Chapter VIII: Campaigns of 1811 in the Peninsula

In January 1811 the 51st embarked at Portsmouth for Lisbon in three of His Majesty's ships, one of which (the _Danemark_), having on board three companies under Major Rice, separated from the fleet during a heavy gale, but eventually reached its destination on the 19th February. Lieut.-Colonel Mainwaring was in command of the regiment, which left Lisbon early in March to join Wellington's army, then advancing from the lines of Torres Vedras in pursuit of Massena, who, with the break-up of the winter, had secretly withdrawn from his cantonments about Santarem, leaving dummy sentries on outpost duty, in order to deceive the British. But the _ruse_ succeeded for only a few hours, for the officers of the Light Division, who, from across the Rio Mayor, had been watching the enemy throughout the winter, detected the men of straw through their "spy-glasses," reported that the French were in full retreat, and immediately took up the pursuit. Almost at once they were on the heels of Ney's rearguard, engaged it at Pombal on the 11th March, and at Redinha on the 12th, and fought again at Cazal Novo and Foz de Aronce[54] on the 14th and 15th; but Ney, who knew his business only too well, never suffered himself to become seriously embarrassed, his force always melting away at the opportune moment, much to the disgust of his pursuers.

The young soldiers, of whom the 51st was now largely composed, made an early acquaintance with the horrors of war, for a very few marches brought them into the country through which the French army had recently retreated, and signs of cruelty to the Portuguese inhabitants and of wanton destruction of property were visible everywhere. Villagers, deprived of all that they possessed, were left to die of starvation; and towns and villages were ruthlessly set on fire. Leyria was still in flames when the 51st passed through it, and the road onwards was "broadly marked by the putrefying carcases of dead French soldiers stretched beside the wreck accumulated by their wanton, shameful outrages." The regiment joined Wellington's army at the village of Carripinar, and on the 19th March the whole force, except the two divisions still in close pursuit of the enemy, assembled at Moita, where a halt of some days was made, in order to obtain supplies from Lisbon. On the 28th March a forward movement brought the troops to Celorico, when the 51st took its place in the 7th Division (Major-General Houston), and on the following day marched out with the centre column for the attack on Guarda. The enemy, however, made no attempt to defend the town, but withdrew at once, with the loss of a considerable number of prisoners.

Still retreating rapidly, Massena took up a position behind the Coa, and at Sabugal, on the 3rd April, Wellington attacked him with great success, utterly defeating him, and two days later forcing him to cross the frontier into Spain. Wellington then commenced the investment of Almeida, a Portuguese frontier fortress in possession of the French, while Massena, unable to feed his army on the country, retired to Salamanca. All April was spent by the British force in the vicinity of Almeida, and the following extract from a letter written by Major Rice on the 16th of the month, from "_Villa Mayor, upon a branch of the Coa, and near Almeida_," will help to show how the situation appeared to the regimental officer:--

"As you will have heard of all our operations since Massena's
flight, which was tolerably rapid, it would be useless for me
to attempt a recapitulation, whose only merit would consist in
incorrectness and stupidity. You will see by the public documents
that no general action has taken place, though much skirmishing
with the advance, which has always been to its credit and
gallantry. Had the gentlemen--I mean the French--not been so very
swift of foot, the business would have been most decisive and
glorious for those concerned, as well as for the nation at large.
The chase has been given these several days. It is indeed even
reported they have quitted Salamanca. The whole of our army is
now concentrated between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo--fortresses
in possession of the enemy which still hold out. How they are to
be disposed of is all a secret, but of this and all other matters
of real importance you will be better informed at home than I am
here. The whole tract of country passed by us since we left Lisbon
is completely devastated--scarce a village or town that has not
been fired by the French. The beautiful city of Leyria, with its
convents and churches, has been made a dreadful example of--immense
and valuable libraries all committed to the flames. For a collector
of old and mutilated manuscripts and parchments there was a fine
field, for they were kicking and blowing about in all directions.
The poor, half-famished inhabitants literally vegetate in the
fields,--a sight more distressing than any I have yet witnessed,
and I thought till then that I had been pretty familiar with every
species of human misery. It does not do to moralise, for such
things are the consequence of warfare, but I do verily believe that
never before was it conducted with so much barbarism--_au part
des Français_,--the bare details of which shock the most obdurate
and unfeeling heart. Lord Wellington and staff have just passed
us. He is going to the side of Badajoz. Something, I conclude, of
importance has transpired that calls his attention in the Alentejo.
What is now to be done is mere matter of speculation; time, as in
everything, will discover. We are horribly fed, sometimes three or
four days without bread."

Again, on the 23rd April, he wrote from the same place:--

"Still stationary; nothing whatever has transpired of any moment in
this quarter since my last advice. Almeida continues invested; what
is to be the result, as I said before, I am ignorant of. It is,
however, pretty clear that no operations have as yet begun as to
indicate the intention of a siege. One would suppose that something
must shortly be attempted, unless Lord Wellington is informed as to
the positive provisionment of the garrison, by which the trouble
and the loss of heads may be spared. The French are friendly, and
give us no trouble. They occupy a position on the Agueda with a
corps of 4000 men--merely, I conclude, as a reconnaissance from the
main body of the army, which is at Salamanca and in cantonments
in the neighbourhood, or it may be further, from what I know, so
little do we hear.

"His lordship we have heard nothing of since his departure for the
Alentejo. Some serious errors have been committed, to the full
extent of which we remain in the dark. Much anxiety is, of course,
expressed. I trust things will not prove so bad as report makes
them, as any little reverse gives encouragement to _our friends_.
A squadron of the 13th was surprised and taken near Badajoz
lately; it was acting as a picket to a division of our army; the
consequence was so far serious that the French cavalry pushed
through the cantonments of the infantry, who, supposing themselves
in security, were totally unprepared, and gaped (wide enough, I
daresay) at the sight. A loss of a few ears, arms, old hats, &c., I
conclude, took place, though as yet no details of the reverse have
arrived. It is a d--d bad business, and won't bear telling.

"What a gallant business at Cadiz! Is it not a pity so much good
blood should be spilled for those dastardly Spaniards? Ought
not now those zealous English fools in the cause of Spain to
be sickened, or do they want another bloody fight, by way of
ascertaining if British soldiers will fight? The game of Spain must
be up. Of this country (Portugal) I shall not yet talk, though
its ultimate fate cannot but be foreseen. But I must not discuss
politics. The weather is here dreadfully cold and unpleasant,
though you will scarce believe it from our geographical situation.
Guarda, from which we are distant but five leagues, is supposed
to be one of the highest cities in Europe, so of our atmosphere I
leave you to judge. Hunger, misery, and grumbling is the order of
the day."

Wellington's departure for the Alentejo and the events in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, to which Rice refers in the above letters, had been occasioned by the fact that while the pursuit of Massena was being carried out, Soult, who had assembled a powerful army in the south of Spain, advanced rapidly, and after defeating the Spaniards, detached Mortier to besiege the fortress of Badajoz, held by a Spanish garrison. On the 11th March the latter ignominiously surrendered, and the French, having secured Badajoz, moved on and captured Campo Mayor. A week later, Wellington, seeing no chance of drawing Massena into a general engagement, and thus feeling confident that he could spare a portion of his force, despatched Marshal Beresford with two divisions of infantry and some cavalry and artillery towards Campo Mayor. That fortress was reached on the 25th March, but the enemy did not await the arrival of the British, who, seeing the French in full retreat towards Badajoz, pushed on, and after a brilliant cavalry charge captured the enemy's convoy, only, however, to lose it again by rashly pursuing too far and coming under the fire of the guns of the fortress.

Early in April, Beresford began the investment of Badajoz, but so many difficulties, real or imaginary, lay in his way that before the investment could be completed the French had ample time to provision the place and repair its defences. It was on the 7th April that the incident of the capture of a squadron of the 13th occurred, and Napier says of it that the French general, with 3000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and four guns, "surprised a squadron of the 13th, which was in front, and then came so close up to the main body as to exchange shots; yet he was permitted to retire unmolested, in the face of more than 20,000 men!" Napier attaches no blame to the 13th Light Dragoons for what occurred, but rather extols their gallantry. Of the supineness and inactivity of Beresford in all these operations he has, however, much to say; and Rice's remarks point to the fact that camp rumours were for once tolerably accurate.

With Wellington's arrival in front of Badajoz on the 21st April new life was put into the operations, for he gave orders to prosecute the siege with all vigour before Soult could come to the succour of the garrison. Requisites for the siege, however, were not forthcoming in sufficient quantities, for although guns, ammunition, and entrenching tools had been ordered up from Lisbon, the transport for their conveyance was hopelessly inadequate. Yet the engineer officers set to work to mark out the trenches, and were preparing to break ground, when Wellington received information from his northern army which necessitated his immediate return to the neighbourhood of Almeida. Leaving instructions, therefore, with Beresford to delay the siege of Badajoz for the time being, he hurried north, to find, on his arrival, that Massena's activity was causing considerable anxiety, for it was known that the French marshal was advancing in strength to raise the blockade of Almeida.

By the 28th April Wellington was back with his army, and taking in the situation at once, decided to give battle between the Agueda and the Coa. Massena conducted his operations much as his adversary had foreseen that he would do, and within the week was fought the battle of Fuentes d'Onor,[55] on ground midway between Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.

Hereabouts the river system is somewhat intricate, no fewer than five considerable streams flowing, in almost parallel channels, from south to north. On the east the Agueda flows close by the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo; westward of the Agueda are its tributaries, the Azava, the Duas Casas, and the Turon; and a little to the west of Almeida is the Coa--all within a space of thirty miles, and for the most part unfordable. As early as the 24th April Massena had pushed forward his advanced troops from Ciudad Rodrigo, with the object of seizing the crossings of the Azava, but the British outposts on that river drove them back, and continued to hold the river line, until Wellington arrived and selected a position behind the Duas Casas, when the outposts gradually fell back and allowed the French to advance. This they did on the 2nd May, and, on the 3rd, succeeded in crossing the Duas Casas at one point and capturing the village of Fuentes. They did not, however, remain long in possession, for after a fierce fight the British drove them out and forced them back across the Duas Casas.

Next day, Massena moved forward with 5000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry, and Wellington made some alterations in his dispositions, so that his front now extended for a distance of some seven miles. By this new arrangement, the 7th Division (to which the 51st belonged) was placed on the extreme right, near the hill of Nava de Avel, opposite to which the French appeared to be massing in strength. On the morning of the 5th May Massena pushed on, and simultaneously attacked the village of Fuentes and the right of the British position. The 7th Division, outnumbered, were forced back, but the Light Division and the cavalry hastened to its support, and restored the fight. Wellington, now observing that his right was in imminent danger of being turned, ordered the 7th Division to draw in, and the Light Division covered the withdrawal in a magnificent manner. The enemy's strong force of cavalry made strenuous efforts to crush this portion of the line, and what immediately occurred is best described in the words of Napier. "The Light Division," he says, "was thrown into squares; the Seventh Division, which was more advanced, endeavoured to do the same, but the horsemen were too quick upon them, and some were cut down; the remainder stood firm, and the Chasseurs Britannique ranged behind a loose stone wall poured such a fire that the French recoiled and seemed bewildered."

According to all accounts, the battle scene at this phase of the fight was a most picturesque one. The vast plain was covered with charging bodies of horsemen, who once and again endeavoured to break the squares, which, nothing daunted, met the onslaught, and leisurely retired. But the grandest sight of all on that memorable day was perhaps that presented by Norman Ramsay's two-horse artillery guns, which, hemmed in and cut off by the enemy's cavalry, saved themselves, not by their fire, but by cleaving their way at full gallop through the astonished French horsemen. This was, however, but one incident of many in a day of great deeds, and for a long while the issue of the fight hung in the balance. Failing to effect his purpose on the British right, Massena directed his attention to the capture of the village of Fuentes; but at this point also his troops were eventually beaten back, and at nightfall the British and French sentries, separated only by the breadth of the Duas Casas, agreed to take water from the river without molestation--a tacit agreement which always existed in Peninsular warfare between the veterans of the opposing armies.

Considering the critical situation in which the 7th Division was for so long placed, the casualties in the 51st on this day were remarkably few--only half a dozen wounded. In the briefest of letters Sam Rice described the events in which he had taken part as senior major of the regiment. "We have suffered little," he wrote, "though the first attack was made on our regiment by a body of cavalry, who came up to the charge, but were soon convinced that we were not to be trifled with. I am well and safe. I had an 'all-but,' having my cap whisked off by a three-pounder, but received no other injury than a temporary stunning from the concussion. The French again menaced us this morning, but it has since proved a mere manœuvre, and they are off, and we prepared to follow. I literally have not time to say more."

This was written on the day after the battle, and it is possible that the writer was too sick at heart to say more; for something had occurred, as will be disclosed a little later on, which must have caused endless regret to every officer of the regiment who came out of action. They were not, however, given much time to brood over their misfortune, for on the 10th May Massena gave up the attempt to reach Almeida, and withdrew his army beyond the Agueda, when he was relieved of his command by Marmont. That same night, Brenier, in command of Almeida, seeing that there was now no hope of succour reaching him, resolved on a bold stroke. Having destroyed the guns of the fortress, he marshalled the garrison, and, in one solid mass, at dead of night, broke through the blockading force, almost before any one was aware of what was taking place, and eventually made his escape with only a few casualties. Wellington, disgusted at the escape of the garrison, vented his wrath on his lax troops in no measured terms, and leaving Sir Brent Spencer with a sufficient force to watch Marmont, despatched the remainder of the army to Badajoz, the siege of which he proposed to renew at once.

While Wellington was fighting Massena at Fuentes d'Onor, much had been going on in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, and Wellington, although seemingly so fully occupied in the north, was at the same time planning for the overthrow of Soult in the south. It will be remembered that when he hurriedly left Badajoz, at the end of April, to attend to Massena, he instructed Beresford to prosecute the siege leisurely. Certainly Beresford could do no more, since, as has been said, he lacked all the requisites for a regular siege, but he attempted more, and failed ignominiously. From the 5th to the 12th May the first siege of Badajoz was carried on without sufficient organisation, and assaults were directed on various points before they had been properly breached, with the result that within the week Beresford had lost nearly a thousand men, and had made no impression on the fortress. Then came the news that Soult was moving to the relief of the garrison, when Beresford at once raised the siege, marched south, and prepared to give battle. On the 16th May was fought the memorable and bloody battle of Albuhera (or Albuera), where, more by good luck than good management, Beresford, with a loss of four thousand of his eight thousand men, succeeded in defeating his adversary, whose losses were still heavier. The investment of Badajoz was now resumed, and Wellington was soon on the spot, making arrangements for a second siege.

Badajoz at this time was probably the strongest fortress on the Spanish frontier. It was situated on the south bank of the Guadiana, a broad and deep river, which was of itself considered to be sufficient protection from an attack from the north. On that side, therefore, the defences of the fortress consisted only of a simple rampart. On all other sides the fortifications were formidable, having regular bastioned fronts, with solid masonry parapets, encircled by a ditch in places thirty feet deep. Within the north-east angle of the fortress stood the ancient castle, built on a hillock one hundred feet in height, and overlooking the Guadiana; yet, in its turn, overlooked by the high ground (barely five hundred yards distant) to the north of the river. In order to guard against the possibility of an enemy's artillery occupying these heights and demolishing the castle, a detached fort, known as St Christoval (or San Christobal), had been built on them; while, on the opposite side of Badajoz, there were two detached works--Pardeleras on the south, and Picurina on the south-east.

In the first siege, Beresford had attempted to attack from the north, capture St Christoval, and, after establishing batteries, breach and assault the castle. St Christoval, however, proved too strong for the assailants, and thus Beresford was forced to leave his work undone. When Wellington came on the scene to prepare for the second siege, he decided to follow Beresford's plan, and accordingly, on the 24th May, the 7th Division invested St Christoval. Trenches were now commenced towards the castle and towards St Christoval, and batteries were soon erected. During the first few days of June the trenchwork made rapid progress, and the guns fired continuously on the castle and on the fort. On the 6th June, a practicable breach in St Christoval was reported, and the assault was ordered to take place forthwith.

On the night of the 6th-7th, the assault was launched, Major Macintosh, of the 85th, commanding the Stormers, and Ensign Dyas, of the 51st, the Forlorn Hope. The advanced party succeeded in dropping into the ditch undiscovered, and the Stormers with their escalading ladders followed close behind, but on reaching the breach it was found that the defenders had succeeded in repairing it, and had added to its summit a high perpendicular wall--so high that the ladders would not nearly reach the top. Then the enemy's musket-fire fell upon the unfortunate Stormers, and shells, rolled from the ramparts, bursting amongst them, played havoc in the ranks. Retreat was inevitable, and upwards of a hundred dead and wounded were left in the ditch.

Next day the guns reopened fire on St Christoval, and on the 9th June a second assault was ordered. Ensign Dyas again led the Forlorn Hope, and Major M'Geechy, of the 11th, the Stormers. The ladders carried were much longer than those used on the previous occasion, yet they did not prove long enough; for the defenders had removed the débris from the foot of the breach and thus rendered the place safe from escalade. Shot and shell now rained on the baffled assailants, but, nothing daunted, they reared their ladders and pressed up them, in the attempt to reach the rampart--only, however, to be bayoneted at the top, or to be hurled backwards into the ditch as the defenders pushed the ladders away. The disaster was complete. M'Geechy was killed, and ere the troops could extricate themselves from the ditch hundreds had fallen. Of the 51st alone there fell in these two desperate assaults one officer killed and three officers wounded, twenty-six men killed and seventy wounded; but Dyas, the hero of two Forlorn Hopes, escaped unharmed, and was personally complimented by Wellington for his gallantry.

Major Sam Rice, who had taken an active part in these assaults, wrote, in his usual laconic way, from _Camp before Badajoz, 16th June 1811_:--

"The siege of this place, which began under such favourable
auspices, I am sorry to say, is not likely to terminate yet
awhile, and, if at all, only by starvation, for it is most ably
defended, beyond, I believe, the calculations of the scientifics.
We opened fire from our batteries on the 2nd June, and proceeded
to batter and destroy, but without much effect, for the guns and
all apparatus are withdrawn within these last three days. The cause
is said to be that Marshal Soult is again coming forward with
a determination to dispute the point, and afford relief to the
garrison; but before this a general action must be fought, and a
bloody one it will be, for on this depends the fate of Badajoz and
of the frontier--at any rate for a time. The place still continues
invested, but all expect to move directly to the army in front.
We have been most cruelly harassed day and night, and totally
uncovered, as well as exposed to a most scorching sun. Our Regiment
has suffered much in two unsuccessful attempts to storm a fort--
100 men killed and wounded, and several officers. I have escaped
wonderfully, though never under a hotter fire in all my life.
I am writing from the bare ground, on which I have taken up my
abode this last month entirely. Mainwaring is sick; I command the
Regiment, reduced already to 300--so much for honour and glory!"

Almost immediately after this letter was written, Wellington, learning that Marmont had come down and united with Soult, raised the siege, and withdrew his force rapidly, a few miles, to the Caya river, and on the 19th June the French armies entered Badajoz. The combination against Wellington was now weighty. Soult and Marmont could put sixty thousand men into the field, whereas the Allies on the Caya could not muster half that number. But the French marshals failed to discover this weakness, and Wellington found the ground about the Caya so favourable that he was able to present a bold front and deceive his opponents as to his actual strength, which, even after Spencer joined him with the force left in the neighbourhood of Almeida, stood at no more than twenty-eight thousand fighting men. Unwilling to risk a battle without knowing the actual strength of their adversary, Soult and Marmont made no attempt to advance, but shortly afterwards retired and separated, to commence a new plan of campaign.

The following letter from Major Rice gives his views on the situation about this time:--

"CAMPO MAYOR, _19th July 1811_.

"Since my last we have been tolerably quiet; scarce even alarms,
which have their advantages in keeping the body and soul in that
activity so essential to the military character. It seems now
pretty well ascertained that the French army is broken up for
the present. Soult, with a corps, reoccupies Seville. Marmont,
with the remaining force, Plasencia and its neighbourhood. By an
intercepted letter from Marmont, and which is said to be authentic,
he complains much of the disorganisation of his army, and want of
resources of every kind, and particularly money, without which he
can anticipate no future good. I suppose the gentlemen soldiers
begin to grumble--pay or plunder is the cry. For my part, I've
heard so much of armies being annihilated, want of pay, food, and
clothing, &c., &c., and cowed at even the sight of British troops,
all which statements have proved so incorrect by pretty fair
experience, that I now give ear to nothing that is said, however
apparently good the authority. Whatever may be their motives,
one thing is pretty certain and known to both parties--that no
active warfare can be carried on at this season of the year in the
Alentejo without mutual destruction. The campaign may probably
open again early in the autumn. On what point the attack is likely
to be made, I as little care as I am able to form an opinion, but
wherever it is, they will certainly get cursedly licked. So much
for presumption! The whole of our army, which has been bivouacking
in this vicinity, is now nearly in motion, standing by divisions
along the frontier, to Castello Branco and beyond.

"We march to-morrow for Nissa (or Niza), a town this side the
Tagus, and near one of the principal fords, Villa Velha. The
weather is most dreadfully hot. Crowded, and stenched out by all
sorts of agreeables--dead animals, &c.--our situation is not
the most delectable one. Withal, bad fare, and every article
exorbitantly dear. Mainwaring has got a staff appointment, and an
officer from half-pay has been brought in. What satisfaction is
there in serving if it has not its reward? I am fairly sick of the
business. I have had nothing but losses of late. A valuable horse
broke from me while at Badajoz, swam the Guadiana, and I believe is
now in the French lines. Poor Harry's[56] pistol, which I had in
my sash the night of the storm (St Christoval), dropped out, and
I lost also my poor dear Mary's[57] snuff-box, which I considered
almost as my guardian angel, it having been my companion in every
affair."

The latter part of this letter helps to throw light on Sam Rice's character, and it is evident from it that he was a man who bore no ill-will to any one. He mentions casually that "an officer from half-pay has been brought in," and he immediately dismisses the subject with, "I am fairly sick of the business," and never refers to it again. Yet he, the senior major of the 51st, had been passed over for the command of the regiment, and Lieut.-Colonel Mitchell, who had had no previous connection with the regiment, had been brought in over his head. Under such circumstances an ordinary man might have been excused if he had given vent to his feelings by filling two or three sheets of paper with abuse of every one in authority. Major Rice was the victim of circumstances; by no fault of his own he had lost the command of his regiment; but he was above all things loyal, and he refused to give away his commanding officer, Colonel Mainwaring. He says nothing whatever of any trouble. On the 16th June he writes, "Mainwaring is sick; I command the Regiment"; and on the 19th July, "Mainwaring has got a staff appointment." It would have been easy for him to have told the whole story, and thus excused himself, as certainly nine out of ten people would have done. He, however, chose the better part, and left unsaid anything that might have detracted from the conduct of his commanding officer, and anything that might have been seized upon by gossip-mongers as affecting the good name of the Regiment.

In later years Sir John Colborne related what took place in the following words:[58]--"Colonel Mainwaring, of the 51st, was placed in a position [Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro] in which he thought he was sure to be surrounded by the French. So he called his officers and said, 'we are sure of being taken or killed; therefore we'll burn the colours.' Accordingly, they brought the colours and burnt them with all funeral pomp, and buried the ashes, or kept them, I believe. It so happened that the French never came near them. Lord Wellington was exceedingly angry when he heard of it, as he knew well enough where he had placed the regiment. So he ordered Mainwaring under arrest and tried him by court-martial. An old colonel, who undertook his defence, said, 'I believe it was something to do with religious principles.' 'Oh,' said Lord Wellington, 'if it was a matter of religious principles, I have nothing more to do with it. You may take him out of arrest; but send him to Lisbon.' So he went to Lisbon, and was never allowed to command his regiment again; he was sent home."

Such is the story, and there is little doubt that when Sam Rice wrote, on the 16th June, that he was in temporary command, as Mainwaring was sick, he knew perfectly well that his commanding officer, although he certainly had been invalided to Lisbon, had been virtually relieved of his command. But the authorities, evidently unwilling to be too severe on an officer who had performed good services for his country, but who had erred through excess of zeal, so arranged matters that, on the 13th June 1811, Lieut.-Colonel Mainwaring exchanged to the half-pay of the 26th Foot (with Lieut.-Colonel Mitchell) and was appointed commandant of Hilsea Barracks in England. The matter, of course, had to be referred home, and so took some time, and in the meanwhile Colonel Mainwaring had taken his regiment to the camp before Badajoz, and had been hurt in the trenches.

Now, as a matter of fact, Sir John Colborne was wrong in saying that "the French never came near them," for it is perfectly certain that the 7th Division was posted in a most perilous position, and was very seriously attacked, although certainly the 51st was not so desperately engaged as were some of the other regiments. The division, numbering some four thousand infantry (of whom the 51st and 85th were the only British regiments), and supported by fourteen hundred cavalry, was detached two miles from the main position, on practically open ground, and every one in the division knew that since Wellington's left flank was impregnable, Massena would, of necessity, direct his attack on the right flank. Wellington himself was well aware of this, but either he did not anticipate so vast a turning movement as his adversary eventually launched, or he had intended that the 7th Division should only hold the outlying position assigned to it long enough to induce Massena to develop his attack against it. Be that as it may, the fact remains that, at one time, the 7th Division was threatened by twenty thousand of Massena's infantry and nearly the whole of his masses of cavalry, and for a while was in imminent danger of being cut off and annihilated. Wellington, of course, set matters right as soon as he realised that the situation was becoming critical, but there were some who imagined that he was intensely annoyed at having made faulty dispositions in the first instance, and that he endeavoured to justify himself in the eyes of the 7th Division by venting his wrath on the colonel of the 51st. At the same time the burning of the colours was an extraordinary procedure on the part of the colonel, and it is not easy to understand how it was that the other senior officers of the regiment acquiesced in it, if, indeed, they did so. When the circumstances became known to Wellington, he was bound to take notice of what had occurred; but apparently the officers of the 51st considered that he was unduly severe in treating their colonel's action as anything more than an error of judgment, for which a reprimand might have been sufficient. As it was, they always maintained that the commander-in-chief had been harsh and unjust, because it had been represented to him that Colonel Mainwaring had doubted the wisdom of his dispositions.

Years afterwards his nephew, Frederick Mainwaring,[59] who, when only fourteen years of age, fought as an ensign of the 51st at Fuentes d'Onor and elsewhere, wrote very strongly on the subject, and referred to the incident of the burning of the colours, though without actually mentioning what had occurred, in the following words:--

"An action, in which this officer took the greatest responsibility
upon himself, and which ought to have reflected credit upon him
rather than annoyance, was misrepresented to the great Duke,
who, with all his bright qualities, is said (if report does not
greatly belie him) never to alter an opinion or a resolution once
formed."[60]

Colonel Mainwaring was not the only commanding officer in the Peninsula who was troubled by the presence of his regimental colours in the field, for there were occasions upon which the colours hampered the movements of a regiment very considerably. In action they could never be neglected, since they were held to contain, as it were, the soul of the regiment. Originally used as the rallying-point, they had gradually come to be regarded as what nowadays would be termed the _mascot_ of the regiment, so that their loss in battle was thought likely to lead to the most dire consequences. The officers who carried them knew that they were in honour bound to defend them to the last, and when a whole regiment was ordered to skirmish to the front, it was often necessary to leave a company behind to guard the colours. As the war in the Peninsula went on, light infantry regiments realised that their colours were an encumbrance, and observing that rifle regiments were not provided with colours, some of them got permission to place theirs in store. But this was exceptional, and most regiments continued to carry their colours into action. At Waterloo they were everywhere conspicuous, and even in modern times their defence in the field has led to fierce fighting and the performance of signal acts of gallantry. Now, however, the extended battlefield has made their presence an impossibility, and they are no longer taken on active service. Perhaps, in this way, the sentiment attached to the "flag that bore the battle and the breeze" has been rudely crushed; yet the colours of to-day, emblazoned with numerous battle honours, are useful in reminding the young soldiers of a regiment of the victories won by their ancestors.

Whether, as a result of this trouble over the 51st colours at Fuentes d'Onor, Rice suffered to any great extent by being passed over for the command of the regiment is questionable. He certainly did not succeed to the command for another six years; but, if nothing had occurred, Colonel Mainwaring could have continued to hold it for that length of time, or for even longer. The fact of another officer having been brought in over his head did not reflect on Rice's character as an officer, for it always has been well known to every one in the service that an outside officer must take the place of a commanding officer relieved of his command; and it will readily be understood that such an arrangement is a necessity. As we shall see, the authorities made it up to Rice in more ways than one, and he eventually received as many decorations and honours as he would have received if he had succeeded Colonel Mainwaring[61] in the command of the 51st.

Having failed to reduce Badajoz, Wellington decided to invest Ciudad Rodrigo, and towards that place his troops were now moving. The 51st marched from Campo Mayor to Sabugal, and thence proceeded to Alfayates and Villa Mayor, at which latter place the regiment remained throughout the greater part of August and September, as will be seen from the two following letters from Major Rice, who during this time was in temporary command of the regiment:--

"CAMP, OR BIVOUAC, NEAR PENA MACOR,
_August 9th, 1811_.

"My last (from Campo Mayor, I believe) informed you that, the foe
being no longer to be dreaded in that quarter, the army was moving
into cantonments along the frontier, and that we (that is, the 7th
Division) were to occupy Nissa, or Niza. Such did take place, and
all indulged in the fond hope that we should enjoy a little _otium_
for a month or so; but, alas, it is willed otherwise, for we are
once more in motion, and are so far advanced northwards, retracing
our footsteps to the Coa. What is to be done, or the cause of this
sudden movement, is a mystery, and I believe only known to the
Lord of Lords--_in this country_, N.B.! I do not myself think any
serious attack will again be made by Monsieur François, and in
my opinion it is only a little ruse of Baron Douro's to distract
him--harass--or what you will, and causing a 'diversion in the
south,' as we say in Greek, &c., &c. Whatever may be the cause, it
is no little annoyance to be so constantly on the march in this
hot weather, and in a country more wretched than you can possibly
imagine. Not an article of any description is to be purchased,
and were it not for our rations we should be literally starved.
We have not been under a roof for this some time; every day we
take up fresh ground, and seek shelter in the woods, which luckily
abound, or we should actually be grilled alive. As yet I have held
out tolerably well, being unwilling to give in while there is a
prospect of anything going on. How long I shall last I cannot
say, for we are all getting sickly. The Regiment has no more than
300 men. When his lordship sends dispatches, it is said that he
stops private letters; he probably dipped into mine and saw their
brilliancy, so fearing to be eclipsed he arrested their progress.
This may account for their non-receipt!"

"VILLA MAYOR, UPON THE COA,
_19th August 1811_.

"I wish I could convey to you anything new and interesting
relative to this country, or what is likely to be the result of
such apparently protracted operations. I am most positively in
the utmost obscurity; mystery is the order of the day, really
I believe because no one but the lord of lords is enlightened,
and I sometimes doubt whether he is always so, such is the
fluctuating state of Spain, and probably the difficulty of gaining
intelligence of the real movements of the foe. The whole army
still remains cantoned upon this frontier; the advance upon the
Agueda, with pickets probably as far as Ciudad Rodrigo. They talk
of a siege, but I do not hear of the arrival of the battering
train, which may possibly be _en route_ from Oporto. You will
hardly suppose us to be in such ignorance, but true it is, for one
division scarce knows how the other is posted; but as there is one
tolerable fair directing head, it is of no moment of what materials
are composed those who act in so confined a sphere.

"The French don't appear to have made any movement, still occupying
Plasencia and the contiguous country. Ciudad Rodrigo has but a
garrison of 1500 men. A considerable body at Salamanca, but nothing
to oppose us if we choose to invest that place or make an advance,
which is not, I think, likely. The French to do anything here must
assemble in great force and bring forward their supplies, which you
know is difficult in any country, much more so in such a barren
desert as this is. The grand puzzle now is, what has been the cause
of this rapid and unexpected movement from the Tagus to the Coa,
when every one supposed we should be resting till the autumn? Be
sure to send the fishing-rod. I'm longing to whip the Coa."

From this letter, as well as from many other letters, one sees how very little was known, even to senior officers of regiments, as to what was going on, or what was likely to happen. This is a matter which is often forgotten by the layman, who is apt to think, when reading the history of a campaign, that the regimental officers failed on certain occasions to appreciate the situation, and therefore failed to do the right thing at the right moment. Whereas, in nine cases out of ten, in all probability the regimental officers were completely in the dark as to the intentions of the commander of the forces; and if the officers knew little of the operations in progress, or of the reason for movements, the men in the ranks knew still less. Thus we constantly find in the Peninsular letters and journals of regimental officers and soldiers--at any rate at the beginning of the war--expressions of distrust in the generals, grumblings at having to perform forced marches for no apparent reason, and disgust at being ordered to retreat at the moment when they expected to give battle. But, as the war progressed, the men learned to take things as they came, and made no attempt to reason out the whys and the wherefores of strategical movements. The discipline which had been drilled into the soldiers taught them that it was not necessary for them to exercise their reasoning powers until they were in actual touch with the enemy, and the officers seldom thought ahead of the immediate tactical situation.

It must be remembered that a century ago few of the rank and file could read or write, and few of the regimental officers were students of the theory of the art of war. It was not possible, therefore, for these officers and men to work out any great strategical scheme, especially as they had no means of learning anything of the enemy's movements going on at a distance. Hints and rumours filtered through from the staff officers, and were greedily seized upon for discussion in the bivouacs, but in the generality of cases they were quite erroneous and frequently misleading. So the regimental officers contented themselves with living in the present, without troubling about problems of strategy, and they were quite unable to fathom the mystery of the part played by politics in the war. It will be noticed that Sam Rice, at the time a senior regimental officer, in his letters declines to discuss politics, and says little about strategy.

In the vast store of literature dealing with the Peninsular War, there are many volumes of officers' letters and journals, principally of officers who served on the staff, and so to a certain extent behind the scenes. Moreover, the majority of these books were written up and edited years after the war had come to an end, and after every movement in the various campaigns had been thoroughly discussed. There are few books by regimental officers containing their views written down at the time and not altered before publication, and in such as there are we find questions of strategy either avoided or dismissed in a few words, and even questions of tactics only vaguely referred to. For but vaguely did these regimental officers ever know whither they were going, or for what purpose, from one month's end to the next. It was enough for them to be told that their regiment would march at a certain hour in a certain direction, and that what would happen afterwards would depend on circumstances. As soon as touch was gained with the enemy, the regimental officers and the men were given a general idea of the existing tactical situation and what it was intended that they should do. But even then they were not told all, and as often as not they went into action knowing no more about the dispositions of the enemy than they could see with their own eyes. Consequently there were occasions when, with a little more information--a slight dispersal of the "fog of war"--they might have crushed their enemy beyond recovery, instead of merely crippling him.

Why information about the enemy should have been withheld it is difficult to understand, and it must have been most irritating. Of the intentions of their great chief, officers and men never expected to be informed, and they had neither the desire nor the ability to probe into them. To Wellington himself this inability on the part of his army to forecast his plans was probably an immense satisfaction, for, he must have argued, if his own troops could not see through the veil, it was not likely that the enemy would be able to do so. And, naturally, for a general to be sure that his plans are kept secret, with a possibility of his being able to blind and deceive his adversary, is a great asset in war. On the other hand, it is an undoubted fact that Wellington carried this matter of reticence to extremes; he seldom took even his staff into his confidence; any information which he collected he kept to himself; and only on rare occasions did he discuss his plans with anyone. The wisdom of such an attitude on the part of a commander-in-chief may, of course, be questioned, on the grounds that if he were unfortunate enough to be killed at the critical moment, the next senior officer would be in the awkward predicament of having to formulate a plan of his own on the spur of the moment. It may be argued that Wellington's plans were so thoroughly worked out in every detail that there was no loophole for failure, and no doubt as to what was intended. That may have been so; but there is no proof, for fortunately it was never put to the test, and the great man saw all his plans brought to a finish. Still, it is well known that Wellington realised to the full the danger of his policy of reticence; and it is on record that he himself expressed the opinion that had he been placed _hors de combat_ by the shot which passed over his head and wounded Lord Uxbridge at Waterloo, the British and their Allies would have suffered defeat. His generals may have chafed under such an autocratic rule, yet they, as well as the whole army, had absolute confidence in their leader--at any rate after the first year or two.

But the "grand puzzle" about which Rice wrote on the 19th August was not so intricate as he seems to have thought; for Wellington had made up his mind all along to attempt the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, and had only cantoned his troops about the Tagus in order to deceive the enemy as to his intentions. He was now moving his army up towards the fortress with all speed, hoping to reduce it before it could be re-victualled for a siege. But in this he failed, for a convoy of stores of all kinds had reached the place while Wellington's troops were still at a distance from it. The 51st had remained at Villa Mayor until the 22nd September, had then marched to Guinaldo, and on 25th to Albergueria. Rice by this time had been forced to go to hospital, and on the 26th September he wrote from Aldea da Ribeira: "I have been confined to my bed for these eight days with a violent attack of dysentery, accompanied by a good deal of fever. I think the former is in some measure conquered. Am taking bark, for I am most terribly low and hipped--all alone in a most miserable village. How I shall get on I know not. The task is arduous for an invalid in this most horrid of countries. The regiment is a league in advance; a retreat or an action must take place within twenty-four hours, for the French are only distant five leagues from our outposts. Our army is in a wretched state; they say 30,000, with an immensity of officers, sick; in short, you see nothing from morning to night but misery. You must not consider my case desperate, so I beg of you not to alarm Fanny."[62]

His next letter was from _Celorico, upon the Mondego, 12th October 1811_--

"I gave you a few hasty lines, I think, on the 26th September. As
I predicted that a retreat or an action would take place within
twenty-four hours, so it happened. The French pushed forward in
great force, and would gladly have brought on an action, but a
wise head said nay, and we retrograded. The 3rd Division was
pressed hard by the cavalry, but retired in good order by squares,
so suffered not so much as might have been expected. The French
have again taken themselves off, Marmont by the pass of Banos to
Plasencia, and the Comte d'Orsini[63] (or some such name), with
the remaining force, is gone into cantonments in the vicinity of
Salamanca. What will be the end of all this kicking about and
expense of shoe leather I cannot say. Our advanced posts extend
nearly as far as before, though several divisions are on this side
of the Coa, where I think they will remain for the winter, or until
some fresh alarm calls us again into motion. I have been very
unwell since my last, but am now considerably better, and have to
complain principally of weakness. Another fortnight will, I hope,
put the old horse once more on his legs. The best of them cannot go
for ever. His lordship is just coming in to inspect the hospitals."

Shortly after this the 51st went into winter quarters at Pena Macor, while Wellington perfected his arrangement for converting the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo into a siege. That the regimental officers did not take a very bright view of the situation is evident from the following letter from Major Rice:--

"PENA MACOR, _4th December 1811_.

"We have got papers down to the 15th November. Grand news was
expected, such as Northern Coalition--the old joke! I wish we could
get those Russian bears on foot; nothing can be done here but by
something of the sort. Bony, I fear, is too deep, and John Bull
such a cursed fool that I am no longer sanguine in the cause and
the issue of the glorious struggle. The army has again been on the
_qui vive_, but nothing done. A convoy of provisions was attempted
to be thrown into Ciudad Rodrigo, but our lord was too deep. He
has good intelligence and certain requisites. General Renaud
passed some days here with us. He likes good living and plenty of
wine--a tolerable sort of Frenchman. He was taken by Don Julian,
the famous guerilla partisan. He thinks Bony will never forgive
him, and is alarmed. I shall struggle on a little longer before
I give in--take another round or two--the odds against me. My
poor brother major[64] died the other day--a short illness, which
terminated with a melancholy disease--what the wigs call _timor
orsi_--otherwise, fear of hell."

So 1811 closed, and was followed by a year of strenuous work for the British troops--a year of great victories, yet one also of arduous marches, vast hardships, and heavy casualties. And Major Sam Rice managed to "struggle on" to the end of it.