Chapter VI: Part 6

A good deal is alleged by those trading from Britain to the East Indies against the policy of any part of the British nation lending patronage to such an undertaking, which, it is presumed, would benefit the countries bordering the Mediterranean more than our own; though, if the canal in question would be the means of most materially shortening the distance between the two most important portions of the British Empire, little doubt can be entertained of the benefit conferred on the extensive commerce of the two countries, even though some other nations would receive a greater proportional advantage in the accomplishment of the measure; and though the commerce of other nations might increase in a greater ratio than the British, still all would participate in facilities to be obtained; and in the case of war arising, it is but too obvious, that the power possessing a naval superiority has the means of closing such a channel of commerce to its enemies, by stationing cruisers at each extremity. So much may be urged with a view of removing the prejudice of British interests against the measure; but it will readily be believed, that if the British fail to patronize the undertaking, other nations and powers will do so shortly: and it is therefore manifest, if British subjects were chiefly concerned in advancing the capital, and in executing and managing this great work, it would be vastly more for the benefit of Britain, than if any other nation or Government lent their resources. But undertake it who may, it is most probable, that both the funds and the energies of execution will come from this country; and it is too probable, that if the measure is executed by any other parties than British, the work will be upon a cheaper and less effective plan of navigation, permitting only small craft to navigate, unfit for British commerce in the East, though sufficient for the small traders in the Mediterranean, who would consequently, in such a case, reap the entire benefit. I am decidedly of opinion, that British capital and British energy would alone execute the work in a truly useful and permanent style. But the measure is daily becoming so much more obvious as one of practical facility, that it cannot long be postponed in some shape or another.

The conclusions may now be recapitulated in general terms:—

1st. That a ship canal between the two Seas, which contemplates an extended commerce between the countries of Europe and the Indian Ocean, should be free from the effects of all fluctuating causes, arising from inundations or floods, &c.

2nd. That it should be a measure irrespective of the commerce of Egypt and the Nile, or rather that it could not combine these objects in the same measure, with any good results; though it would be the means of greatly improving the commerce of Egypt by accessory measures.

3rd. That the mean fall from the level of the Red Sea to that of the Mediterranean (say thirty feet) is sufficient to keep the artificial channel clean, if the fall be properly economised; and also that it would be able to preserve its mouth in the Bay of Pelusium in a navigable state at all seasons.

4th. That a navigation of still water with locks could not be long maintained with advantage, under all the circumstances of the case.

5th. That a broad and deep stream like that of the Dardanelles could not be produced by natural operations, assisted slightly by art; but that the attempt would be pregnant with mischief in some quarters, and result in disappointment.

6th. That a direct and perfectly controllable channel, of a uniform size and shape and incline, would be the safest and most appropriate undertaking of which the circumstances permit, and under the imperfect information we possess.

It must, however, be confessed, that no definitive opinion can be given, or very satisfactory estimates assumed, until a new and detailed survey, having the express objects in view, is completed, comprehending the necessary levellings and borings and maritime surveys of the ports at the termini of the Canal.

With respect to the land survey, were all the necessary persons and means duly prepared to commence operations in the beginning of October, it is probable the investigation might be completed in the beginning of the following May, and a true solution given to this great geographical, commercial, and engineering question.

As mankind multiply and make progress in arts and civilization, new wants arise, and the ingenuity and industry of man is taxed to discover new sources of wealth, maintenance, and occupation: and we find, under the dispensations of an all-wise Providence, that at suitable seasons resources are unveiled which have been long provided but concealed until the fit occasion presents itself. Amongst the numerous administrations of the same wise and merciful design, it is not unreasonable to believe that the completion of navigable channels across the Isthmuses of Suez and Darien are enterprises amongst the events designed to minister to the growing wants and improvement of the human race.

* * * * *

In the preceding pages an endeavour has been made to show the superiority of a direct communication between the two Seas (which would provide for the speedy passage of large ships at all seasons), over a communication partly through the medium of the Nile, which would be interrupted in the dry season, and prove tedious at all times; and it now remains to say a few words on the comparative value of railways.

Railways, under present circumstances, would expedite the transmission of passengers by the steam ships across the Desert, and might be useful in the transmission of light and valuable goods between the Nile and the Red Sea; but it must be greatly doubted if a sufficient traffic could thereby arise to pay the construction and maintenance of eighty miles of railway between Cairo and Suez. On the other hand, were it contemplated to construct a railway between the bay of Tineh and Suez, the cost, including the improvement of the harbours at either terminus, would nearly equal the expense of the proposed Canal; but the _means_ of keeping the terminal harbours deep and clean would be foregone from want of means of scourage; and to the expense of the railway would have to be added the expense of unloading and reloading the cargoes of each shipment; so that it is manifest that a railway direct between the two Seas could stand no competition with the proposed Canal, which, besides its value as a commercial channel, would facilitate the steam navigation with India in the highest degree, by permitting the steamers to make a continuous voyage; and by permitting supplies of coals being sent direct to Suez and Aden, &c., the detention of steamers at Suez and Alexandria would be avoided, four or five days would be gained in the transmission of passengers and mails, and the expenditure in the price of coals would be much reduced.

The Author again acknowledges his obligations to the able statements of Mr. Maclaren’s paper of 1825, connected with this subject, and now quotes that author’s opinions and those of the writer in the Foreign Quarterly Review of 1836, as to the feasibility of the proposed measure:—

“Yet it is certain that the project must not only have been practicable but easy, since it was accomplished in early times by men who were unprovided with many of those resources which modern art supplies. In fact, when the ground is explored the supposed difficulties vanish, and we discover that Nature has furnished such singular and unexpected facilities for establishing a water communication between the two Seas, that she has left little for man to do to complete her work.”—MACLAREN, _Jamieson’s Journal_, 1825, p. 274.

“Were European civilization and a regular Government permanently re-established in Egypt, the undertaking would be found not only practicable but easy; so great, in fact, are the facilities which the ground presents, that though the Canal (taking the magnitude of its section into account) would certainly be the largest that exists, the expense would be considerably less than that of some small works of the same kind executed in the west of Europe.”—_Ibid._ p. 290.

“There is little doubt that if the French had remained in Egypt, and especially with Napoleon at the head of the Government, they would have carried their project (of canals) into effect. The expense, compared with the magnificent result, is so trifling, that the wonder is that it has not been carried into effect before now, either by a company having the support of Mahommed Pacha, or by the Pacha on his own account.”—_Foreign Quarterly Review_, 1836, p. 362.

“A glance at the map which accompanies the Topographical Survey of the French engineers is quite sufficient to demonstrate with what facility and at what moderate expense a ship’s canal might be constructed from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.”—_Ibid._ p. 368.

APPENDIX.

No. IX.

ARTICLE FROM THE MONITEUR.

FROM THE MONITEUR,

(THE OFFICIAL PAPER OF FRANCE,)

6th July, 1855.

THE CUTTING OF THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ.

This undertaking, one of the grandest and most useful of the age, has for some time attracted a considerable share of public attention. There is but one opinion as to its immense results, but the question of the track has been a subject of discussion, which, in the absence of authentic documents and an exact knowledge of the localities, may mislead public opinion.

Two tracks have been proposed: one _direct_, which is to unite the two Seas by a Canal in a straight line from Suez to Pelusium; the other _indirect_, which, starting from Suez, joins the Nile below Cairo, and terminates at the port of Alexandria.

In the eyes of all who are acquainted with Egypt the direct track alone appears practicable, the indirect track however has recently found its advocates in some European journals; the following particulars, collected on the spot, will enlighten public opinion upon this point.

In the first place there is a difference of length between the two tracks, which is not unimportant. The direct track being the shortest, would certainly not, of itself, be sufficient to give it the preference, especially if the other were both most economical and most advantageous; but it appears that besides having the advantage of being much shorter, the direct track also has the recommendations of being more economical, more advantageous, and more easy of execution.

1st. The indirect Canal has to cross the Nile, and this condition is almost impossible to be carried out. The crossings of rivers are attended, as is well known, with difficulties, even when there is only a draught of water of 2 to 3 _met._: what would they be for a Canal which is to be 8 _met._ deep? And even one of the most decided partisans of the indirect track has not hesitated to declare frankly, considering this immense obstacle, which alarms but does not discourage him: “that the maintenance of such a depth presents difficulties which have never been surmounted nor even attempted.” It is true that at first the help of the barrage was reckoned upon in risking the crossing of the river; but this barrage can only serve at the low waters during four or five months of the year, at the time when the lands are irrigated to prepare for the summer crops; the reserved waters of the Nile will never, even at their _maximum_, be more than 4 to 4½ _met._, which is very far from 8 _met._ Above the barrage, at the point where the ships are to cross, the breadth is 2000 _met._ and if a transverse channel were dug there, how could it be prevented from filling with alluvium and mud? During the increase of the waters, how could a current of five miles an hour, be crossed by sailing vessels against the wind blowing from the east and south?

Against this formidable obstacle to the crossing which cannot be avoided, an expedient not less surprising, and still more impracticable, has been devised; the barrage is set aside, the employment of it being too hazardous, and the Nile is to be crossed by a bridge Canal. But can we form an idea of a Canal 8 _met._ deep crossing a river like the Nile above the barrage? According to the very calculations of those who propose such schemes, there would be required 1,213,147 _met. cub._ of water _per diem_ to supply the upper basin, and as this enormous quantity of water would have to be raised thirty _metres_ above the level of the two Seas; the engines required for this purpose must represent 5620 horse power by calculation, corresponding to 6000 horse power in those to be provided; not to speak of the obstacles that such a colossal work would oppose to the ordinary navigation, it would be an expense upon that point only of 50 to 60,000,000 _francs_. And the bridge Canal after all these sacrifices, would not be more firm or more durable than any construction of that kind. And moreover for this super elevation of level there would be required ten locks in addition to the fourteen already on the line.

2nd. The indirect Canal will be detrimental to the Canal works, so necessary to Lower Egypt, and will partly interfere with that admirable hydraulic system, which is at once the pride and the fertilization of the country. It will be in vain to make circuits to avoid the branchings of the network; as the termination is to be at the port of Alexandria, it will be absolutely necessary to pass between the Mahmoudieh Canal and Lake Mareotis; and then the flow of all the waters into the Lake which is destined to receive them will be prevented. Passing through the Lake, as the railway does, seas of mire will be met with, so much dreaded on the Pelusiac coast. It has already been necessary to raise again and again the embankment of the railway which was disappearing in the Lake, and for three years it has been necessary to labour unceasingly at the repairs which are continually required; what will it be when a dyke must be constructed at least 6000 _metres_ in length, to heights of 7 to 8 _metres_, without knowing where to procure the necessary earth for these embankments?

3rd. The indirect Canal cannot terminate in the port of Alexandria without causing still greater confusion there than it causes in the Canal works. In the first place the port of Alexandria is not _immutable_, as has been supposed. It has not escaped the action of the ground swell, which has choked it with sand to a good third of its extent. The part of the port which has been selected is frequently agitated by the north-west winds, and the surf is then so violent in rough weather, that even small craft dare not approach it. The rock is found there at a small depth below the sea, and as it would be necessary to extend the dykes of the Canal to 250 _metres_ into the harbour, to obtain a draught of water of 7 _met._, 50 to 8 _met._, the rock would have to be excavated under the water. Add to this that in this direction all the grand magazines and all the Government works would be encountered; there is not the least free space between the railway and the Mahmoudieh canal. But let us suppose all these difficulties overcome, there are others which the Canal raises, and which it multiplies the more it is employed. The port of Alexandria, the only military port of Egypt, is then besieged by hundreds of merchant vessels, and by the sailors of the whole of Europe. Let there be a contrary wind ever so slight, or some requisite repairs to the locks, and that the movement is arrested, just fancy the impediment, without taking into account the political dangers of such an accumulation. Moreover it is not only at Alexandria that this intolerable inconvenience would arise; it might happen, in consequence of accidents easily to be foreseen but impossible to be prevented, that Egypt should see all on a sudden 8 to 10,000 foreign sailors stationed on a point of her territory, because the forty vessels at least which traverse it every day have been forcibly detained at some part of the passage during twenty or five and twenty days consecutively.

To these conclusive reasons, it would not be difficult to add others; but these must be sufficient to warn unbiassed minds against the indirect passage.

The inconveniences, or rather the impossibilities of the indirect track, become more striking when compared with the conditions of the direct track and its incontestable advantages.

1st. To begin with, the direct track is only about one third the length of the other. That would be 400 _kilometres_ long, and the direct track is only 155, which would be reduced to 120, as will be seen. Near about the middle of the Isthmus, the Bitter Lakes are met with, which give 18 _kilometres_ of navigation ready made, and not requiring a single turn of the shovel, as the Viceroy’s engineers say, and 18 _kilometres_ in addition are three parts excavated by nature itself; 120 _kilometres_ therefore remain, that is to say, 30 leagues at the most.

2nd. The direct track is the easiest. There are only two salient points in the entire Isthmus that it is necessary to traverse by partly turning them; one, the Serapeum, which, according to the levels checked in 1853, is 16 _met._, 5950 high; and the other El Guisr, which is 11 _met._, 6300. With the depth of the Canal, this would make a cutting of 20 or at most 24 _metres_ at some points. There is certainly nothing in such a work to terrify our engineers.

3rd. The direct track is the most natural. The Isthmus is traversed by a longitudinal depression, formed by the meeting of the two plains descending with an imperceptible slope, the one from Egypt, the other from the frontier hills of Asia. The Bitter Lakes, filled with the waters of the Arabian Gulf by the action of the tides only, may easily form a reservoir which, with a surface of 280,000,000 _square metres_ by a rise of 2 _metres_ of moving waters, would not receive less than 560,000,000 _cubic metres_, for the service of the Canal, below the water line at the level of the two Seas. Lake Timsah, situated at about an equal distance from Suez and Pelusium, is like an inland port where ships can be revictualled and repaired. Moreover, by another favour of nature, towards Lake Timsah a second not less remarkable hollow abuts perpendicularly on the longitudinal depression, it is that of the Wady-Tomilat (the fertile Goshen of the Bible). This hollow still receives the overflowings of the Nile for a great part of its length, and forms the natural track of a communication starting from the river and joining, at the central part of the Isthmus, the line of maritime navigation which would be established between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean.

4th. The direct track is the most useful. It serves at the same time the interests of commerce in general and the political interests of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. It will require but little to maintain it, and as there will be very few works of art, navigation will not be exposed to those interruptions which it would have to dread on the indirect track.

To these evident advantages of the direct track, to these relative facilities which had attracted the attention of the sovereigns of Egypt, of Amrou and Mustapha III. for example (see Lebeau, _Histoire du Bas-Empire_, tom. XII. p. 490, and the _Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur les Turcs_, pts. III. and IV.), before attracting that of the nineteenth century, there is but one objection, and it is this:—

It is impossible, they say, for large ships to approach Pelusium; and the direct Canal is chimerical, because it cannot open into the Mediterranean.

This oft-repeated objection is but specious, and cannot stand before an examination of the facts. The entrance to Pelusium is certainly a difficult and costly work, but it is perfectly practicable, and engineers have overcome very different obstacles with resources much inferior to those now at their command.

It is well in the first place that it should be known that the level of the two Seas, excepting the difference of the tides, which are pretty high at the south in the Red Sea, and almost nothing at the north in the Mediterranean, is perceptibly the same. The commission of 1799 had found for the Arabian Gulf an elevation of 9 _met._ 90; but its labours, performed in the midst of all the dangers and disturbances of war, had not been verified, and the genius of Laplace resting upon accurate theoretical views, had formally denied the possibility of such a depression within a distance of scarcely thirty leagues. Afterwards, towards 1840, some English officers had proved by the barometer and the boiling water process that there was no difference of level; and in 1843, Prince Metternich, having been informed of these labours, sent instructions to Egypt to induce Mehemet Ali to interest himself in the grand undertaking of the cutting of the Isthmus: his dispatch is still in the Archives of the Austrian Consulate at Alexandria. In 1847 a commission of French engineers, sent out by M. Paulin Talabot under the direction of the learned M. Bourdaloue, and assisted by Egyptian engineers directed by M. Linant, chief engineer to the Viceroy, put the fact beyond all question, and M. Paulin Talabot had the honour of stating it in a memorial that has become famous. Our Academy of Sciences bestirred itself for the honour of the ancient Egyptian commission. M. Sabatier, Consul general of France, asked the Viceroy for a fresh verification, which M. Linant was charged to undertake in 1853, and which confirmed, saying an insignificant variation, the labours of 1847.

So that the considerable super-elevation of the Red Sea cannot be reckoned on for facilitating the approaches from the Mediterranean at the other extremity of the Canal; there is only the difference of the tides.

As a depth of 7 _met._ 50 to 8 _met._ is not found before Pelusium or Tineh, but at a distance of 6000 _met._ into the sea, it is assumed that it is practically impossible to prolong the jetty of the Canal to that distance, because the waters are but _liquid mud_, and that _clouds of earth_ would interfere with the progress of the vessels and the solidity of the works.

This is a complete mistake.

Because Herodotus has said, that the Delta is a present from the Nile, his inaccurate assertion has been repeated without verifying it, and his metaphor has passed for an incontestable truth. But it is an absolute fact, and it is only necessary to ask those who have been at Pelusium, that the water there is as limpid as at Alexandria or Jaffa. The banks of _travelling mud_ seen by Admiral Sir Sidney Smith have no more reality than the _present from the Nile_, and for the twenty years that these coasts have been traversed in every direction by steam boats, no one has ever met again with those muddy banks. The truth is, that the waters of the Nile, which, at the time of the inundation are distinguished for more than ten leagues into the sea, carry far out into the Mediterranean and deposit in its depths, the masses of earthy matter which they hold in suspension (near 1/8000) which do not reappear on the coasts but in imperceptible quantities; the truth is, that a handful of sand may be taken up from the sea beach, at Pelusium, without finding the least particle of mud. The Viceroy’s engineers have proved that the coast, from El-Arish to Tripoli, is pure sand, and the soundings taken along the shore give the same result. Far from the Nile forming accretions at Pelusium, it is an axiom now admitted by science that the muddy or sandy deposits observed at the mouths of rivers are entirely owing to matters brought by the tide. The rivers have no part therein; and the excellent observations made by most able hydrographers at the bay of Mount St. Michael, at the mouths of the Scheld, the Meuse, the Rhine, the Yssel, have superabundantly proved it. The accumulations of sand at Pelusium and Suez, like the whole Isthmus, have been formed by the maritime deposits of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The thorough investigation of the motion of the waves has demonstrated that the bars of rivers are due to the ground swell alone. The Nile, therefore, has no influence upon the approaches to Pelusium, as Herodotus supposed, and as is still the common opinion; and this is so true, that for 20 _kilometres_ above its mouth there are accretions of mud, while below there is nothing but sand. Finally the accumulations of sand are more considerable in proportion as the waters of the river are less abundant.

Setting aside from the question the hypothetical assertions, it remains therefore incontestable that the only difficulty at Pelusium, is the length of the jetties in the sea. Pelusium, with its ruins, is at the same point where Strabo saw it, where the Egyptian commission saw it, which found the twenty stadia of the Greek geographer between the shore and the town quite correct. But are jetties of a league and a half into the sea possible, or are they indeed a work that cannot be executed? The answer to this question is easy: a hundred years ago, the Hollanders, not so rich and not so skillful as we are now, although quite as bold, erected at the Cape, in the bay of the Lion, at a depth of 16 _met._, in spite of the most frightful tempests, a dyke of 8000 _metres_, that is, a work of at least four times the extent of that required for the entrance of the Canal at Pelusium.

As for the harbour of Suez, the work there would be comparatively trifling because it is sheltered from all the winds, excepting that from the south-east, and ships keep the sea there very well, as is proved by the English Magazine corvette, moored there for two years, without sustaining any damage.

What is to be deduced from these observations?—That it is possible to make a canal 100 _metres_ wide from Suez to Pelusium, with a draught of water of 8 _met._, below low water in the Mediterranean, with parapets, towing path, &c. and available for the passage of screw and paddle frigates, and vessels of 1000 to 1500 tons burthen, and that this canal, following the straight line between the two Seas is the only practicable one, as it will be one of the grandest and most useful works ever performed by man.

To conclude, this track is the only one that the prince who now rules in Egypt will allow. Well informed himself in nautical arts and sciences, the inheritor of the policy of Mehemet Ali, which he approves while he practises, he has declared in dictating his own terms for the firman of concession, that he would have the shortest and least expensive track, and one that would be available for the largest ships. It is not in the scheme of an inland canal that the real junction of the two Seas consists; the indirect canal cuts through Egypt, and not the Isthmus; its extent is not only tripled, but the cost of execution and maintenance are enormous, and the existence of a canal constructed upon these conditions would be always uncertain and precarious while the direct track, which unites so many advantages, has none of these drawbacks.

HÔTE.

FOOTNOTES

[1] I think it to the purpose to insert here a letter, which I addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Her Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador, on my leaving Constantinople:—

_Pera_, 28th February, 1855.

“There are questions which require to be boldly met in
order to be well resolved, as there are wounds which must
be opened in order to be healed. The frankness with which
you received my first remarks upon a subject, the gravity
of which I do not affect to disguise, encourages me to
submit to your consideration a point of view from which
it appears to me advisable to contemplate the question
of the Isthmus of Suez. The great influence which your
character and your long experience naturally give you the
right to exercise in the decisions of your Government on
all Eastern questions, makes me especially anxious to
neglect no opportunity of enabling Your Excellency to
form an opinion from a perfect acquaintance with the case.

The results already obtained from the intimate alliance
of France and England, testify sufficiently to the
advantages that the European balance and civilization
in general derive from that union of the two peoples.
The future and the welfare of all the nations of the
universe are therefore concerned in maintaining intact,
in preserving from any attack, a state of things, which,
to the everlasting honour of the Governments that have
brought it about, can alone, with time, ensure the
blessings of progress and of peace to the human race.
Thence the necessity of getting rid, beforehand, of all
causes of rupture, or even of coolness, between the
two peoples; thence, consequently, the paramount duty
of anticipating amongst future contingencies, those
circumstances calculated to awake ancient feelings of
antagonism, and to raise, in the bosom of either nation,
those emotions against the violence of which, the wisdom
of Governments is powerless to struggle. The motives for
hostile rivalry are tending successively to give place to
that generous emulation which gives birth to great things.

Looking at the situation of affairs in a general way,
it is scarcely to be perceived upon what ground and
upon what occasion, those struggles, which so long
desolated the world, could be renewed. Is it financial
and commercial interests that could cause division
between the two peoples? Why, British capital thrown
into all the undertakings of France, and the immense
developement of international commerce, have established
ties between them which become closer every day. Is it
political interests and questions of principle? Why, the
two nations have but one common aim, one same ambition:
the triumph of right over might, of civilization
over barbarism. Is it, finally, a sordid jealousy of
territorial extension? Why, they acknowledge, at the
present time, that the globe is vast enough to offer to
the spirit of adventure that animates their respective
populations, countries to make available, human beings to
withdraw from the state of barbarism; and, moreover, from
the moment that their flags wave together, the conquests
of the one profit by the activity of the other.

At the first glance, then, nothing is perceived in the
general state of affairs that could impair our cordial
relations with England.

If, however, we look closer, an eventuality presents
itself which, causing the most enlightened and most
moderate cabinets to partake in popular prejudices and
passions, is capable of reviving old antipathies, and
of compromising, with the alliance, the benefits to be
derived from it.

There is, in fact, a point of the globe with the free
passage of which the political and commercial power of
Great Britain is bound up, a point, the possession of
which France had, on her part, aspired to in former
times. This point is Egypt, the direct route from Europe
to India, Egypt bathed once and again with French blood.

It is superfluous to define the motives which would
not allow England to see Egypt in the possession of a
rival nation without opposing it by the most energetic
resistance; but what should also be taken into serious
consideration, is, that with less positive interests,
France under the dominion of her glorious traditions,
under the impression of other feelings more instinctive
than rational, and therefore more powerful over the
impressionable spirit of her inhabitants, would not, in
her turn, leave to England the peaceable sovereignty of
Egypt. It is clear that, so long as the route to India is
open and certain, that the state of the country ensures
the facility and promptitude of the communications,
England will not set about creating the most grave
difficulties by appropriating a territory which, in her
eyes, has no other value than as a means of transit.
It is likewise evident that France—whose policy, for
the last fifty years, has been to contribute to the
prosperity of Egypt, both by her counsels and by the
concourse of a great number of Frenchmen distinguished
in the sciences, in administrative capacity, in all the
arts of peace or war—will not seek to realize, in this
direction, the projects of another epoch, so long as
England does not interfere.

But let one of those crises occur which have so often
shaken the East, let a circumstance arise wherein England
should find herself under the rigorous necessity of
taking a position in Egypt to prevent another power from
forestalling her, and tell us then if it is possible that
the alliance could survive the complications which such
an event would occasion. And why should England consider
herself obliged to become mistress of Egypt, even at
the risk of breaking her alliance with France? For this
single reason, that Egypt is the shortest and most direct
route from England to her Eastern possessions; that
this route must be constantly open to her; and that,
in whatever concerns this mighty interest, she could
never temporise. Thus, from the position given to her
by nature, Egypt might still become the subject of a
conflict between France and Great Britain; so that this
chance of rupture would disappear if, by a providential
event, the geographical conditions of the ancient world
were changed, and, that the commercial route to India,
instead of passing through the heart of Egypt, were
removed to its confines, and, being opened to all the
world, could never be exposed to the chance of its
becoming the exclusive privilege of any one.

Well! this event, which must have been the design of
Providence, is now within the reach of man. It may be
brought about by human skill. It is to be realized by the
cutting of the Isthmus of Suez, an undertaking to which
nature opposes no obstacle, and wherein English capital,
as well as that of other countries, will certainly take
part.

Let the Isthmus be cut through, let the waves of the
Mediterranean mingle with those of the Indian Ocean,
let the Railroad be continued and completed, and Egypt,
in acquiring an increased importance as a productive
country, as a country of internal commerce, as a general
storehouse and common transit, loses its dangerous
pre-eminence as an uncertain and contested passage of
communication.

The possession of its territory being no longer an object
of interest to England, ceases to be a possible bone of
contention between that power and France, the union of
the two peoples is for the future unalterable, and the
world is preserved from the calamities which a rupture
between them would produce. This result affords such
securities for the future, that it is sufficient to
point them out, to attract to the undertaking destined
to produce it, the sympathy and the encouragement of the
Statesmen whose efforts are directed to the settlement
of the Anglo-French alliance upon an immoveable basis.
You, my Lord, are one of those Statesmen, and you have
too large a share in questions of high policy, to which
I am a stranger, for me not to entertain the wish to
communicate to you my aspirations.

FERD. DE LESSEPS.”

[2] These very sensible observations are taken from a correspondence which appeared in the “Times” of the 13th June last.

[3] The other two were Mr. Stephenson for England, and M. Négrelli for Austria.

[4] As the work of the Viceroy’s Engineers will be published, an extract only is here given, which will suffice to make known the importance of their labours, and show the practical results of their investigations.

[5] Extracts from _Communications with India, China, &c. Observations on the Practicability and Utility of opening a Communication between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, by a Ship Canal, through the Isthmus of Suez. By Arthur Anderson. London, Smith, Elder & Co. Cornhill, 1843._

[6] Since writing this, an article on the “Suez Canal” has appeared in the Foreign and Colonial Quarterly Review, which, although containing some inaccuracies of minor importance, and professing only to take a general view of the subject, the writer would exempt from the above description.

[7] Extracts from _Inquiry into the Means of establishing a Ship Navigation between the Mediterranean and Red Seas_. _By James Vetch, Capt. R.E., F.R.S. London, Pelham Richardson, 23, Cornhill, 1843._

THE END.

CHISWICK PRESS: PRINTED BY C. WHITTINGHAM, TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE.