Chapter VI: A DEFENSE OF THE BATTLE OF SAND CREEK (Continued)

If anything in addition to Governor Evans's statement were needed to prove the hostility of the Indians attacked at Sand Creek, it will be found in the admission of the Indians themselves at the council held by Governor Evans with the Cheyenne and Arapahoe chiefs in Denver about sixty days prior to the battle. At this council, there were present Black Kettle, leading chief of the Cheyennes, White Antelope, chief of the central band of the Cheyennes, Bull Bear, leader of the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, Neva, sub-chief of the Arapahoes, and several other minor chiefs of that tribe. These chiefs admitted that their people had been, and were still committing depredations, as the following extract from the report of the council, taken down at the time, conclusively shows:

GOV. EVANS: Who committed the murder of
the Hungate family on Running
Creek?

NEVA: The Arapahoes, a party of the northern
band who were passing north.
It was the Medicine Man, or
Roman Nose, and three others.
I am satisfied from the time he
left a certain camp for the north,
that it was this party of four
persons.

AGT. WHITLEY: That cannot be true.

GOV. EVANS: Where is Roman Nose?

NEVA: You ought to know better than me,
you have been nearer to him.

GOV. EVANS: Who killed the man and boy at the
head of Cherry Creek?

NEVA: (After consultation) Kiowas and
Comanches.

GOV. EVANS: Who stole the horses and mules
from Jimmy's Camp twenty-seven
days ago?

NEVA: _Fourteen Cheyennes and Arapahoes
together._

GOV. EVANS: What were their names?

NEVA: Powder Face and Whirlwind, _who
are now in our camp, were the
leaders_.

COL. SHOUP: I counted twenty Indians on that
occasion.

GOV. EVANS: Who stole Charlie Autobee's
horses?

NEVA: Raven's son.

GOV. EVANS: I suppose you acknowledge the depredations
on the Little Blue,
as you have the prisoners then
taken in your possession?

WHITE ANTELOPE: We [the Cheyennes] took two
prisoners west of Ft. Kearney
and destroyed the trains.

It will be seen from the foregoing, that these Indians, although pretending to be friendly, had to admit that their people stole the horses from the soldiers at Jimmy's Camp, near Colorado City, an account of which I have already given, and that the Indians who did it were in their camp at Sand Creek at the time the council was being held. They lied concerning the man and boy killed at the head of Cherry Creek, for they knew that the Kiowas and Comanches never came this far north, and that the murders were committed by their own people. Neva's admission that Raven's son stole Charlie Autobee's horses proved the hostility of the Arapahoes, as Raven was the head chief of that tribe.

At the time the council was being held, General S. R. Curtis, commanding the military district, sent the following telegram to Colonel Chivington, evidently fearing that peace would be made prematurely.

FT. LEAVENWORTH,
September 28th, 1864.

TO COLONEL CHIVINGTON:
I shall require the bad Indians delivered up; restoration of
equal numbers of stock; also hostages to secure. I want no peace
till the Indians suffer more. Left Hand is said to be a good
chief of the Arapahoes but Big Mouth is a rascal. I fear the
Agent of the Indian Department will be ready to make presents
too soon. It is better to chastise before giving anything but
a little tobacco to talk over. No peace must be made without
my direction.

S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.

On November 2, 1864, Major Wynkoop was relieved of the command at Fort Lyon, and Major Anthony, of the First Regiment of Colorado Cavalry, was appointed his successor. The reason given for the removal of Major Wynkoop was that he was inclined to temporize with the hostile Indians, contrary to the orders of his superior officers.

In a report made by Major Anthony to his superior officer from Fort Lyon, under date of November 6, 1864, he says:

Nine Cheyenne Indians to-day sent in wishing to see me. They
state that six hundred of that tribe are now thirty-five miles
north of here coming toward the post, and two thousand about
seventy-five miles away waiting for better weather to enable
them to come in.

I shall not permit them to come in even as prisoners, for
the reason that if I do, I shall have to subsist them upon a
prisoner's rations. I shall, however, demand their arms, all
stolen stock, and the perpetrators of all depredations. I am
of the opinion that they will not accept this proposition,
but that they will return to the Smoky Hill.

They pretend that they want peace, and I think they do now, as
they cannot fight during the winter, except where a small band
of them can fight an unprotected train or frontier settlement.
I do not think it is policy to make peace with them until all
perpetrators of depredations are surrendered up to be dealt
with as we may propose.

This report was dated only twenty-three days before the battle of Sand Creek occurred. The Indians Major Anthony mentions as camped thirty-five miles away were those that were attacked by Colonel Chivington. That they were not, and had not been under Major Anthony's protection, and that he considered them hostile, is clearly shown by the above report as well as by the testimony given by him March 14, 1865, in an investigation of the battle of Sand Creek made by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, as is shown by the following extracts:

"You say you held a conference with the Indians. State what
occurred?"

"At the time I took command of the post, there was a band of
Arapahoe Indians encamped about a mile from the post, numbering,
in men, women, and children, 652. They were visiting the post
almost every day. I met them and had a talk with them. Among
them was Left Hand, who was a chief among the Arapahoes. He
with his band was with the party at the time. I talked with
them and they proposed to do whatever I said; whatever I said
for them to do, they would do. I told them that I could not
feed them; that I could not give them anything to eat; that
there were positive orders forbidding that; that I could not
permit them to come within the limits of the post. At the same
time they might remain where they were and I would treat them
as prisoners of war if they remained; that they would have to
surrender to me all their arms, and turn over to me all stolen
property they had taken from the government or citizens. These
terms they accepted. They turned over to me some twenty head
of stock, mules and horses, and a few arms, but not a quarter
of the arms that report stated they had in their possession.
The arms they turned over to me were almost useless. I fed
them for some ten days. At the end of that time I told them
that I could not feed them any more; that they better go out
to the buffalo country where they could kill game to subsist
upon. I returned their arms to them and they left the post.
But before leaving they sent word out to the Cheyennes that
I was not very friendly towards them."

"How do you know that?"

"Through several of their chiefs: Neva, an Arapahoe chief,
Left Hand, of the Arapahoes; then Black Kettle and War Bonnet,
of the Cheyennes."

"What property did they turn over?"

"Fourteen head of mules and six head of horses."

"Was it property purporting to have been stolen by them?"

"Yes, sir."

"From whom?"

"They did not say, yet some of it was recognized; some of it
was branded 'U. S.' Some was recognized as being stock that
belonged to citizens. It was generally understood afterwards—I
did not know it at the time—that the son of the head chief of
the Arapahoes, Little Raven, and I think another, had attacked
a small government train and killed one man...."

"Who was the chief of that band?"

"Little Raven was the chief of those I held as prisoners....

"A delegation of the Cheyennes, numbering, I suppose, fifty or
sixty men, came in just before the Arapahoes left the post.
I met them outside the post and talked with them. They said
they wanted to make peace; that they had no desire to fight
against us any longer. I told them that I had no authority
from department headquarters to make peace with them; that I
could not permit them to visit the post and come within the
lines; that when they had been permitted to do so at Fort
Larned, while the squaws and children of the different tribes
that visited the post were dancing in front of the officers'
quarters and on the parade ground, the Indians had made an
attack on the post, fired on the guard, and run off the stock,
and I was afraid the same thing might occur at Fort Lyon. I
would not permit them to visit the post at all. I told them
I could make no offers of peace to them until I heard from
district headquarters. I told them, however, that they might go
out and camp on Sand Creek, and remain there if they chose to
do so; but they should not camp in the vicinity of the post;
that if I had authority to go out and make peace with them,
I would go out and let them know of it.

"In the meantime I was writing to district headquarters
constantly, stating to them that there was a band of Indians
within forty miles of the post—a small band—while a very
large band was about 100 miles from the post. That I was strong
enough with the force I had with me to fight the Indians on
Sand Creek, but not strong enough to fight the main band. That
I should try to keep the Indians quiet until such time as I
received reinforcements; and that as soon as reinforcements
did arrive we should go further and find the main party.

"But before the reinforcements came from district headquarters,
Colonel Chivington came to Fort Lyon with his command, and I
joined him and went out on that expedition to Sand Creek. I
never made any offer to the Indians. It was the understanding
that I was not in favor of peace with them. They so understood
me, I suppose; at least I intended they should. In fact, I
often heard of it through their interpreters that they did
not suppose we were friendly towards them....

"This is the way in which we had been situated out there. I
have been in command of a body of troops at Fort Larned or Fort
Lyon for upwards of two years. About two years ago in September
the Indians were professing to be perfectly friendly. These
were the Cheyennes, the Comanches, the Apaches, the Arapahoes,
the Kiowas, encamped at different points on the Arkansas
River between Fort Larned and Fort Lyon. Trains were going up
to Fort Lyon frequently and scarcely a train came in but had
some complaint to make about the Indians. I recollect that one
particular day three trains came in to the post and reported
to me that the Indians had robbed them of their provisions.
We at the post had to issue provisions to them constantly.
Trains that were carrying government freight to New Mexico
would stop there and get their supplies replenished on account
of the Indians having taken theirs on the road.

"At one time I took two pieces of artillery and 125 men, and
went down to meet the Indians. As soon as I got there they
were apparently friendly. A Kiowa chief perhaps would say to
me that his men were perfectly friendly, and felt all right
towards the whites, but the Arapahoes were very bad Indians. Go
to the Arapahoe camp, and they would perhaps charge everything
upon the Comanches; while the Comanches would charge it upon
the Cheyennes; yet each band there was professing friendship
towards us....

"When the Indians took their prisoners (in fact, however,
they generally took no prisoners) near Simmering Spring, they
killed ten men. I was told by Captain Davis, of the California
volunteers, that the Indians cut off the heads of the men after
they had scalped them, and piled them in a pile on the ground,
and danced around them, and kicked their bodies around over
the ground, etc. It is the general impression of the people of
that country that the only way to fight Indians is to fight
them as they fight us; if they scalp and mutilate the bodies
we must do the same.

"I recollect one occasion, when I had a fight on Pawnee fork
with the Indians there, I had fifty-nine men with me, and the
Indians numbered several hundred. I was retreating and they
had followed me about five miles. I had eleven men of my party
shot at that time. I had with my party then a few Delaware
Indians, and one Captain Fall Leaf, of the Delaware tribe, had
his horse shot; we had to stop every few minutes, dismount, and
fire upon the Indians to keep them off. They formed a circle
right around us. Finally we shot down one Indian very close
to us. I saw Fall Leaf make a movement as though he wanted
to scalp the Indian. I asked him if he wanted that Indian's
scalp and he said he did. We kept up a fire to keep the Indians
off, while he went down and took off his scalp, and gave his
Delaware war-whoop. That seemed to strike more terror into
those Indians than anything else we had done that day. And I
do think if it had not been for that one thing, we should have
lost a great many more of my men. I think it struck terror to
them so that they kept away from us."

"Did the troops mutilate the Indians killed at Sand Creek?"

"_They did in some instances that I know of, but I saw nothing
to the extent I have since heard stated._"

"Did you not feel that you were bound in good faith not to
attack those Indians after they had surrendered to you and
after they had taken up a position which you yourself had
indicated?"

"I did not consider that they had surrendered to me; I never
would consent that they should surrender to me. My instructions
were such that I felt in duty bound to fight them wherever I
found them; provided I considered it good policy to do so. I
did not consider it good policy to attack this party of Indians
on Sand Creek unless I was strong enough to go on and fight
the main band at the Smoke Hills, some seventy miles further.
If I had had that force, I should have gone out and fought
this band on Sand Creek...."

"You think the attack made upon those Indians, in addition to
the other characteristics which it possesses, was impolitic?"

"I do, very much so. I think it was the occasion of what
has occurred on the Platte since that time. I have so stated
in my report to the headquarters of the district and of the
department. I stated before Colonel Chivington arrived there
that the Indians were encamped at this point; that I had a
force with me sufficiently strong to go out and fight them;
but that I did not think it policy to do so, for I was not
strong enough to fight the main band. If I fought this band,
the main band would immediately strike the settlements. But so
soon as the party should be strong enough to fight the main
band, I should be in favor of making the war general against
the Indians. I stated to them also that I did not believe we
could fight one band without fighting them all; that in case
we fought one party of Indians and whipped them, those that
escaped would go into another band that was apparently friendly
and that band would secrete those who had been committing
depredations before. As it was with Little Raven's band; his
own sons attacked a train a short distance above Fort Lyon,
killed one soldier, took a government wagon and mules, some
horses, and took some women prisoners. One woman they afterwards
outraged and she hung herself; the other one, I think, they
still hold. Some of the Indians have married her, as they call
it, and she is still in their camp, as I have understood;
not now in the camp of those who took her prisoner, but she
has been sold to the Sioux and Cheyennes. The instructions we
constantly received from the headquarters both of the district
and the department, were that we should show as little mercy
to the Indians as possible...."

In another part of his testimony, Major Anthony said referring to the Arapahoes, "I considered them differently from the Cheyennes," and when asked if they were with the Cheyennes at Sand Creek, replied, "I understood, afterwards, that some six or eight or ten lodges of the Arapahoes were there."

Major S. G. Colley, the Indian agent, said in his testimony, "Left Hand's band had gone out to Sand Creek," and when asked how many were in Left Hand's band, replied, "About eight lodges of about five to the lodge."

If there were no other evidence, the following telegrams from General Curtis, Commander of the Department of Missouri, are in themselves sufficient proofs of the hostility of both Cheyennes and Arapahoes:

FT. LEAVENWORTH, April 8th, 1864.

TO COLONEL CHIVINGTON:

I hear that Indians have committed depredations on or near
Platte River. Do not let district lines prevent pursuing and
punishing them.

S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.

FT. LEAVENWORTH, May 30th, 1864.
TO COLONEL CHIVINGTON:

Some four hundred Cheyennes attacked Lieut. Clayton on Smoky
Hill. After several hours fight the Indians fled, leaving
twenty-eight killed. Our loss four killed and three wounded.
Look out for Cheyennes everywhere. Especially instruct troops
in upper Arkansas.

S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.

FT. LEAVENWORTH, October 7, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff:

General Blunt came upon a party of Arapahoes and other hostile
Indians supposed to be four thousand, with fifteen hundred
warriors, on the twenty-fifth ultimo. This was about one hundred
miles west of Larned on Pawnee fork. The Indians overpowered
the advance, but the main force coming up routed and pursued
them. Ninety-one dead Indians were left and we lost two killed
and seven wounded. General Blunt's force was less than five
hundred. He pursued for several days.

S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.

The place where this battle occurred was about one hundred and thirty miles east of the Sand Creek battle-ground, and probably some of the same Indians were in both encounters.

The telegrams I have quoted indicate that General Curtis was fully alive to the situation. Evidently he believed the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were hostile and was not in favor of making peace with them until they had been punished.

On account of his limited force, Colonel Chivington could do little more than protect the lines of travel; consequently, all that summer and fall the frontier settlers were compelled to take care of themselves. And it was not until after the Third Colorado had been organized and equipped that he was able to strike a decisive blow. In his deposition presented at the investigation by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, among other things, Colonel Chivington has the following to say concerning the battle of Sand Creek and the conditions leading up to it.

"On the 29th day of November, 1864, the troops under my command
attacked a camp of Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians at a place
known as Big Bend of Sandy, about forty miles north of Fort
Lyon, Colorado Territory. There were in my command at that time
about (500) five hundred men of the Third Regiment Colorado
cavalry, under the immediate command of Colonel George L.
Shoup, of said Third Regiment, and about (250) two hundred
and fifty men of the First Colorado cavalry; Major Scott J.
Anthony commanded one battalion of said First regiment, and
Lieutenant Luther Wilson commanded another battalion of said
First regiment. The Third regiment was armed with rifled
muskets, and Star's and Sharp's carbines. A few of the men of
that regiment had revolvers. The men of the First regiment
were armed with Star's and Sharp's carbines, and revolvers.
The men of the Third regiment were poorly equipped; the supply
of blankets, boots, hats, and caps was deficient. The men of
the First regiment were well equipped; all of these troops
were mounted. I had four 12-pound mountain howitzers, manned
by detachments from cavalry companies; they did not belong to
any battery company.

"From the best and most reliable information I could obtain,
there were in the Indian camp, at the time of the attack, about
eleven or twelve hundred Indians; of these about seven hundred
were warriors and the remainder were women and children. I am
not aware that there were any old men among them. _There was
an unusual number of males among them, for the reason that
the war chiefs of both nations were assembled there, evidently
for some special purpose...._"

"What number did you lose in killed, and what number in wounded
and what number in missing?"

"There were seven men killed, forty-seven wounded, and one
was missing.

"From the best information I could obtain, I judge that
there were five or six hundred Indians killed; I cannot state
positively the number killed, nor can I state positively the
number of women and children killed. Officers who passed over
the field, by my orders, report that they saw but few women
and children dead, no more than would certainly fall in an
attack upon a camp in which they were. I myself passed over
some portions of the field after the fight, and _I saw but one
woman who had been killed, and one who had hanged herself; I
saw no dead children. From all I could learn, I arrived at the
conclusion that but few women or children had been slain. I
am of the opinion that when the attack was made on the Indian
camp the greater number of squaws and children made their
escape, while the warriors remained to fight my troops._

"I do not know that any Indians were wounded that were not
killed; if there were any wounded, I do not think they could
have been made prisoners without endangering the lives of the
soldiers; Indians usually fight as long as they have strength
to resist. Eight Indians fell into the hands of the troops
alive, to my knowledge; these with one exception were sent to
Fort Lyon and properly cared for....

"My reason for making the attack on the Indian camp was that
I believed the Indians in the camp were hostile to the whites.
That they were of the same tribes with those who had murdered
many persons and destroyed much valuable property on the Platte
and Arkansas rivers during the previous spring, summer, and
fall was beyond a doubt. When a tribe of Indians is at war with
the whites, it is impossible to determine what party or band
of the tribe or the name of the Indian or Indians belonging
to the tribe so at war, are guilty of the acts of hostility.
The most that can be ascertained is that Indians of the tribe
have performed the acts. During the spring, summer, and fall
of the year 1864, the Arapahoe and Cheyenne Indians, in some
instances assisted or led on by Sioux, Kiowas, Comanches, and
Apaches, had committed many acts of hostility in the country
lying between the Little Blue and the Rocky Mountains and
the Platte and Arkansas rivers. They had murdered many of the
whites and taken others prisoners, and had destroyed valuable
property, probably amounting to $200,000 or $300,000. Their
rendezvous was on the headwaters of the Republican, probably
one hundred miles from where the Indian camp was located. I
had every reason to believe that these Indians were either
directly or indirectly concerned in the outrages that had been
committed upon the whites. I had no means of ascertaining what
were the names of the Indians who had committed these outrages
other than the declarations of the Indians themselves; and
the character of Indians in the western country for truth and
veracity, like their respect for the chastity of women who may
become prisoners in their hands, is not of that order which
is calculated to inspire confidence in what they may say.
In this view I was supported by Major Anthony, 1st Colorado
Cavalry, commanding at Fort Lyon, and Samuel G. Colley, United
States Indian Agent, who, as they had been in communication
with these Indians, were more competent to judge of their
disposition toward the whites than myself. Previous to the
battle they expressed to me the opinion that the Indians should
be punished. We found in the camp the scalps of nineteen white
persons. One of the surgeons informed me that one of these
scalps had been taken from the victim's head not more than
four days previously. I can furnish a child captured at camp
ornamented with six white women's scalps. These scalps must
have been taken by these Indians or furnished to them for
their gratification and amusement by some of their brethren,
who, like themselves, were in amity with the whites.

"I had no reason to believe that Black Kettle and the Indians
with him were in good faith at peace with the whites. The day
before the attack Major Scott J. Anthony, 1st Colorado Cavalry,
then commander at Fort Lyon, told me that these Indians were
hostile; that he had ordered his sentinels to fire on them if
they attempted to come into the post, and that the sentinels
had fired on them; that he was apprehensive of an attack from
these Indians and had taken every precaution to prevent a
surprise. Major Samuel G. Colley, United States Indian Agent
for these Indians, told me on the same day that he had done
everything in his power to make them behave themselves, and
that for the last six months he could do nothing with them;
that nothing but a sound whipping would bring a lasting peace
with them. These statements were made to me in the presence
of the officers of my staff whose statements can be obtained
to corroborate the foregoing....

"Since August, 1863, I had been in possession of the most
conclusive evidence of the alliance, for the purposes of
hostility against the whites, of the Sioux, Cheyennes,
Arapahoes, Comanche, Kiowa and Apache Indians.

"Their plan was to interrupt, or, if possible, entirely prevent
all travel on the routes along the Arkansas and Platte rivers,
from the states to the Rocky Mountains, and thereby depopulate
this country....

"With very few troops at my command, I could do little to
protect the settlers, except to collect the latest intelligence
from the Indians' country, communicate it to General Curtis,
commanding department of Missouri, and warn the settlers of
the relations existing between the Indians and the whites,
and the probability of trouble, all of which I did....

"Commanding only a district with very few troops under my
control, with hundreds of miles between my headquarters and
the rendezvous of the Indians, with a large portion of the
Santa Fe and Platte routes, besides the sparsely settled and
distant settlements of this Territory to protect, I could not
do anything till the 3rd regiment was organized and equipped,
when I determined to strike a blow against this savage and
determined foe. When I reached Fort Lyon, after passing over
from three to five feet of snow, and greatly suffering from
the intensity of the cold, the thermometer ranging from 28 to
30 degrees below zero, I questioned Major Anthony in regard
to the whereabouts of hostile Indians. He said there was a
camp of Cheyennes and Arapahoes about fifty miles distant;
that he would have attacked before, but did not consider his
force sufficient; that these Indians had threatened to attack
the post, etc., and ought to be whipped, all of which was
concurred in by Major Colley, Indian agent for the district
of the Arkansas, which information with the positive orders
of Major-General Curtis, commanding the department, to punish
these Indians, decided my course, and resulted in the battle
of Sand Creek, which has created such a sensation in Congress
through the lying reports of interested and malicious parties.

"On my arrival at Fort Lyon, in all my conversations with Major
Anthony, commanding the post, and Major Colley, Indian Agent,
I heard nothing of this recent statement that the Indians were
under the protection of the government, etc., but Major Anthony
repeatedly stated to me that he had at different times fired
upon these Indians, and that they were hostile, and, during
my stay at Fort Lyon, urged the necessity of my immediately
attacking the Indians before they could learn of the number of
troops at Fort Lyon, and so desirous was Major Colley, Indian
agent, that I should find and also attack the Arapahoes, that
he sent a messenger after the fight at Sand Creek nearly forty
miles to inform me where I could find the Arapahoes and Kiowas;
yet, strange to say, I have learned recently that these men,
Anthony and Colley, are the most bitter in their denunciations
of the attack upon the Indians at Sand Creek. Therefore, I
would, in conclusion, most respectfully demand, as an act of
justice to myself and the brave men whom I have had the honor
to command in one of the hardest campaigns ever made in this
country, whether against white men or red, that we be allowed
the right guaranteed to every American citizen, of introducing
evidence in our behalf to sustain us in what we believe to
have been an act of duty to ourselves and to civilization."

Colonel George L. Shoup, in a deposition presented to the military commission investigating the battle of Sand Creek, among other things, says:

On or about the 12th of November, 1864, I left Denver for Fort
Lyon, with Companies C, D, and F of my regiment and Company
H of the First Colorado Cavalry, and on or about the 18th of
November joined Major Sayre at Boonville with that portion of
the regiment which had been left at Bijou Basin (he having been
ordered to precede me), consisting of Companies A, B, and E,
and I and M. On or about the 20th Captain Baxter joined the
command with Company G, and the day following Colonel John M.
Chivington, commander of the district of Colorado, arrived and
assumed command of the column, I still commanding my regiment.
On or about the 22d the column, consisting of my regiment
and a battalion of the first, marched from Boonville towards
Fort Lyon and reached Fort Lyon on the 28th, and went into
camp. On the evening of the 28th I received orders from the
colonel commanding to prepare three days' cooked rations, and
be ready to march at eight o'clock the same evening. At eight
o'clock the column marched in the following order: the first
regiment on the right, my regiment on the left. I had under
my immediate command between five hundred and fifty and six
hundred men mounted. My transportation was left at Fort Lyon.
The column marched all night in a northerly direction. About
daylight the next morning came in sight of an Indian village.
Colonel Chivington and myself being about three-fourths of a
mile in advance of the column, it was determined to make an
immediate attack. Lieutenant Wilson, commanding a battalion of
the first, was ordered to cut off the ponies of the Indians at
the northeast of the village. By order of Colonel Chivington,
I was ordered to send men to the southwest of the village, to
cut off the ponies in that direction, and then to immediately
engage the Indians.

"Did Colonel Chivington make any remarks to the troops, in
your hearing?"

"He did not."

"Did you approach the camp of the Indians in line of battle
with your men mounted, or dismounted?"

"Kept my men in columns of fours till I arrived at the village,
when I formed them in line of battle, and to the left of a
battalion of the first, commanded by Lieutenant Wilson, my
men mounted."

"At what distance was your command from the village when you
commenced fire upon it?"

"I did not allow my men to fire when I formed my first line;
the battalion on my right was firing. I wheeled my men into
column of fours and marched to the rear of the battalion on
my right, to the right of that battalion, to obtain a better
position. I marched up Sand Creek some distance, following the
Indians who were retreating up the creek. When opposite the
main body of Indians, wheeled my men into line, dismounted,
and opened fire."

"Did you know what band of Indians it was at the time of the
attack?"

"I heard while at Fort Lyon that Left Hand, of the Arapahoes,
and Black Kettle, of the Cheyennes, were at the village."

"Did you, at any time prior to the attack, hear Colonel
Chivington say that he was going to attack Black Kettle's band?"

"I did not."

"How long did the fight last?"

"The fighting did not entirely cease until about three o'clock
in the afternoon."

"Did you camp with your regiment near the battle-ground?"

"We camped on ground occupied by the Indians before the battle."

"What was done with the Indians and other property?"

"The lodges were burned. The ponies, numbering, as I was told,
five hundred and four, were placed in charge of the provost
marshal. A few remained in the hands of the troops."

"What were the casualties of your regiment?"

"Ten killed, one missing, about forty wounded."

"In your opinion how many Indians were killed?"

"From my own observation I should say about three hundred."

"Were they men, or women and children?"

"Some of each."

"Did you witness any scalping or other mutilation of the dead
by your command?"

"I saw one or two men who were in the act of scalping, but I
am not positive."

* * * * *

"Were you present in council with some Indian chiefs in Denver,
some time last summer or fall?"

"I was."

"Who were present—whites and Indians?"

"Governor Evans, Colonel Chivington, Captain S. M. Robbins,
Major Wynkoop, Major Whiteley, Amos Steck, J. Bright Smith,
Nelson Sargent, Captain John Wanless, Black Kettle, White
Antelope, and five or six other Indians, and John Smith and
Sam Ashcroft, interpreters."

"Did the Indians express a desire for peace with the whites?"

"Yes."

"Upon what terms did they desire peace?"

"That they have protection and supplies while the war was
carried on against hostile Indians."

"Was peace guaranteed to them on any terms?"

"They were told by Colonel Chivington that if they would come
in and surrender themselves, he would then tell them what to
do."

"What did the governor tell them?"

"That as they had violated all treaties they would have to
treat with the military authorities, to whom he had given up
all the authority."

"Did Colonel Chivington tell them that he would guarantee them
peace only on condition that they would come into the post
and lay down their arms?"

"Colonel Chivington did not guarantee them peace upon any terms,
but if they would come into the post, surrender themselves,
and lay down their arms, he would tell them what to do."

"Did the Indians say that they would do so?"

"They said that they would go back to their people, tell them
and advise them to do so."

* * * * *

"Did you have any conversation with Major Colley, Indian
agent for the Arapahoes and Cheyennes of the Upper Arkansas,
respecting the disposition of the Indians and the policy that
ought to be pursued towards them? If so, state what he said."

"I had an interview with Major Colley, on the evening of the
28th of November, in which he stated to me that these Indians
had violated their treaty; that there were a few Indians that he
would not like to see punished, but as long as they affiliated
with the hostile Indians we could not discriminate; that no
treaty could be made that would be lasting till they were all
severely chastised; he also told me where these Indians were
camped."

"State what you heard Major Scott J. Anthony say in reference
to these Indians on the 28th of November last."

"He said he would have fought these Indians before if he had
had a force strong enough to do so, and left a sufficient
garrison at Fort Lyon, he being at the time in command of Fort
Lyon."

The Hon. S. H. Elbert, Acting Governor of Colorado, in a message to the Legislature, a few months after the affair, reflects the general attitude of the people toward the battle, and those participating in it. The following is an extract from it:

The before unbroken peace of our Territory has been disturbed
since the last spring, by an Indian war. Allied and hostile
tribes have attacked our frontier settlements, driven in our
settlers, destroyed their homes, attacked, burned, and plundered
our freight and emigrant trains, and thus suspended agricultural
pursuits in portions of our country, and interrupted our trade
and commerce with the States. This has for the time seriously
retarded the prosperity of our Territory.

At the commencement of the war the General Government, taxed
to the utmost in subduing the rebellion, was unable to help
us, and it became necessary to look to our own citizens for
protection. They everywhere responded with patriotism and
alacrity. Militia companies were organized in the frontier
counties and secured local protection. Much credit is due
to Captain Tyler's company of militia for the important
service they rendered in opening and protecting our line of
communication with the States.

In response to the call of the governor for a regiment of
cavalry for one hundred day service, over a thousand of
our citizens—the large majority of them leaving lucrative
employment—rapidly volunteered, and in that short time, despite
the greatest difficulties in securing proper equipments,
organized, armed, made a long and severe campaign amid the
snows and storms of winter, and visited upon these merciless
murderers of the plains a chastisement smiting and _deserved_.
The gratitude of the country is due to the men who thus
sacrificed so largely their personal interests for the public
good, and rendered such important service to the Territory;
and their work, if it can be followed up with a vigorous winter
campaign, would result in a permanent peace.

The necessity of such a campaign, and the imperative demand for
immediate and complete protection for our line of communication
with the States has been, and is now being, earnestly urged on
the Government at Washington, and with a prospect of success.
These efforts should be seconded by your honorable body with
whatever influence there may be in resolution or memorial,
setting forth the facts and necessities of our situation.

The testimony of Governor Evans, Major Anthony, Colonel Chivington, Colonel Shoup, and Acting Governor Elbert covers every phase of the matter in controversy. Governor Evans's statement proves beyond question that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were viciously hostile during the entire summer preceding the battle of Sand Creek, and this was admitted by Black Kettle in his letter to Major Colley, the Indian agent, and by the other chiefs in the council at Denver. Governor Evans also makes it plain that he refused to consider the question of making peace, and turned the Indians over to the military. The telegram of General Curtis, commander of the Military Department, sent at the time the council was being held, says, "No peace must be made without my direction." And peace had not been made when the battle was fought. Major Anthony, commander of the military post of Fort Lyon, near the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indian agency, says that the Indians attacked were hostile and not under his protection, and that he would have punished them had his force been strong enough to fight also the large band on the Smoky Hill River. Colonel Chivington's testimony confirms the statement of Governor Evans as to the hostility of both Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and both he and Colonel Shoup say that this was corroborated by Major Anthony, and Major Colley, the Indian agent, each of whom told them, while at Fort Lyon prior to the battle, that the Indians camped on Sand Creek were hostile and should be punished. Major Anthony admits that there were Arapahoes camped near the Fort when he assumed command, and that, in compliance with his demand, they surrendered twenty head of stock, stolen from the whites, and a few worthless guns; and added that a week or two later he returned the guns, and told the Indians that he could no longer feed them and ordered them to go out on the plains, where they could kill buffalo for food; whereupon they left.

The only Arapahoes that by any stretch of the imagination could be said to have been under the protection of the military were the small part of the tribe under the control of Left Hand, a sub-chief; while there is no doubt whatever as to the hostility of the head chief Raven and his followers, who constituted a large majority of the tribe. It is generally conceded that the chief Left Hand and a few of his adherents were peaceably inclined. But, unfortunately, he and the occupants of six or eight lodges of his people, about forty persons in all, including women and children, were in the camp of the hostile Cheyennes and Arapahoes at the time the attack was made, and suffered accordingly. Left Hand knew that the Cheyennes and a very large part of his own people were at war with the whites, and of the chance he was taking in being in company with the hostiles. If it resulted disastrously, he had no one but himself to blame. It was utterly impossible to discriminate between Indians in the midst of the battle. In those days, Indians seldom permitted themselves to be taken prisoners in battle, and an attempt to do so, even if the Indian was badly wounded, was a dangerous undertaking. This was the reason that no prisoners were taken at Sand Creek. Major Anthony, who was not friendly to Colonel Chivington, says that while in some instances the Indians killed at Sand Creek were mutilated, he saw nothing to the extent since stated.

Colonel Chivington's statement concerning the matter is:

Officers who passed over the field by my orders after the
battle, for the purpose of ascertaining the number of Indians
killed, report that they saw but few women and children dead;
no more than would certainly fall in an attack upon a camp in
which they were. I myself passed over some portions of the
field after the fight, and saw but one woman who had been
killed and one who had hanged herself. I saw no dead children.

In this connection, I wish to refer back to my own statement concerning the matter, as Colonel Chivington's observations were identical with mine.

All this shows that the charge that the battle was merely a massacre is as untruthful as are most of the other statements made by the coterie of disgruntled army officers, Indian agents, traders, interpreters, and half-breeds. Much of the testimony given at the Congressional and military hearings was hearsay evidence of statements said to have been made by persons who claimed to have been in the battle. Possibly, some such statements may have been made by irresponsible braggarts belonging to the two regiments that formed the command, for in every regiment during the Rebellion, Eastern as well as Western, there were a few men who were no credit to their comrades, and who have since told of many fictitious happenings, or those having only the slightest basis of truth. Statements of this character may, perhaps, have been made by irresponsible members of the First and Third Colorado regiments.

It is inconceivable to any one who knew the members of the latter regiment that either its officers or enlisted men, with possibly a rare exception, would have approved of, and much less have participated in, the wanton acts of cruelty claimed to have been perpetrated. No unprejudiced person can believe a charge of such a character against Colonel Shoup, afterwards for many years an honored United States Senator from the State of Idaho; or of Major Hal Sayre, one of Colorado's most respected mining engineers; or of Captain Harper Orahood, who, later, was for many years a law partner of Senator H. M. Teller; or of Captain Baxter of Pueblo, or Captain Nichols of Boulder, both afterwards members of the Legislature of Colorado and honored citizens in the community in which they lived; or in fact against any of the officers of the Third Colorado, as practically all of them were men of high standing in their respective communities.

I was on the battle-field within fifteen minutes after the fight began, and during the day, with a part of our company, I went along the south side of Sand Creek from the scene of one engagement to another, until I had covered the full length of the battle-field on that side of the creek. We then crossed over to the north side and followed up the creek as far as the engagement had extended. On our return to camp, we went over the entire length of the scene of the fighting on the north side of the creek, thus covering almost the entire battle-field, as after the first half-hour in the morning there was but little fighting except near the banks of the creek. During that time I saw much of the battle, but not once did I see any one shoot at a squaw or a child, nor did I see any one take a scalp, although it is true that scalps were taken, for as I returned to camp I saw a number of dead Indians whose scalps had been taken, and among them a few squaws. They had probably been scalped by some of the reckless persons referred to, or possibly by some of the many men in the regiment whose relatives or friends had been killed and brutally mutilated by the savages during the preceding summer. I am not apologizing for the acts of these people, but every fair-minded person must admit that there may have been extenuating circumstances connected with the offense, and no one unfamiliar with the horrors of savage warfare can appreciate the feelings of those who have suffered from their attacks. I did not see a dead or wounded child, and it is inconceivable that any were killed during the fight except accidentally. The incident of the child who wished me to take it up as I was returning to the camp indicates the sympathetic attitude of our men towards the innocent non-combatants.

I think the proof I have presented shows conclusively that every one of the charges made by the enemies of Colonel Chivington was untrue; that, on the contrary, the Indians attacked at Sand Creek were, and had been during the previous summer, viciously hostile to the whites; that they were not under the protection of the military authorities at Fort Lyon, and that the battle was not a wanton massacre.

The adverse criticism of this whole affair was but one of the many acts of injustice experienced by the frontier settlers. From the formation of the Government, up to the time when the Indians were finally placed upon reservations, the frontier settlements, in addition to defending themselves from the savages, always had to contend with the sentimental feeling in favor of the Indians that prevailed in the East. The people of the East had apparently forgotten the atrocities perpetrated on their ancestors by the savages, and, resting secure in the safety of their own homes, they could not realize the privations and dangers that those who were opening up the regions of the West had to endure. And to add to the difficulties of the situation, the Indian Department was usually dominated by sentimental people who apparently never had any conception of a proper and humane method of dealing with the Indians.

The Government continued to recognize each one of the tribes as a separate nation, and entered into treaties with them, as though they had the standing of an independent and responsible power. Broken down and often corrupt men were appointed as agents to represent the Government. The salaries received by the agents were so small that no one could afford to take the position unless he intended to increase his remuneration by corrupt methods. As a part of this machinery for dealing with the Indians, disreputable white men were employed as interpreters, who, often by reason of some crime committed in the States, had for safety's sake exiled themselves among the Indians, had married squaws, and, virtually, had become Indians in habits and sympathy. The result was that when the Government made treaties with the Indians, accompanied by an issue of annuities, it frequently happened that the agent and the interpreter would apply a considerable portion of such annuities to their own use. The Indians, knowing this, would become angry and take vengeance upon the white settler.

No effort seems to have been made to study the nature and character of the Indian, nor the inherited traits that governed him in his dealings with others. The nomadic Indian of the central and western part of the United States was, in most matters, merely a child. His sole occupation from youth to old age was following the chase and fighting his enemies. Almost the sole topic of conversation in their tents and around their camp-fires was the details of their hunting expeditions and of their battles; and from his earliest days, every Indian boy was taught that his one hope of glory and the making of a reputation depended upon his ability to kill other human beings. Every tribe had its hereditary enemies with whom it was in a state of continuous warfare. During the summer-time, it was one continuous round of war-parties going out to attack their enemies, and parties returning, bringing with them the scalps of those they had killed, together with squaws and children they had captured, and frequently with large herds of horses they had stolen. If the raids were against the whites, they would return with all sorts of plunder taken from wagon-trains and ranch houses, and oftentimes with captive white women and children. It must be understood that no white man who understood the character of the Indian would ever permit himself to be taken a prisoner, for that meant torture of the most horrible character. For that reason, white men, engaged in battle with the Indians, seldom failed to reserve one last shot in their revolvers, with which to end their lives if capture was imminent, and in many instances men have shot their wives and children rather than allow them to fall into the hands of the Indians. The fate of the women captured by the Indians is indescribable.

After a successful raid, there would ensue a series of scalp dances, accompanied by a period of frenzied rejoicing, in which unspeakable cruelties were perpetrated upon their captive victims. The fiendishness of these cruelties it is almost impossible to describe. In these orgies the squaws always participated, and as a rule were even more diabolical than the warriors. With such examples and with such mothers, how could an Indian child grow up to be anything but fiendish? The Indians had no conception of such a thing as mercy, compassion, or humane treatment of their enemies. Any exhibition of sentiment of that sort would have been considered an evidence of weakness, and any act of forbearance shown toward them by the whites served only to make them more difficult to control thereafter. They gave no quarter and they asked no quarter.

As showing their contempt for the army, I saw upon more than one of the Indian tents that we captured at Sand Creek rude paintings portraying their fights with the soldiers of the United States Army. In every case the soldiers were running at the top of their speed, pursued by Indians who were firing at them and scalping those who had been killed. The Indians knew no law, nor did the Government attempt to teach them any. From the first they were permitted to go on year by year educating their young in savagery, while at the same time the agents of the Government were dealing dishonestly with them; and in every case it was the frontier settler who had to pay the penalty.

The savages soon found out that they could kill the whites, steal or destroy their property throughout the summer, and then upon their professing penitence, the Government would permit them to remain unmolested during the winter and at other times would make a treaty of peace with them and give them large quantities of annuities. After this, they could rest in security until their ponies were in condition to start upon the war-path again the following spring. Was there ever anything in the history of the dealings of any nation with its savage neighbors more absurd or more disreputable? The period I have referred to was certainly a "Century of Dishonor," not only because of the attitude of the Government in its dealings with the Indians, but in the treatment of those of its own people who were opening up frontier lands for settlement.

The Indians could have been easily handled had the Government studied their nature and formulated a system of laws for their control, compelling them to regard the rights of the whites as well as of their neighboring tribes, and had at the same time protected them from wrongs perpetrated upon them by thieving and disreputable white men; in short, have treated them with justice in all things, and have required the same from them in their dealing with the whites. Had this policy been pursued, it would have been of infinite benefit to the Indians, and would have saved the lives of thousands of white men along the frontier settlements. In this connection, I assert, from my personal knowledge, that more than ninety-five per cent. of the frontier settlers treated the Indians with the utmost fairness and used every possible endeavor to avoid difficulties with them.

As I have already said, the Indian is at a great disadvantage in carrying on warfare during the winter. He has no trouble in this direction in his warfare with his own race, as every tribe is alike in this respect. In this way the white people had a great advantage, and it would have required only a few cases of summary punishment such as we gave them at Sand Creek, to have settled Indian troubles for all time. We who inhabited the frontier in the early sixties knew this and realized that nothing struck such terror to the Indian tribes as to be attacked in the winter, and had the battle of Sand Creek been followed up as it should have been, the frontier settlements of Colorado would thereafter have had little trouble with any of the Indians of the plains.

Four years later, the absurdity of the policy of permitting the Indians to murder and rob during the summer, make peace in the fall, and remain unmolested during the winter, accumulating ammunition for the following summer's warfare, finally dawned upon the military authorities and a new policy was adopted. As a result, on the 27th of November, 1868, General Custer, under the direction of General Sheridan, commander of the military division of the Missouri, made an attack upon the Cheyennes camped on the Washita, south of the Arkansas River, in which one hundred and three Indians (a number of whom were squaws) were killed, fifty-three squaws and children were captured, and 875 ponies were taken. This attack was at the same time of year and was almost identical with that made by Chivington at Sand Creek. General Sheridan says in his report:

The objects of the winter's operations were to strike a hard
blow and force them on to the reservation set apart for them,
or if this could not be accomplished, to show to the Indian
that the winter season would not give him rest; that he, with
his village and stock, could be destroyed; that he would have
no security winter or summer except in obeying the laws of
peace and humanity.

As in the case of Chivington, Custer was attacked viciously for this affair by Wynkoop and others, but, fortunately, Custer had the backing of the commanding officers of the army and nothing his enemies could do affected him in the least.

What a fortunate thing it would have been for the frontier people if this policy had been adopted a few years sooner!