Chapter XIV: Politics in Tunis

A survey of the situation — M. Roustan’s policy — The first campaign — The Treaty of the Bardo — The insurrection — Bombardment of Sfax — Occupation of Tunis — March upon Kairwan — Capture of Kairwan — Results of the French policy — English interests — Estrangement of Italy.

I have completed the record of my visit to Tunis, but I shall hardly have accomplished my whole task until I have said something regarding the remarkable political situation which I found in existence there. From the foregoing pages I have excluded politics as far as possible; but the political problem which Tunis at this moment presents to the world is so remarkable, that it is impossible to pass it by unnoticed; and I shall attempt, therefore, in this concluding Chapter, by giving some extracts from my diary referring to this aspect of my visit, to convey to the reader an idea of the state of things existing in the Regency at the time when I was there. Those who trouble themselves to read these pages will see that more than once I have indulged in the gratuitous blunder of prophesying. My prophecies were not only written on the dates mentioned, but were printed a few days afterwards in the _Standard_ newspaper. I do not think however that my predictions as to what must be the result of M. Roustan’s adventures in Tunis have proved to be very far wrong. Writing several weeks before the famous Roustan-Rochefort trial, I gave in outline most of the facts which were brought to light during the course of that trial, and upon some other points of interest, such as the probable action of the insurgent Arabs after the fall of Kairwan, I foretold with tolerable accuracy what has actually come to pass. Let me say at once, however, that the credit of this is not due to me, but to those clear-sighted and dispassionate men with whom I had the good fortune to be brought in contact during my stay in the Regency, and who did so much to enlighten my mind as to the real nature of the situation existing there.

And here it may be proper to observe, by way of showing that England is not without an interest of her own in Tunisian politics, that not fewer than 10,000 subjects of the Queen are to be found in the Regency. It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that these are almost all Maltese, the number of actual Englishmen in the Regency being probably under twenty. As coachmen, boatmen, gardeners, artisans, and coffee-shop keepers, the Maltese find plenty to do in all parts of Tunis. Their moral character is not very high, and at times they give her Majesty’s Consul-General not a little trouble; but they are English subjects, protected by treaty; and it is the undoubted duty of our government to watch over their interests. That recent events in Tunis have not been very favourable to these persons is only too certain. Some thirty British subjects have been killed during the course of the war between the French and the Arabs, and an enormous quantity of property, belonging not merely to Maltese, but to English merchants trading through agents in the Regency, has been destroyed. The loss of life is chiefly due to the Arabs; but the loss of property is almost entirely due to the French, who have peculiar notions as to the rights of neutrals, where a question of loot is concerned. English trade with Tunis is very large. The esparto grass, which is exported from Sfax and other places on the coast, is almost all brought to this country; and the name of one English firm, Messrs. Perry, Bury, and Co., of Manchester, seemed to be on the lips of all the traders in the Gulf of Hammamet. England as a great consumer of the products of Tunis, naturally supplies that country in turn with many of the articles required by her inhabitants, and it was pleasing to see that genuine English goods—Manchester cottons, Sheffield knives, and London pickles, sauces, and tinned meats—enjoyed a practical monopoly in the towns of the Regency. It is not, therefore, correct to represent this country as having no interest in Tunis. At the same time it would be a mistake to exaggerate the extent of that interest, or to give way to any imaginary fears, because France, by one of the most cynical acts of aggression on record, has made herself the mistress of the destinies of the country. Her act is a serious one so far as the Italians are concerned; but England, so long as she retains Malta can afford to look on at the endless schemes and counter-schemes of the rivals, with something like indifference.

When I reached Tunis the second act in the comedy devised by M. Roustan was in full progress. The Bey had succumbed to the inevitable, when the French Consul waited upon him in his palace at Manouba, and, pointing to the Republican troops drawn up within sight of the windows of the room where they were seated, warned the unlucky Ruler that the occupation of Tunis would be immediately effected, unless the treaty which was presented to him were signed. Those who were in Tunis at that time know what anguish prevailed, not merely at the palace but in the capital, during this crisis. Mr. Reade had been the adviser of the Bey up to this point. His Highness had placed himself entirely in his hands, and the English Consul-General had given him the best possible counsel. It was at Mr. Reade’s instigation that the Bey had not only desisted from offering any resistance to the progress of the French troops through his territory, but had despatched his brother, the heir apparent, Si Ali Bey, at the head of the Tunisian army, for the purpose of cooperating with the French commander in his operations against the “Kroumirs.” Everybody in Tunis knew then what everybody in France knows now, that the ravages of the so-called Kroumirs were a mere pretext for the invasion of the Regency, and that the expedition was sent forth in the interests of French financiers, who found their interests threatened by the schemes of Italian rivals.

The first and natural wish of the Bey was to oppose the French invasion by force; for he was perfectly conscious of the fact that the Republic had not the shadow of justification for its attack upon his territory. Mr. Reade, by his urgent solicitations induced the Bey to abstain from the fatal step of resistance; he even went further, and, as I have shown, got him to send his own brother and the Tunisian army, not to oppose but to cooperate with the French. In the meantime, it was hoped that by urgent diplomatic representations to the different courts of Europe some steps might be taken to avert the impending catastrophe. M. Roustan and his friends were greatly disappointed when they learned that the Bey, by the wise advice of Mr. Reade, was not going to fall into the trap they had laid for him, by offering any resistance to the advance of the French troops. To most men this step on the part of his Highness would have seemed a fatal bar to further action on their part. M. Roustan, however, did not allow himself to be materially hindered by the Bey’s discreet conduct. Abandoning even the semblance of a pretext he brought the French troops up to the village of Manouba, within four miles of Tunis, and within sight of the Bardo and the Bey’s private palace. Then, as we have seen, he presented his monstrous treaty for signature. The Bey’s agony, as I have said, was intense. He knew that to permit the occupation of Tunis would be to seal his own doom. Henceforth he would be merely a puppet in the hands of M. Roustan, and the greater part of his Arab subjects would treat him with the contempt due to a traitor. On the other hand, he could not fail to see that the Roustan treaty was merely the prelude to the seizure of his sceptre by the French. With the aid of Mr. Broadley, an English barrister, he drew up a dignified protest against the action of France, and telegraphed this to all the courts of Europe, during the few hours which his hard taskmaster was good enough to allow him for consideration. Up to the date of my leaving Tunis—November 3rd—not one of the recipients of this protest, which was sent off in May, had found time to acknowledge its receipt. So, deserted by Europe, and alas! no longer allowed to feel confidence in Mr. Reade’s power to help him, the Bey signed the treaty, and placed himself in the hands of M. Roustan.

This was the first act of the comedy. It was followed by an interval, during which there was apparent peace in the Regency. Mustapha, the barber’s boy who had become Prime Minister, was shipped off to Europe, and M. Roustan installed himself as master of the land. All manner of concessions were granted to French companies. Railways, harbours, agricultural banks, public works of every description were projected. The Italians found themselves driven to the wall. Even English subjects, like Mr. Levy, saw their rights rudely interfered with; for M. Roustan was master, and all others had to submit. But presently there came a change. The French troops were returning to their own country. It did not suit the purpose of the Ministry to allow the people of France to imagine that anything like a war was in progress. So it was announced in the Chambers that the Treaty of the Bardo had settled everything, and that it was no longer necessary to keep any large army of occupation in Tunis. It was at this moment that the insurrection broke out at Sfax. The Arabs there proclaimed themselves independent of the Bey, who had sold them to the infidel, and invited their countrymen to join them. The first news of this insurrection was sent up to Tunis by Mr. Gallia, our Vice-Consul at Susa, who happens to have also a residence and place of business at Sfax. Mr. Gallia’s reward was to have his house plundered by the French troops when they entered Sfax. Of the bombardment of that place by the French, and of its capture, and the loot by the victorious troops, I need only say here that it resulted in the spread of the insurrectionary feeling throughout the Regency. The whole Arab race boiled over with indignation; and outrages, and murders as horrible as that which occurred at the railway station at Oued Zergha, became common. The French troops were hurried back to the Regency; three columns were formed for the advance of an army against Kairwan, the sacred city, which was suspected of being the centre of disaffection, and Tunis itself was occupied by a large force of Republican troops. It was at this moment that I arrived in the Regency, and from this point the following extracts from my letters will afford some idea of the political situation.

_Tunis, October 18th._—It is difficult to convey to the mind of the English reader an idea of the state of things now prevailing in Tunis, at a distance of barely four days from London; and it would probably be still more difficult to make any man of ordinary honesty understand the full meaning of that drama—half comic half tragic, and wholly disreputable—which is now being played out by the most cynical of actors under the eyes of the entire world. The visitor to Tunis at this moment finds himself in a country in which a state of war prevails. At Goletta immense French transports may be seen, disembarking troops and stores sufficient for a campaign against Germany. All along the short line of railway between the port and the capital, French camps are scattered; trains of artillery may be seen in slow progress towards the front, and ambulances provided with all the appliances which modern surgery has invented are also visible. Here, in Tunis, French sentries are mounted upon the crumbling white walls of the Kasbah, the great citadel of the place; French camps are pitched in the open spaces within the forts; French patrols pass through the streets at regular intervals, and the Grand Hotel, where a French general is installed, is the real headquarters of the Government of the city. Yesterday three columns of French troops, numbering in all some 30,000 men, began their march—two from the neighbourhood of Tunis, one from Susa—towards the sacred city of Kairwan, which has been selected as the special place to be honoured by a demonstration of French valour. If ever there was a country in a state of war, it is Tunis at the present moment. And yet no war has been declared; no pretext for military operations has been discovered, and a portion at least of the Parisian press maintains that no war exists. Even more startling than the contrast between the state of things visible here, and that in the existence of which official France pretends to believe, is the contrast between the condition of Tunis now and its condition twelve months ago, or even more recently.

At the beginning of the present year there was no European country which could vie in peacefulness, in security of life and property, with Tunis. There were of course certain tracts of wild mountainous country in the north-west portion of the Bey’s territory, where it would have been unsafe for any European to venture. But apart from these very limited districts, there was no part of Tunis where life was not perfectly safe. So recently as last April, Lord and Lady Bective visited Kairwan; and they not only did so in perfect safety, but they were received as honoured and welcome guests by the Arabs of that famous city. Here in Tunis no one thought for a moment of any danger from the native population. The tourist could wander at his will among the interesting ruins which abound in the neighbouring country, not only without dread of being subjected to violence, but with a feeling of absolute security which he could hardly entertain in London or Paris. Now, all this is changed. No man would dare to travel half a dozen miles from the city—to do so would be to court almost certain death. It would be almost as dangerous to venture into any of the villages which lie under the very shadow of the walls of Tunis. And even within the city itself, Europeans are warned on no account to venture out after dark. If you walk through the Arab quarter, averted faces and muttered curses meet you on every side; while the air is filled with rumours of an impending catastrophe. Twice during the present week the French troops in the city have been roused in the dead of night, and marched hurriedly to a central point, in order to resist a general rising of the Arabs, which everybody expected, and which it was believed had already begun. The imaginations of the non-Mussulman population, stimulated by all that they see around them, are still further excited by the horrible and, alas! true stories of tortures perpetrated upon unhappy Christians who have fallen into the hands of the Arabs; and everywhere a feeling not only of insecurity but of positive dread, has replaced that which prevailed last year. And these are the first results of that famous treaty which M. Roustan wrung from the Bey less than six months since, and by which France, or rather her Consular Agent, was made absolute master of the properties and the destinies of the Tunisian Government and people. It is obvious to everybody now that a fatal blunder was made by the French Cabinet when it placed itself in the hands of M. Roustan. It is a blunder which has already cost an enormous sum of money, and a serious expenditure of life, and it is one which may yet have consequences of the gravest kind, affecting not merely France but other European countries whose interests are still dearer to the Englishman.

It is not my business, however, to enter into a political disquisition on the origin and objects of the Tunisian expedition. I have done my duty when, as an eye-witness, I point out the extraordinary results of the Roustan policy up to the present moment. That policy has, in the first place, compelled France to enter upon a war on a large scale against a nation with whom it professedly has no quarrel; and, in the second place, it has entirely destroyed the security of life and property in Tunis, and has made one of the most peaceful and harmless races in the world, the bitter enemies not merely of France, but of all the powers and peoples of Europe. With more than 50,000 French soldiers in Tunis, and yet with the very streets of the capital itself in such a state that Europeans dare not move about them freely, it can hardly be contended that the civilizing and pacifying mission of the French Consular Agent has been altogether as successful as might have been desired. As to the secret history of that mission—the history which is upon the lips of everybody in Tunis—it is not for me to tell it here; but there is some probability that the revelation of the truth will not be long delayed. M. Camille Pelletan and other French deputies have come to Tunis for the special purpose of learning the truth on the subject; and some startling revelations may be expected when the debates begin in the Chambers.

Within the next fortnight it is believed that decisive military operations will have been carried out against Kairwan. Yesterday, as I have stated already, three French columns started for that place. The first column, under the command of General Saussier, to whom the command in chief is entrusted, has started from Tunis, and advances by way of the famous Enfida estate. The suggestion made here is, that this column will accomplish a double purpose; it will not only aid in the conquest of Kairwan, but will put the French in possession of that particular piece of property the name of which was mixed up so prominently with the early history of the Tunisian question. The second column, under General Logerot, has marched from Zaghouan, and will make a slight _détour_ to the west, on its way to the sacred city. The third has the port of Susa as its point of departure; and it is to advance by means of a temporary railway which is to be constructed to Kairwan. The distance from Susa to Kairwan is barely thirty miles, so that there ought to be no difficulty in the construction of this line. Another column, intended for the pacification of the country as well as the conquest of Kairwan, is now moving across the Bey’s territory from Tebessa. The distance it has to traverse is, however, so great that it can hardly take part in the operations against the city itself, unless those operations should be unexpectedly delayed.

No one, of course, can entertain any doubt as to the result of the operations against Kairwan. The famous city is doomed. Optimists now can only pray that its captors will show respect for the feelings not merely of the Mussulman, but of the whole civilized world. The “loot” of a place like Kairwan would be a disgrace and a disaster. The world as it watches this great expedition against Kairwan, undertaken, as I have shown, upon a scale of such magnitude, ought to bear in mind the fact that Kairwan itself has been guilty of no offence. It has offered, and is offering, no resistance to the French army, although naturally enough the Arabs of Kairwan, like the rest of the world, fail to see what special reason can be alleged for the course now being pursued by France in a country with which it does not pretend to be at war, and which it professes that it has no desire to annex. No plea of military necessity can therefore be put in on behalf of the expedition to which the French are now committed. It is an expedition undertaken for the purpose of giving the Gambettist Republic a new dose of “glory,” and of putting an end, if possible, to awkward discussions in the French Chambers. That is the plain truth about this march upon the sacred city—a march which is regarded by all the Arabs, I need hardly say, as being in itself an act of sacrilege. That it will not result in the pacification of the country is firmly believed by competent military authorities here. The Arabs, save a few of the more fanatical, will in all probability escape into the mountainous districts of the interior, or—and this is an eventuality which it is necessary that English statesmen should seriously consider—they will make their way across the frontier into Tripoli, and throw themselves into the arms of the great Mussulman force already assembled there, where they will nurse their indignation against the assailants of their brethren in race and religion.

_Tunis, October 25th._—The truth about Tunis has not yet been told to the world. Part of it has, it is true, been revealed in the columns of certain of the ultra-Radical journals of Paris; but, partly because of the quarter in which the revelations have been made, and partly, also, because of the evident bias of the writers, those stories have not attracted so much attention as they might reasonably have been expected to do. It will not, however, be from any want of zeal on the part of inquirers after it, if the whole truth regarding the Tunisian question is not made known to the world at no distant date. This city is now swarming, I shall not say with spies, but with investigators of all descriptions, bent upon learning everything regarding the proceedings of M. Roustan and his wonderful _entourage_. We have here, among others, M. Camille Pelletan, the lieutenant of Dr. Clémenceau, and M. Pelletan does not even affect to conceal the fact that he is preparing the materials for a savage indictment, not merely of M. Roustan and the French Ministry, but of M. Gambetta himself, when the Chambers meet. That he is satisfied with the success that has attended his efforts to unravel all the mysteries of the Tunisian question, I have the best authority for saying; and there can be no doubt that when he makes his promised statement to the Chamber of Deputies he will have a tale to tell which must produce a very lively sensation. It is not only, however, among French Deputies and Special Correspondents that the inquiries after the truth are to be found. Strange as it may seem, at least one other country besides that immediately concerned in the Tunisian expedition is interesting itself in what is passing or has passed here. Tunis has lately witnessed a remarkable influx of mysterious Germans—gentlemen, for the most part, of a decidedly military bearing, whose sauerkrautish French would alone suffice to betray their nationality to the observant. These gentlemen are by no means obtrusive in their demeanour. They frequent none of the hotels; they might even seem to be anxious to escape the observation of the French authorities. They are chiefly to be found in certain small cafés in the European quarter which do not appear to have been discovered as yet by the officers of the French army. Here they are, however, and for what purpose? They are not bent on seeking pleasure. It is only a mad Englishman who will come to Tunis for pleasure at a time like the present. They are not engaged in commercial pursuits; they are not even the correspondents of German newspapers. All that can be said about them is that they show a most unwearied assiduity in collecting facts, both political and military, with regard to the past and the present of French rule in Tunis. They also will aid the world, it may be assumed, in arriving at a full knowledge of the truth regarding one of the most remarkable episodes in modern history.

And what is that truth? For obvious reasons my pen is restrained from writing of it. It will be better to wait till the debate in the French Chambers for the full chronicle of the scandals that surround this question; yet even now not a little may be said. I see it still repeated in certain newspapers in England, that after all the French have only done in Tunis what we did in Afghanistan. More amazing ignorance of actual facts than that which is shown by this assertion, it would be difficult to conceive. Granting for the moment that our policy in Afghanistan was as bad as these papers believe it to have been, there would still be not even the faintest similarity between the two cases. I have never seen it hinted that we entered Afghanistan in order to advance the pecuniary interest of a coterie of adventurers at Calcutta or London; nor has it ever been suggested that a fair and frail Helen was closely connected with the origin of our expedition to Cabul. It is said here, however, upon authority which is unimpeachable, that the violent seizure of Tunis by the French, and all the misery, loss of life, and confusion that have resulted from that step, can be traced directly to the visit of a certain Tunisian lady to Paris, and to the acquaintances she there formed amongst a band of well-known financiers. This lady had exceptional influence over a very powerful person in Tunis. She had exercised similar influence over other powerful persons in the place before she made the acquaintance of this particular gentleman, and altogether she occupied a very extraordinary and important place in Tunisian affairs. On the particular visit to Paris to which I refer, her sympathies were enlisted on behalf of the speculators in question. She returned to Tunis resolved to procure for them a most important concession from the Bey—a concession which would practically have placed the greater part of the country in pawn to them. By means of the gentleman whose movements she controlled, she brought the matter under the notice of the Bey. His Highness, however, refused to grant the concession, pleading the perfectly accurate reason that he could not do so without violating his treaty engagements with England and other countries. Thereupon he was bluntly told that he would live to repent his decision; and that the concession he had been asked to make voluntarily was trifling compared to that which would within twelve months be wrung from him by force. In fact, it was by no means obscurely hinted that the days of his rule and of Tunisian independence were numbered. Little more than six months afterwards the “ravages” of the Kroumirs were discovered; French journalists declared it to be intolerable that their country should be exposed to insults and injuries at the hands of a horde of savages; and one of the gentlemen who had been most urgent in seeking the concession of which I have spoken from the Bey, himself proposed in the Chamber of Deputies that an expedition should be undertaken for the purpose of vindicating the dignity of France, and chastising the aggressors. From that expedition came, I need hardly say, the Treaty with M. Roustan, the cession of Bizerta and a considerable tract of territory, the submission of the Bey’s Government to that of France, and now the occupation of Tunis itself and the practical conversion of the Regency into a French dependency.

All these facts have been hinted at, if they have not been clearly stated before; but it is well that they should be stated again. Connected with them are numberless scandals, some of so flagrant a character that I cannot even hint at their nature. But, as I have said, the searchers after truth are abroad, and we shall have a highly spiced dish of Tunisian facts served up in the French Chambers at no distant date. The Enfida case, which is one of the side issues connected with the affair, is in itself a very remarkable instance of the manner in which those who represent France in this country are trifling with the national honour. A few months ago, before the great blow had been struck, and when Tunis was still independent, the French authorities, after much correspondence, professed themselves anxious to submit Mr. Levy’s claim to arbitration. England saw then no reason for withdrawing it from the ordinary tribunals. Suddenly, however, the attitude of France has undergone a curious change. Now that Tunisian independence is completely at an end—now that the Bey is little more than a prisoner in his own palace—now that the French flag floats above the Tunisian one on the towers of the Kasbah, and now that French soldiers and policemen are patrolling the streets of Tunis itself—now, in fact, that France is omnipotent and can control or crush any Tunisian institution, M. Roustan has turned round upon himself, refuses to submit the Enfida dispute to arbitration, and has actually sent it before one of those local tribunals the integrity and competency of which he stoutly denied so long as there was the remotest chance of their acting in an independent manner. I am glad to say that the English Government seem to be inclined to insist upon arbitration by some wholly independent party as the only satisfactory solution of the question, and in this resolve it may be hoped that the French Government will eventually acquiesce.

The diplomatic struggles and rivalries of places like Tunis are proverbial, and there is no need to say that the hottest warfare has been waged here between the representatives of the different European powers. I am glad to say that amid the strife Mr. Reade, the English representative, has been able to keep himself entirely aloof from all personal jealousies or local scandals; and that, whilst maintaining with firmness and dignity the interests and honour of his country, he has not given offence even to the most arrogant of his colleagues. On the other hand, M. Roustan is now being denounced by everybody, and particularly by Frenchmen themselves. Except in his own immediate circle nobody seems to have a good word for him, and his early downfall is freely predicted. Among the offences laid to his charge are the contradictory promises he is said to have made to many of the prominent actors in this Tunisian question. He is believed to have intrigued not merely with the Bey, but with his Prime Minister, the ex-barber’s-apprentice Mustapha, with Ali Bey, the Bey’s elder, and with Taib Bey his younger, brother. It follows from all that has happened, and from all that is now being brought to light, that Frenchmen themselves are most anxious to secure his removal. The misfortune is, that his removal will now exercise but small appreciable influence upon the future of Tunis. It is in the possession of France at this moment. The noble Gulf of Tunis, the trade of the country, all its strategical points, are in the keeping of the French; and though the latter will have to pay a heavy price in blood, money, and reputation for the prize they have thus secured, they are not likely to relinquish it merely because M. Roustan has been exposed and punished.

It is not merely on the side of the French that curious intrigues are just now in full progress under one’s very eyes. The Bey, as I have said, is practically a prisoner in his palace at Goletta, utterly dejected and heartbroken, and so completely devoid of spirit that he has just conferred—need I say at whose bidding?—his highest decoration upon the French general commanding the troops in occupation of Tunis—an occupation which every Arab resents as an insult to his nationality and his creed. It is not surprising in these circumstances that rumours should be current regarding a probable change in the nominal rulership. Ali Bey, the next brother of the Bey, who is known as the Bey of the Camp, eagerly puts himself forward as the supplanter of the reigning Bey. Unfortunately for his chances he is very deaf, and, moreover, he is more than suspected of complicity in many of the intrigues of M. Roustan. His own troops are at this moment in a state of almost open mutiny against him, and more than once he has been denounced when riding through his own camp, as a traitor who had sold his country. The third brother, Taib Bey, lives a retired life at the Marsa, in a large and beautiful country-house, not far from the residence of the English Consul. He seems to be a man of considerable shrewdness and intelligence. Last of all on the list of Pretenders is Mustapha, whose friends openly declare that he is about to return to this country as Governor-General—a French Governor-General of course. I should imagine, however, that his chances are dependent upon the fortunes of his friend M. Roustan.

_Tunis, October 30th._—There is something very amusing in the manner in which the capture of Kairwan has fallen flat upon the European community here. How the intelligence may have been received in Paris I am not of course aware. Perhaps the _coup de théâtre_ of General Farre and M. Roustan may have been successful, and the Parisians may have applauded the occupation of the sacred city as though it were an achievement equal to another Solferino or Magenta. But here even the dullest of persons sees too much of what is passing behind the scenes to be deceived. It was known early last week that Kairwan was to be occupied exactly in time to allow of the news reaching Paris on Friday evening. The day before, I received a note from an officer with General Etienne’s force, dated Tuesday, and telling me that they were in sight of Kairwan, never having fired a shot during the march. I was therefore quite prepared for the receipt of the news of the occupation. On Friday morning, about ten o’clock, the transport _Sarthe_ steamed into Goletta, bringing the expected tidings; and two hours afterwards everybody in Tunis was—laughing at it. The prodigious achievement, which was to crush the insurrection and strike terror into the hearts of the Arabs in North Africa, had resolved itself into a simple promenade across forty miles of sandy desert, and the holy city had been yielded up without a blow being struck in its defence. It was quite evident that the Arabs were too clever to fall into the trap which had been so ostentatiously laid for them by the French. A battle at Kairwan would, according to French ideas, have justified the destruction of the city; whilst it would at the same time have crippled the power of the Arabs. But the Arabs are as far from subjection as they ever were.

We have a fresh instance of mismanagement in this capture of Kairwan. The plan of campaign was that the two columns of Susa and Zaghouan should meet in front of the city on Tuesday last. Somehow or other, however, they “missed their connexions,” as the Yankees would say. General Etienne performed his part; General Saussier, the superior officer, failed in his. Although he encountered but trifling resistance, his straggling and ill-arranged column could not arrive at Kairwan on Wednesday night. The funny thing is, that there is much indignation among the leading officers here against General Etienne! It is said that it was his first duty to await the arrival of his superior, and that he has shown “indecent haste” in fulfilling his instructions and reaching and occupying Kairwan. General Etienne, however, is the only man who has shown himself up to his work during this campaign. The work has not been very heavy, but such as it is he has done it well. On reaching the city, Colonel de Moulin was sent forward to communicate with the Governor, one of the Bey’s servants, and a man of much intelligence. A white flag had previously been hoisted on the tower of the great Mosque of Okba. The Governor explained to Colonel de Moulin that he was the loyal subject of the Bey, and was prepared to receive the French army as the allies of his Highness. He only begged that the mosques might be held inviolate, and that the army would be content with passing through the town, and would not attempt to take up quarters in it. Colonel de Moulin asked the Governor to come with him to the spot where General Etienne was awaiting the result of the interview. This the Governor did. After some conversation the French general intimated that he must take possession of the Kasbah, or citadel within the walls, but that in all other respects he would comply with the Governor’s wishes. The French column was thereupon formed up, and each battalion being headed by its trumpeters marched into the sacred city to the sound of shrill martial music. The streets were crowded with Arabs, arrayed in their burnouses of many colours, and all watched with interest the passage of the troops. Anger and indignation were depicted upon every countenance. Very little else was to be seen that was worthy of notice by the unwelcome guests for whom the city had opened its gates.

The streets are narrow, tortuous, and ill-paved; the houses of the prevailing Moorish type; and the great mosques are not particularly conspicuous so far as their exteriors are concerned. Within they contain many noble columns and antiquities, and _curios_ of enormous interest and value. But no one was allowed to violate these shrines, within which no Christian foot has yet penetrated. There was general disappointment on the part of all when, the march through having been finished, the troops were brought out of the city, at the opposite gate to that by which they had entered. The detachment occupying the Kasbah was a small one, General Etienne feeling justified, in the absence of all resistance, in making this concession to the wishes of the Governor. He had previously given the latter to understand that he would hold him personally responsible for the maintenance of order within the walls. The situation chosen for the camp is good. It is within easy distance of the city, and has been entrenched—not because there is any fear of attack from the people of Kairwan themselves, but because of the possibility of a sudden raid from the neighbouring hills, into which the insurgent Arabs have fled for refuge.

Such is the story of the occupation of Kairwan by General Etienne; and it will be seen at once how tame a story it is. But though there has been nothing brilliant in this mean achievement, and though the struggle with the Arabs has been hardly advanced a single step by the occupation of this city, it has a degree of importance. The excitement and resentment among the Arab population of the Regency has been greatly intensified by an outrage upon a shrine which they have long regarded as sacred. Here in Tunis, the Arabs openly declare that the insult thus put upon their faith must be avenged in blood; and outside the city walls the populace is seething with rage. The hope which apparently prevails is that the Sultan may come to their assistance even now, and that with the aid of his troops they may avenge themselves upon the invader. It is to put an end to this hope that the Bey has been induced, or compelled, to issue a proclamation to his people. This proclamation, which appears on all the walls in the Arab quarter, states that the Sultan has sent his troops to Tripoli merely to preserve order, and that they are now about to be withdrawn. Still, the very fact that it should have been thought necessary to issue such a notice, shows how strongly the French are impressed with a sense of the danger which threatens them on that side. Nor is their anxiety groundless. Advices from Tripoli show that the excitement among the Mussulman population there is intense, and is being fomented by the action of fanatical preachers, who are passing from place to place, stirring up popular hatred against the infidel. Many hundreds of Tripolitans, including a large number of Turkish soldiers, have crossed the frontier, and are joining the Tunisian Arabs in these mountain fastnesses, in which they are preparing for the guerilla operations they evidently contemplate. It is, therefore, in that direction that the Tunisian question will probably next appear in a serious form.

_Malta, Nov. 5th._—The rains were beginning to set in over Tunis when I left the Regency, and with the commencement of the rainy season the best authorities were agreed in believing that the fighting would cease. The Arabs have spent several months, during which no work could be done upon the land, in assailing their hated enemy, and they have inflicted upon him not only severe losses, but the necessity of taking the most costly and extensive measures for maintaining his hold upon the country. Now that the time is come when the natives must either attend to their fields or allow the next harvest to be entirely lost, those who know them best feel convinced of the course they will take. They will leave the mountains and come down to the plains, not to fight, but to work. A few months hence, when the harvest has been secured, there will probably be another insurrectionary movement, which will break out sporadically in all manner of unexpected places, and cause fresh trouble and expense to the French. For the present, however, there will be something like peace, save where General Saussier pursues his favourite occupation of having some unfortunate Bedouin hanged, simply to encourage the others. The moment seems, therefore, a favourable one for attempting some review of the situation as a whole.

Whatever may be thought about the morality of the transactions which have placed the French in command of Tunis—and I have spoken already with quite sufficient plainness on that point—the English public must make up their minds to one thing—that is, that France will not quit her hold of the prize she has now got within her grasp. I have spoken to many Frenchmen of influence and position who have visited Tunis during the past month for the purpose of learning the truth about the Tunisian question. There is not one of them who does not admit that the series of transactions which have ended by placing the tricolor on the Kasbah of the capital and the walls of Kairwan reflect dishonour upon the national name; there is not one who is not prepared to insist upon the exposure and punishment of M. Roustan and his _entourage_. But I have not met a single Frenchman who has expressed his willingness to retire from the country now that he sees France in actual possession of it. “What! give up Tunis now, after all the lives and the money we have spent in getting hold of it! Give it up after the tremendous price in honour we have paid to secure it! Never!” This is the French view of the matter; and even the Englishman who has been educated by recent transactions in Afghanistan and South Africa, must admit that there is some force in the prevailing French sentiment upon the subject. But whether that sentiment be just or not, let us at least not shut our eyes to the plain fact which stares us in the face—the fact that, whether M. Roustan is retained or dismissed, whether his conduct is denounced or applauded, nobody believes that France will retire from Tunis. There she is, and there she will stay, if for no other reason than because she has now such extensive financial interests in the country, that the clique of capitalists and jobbers who secretly control her foreign policy cannot afford to let those interests be sacrificed. But what must be the probable consequences of her retaining the prize she has succeeded in seizing by an act of international brigandage?

So far as other powers are concerned, there can be no doubt that Italy is the heaviest sufferer for the moment. The interests of Italy in Tunis far surpass those of any other country. Italian has hitherto been the European language used there in all commercial transactions; Italian capital has been most largely invested in the native industries; and the vast majority of the Christian population have hitherto claimed the protection of the Italian Consul-General. The Italians themselves will not deny that they have for a long time entertained a desire to do that which France has now done. They were the keen and eager rivals of Frenchmen in all the various enterprises designed for the development of Tunis. But either they were less bold or were more scrupulous than their competitors. At all events they had no M. Roustan to take the lead on their behalf, and thus, when the moment for action arrived, they were left hopelessly behind. It is impossible to exaggerate the rage and bitterness which now fill them against the French. If the two nations were actually at this moment at war with each other, the feeling could not be more hostile. Nor need we be surprised at this. The loss of the Italians in actual money in consequence of this transfer of Tunis to France is a very heavy one. The French, it must be understood, are not doing things by halves. They are already boasting that they will soon drive the last Italian capitalist out of Tunis, that the Goletta Railway (the purchase of which by an Italian company was the incident which fired the train of subsequent events) will soon be in their hands, and that before long they will be financially and commercially supreme.

All this the Italians see for themselves, and they are overwhelmed with chagrin at the spectacle. But they feel also that their _prestige_, and even their military position, has received a most serious blow. With the French at Bizerta and Goletta they maintain that they are unexpectedly outflanked. Various schemes have been put forward in Italy in order to secure some compensation for the injury thus inflicted upon the country. I find that in the important coast towns the favourite idea of the Italian residents is that Tripoli should be seized, in order to counterbalance the French acquisition of Tunis. But at Tripoli itself that idea finds no favour, even among the Italians; and the reason for this it is not difficult to discover. Neither from a financial, a military, nor a political point of view is Italy strong enough to secure Tripoli. Those who are on the spot are well aware of this, and they are most anxious to counteract the Chauvinist ideas of their fellow-countrymen at a distance. Let me add, that France herself would be worsted in any attack upon Tripoli. She may have the money and the men, but she lacks the power necessary to enable her to defy, not merely the Tripolitan Arabs, but the forces of united Europe. For the Italians to thrust themselves into the wasp’s nest from which the insurrectionary movement in Tunis originated, would be an act of supreme folly. To say nothing of the course which England would be bound to take in such a case—to say nothing of any resistance which might be offered by the regular Turkish army—the Arabs of Tripoli are themselves formidable enough to make any attack upon them by a State like Italy, a most dangerous if not a hopeless undertaking. They are far more fanatical than their co-religionists in Tunis; they are rich and brave; and at this moment they are eager to throw themselves across the border in order to revive the insurrectionary movement in the Regency. The attempt of any Christian power to interfere with them on their own territory would be the signal for the outbreak of a “Holy War,” compared with which that which has been waged in Tunis would be utterly insignificant.

Let me state, in proof of what I say as to the spirit which animates these Tripolitan Arabs, that I have ascertained during my trip down the coast that a subscription is actually being raised in Tripoli among the wealthier Moors for the equipment of a local militia, which may be ready to take its part in that war of race and religion for which every Tripolitan longs so earnestly. Italy must therefore give up the idea of Tripoli as an utterly hopeless one. It is difficult to see in what other direction she can obtain the compensation she covets. Nothing, for example, can counterbalance the French occupation of Bizerta, that noble harbour which may justly be styled the pride of North Africa—a harbour which, if improved, at a comparatively small expenditure, may be made equal to the requirements of the greatest naval power in the world. It has been suggested that Italy, which now holds Pantellaria, might convert that island into a naval and military position of value. No doubt, looked at simply upon the map Pantellaria seems to be in an admirable strategical position. It appears to guard the Malta channel and to cover the Tunisian coast. But I have been to Pantellaria, and I find it destitute of anything in the shape of a harbour. It can never vie either with Goletta or Bizerta as a naval station; and to make it even a position of moderate strength would demand that which Italy cannot afford—the expenditure of an almost unlimited amount of money.

It does not seem, therefore, that the Italians can obtain any adequate compensation for the loss of influence they have sustained through the action of the French. They must just submit, as other nations have had to do before them, to the aggressions of the strong. But the temper in which they have accepted that which they conceive to be the loss and humiliation to which they have been subjected does not bode well for the future peace of Europe.

I turn now to the position of England, and to the effects upon our own country of the French action in Tunis. In the first place, it cannot be doubted that down to the beginning of the present year the political position of England in Tunis was incomparably better than that of any other power. This was partly, it must be admitted, due to the exceptionally favourable way in which we were represented at the Court of the Bey. Mr. Reade has not only personal qualities and a vast experience which combine to make him a peculiarly able and powerful representative of his country in a State like Tunis, but he is the owner of that which in this part of the world may be called a really great name. His father, Sir Thomas Reade, who lies buried in the little English cemetery at Tunis, was for many years the most powerful and popular personage in the country. He was known by all the Arabs not as “the English Consul,” but as “the Consul.” Mr. Reade himself was born in Tunis, and his return to it to fill the place once occupied by his father was hailed with universal delight by the Tunisians themselves.

But since the signature of the May treaty he has occupied an entirely different position. Up to that time he was regarded as the representative of the nation which was the disinterested friend of Tunis; and from the Bey downwards the people of the country consulted him and trusted him. Since then, however, it has been seen that England either will not or cannot interfere to save the Regency from the clutches of the French; and as a natural and inevitable consequence, Mr. Reade is no longer regarded as a powerful mediator on behalf of Tunis. In one word, our political influence in the country, once all-powerful, has now been completely destroyed, as the result of the French aggression. That our commercial influence will suffer can hardly be doubted. At present England supplies Tunis with the greater part of the European goods she consumes. Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, and London stock her bazaars, and everywhere in the shops familiar English names meet the eye. But this cannot last under the existing state of things. The French are pushing their way with the keenest anxiety to drive us out of the market, and they are not slow to turn political events to their own advantage and to our detriment. We must therefore lose considerably from what has taken place in Tunis; whilst the position of our Maltese fellow-subjects, who have hitherto led prosperous lives there, must necessarily be changed very much for the worse.

There is, however, one point on which England suffers no material injury from French aggression in Tunis. So long as she continues to hold Malta she can afford to leave France to do as she pleases at Bizerta and Goletta. Neither of those ports can ever really compare in military strength with our grand harbour of Valetta; while the position of Malta, in the very centre of the Mediterranean, gives it strategical advantages of which no North African port can boast. I say nothing of what has been done by the Englishmen of past generations to increase the military and political value of Malta, though as one stands on the Barecca and surveys the splendid lines of fortification protecting the impregnable harbours in which our ironclads float in security, one cannot but feel grateful to the men who not only won this place for us, but who have guarded it since so well. Italy may feel that she has been outflanked by the seizure of Tunis; England, from the white heights of Malta, can watch the proceedings of the French with complete equanimity.

It remains for me to say a few words as to the effect of this Tunisian aggression upon France herself. Every man who is acquainted with the facts must feel that France will have to pay an enormous price for the “conquest” of M. Roustan—a price not to be measured in blood, money, or honour alone. She is already experiencing some of the results of the policy into which she has been lured. The exposure of military weakness and incompetence which has been made during the course of the campaign—a campaign which has been jealously watched on the spot by German observers—has done much to destroy the _prestige_ and influence she was rapidly acquiring at Berlin. Prince Bismarck may now make his mind easy. The war of revenge is postponed indefinitely. But, on the other hand, Italy is not only estranged, but outraged. People in England have little idea how intense is the feeling of anger burning in the breasts of the Italians at this moment. You must go to Italy in order to learn the truth upon this point. The old sentiment of friendship which showed itself so strongly in 1870, no longer exists, and the Italians are longing for a chance of punishing France for what she has done in Tunis. The Arabs, again, are for ever estranged from their conquerors. They cannot hold their own against them. They have no arms capable of competing with those of France; nor have they military knowledge. But it is safe to predict that for years to come, under the new state of things, both in Algeria and Tunis there will be a constant waste of French life and money—a waste which might have been avoided but for the intrigues of M. Roustan. And at any moment France may find herself confronted by a deadly peril. She may have to choose between a dangerous rebuff in Tunis itself, and an attack upon Tripoli—an attack which would bring her into collision not only with Turkey, but with England, Italy, and Austria. Such are the Dead Sea apples borne by the tree she is now watering with her blood in Tunis.

THE END.

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PRINTED BY GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, LIMITED, ST. JOHN’S SQUARE.

Transcriber's note:

pg 114 Changed: at any noment to: moment

pg 142 Changed: to be forgotton to: forgotten

pg 260 Changed: spendid interior to: splendid

pg 298 Changed: the excitewent among to: excitement

Minor changes in punctuation have been done silently.

Other spelling inconsistencies have been left unchanged.