _west of Kearney_, with a boy nine
years old. These were the prisoners of which White Antelope
said, in the council, "We took two prisoners west of Kearney,
and destroyed the trains." In her published statement she says
the party who captured her and the boy killed eleven men and
destroyed the trains and were mostly _Cheyennes_.

Thus I have proved by the Indian chiefs named in the report, by
Agent Colley and Major Wynkoop, to whom they refer to sustain
their assertion to the contrary, that these Indians had "been
at war, and had committed acts of hostility and depredations."

In regard to their status prior to their council at Denver,
the foregoing public documents which I have cited show how
utterly devoid of truth or foundation is the assertion that
these Indians "had been friendly to the whites, and had not
been guilty of any acts of hostility or depredations."

The next paragraph of the report is as follows:

"A northern band of Cheyennes, known as the 'Dog Soldiers,' had
been guilty of acts of hostility; but all the testimony goes
to prove that they had no connection with Black Kettle's band,
and acted in spite of his authority and influence. Black Kettle
and his band denied all connection with, or responsibility
for, the Dog Soldiers, and Left Hand and his band were equally
friendly."

The committee and the public will be surprised to learn the
fact that these Dog Soldiers, on which the committee throws the
_slight_ blame for acts of hostility, were really among Black
Kettle's and White Antelope's own warriors, in the "_friendly_"
camp to which Major Wynkoop made his expedition, and their head
man, Bull Bear, was one of the prominent men of the deputation
brought in to see me at Denver. By reference to the report of
the council with the chiefs, to which I referred the committee,
it will be observed that Black Kettle and all present based
their propositions to _make peace_ upon the assent of _their
bands_, and that these Dog Soldiers were especially referred
to.

The report continues:

"These Indians, at the suggestion of Governor Evans and Colonel
Chivington, repaired to Fort Lyon and placed themselves under
the protection of Major Wynkoop, etc."

The connection of my name in this is again wrong. I simply
left them in the hands of the military authorities, where I
found them, and my action was approved by the Indian Bureau.

The following extracts from the report of the council will
prove this conclusively. I stated to the Indians:

"... Another reason that I am not in a condition to make a
treaty is, that the war is begun, and the power to make a
treaty of peace has passed from me to the great war chief."

I also said: "Again, whatever peace they may make must be with
the soldiers and not with me."

And again, in reply to White Antelope's inquiry, "How can we
be protected from the soldiers on the plains?" I said: "You
must make that arrangement with the military chief."

The morning after this council, I addressed the following
letter to the agent of these Indians, which is published in
the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864,
page 220:

"COLORADO SUPERINTENDENCY INDIAN AFFAIRS,
DENVER, September 29, 1864.

"SIR:

"The chiefs brought in by Major Wynkoop have been
heard. I have declined to make any peace with them,
lest it might embarrass the military operations
against the hostile Indians on the plains. The
Arapahoe and Cheyenne Indians being now at war with
the United States Government, must make peace with
the military authorities. Of course this arrangement
relieves the Indian Bureau of their care until peace
is declared with them; and as these tribes are yet
scattered, and all except Friday's band are at war,
it is not probable that it will be done immediately.
You will be particular to impress upon these chiefs
the fact that my talk with them was for the purpose
of ascertaining their views, and not to offer them
anything whatever. They must deal with the military
authorities until peace, in which case, alone,
they will be in proper position to treat with the
government in relation to the future.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your
obedient servant,

"JOHN EVANS,
"Governor Colorado Territory and
"ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

"MAJOR S. G. COLLEY, "United States Indian Agent, Upper
Arkansas."

It will thus be seen that I had, with the approval of the Indian
Bureau, turned the adjustment of difficulties with the hostile
Indians entirely over to the military authorities; that I had
instructed Agent Colley, at Fort Lyon, that this would relieve
the Bureau of further care of the Arapahoes and Cheyennes,
until peace was made, and having had no notice of such peace,
or instructions to change the arrangement, the status of these
Indians was in no respect within my jurisdiction, or under my
official inspection.

It may be proper for me to say further, that it will appear in
evidence that I had no intimation of the direction in which the
campaign against the hostile Indians was to move, or against
what bands it was to be made, when I left the Territory last
fall, and that I was absent from Colorado when the Sand Creek
battle occurred.

The report continues:

"It is true that there seems to have been excited among the
people inhabiting that region of country a hostile feeling
towards the Indians. Some had committed acts of hostility
towards the whites, but no effort seems to have been made by
the authorities there to prevent these hostilities, other than
by the commission of even worse acts."

"_Some_ had committed acts of hostility towards the whites!"
Hear the facts: In the fall of 1863 a general alliance of the
Indians of the plains was effected with the Sioux, and in the
language of Bull Bear, in the report of the council, "Their
plan is to clean out all this country."

The war opened early in the spring of 1864. The people of
the East, absorbed in the greater interest of the rebellion,
know but little of its history. Stock was stolen, ranches
destroyed, houses burned, freight trains plundered, and their
contents carried away or scattered upon the plains; settlers
in the frontier counties murdered, or forced to seek safety
for themselves and families in blockhouses and interior towns;
emigrants to our Territory were surprised in their camps,
children were slain, and wives taken prisoners; our trade and
travel with the States were cut off; the necessities of life
were at starvation prices; the interests of the Territory
were being damaged to the extent of millions; every species
of atrocity and barbarity which characterizes savage warfare
was committed. This is no fancy sketch, but a plain statement
of facts of which the committee seem to have had no proper
realization. All this history of war and blood—all this history
of rapine and ruin—all this story of outrage and suffering
on the part of our people—is summed up by the committee, and
given to the public in one mild sentence, "_Some_ had committed
acts of hostility against the whites."

The committee not only ignore the general and terrible character
of our Indian war, and the great sufferings of our people,
but make the grave charge that "no effort seems to have been
made by the authorities there to prevent all these hostilities."

Had the committee taken the trouble, as they certainly should
have done before making so grave a charge, to have read the
public documents of the government, examined the record and
files of the Indian Bureau, of the War Department, and of this
superintendency, _instead of adopting the language of some
hostile and irresponsible witness, as they appear to have done_,
they would have found that the most earnest and persistent
efforts had been made on my part to prevent hostilities. The
records show that early in the spring of 1863, United States
Indian Agent Loree, of the Upper Platte Agency, reported to me
in person that the Sioux under his agency, and the Arapahoes
and Cheyennes, were negotiating an alliance for war on the
whites. I immediately wrote an urgent appeal for authority to
avert the danger, and sent Agent Loree as special messenger
with the dispatch to Washington. In response authority was
given, and an earnest effort was made to collect the Indians
in council. The following admission, in the report of the
council, explains the result:

"Governor Evans: '... Hearing last fall that they were
dissatisfied, the Great Father at Washington sent me out on
the plains to talk with you and make it all right. I sent
messengers out to tell you that I had presents, and would
make you a feast; but you sent word to me that you did not
want to have anything to do with me, and to the Great Father
at Washington that you could get along without him. Bull Bear
wanted to come in to see me, at the head of the Republican,
but his people held a council and would not let him come.'

"Black Kettle: 'That is true.'

"Governor Evans: 'I was under the necessity, after all my
trouble, and all the expense I was at, of returning home
without seeing them. Instead of this, your people went away
and smoked the war-pipe with our enemies.'"

Notwithstanding these unsuccessful efforts, I still hoped to
preserve peace.

The records of these offices also show that, in the autumn of
1863, I was reliably advised from various sources that nearly
all the Indians of the plains had formed an alliance for the
purpose of going to war in the spring, and I immediately
commenced my efforts to avert the imminent danger. From
that time forward, by letter, by telegram, and personal
representation to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the
Secretary of War, the commanders of the department and district;
by traveling for weeks in the wilderness of the plains; by
distribution of annuities and presents; by sending notice
to the Indians to leave the hostile alliance; by every means
within my power, I endeavored to preserve peace and protect
the interests of the people of the Territory. And in the face
of all this, which the records abundantly show, the committee
say: "No effort seems to have been made by the authorities there
to prevent these hostilities, other than by the commission of
even worse acts."

They do not point out any of these acts, unless the continuation
of the paragraph is intended to do so. It proceeds:

"The hatred of the whites to the Indians would seem to
have been inflamed and excited to the utmost. The bodies of
persons killed at a distance—whether by Indians or not is
not certain—were brought to the capital of the Territory and
exposed to the public gaze, for the purpose of inflaming still
more the already excited feelings of the people."

There is no mention in this of anything that was done by
authority, but it is so full of misrepresentation, in apology
for the Indians, and unjust reflection on a people who have a
right from their birth, education, and ties of sympathy with
the people they so recently left behind them, to have at least
a just consideration. The bodies referred to were those of
the Hungate family, who were brutally murdered by the Indians,
within twenty-five miles of Denver. No one here ever doubted
that the Indians did it, and it was admitted by the Indians
in the council. This was early in the summer, and before the
notice sent in June to the friendly Indians. Their mangled
bodies were brought to Denver for decent burial. Many of our
people went to see them, as any people would have done. It
did produce excitement and consternation, and where are the
people who could have witnessed it without emotion? Would the
committee have the people shut their eyes to such scenes at
their very doors?

The next sentence, equally unjust and unfair, refers to my
proclamation, issued two months after this occurrence, and
four months before the "attack" they were investigating, and
having no connection with it or with the troops engaged in
it. It is as follows:

"The cupidity was appealed to, for the Governor, in a
proclamation, calls upon all, either individually, or in such
parties as they may organize, to kill and destroy as enemies
of the country, wherever they may be found, all such hostile
Indians; authorizing them to hold, to their own use and benefit,
all the property of said hostile Indians they may capture.
What Indians he would ever term friendly, it is impossible to
tell."

I offer the following statement of the circumstances under
which this proclamation was issued by the Hon. D. A. Chever.
It is as follows:

"EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, COLORADO TERRITORY,

August 21, 1865.

"I, David A. Chever, Clerk in the office of the
Governor of the territory of Colorado, do solemnly
swear that the people of said territory, from
the Purgatoire to the Cache la Poudre rivers, a
distance of over two hundred miles, and for a like
distance along the Platte river, being the whole
of our settlements on the plains, were thrown into
the greatest alarm and consternation by numerous
and almost simultaneous attacks and depredations
by hostile Indians early last summer; that they
left their unreaped crops, and collecting into
communities built blockhouses and stockades for
protection at central points throughout the long line
of settlements; that those living in the vicinity of
Denver City fled to it, and that the people of said
city were in great fear of sharing the fate of New
Ulm, Minnesota; that the threatened loss of crops,
and the interruption of communication with the states
by the combined hostilities, threatened the very
existence of the whole people; that this feeling
of danger was universal; that a flood of petitions
and deputations poured into this office, from the
people of all parts of the territory, praying for
protection, and for arms and authority to protect
themselves; that the defects of the militia law and
the want of means to provide for defense was proved
by the failure of this department, after the utmost
endeavors, to secure an effective organization under
it; that reliable reports of the presence of a large
body of hostile warriors at no great distance east
of this place were received, which reports were
afterwards proved to be true, by the statement of
Elbridge Gerry (page 232, Report of Commissioner of
Indian Affairs for 1864); that repeated and urgent
applications to the War Department for protection
and authority to raise troops for the purpose had
failed; that urgent applications to department and
district commanders had failed to bring any prospect
of relief, and that in the midst of this terrible
consternation and apparently defenseless condition,
it had been announced to this office, from district
headquarters, that all the Colorado troops in the
service of the United States had been peremptorily
ordered away, and nearly all of them had marched
to the Arkansas River, to be in position to repel
the threatened invasion of the rebels into Kansas
and Missouri; that reliable reports of depredations
and murders by the Indians, from all parts of our
extended lines of exposed settlements, became daily
more numerous, until the simultaneous attacks on
trains along the overland stage line were reported
by telegraph, on the 8th of August, described in the
letter of George K. Otis, superintendent of overland
stage line, published on page 254 of Report of
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864. Under these
circumstances, on the 11th of August, the Governor
issued his proclamation to the people, calling upon
them to defend their homes and families from the
savage foe; that it prevented anarchy; that several
militia companies immediately organized under it,
and aided in inspiring confidence; that under its
authority no act of impropriety has been reported,
and I do not believe that any occurred; that it had
no reference to or connection with the third regiment
of one-hundred-days men that was subsequently raised
by authority of the War Department, under a different
proclamation, calling for volunteers, or with any
of the troops engaged in the Sand Creek Affair, and
that the reference to it in such connection in the
report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War
is a perversion of the history and facts in the case.

"DAVID A. CHEVER."

"Territory of Colorado, Arapahoe County, City of
Denver, SS.: Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 21st day of August, A.D. 1865. ELI M.
ASHLEY, Notary Public."

I had appealed by telegraph, June 14th, to the War Department
for authority to call the militia into the United States
service, or to raise one-hundred-day troops; also had written
to our delegate in Congress to see why I got no response,
and had received his reply to the effect that he could learn
nothing about it; had received a notice from the department
commander, declining to take the responsibility of asking the
militia for United States service, throwing the people entirely
on the necessity of taking care of themselves.

It was under these circumstances of trial, suffering, and
danger on the part of the people, and of fruitless appeal
upon my part to the general government for aid, that I issued
my proclamation of the 11th of August, 1864, of which the
committee complains.

Without means to mount or pay militia, and failing to get
government authority to raise forces, and under the withdrawal
of the few troops in the Territory, could any other course be
pursued?

The people were asked to fight on their own account—at their
own expense—and in lieu of the protection the government
failed to render. They were authorized to kill only the Indians
that were murdering and robbing them in hostility, and to
keep the property captured from them. How the committee would
have them fight these savages, and what other disposition
they would make of the property captured, the public will be
curious to know. Would they fight without killing? Would they
have the captured property turned over to the government, as
if captured by United States troops? Would they forbid such
captures? Would they restore it to the hostile tribes?

The absurdity of the committee's saying that this was an
"appeal to the cupidity," is too palpable to require much
comment. Would men leave high wages, mount and equip themselves
at enormous expense, as some patriotically did, for the poor
chance of capturing property, as a mere speculation, from the
prowling bands of Indians that infested the settlements and
were murdering their families? The thing is preposterous.

For this proclamation I have no apology. It had its origin
and has its justification in the imperative necessities of the
case. A merciless foe surrounded us. Without means to mount or
pay militia, unable to secure government authority to raise
forces, and our own troops ordered away, again I ask, could
any other course be pursued?

Captain Tyler's and other companies organized under it, at
enormous expense, left their lucrative business, high wages,
and profitable employment, and served without other pay than
the consciousness of having done noble and patriotic service;
and no act of impropriety has ever been laid to the charge
of any party acting under this proclamation. They had all
been disbanded months before the "attack" was made that the
committee were investigating.

The third regiment was organized under authority from the War
Department, subsequently received by telegraph, and under a
subsequent proclamation issued on the 13th of August, and were
regularly mustered into the service of the United States about
three months before the battle the committee were investigating
occurred.

Before closing this reply, it is perhaps just that I should
say that when I testified before the committee, the chairman
and all its members except three were absent, and I think, when
the truth becomes known, this report will trace its parentage
to a single member of the committee.

I have thus noticed such portions of the report as refer to
myself, and shown conclusively that the committee, in every
mention they have made of me, have been, to say the least,
mistaken.

First: The committee, for the evident purpose of maintaining
their position that these Indians had not been engaged in war,
say the prisoners they held were purchased. The testimony is
to the effect that they captured them.

Second: The committee say that these Indians were and always
had been friendly, and had committed no acts of hostility
or depredations. The public documents to which I refer show
conclusively that they had been hostile, and had committed
many acts of hostility and depredations.

Third: They say that I joined in sending these Indians to
Fort Lyon. The published report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, and of the Indian council, show that I left them
entirely in the hands of the military authorities.

Fourth: They say nothing seems to have been done by the
authorities to prevent hostilities. The public documents and
files of the Indian Bureau, and of my superintendency, show
constant and unremitting diligence and effort on my part to
prevent hostilities and protect the people.

Fifth: They say that I prevaricated for the purpose of avoiding
the admission that these Indians "were and had been actuated
by the most friendly feelings towards the whites." Public
documents cited show conclusively that the admission they
desired me to make was false, and that my statement, instead
of being a prevarication, was true, although not in accordance
with the preconceived and mistaken opinions of the committee....

This report, so full of mistakes which ordinary investigation
would have avoided; so full of slander, which ordinary care of
the character of men would have prevented, is to be regretted,
for the reason that it throws doubt upon the reliability of
all reports which have emanated from the same source, during
the last four years of war.

I am confident that the public will see, from the facts herein
set forth, the great injustice done me; and I am further
confident that the committee, when they know these and other
facts I shall lay before them, will also see this injustice,
and, as far as possible, repair it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN EVANS, Governor of the Territory of
Colorado, and ex-officio Superintendent
of Indian Affairs.