Chapter II: The Crimea, Danube, and Armenia (1)

Charles Gordon reached Balaclava on New Year's Day, 1855. He found everyone engaged in foraging expeditions, that the siege of Sebastopol excited no interest, that the road from the bay to the hill was like a morass, and that a railway to traverse it was being slowly laid down. Gordon remained about three weeks at Balaclava assisting in the erection of huts, and in the conveyance of some of them to the front. When this task was accomplished he was himself ordered to the trenches, where his work could not fail to be more exciting and also more dangerous than that upon which up to this he had been engaged.

Before following him it will be useful to summarise the leading events that had taken place in the Crimea up to this date. War between England and France on the one side, and Russia on the other, was finally declared in March 1854, the allied forces landed in the Crimea early in September 1854, and the first battle was fought on the Alma stream on the 20th of that month. In that battle 60,000 allied troops--20,000 English, 40,000 French--attacked 120,000 Russians in a strong and well-chosen position. The result was a brilliant victory for the allies, and there is no doubt that it was mainly won by the dashing attack of the English Infantry. The losses were--French, 60 killed and 500 wounded; English, 362 killed and 1620 wounded, thus furnishing clear evidence as to the force which bore the brunt of the engagement. The Russian loss was computed to be not less than 6000, or double that of the allies.

As the allied forces advanced towards Sebastopol the Russian Army assumed the offensive. The brilliant and never-to-be-forgotten Cavalry charges on 25th October, of the Light and Heavy Brigades, under Cardigan and Scarlett respectively, at Balaclava in the valley that stretched at the foot of the hills overlooking the bay of that name, had not merely vindicated the reputation of English horsemen for dash and daring, but had done something--at excessive cost, it is true--to clear the advance for the whole army. When the Russians, assuming in their turn the offensive, attacked our camps on the heights of Inkerman, they were repulsed with heavy loss on both sides, and with the result that more than six months elapsed before they again ventured to show any inclination to attack in the open field, and then only to meet with fresh discomfiture on the banks of the Tchernaya.

The battle of Inkerman was fought in the early morning of 5th November, and again the brunt of the fighting fell on the English army. The Russian General, Todleben, subsequently stated that he reluctantly decided to attack the English camp instead of the French, because "the English position seemed to be so very weak." Here again the losses give no misleading idea of the proportionate share of the two allied armies in the struggle. While the Russian loss was put down in all at 11,000 men, the French lost 143 killed and 786 wounded; the English, 597 killed and 1760 wounded.

The opinion has been confidently expressed that if a rapid advance and attack had been made on Sebastopol immediately after Inkerman, the fortress would have been easily captured; but both before and during the siege the Russians made the best use of every respite the Allies gave them, and this lost opportunity, if it was one, never recurred. It will thus be seen that some of the most interesting incidents of the war had passed before Gordon set foot in the Crimea, but for an engineer officer the siege and capture of the fortress created by Todleben under the fire of his foes presented the most attractive and instructive phase of the campaign.

At this time the French army mustered about 100,000 men, the British about 23,000, and the Russian garrison of Sebastopol 25,000. In addition, there was a covering army, under the Grand Dukes and General Liprandi, which, despite its losses at Inkerman, was probably not less than 60,000 but the successive defeats at Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman had broken the confidence of the troops and reduced their leaders to inaction. The batteries were nearly completed when Gordon reached the front, and a good deal had already been written and said about the hardships of the soldiers. Gordon was a man of few wants, who could stand any amount of fatigue, and throughout his life he was always disposed to think that soldiers should never complain. Writing as late as 12th February 1855, when the worst of the winter was over, he says: "There are really no hardships for the officers; the men are the sufferers, and that is partly their own fault, as they are like children, thinking everything is to be done for them. The French soldier looks out for himself, and consequently fares much better." Something of the same conclusion had been forced on him when on board the French transport between Marseilles and Athens when he wrote: "The poor French soldiers, of whom there were 320 on board without any shelter, must have suffered considerably from cold; they had no covering, and in spite of the wet, cold, and bad weather, they kept up their health however, and their high spirits also, when our men would have mutinied." And again, later on: "We have capital rations, and all the men have warm clothing, and more than enough of that. They of course grumble and growl a good deal. The contrast with the French in this respect is not to our advantage." It must in fairness be remembered that the worst of the maladministration was over before he reached the scene, and that he came with those reinforcements, not merely of men, but still more especially of supplies, which ended "the winter troubles," and converted them into the sanguine hopes and views of the spring.

Gordon was not long in the trenches before he came under fire, and the account of his first experience of real warfare may be given in his own words:--

"The night of February 14th I was on duty in the trenches, and if
you look at the plan I sent you and the small sketch enclosed I
will explain what I had to do. The French that night determined
to join their sentries on their right and our sentries on our
left, in advance of their and our trenches, so as to prevent the
Russians coming up the ravine, and then turning against our
flank. They determined to make a lodgment in the ruined house
marked _B_ on the sketch, and to run a trench up the hill to the
left of this, while I was told to make a communication by
rifle-pits from the caves _C_ to the ruined house _B_. I got,
after some trouble, eight men with picks and shovels, and asked
the captain of the advance trench to give me five double sentries
to throw out in advance. It was the first time he had been on
duty here; and as for myself, I never had, although I kept that
to myself. I led forward the sentries, going at the head of the
party, and found the sentries of the advance had not held the
caves, which they ought to have done after dark, so there was
just a chance of the Russians being in them. I went on, however,
and, though I did not like it, explored the caves almost alone.
We then left two sentries on the hill above the caves, and went
back, to get round and post two sentries below the caves.
However, just as soon as we showed ourselves outside the caves
and below them, bang! bang! went two rifles, the bullets hitting
the ground close to us. The sentries with me retired in a rare
state of mind, and my working party bolted, and were stopped with
great difficulty. What had really happened was this: It was not a
Russian attack, but the two sentries whom I had placed above the
caves _had fired at us_, lost their caps, and bolted to the
trench. Nothing after this would induce the sentries to go out,
so I got the working party to go forward with me. The Russians
had, on the report of our shots, sent us a shower of bullets,
their picket not being more than 150 yards away. I set the men to
work, and then went down to the bottom of the ravine, and found
the French in strength hard at work also. Having told them who we
were, I returned to the trench, where I met Colonel ---- of the
1st Royals. I warned him if he went out he would be sure to be
hit by our own sentries or the Russians. He would go, however,
and a moment afterwards was hit in the breast, the ball going
through his coats, slightly grazing his ribs, and passing out
again without hurting him. I stayed with my working party all
night, and got home very tired."

In further illustration of the confusion prevailing in the trenches at night, he mentions in the same letter that while trying to find the caves he missed his way, and "very nearly walked into the town by mistake."

This was the more surprising because Gordon's intimate knowledge of the trenches was remarkable and well known. The following testimony given by Sir Charles Staveley affords striking proof that this reputation was not undeserved:--

"I happened to mention to Charlie Gordon that I was field officer
for the day for command in the trenches next day, and, having
only just returned from sick leave, that I was ignorant of the
geography of our left attack. He said at once, 'Oh! come down
with me to-night after dark, and I will show you over the
trenches.' He drew me out a very clear sketch of the lines (which
I have now), and down I went accordingly. He explained every nook
and corner, and took me along outside our most advanced trench,
the bouquets (volleys of small shells fired from mortars) and
other missiles flying about us in, to me, a very unpleasant
manner, he taking the matter remarkably coolly."

The late Sir George Chesney, a very competent and discriminating witness, gives evidence to the same effect:--

"In his humble position as an Engineer subaltern he attracted the
notice of his superiors, not merely by his energy and activity,
but by a special aptitude for war, developing itself amid the
trench work before Sebastopol in a personal knowledge of the
enemy's movements _such as no other officer attained_. We used to
send him to find out what new move the Russians were making."

The next incident of the siege described by Gordon occurred about a week after his _bapteme de feu_ in the caves. While the French were somewhat deliberately making at Inkerman a battery for fifteen guns, the Russians, partly in a spirit of bravado, threw up in a single night a battery for nearly twenty guns immediately opposite, at a distance of not more than 600 yards from the French. As this was made in the open ground, it was a defiance which could not be tolerated, and the French accordingly made their arrangements to assault it. Kinglake has graphically described the surprise of the French when they discovered this "white circlet or loop on the ground," and the attempt made by three battalions, with two other battalions in reserve, to capture it. A battalion of Zouaves, under the command of Colonel Cere, carried it in fine style, but the Russian reserves came up in great force, and their own reserves "declining to come to the scratch," as Gordon laconically put it, the Zouaves were in their turn compelled to fall back, with a loss of 200 killed. Encouraged by this success, the Russians gave the French another surprise a few days later, throwing up a second battery 300 yards further in advance of the first "white circlet." These two batteries, mounting between them, according to Kinglake, twenty-two guns, were finally strengthened and equipped by 10th March, and although the French talked much of storming them, nothing was done, much to Gordon's disgust. It was while these operations were in progress that Charles Gordon had a narrow escape of being killed. A shot from one of the Russian rifle-pits "as nearly as possible did for me," he wrote; "the bullet was fired not 180 yards off, and passed an inch above my nut into a bank I was passing." His only comment on this is very characteristic: "They are very good marksmen; their bullet is large and pointed."

This was the first but not the last escape he had during the siege. One of his brothers, writing home some three months later, a few days before the assault on the Redan, wrote as follows: "Charlie has had a miraculous escape. The day before yesterday he saw the smoke from an embrasure on his left and heard a shell coming, but did not see it. It struck the ground about five yards in front of him and burst, not touching him. If it had not burst it would have taken his head off." Of this later shave Gordon himself says nothing, but he describes a somewhat similar incident, which had, however, a fatal result. "We lost one of our captains named Craigie by a splinter of a shell. The shell burst above him, and by what is called chance struck him in the back, killing him at once."

During the three months March, April, and May, the siege languished, and Gordon apologises for the stupidity of his letters with the graphic observation: "It is not my fault, as none of the three nations--French, English, or Russian--will do anything."

At the end of May, however, there was a renewal of activity. General Pelissier succeeded to the French command, and, unlike his predecessors, made it his primary object to act in cordial co-operation with the English commander. He was also in favour of an energetic prosecution of the siege, with the view to an early assault. All the batteries were by this time completed, and 588 guns, with 700 rounds in readiness for each gun, were opposed to the 1174 in the Russian fortress. It only remained to utilise this terrific force, and at last orders were given for the commencement of what was known as the third bombardment. After nearly two days' incessant firing the French stormed the Mamelon and two advance redoubts. These were successfully carried and held, at the same time that the English stormed a position called the Quarries, close under the formidable Redan. Of this bombardment Gordon gives in one of his letters a very good description:--

"On the 6th we opened fire from all our batteries. I was on duty
in the trenches. I could distinctly see the Russians in the Redan
and elsewhere running about in great haste, and bringing up their
gunners to the guns. They must have lost immensely, as our shot
and shell continued to pour in upon them for hours without a
lull. Never was our fire so successful. Before seven we had
silenced a great many of their guns, while our loss was very
small--only one man killed and four wounded. I was struck
slightly with a stone from a round shot and stunned for a second,
which old Jones has persisted in returning as wounded. [It was,
notwithstanding, a real wound.] However, I am all right, so do
not think otherwise. Our fire was continued all night, and the
next day until four o'clock, when we opened with new batteries
much nearer, and our fire then became truly terrific. Fancy 1000
guns (which is the number of ourselves, the French, and Russians
combined) firing at once shells in every direction. On our side
alone we have thirty-nine 13" mortars. At half-past five three
rockets gave the signal for the French to attack the Mamelon and
the redoubts of Selingkinsk and Volhynia. They rushed up the
slope in full view of the allied armies. The Russians fired one
or two guns when the French were in the embrasures. We then saw
the Russians cut out on the other side, and the French after
them, towards the Malakoff Tower, which they nearly reached, but
were so punished by the guns of this work that they were obliged
to retire, the Russians in their turn chasing them through the
Mamelon into their own trenches. This was dreadful, as it had to
be assaulted again. The French, however, did so immediately, and
carried it splendidly. The redoubts of Volhynia and Selingkinsk
were taken easily on our side. In front of the right attack a
work called the Quarries had to be taken, which was done at the
same time as the Mamelon. The Russians cut out and ran, while our
men made their lodgment for our fellows. We were attacked four
times in the night, but held the work. If we had liked to
assault, I am sure we should have taken the place with little
loss, some of our men being close to the Redan. The French took
twenty guns and 400 prisoners, and found the Mamelon so traversed
as to have no difficulty in making their lodgment. We were driven
from the Quarries three times in the night, the Russians having
directed all their efforts against them. Our loss is supposed to
be 1000 killed and wounded. Nearly all our working party had to
be taken for fighting purposes. The attacking columns were 200
strong; one went to the right, and the other to the left of the
Quarries. The reserve consisted of 600 men. The Russians fought
desperately."

A further week was occupied with a heavy but desultory bombardment, but at last on 17th June what is known as "the fourth bombardment" proper began, and after it had continued for about twenty-four hours, orders were given for the assault to be made by the French on the Malakoff and the English on the Redan on the 18th June, a date ever memorable in military annals. The silence of the Russian guns induced a belief that the allied fire had overpowered theirs, and in consequence orders for the attack were given twenty-four hours sooner than had been intended. Kinglake, in his exhaustive History, has shown how this acted adversely on the chances of the assault, because the Russian gunners had really only reserved their fire, and also especially because the Redan, which we had to attack under the original arrangement between Lord Raglan and General Pelissier, had hardly suffered any damage from the bombardment. General Gordon's long account of this memorable assault will long be referred to as a striking individual experience:--

"I must now commence my long story of our attempted assault. To
take up my account from 14th June, which was the last letter I
wrote to you, Seeley, my fellow-subaltern at Pembroke, arrived on
the 15th, and joined the right. On the evening of the 16th it was
rumoured we were to commence firing again in the morning. I was
on duty on the morning of the 17th, and I went down at half-past
two A.M. At 3 A.M. all our batteries opened, and throughout the
day kept up a terrific fire. The Russians answered slowly, and
after a time their guns almost ceased. I mentioned in my report
that I thought they were reserving their fire. [If this view had
only been taken by the Generals, especially Pelissier, a dreadful
waste of life would have been averted, and the result might have
proved a brilliant success.] We did not lose many men. I remained
in the trenches until 7 P.M.--rather a long spell--and on coming
up dined, and found an order to be at the night attack at twelve
midnight on June 17 and 18. I was attached to Bent's column, with
Lieutenants Murray and Graham, R.E., and we were to go into the
Redan at the Russians' right flank. Another column, under Captain
de Moleyns and Lieutenants Donnelly and James, R.E., was to go
in at the angle of the salient; and another under Captain Jesse,
Lieutenants Fisher and Graves, was to go in at the Russian left
flank. We passed along in our relative positions up to the
advanced trench, which is 200 yards from the Redan, where we
halted until the signal for the attack should be given from the
eight-gun battery, where Lord Raglan, Sir G. Brown, and General
Jones were.

"About 3 A.M. the French advanced on the Malakoff Tower in three
columns, and ten minutes after this our signal was given. The
Russians then opened with a fire of grape, which was terrific.
They mowed down our men in dozens, and the trenches, being
confined, were crowded with men, who foolishly kept in them
instead of rushing over the parapet of our trenches, and by
coming forward in a mass, trusting to some of them at least being
able to pass through untouched to the Redan, where of course,
once they arrived, the artillery could not reach them, and every
yard nearer would have diminished the effect of the grape by
giving it less space for spreading. We could then have moved up
our supports and carried the place.

"Unfortunately, however, our men dribbled out of the ends of the
trenches, ten and twenty at a time, and as soon as they appeared
they were cleared away. Some hundred men, under Lieutenant
Fisher, got up to the abattis, but were not supported, and
consequently had to retire.

"About this time the French were driven from the Malakoff Tower,
which I do not think they actually entered, and Lord Raglan very
wisely would not renew the assault, as the Redan could not be
held with the Malakoff Tower in the hands of the Russians.
Murray, poor fellow, went out with the skirmishers of our
column--he in red, and they in green. He was not out a minute
when he was carried back with his arm shattered with grape.
Colonel Tylden called for me, and asked me to look after him,
which I did, and as I had a tourniquet in my pocket I put it on.
He bore it bravely, and I got a stretcher and had him taken back.
He died three hours afterwards. I am glad to say that Dr Bent
reports he did not die from loss of blood, but from the shock,
not being very strong.

"A second after Murray had gone to the rear, poor Tylden, struck
by grape in the legs, was carried back, and although very much
depressed in spirits he is doing well. Jesse was killed at the
abattis--shot through the head--and Graves was killed further in
advance than any one. We now sat still waiting for orders, and
the Russians amusing themselves by shelling us from mortars. When
we appeared, the Russians lined their parapets as thick as
possible, and seemed to be expecting us to come on. They flew two
flags on the Malakoff Tower the whole time in defiance of us.
About ten o'clock some of the regiments got orders to retire.
We, the Royal Engineers, however, stayed until twelve o'clock,
when we were told that the assault was not to be renewed, and
that we could go. Thus ended our assault, of the result of which
we felt so sure. The first plan made was that we should fire for
three hours and go in at six o'clock, but the French changed it,
and would not wait until we had silenced the enemy's artillery
fire, and so we attacked at 3 A.M. My father can tell the effect
of grape from twelve 68-pounders and 32-pounders at 200 yards
upon a column; but whatever may be the effect, I am confident
that if we had left the trenches in a mass, some of us would have
survived and reached the Redan, which, once reached, the Highland
Brigade and Guards would have carried all before them, and the
place would have fallen. General Jones was struck by a stone in
the forehead, but not much hurt. I believe it is said that the
trenches were too high to get over. As the scaling-ladders were
carried over them, this can hardly be sustained. So much for
_our_ assault.

"Now for the assault which was made from the left attack. General
Eyre had an order given him to make a feint at the head of the
creek if we were successful at the Redan; however, at five
o'clock, when we had failed at the Redan, we heard a very sharp
attack on the head of the creek. The 44th and other regiments
advanced, drove the Russians out of a rifle-pit they held near
the cemetery, and entered some houses there. The Russians then
opened a tremendous fire on the houses, and the men took shelter
in line, being under no command, their own officers not knowing
where they were to go, or anything about the place, and no
Engineer officer being with them. The men sheltered themselves in
the houses until they were knocked about their ears. They then
remained in different places--in fact, wherever they could get
any shelter, until dusk, as, if they had attempted to retire,
they would have been all destroyed. The men of General Eyre's
column found lots of drink in the houses. Our losses in the four
columns are--1400 killed and wounded, 64 officers wounded, and 16
killed. The French lost 6000 killed and wounded, they say!
Nothing has occurred since the assault, but it is determined to
work forward by sap and mine!"

In a subsequent letter he wrote: "Remember, in spite of all the absurd reports in the papers, that our troops never once passed the abattis in front of the Redan, which is sixty yards from it, and that we have never spiked a gun of the Russians," and before closing his narrative account of the Redan, the passage in which Mr Kinglake refers to Gordon's evidence and action on this eventful day may well be quoted. It appears from his statement that Gordon lost his temper through excitement at the repulse, and even upbraided and used angry language to his old friend and comrade, Lieutenant, now General Sir Gerald, Graham, on his coming back to the trenches. Such language, it may be pointed out, could not have been used with less justice to any soldier taking part in the assault than to the man who had carried a ladder farther than anyone else, and twice endeavoured to place it against the Redan. It illustrates the perfervid zeal and energy of the young officer, who explained in his letters home how he thought the Russian fortress might have been carried at a rush, and appropriately introduces the passage in which Mr Kinglake records his opinion of Gordon:

"This impassioned lieutenant of sappers was a soldier marked out
for strange destinies, no other than Gordon--Charles Gordon--then
ripening into a hero, sublimely careless of self, and a warrior
saint of the kind that Moslems rather than Christians are fondly
expecting from God."

I cannot refrain from quoting here a letter I received from Mr Kinglake when I sent him a copy of my edition of "General Gordon's Letters from the Crimea," etc., as it records a somewhat more deliberate opinion on his character and career:--

"28 HYDE PARK PLACE,
"MARBLE ARCH, W., _27th July 1884_.

"DEAR SIR,--I indeed feel greatly obliged to you for your
kindness in sending me a copy of 'General Gordon's Letters from
the Crimea.'

"Already I have read a great part of the volume, and I need
hardly say that, apart from the reasons which link me to the
Crimea, I have been greatly interested by seeing what was
thought, and felt, and expressed in his early days by this really
phenomenal man, whose romantic elevation above all that is base
and common has made him, in even these days, a sort of warlike
and heroic Redeemer.

"Your Preface well and ably expresses an opinion that is widely
entertained as to the conduct of our Government towards Gordon,
and I don't know enough of the question to be able to gainsay
your conclusion, but it would seem at first glance that,
considering the imperative reasons, the vast distances, the
changeful condition of things, and the consequent changes of
mind, the task of doing justice between the Government and this
heroic envoy would be one of some complexity. With my repeated
thanks,--I remain, dear sir, very truly yours,

"A. W. KINGLAKE."

Ten days after the repulse at the Redan, Lord Raglan, the gallant soldier over whose bier Pelissier wept like a child, died "of wear and tear and general debility," as Gordon put it, and the siege again entered upon another dull and uninteresting stage. Nearly three months were to elapse before the capture of the fortress that had resisted so long, and the only incident of marked importance during that period was the battle of the Tchernaya, in which the officers in the trenches had no part. In that action the last effort of the Russian commanders to relieve the place and extricate Todleben from his peril was repulsed by the whole allied forces, for in this engagement both the Italians and Turks took part, with a loss of seven or eight thousand men. The only comment Gordon makes on the action is that "the Sardinians behaved very well." At last, on 8th September, a second general assault was delivered, the English again attacking the Redan, and, more fortunate in one sense than on the earlier occasion, effected a lodgment in the fortress, but were then driven out with heavy loss. But the French succeeded in storming and holding the Malakoff, which commanded the Redan, and the Russians retired to the northern side of the harbour during the night after blowing up their ships. The fall of Sebastopol, especially after the doubts held and expressed in July and August as to whether the siege would not have to be raised, caused the greatest excitement and widespread satisfaction. General Gordon sent home the following graphic description of this final and at last successful attack:--

"I must now endeavour to give you my idea of our operations from
the eventful 8th of September to the present 16th. We knew on the
7th that it was intended that the French should assault the
Malakoff Tower at twelve the next day, and that we and another
column of the French should attack the Redan and central bastion.
The next day proved windy and dusty, and at ten o'clock began one
of the most tremendous bombardments ever seen or heard. We had
kept up a tolerable fire for the last four days, quite warm
enough; but for two hours this tremendous fire extending six
miles was maintained. At twelve the French rushed at the
Malakoff, took it with ease, having caught the defenders in their
bomb-proof houses, where they had gone to escape from the shells,
etc. They found it difficult work to get round to the Little
Redan, as the Russians had by that time got out of their holes.

"However, the Malakoff was won, and the tricolour was hoisted as
a signal for our attack. Our men went forward well, losing
apparently few, put the ladders in the ditch, and mounted on the
salient of the Redan, but though they stayed there five minutes
or more, they did not advance, and tremendous reserves coming up
drove them out. They retired well and without disorder, losing in
all 150 officers, 2400 men killed and wounded. We should have
carried everything before us if the men had only advanced. The
French got driven back with great loss at the central bastion,
losing four general officers. They did not enter the work. Thus,
after a day of intense excitement, we had only gained the
Malakoff. It was determined that night that the Highlanders
should storm the Redan the next morning.

"I was detailed for the trenches, but during the night I heard
terrible explosions, and going down to the trenches at 4 A.M. I
saw a splendid sight--the whole town in flames, and every now and
then a terrific explosion. The rising sun shining on the scene of
destruction produced a beautiful effect. The last of the Russians
were leaving the town over the bridge. All the three-deckers,
etc., were sunk, the steamers alone remaining. Tons and tons of
powder must have been blown up.

"About eight o'clock I got an order to commence a plan of the
works, for which purpose I went to the Redan, where a dreadful
sight was presented. The dead were buried in the ditch--the
Russians with the English--Mr Wright reading the Service over
them. About ten o'clock Fort Paul was blown up--a beautiful
sight. The town was not safe to be entered on account of the fire
and the few Russians who still prowled about. The latter cut off
the hands and feet of one Frenchman. They also caught and took
away a sapper who would go _trying_ to plunder--for as to plunder
there was and is literally nothing but rubbish and fleas, the
Russians having carried off everything else. I have got the lock
and sight off a gun (which used to try and deposit its contents
very often in my carcass, in which I am grateful to say it
failed) for my father, and some other rubbish (a Russian cup,
etc.) for you and my sisters. But you would be surprised at the
extraordinary rarity of knick-knacks. They left their pictures in
the churches, which form consequently the only spoil, and which I
do not care about buying. I will do my best to get some better
things if it is possible. On the 10th we got down to the docks,
and a flag of truce came over to ask permission to take away
their wounded from the hospital, which we had only found out that
day contained 3000 wounded men. These unfortunate men had been
for a day and a half without attendance. A fourth of them were
dead, and the rest were in a bad way. I will not dwell any more
on it, but could not imagine a more dreadful sight.

"We have now got into the town, the conflagration being out, and
it seems quite strange to hear no firing. It has been a splendid
city, and the harbour is magnificent. We have taken more than
4000 guns, destroyed their fleet, immense stores of provisions,
ammunition, etc. (for from the explosions they did not appear to
be short of it), and shall destroy the dockyard, forts, quays,
barracks, storehouses, etc. For guns, Woolwich is a joke to it.
The town is strewn with our shell and shot, etc. We have traced
voltaic wires to nearly every powder magazine in the place. What
plucky troops they were! When you hear the details of the siege
you will be astonished. The length of the siege is nothing in
comparison with our gain in having destroyed the place.

"We are not certain what the Russians are doing on the north
side, and as yet do not know whether we shall follow them up or
not. We ought to, I think. It is glorious going over their horrid
batteries which used to bully us so much. Their dodges were
infinite. Most of their artillerymen, being sailors, were
necessarily handy men, and had devised several ingenious modes of
riveting, which they found very necessary. There was a vineyard
under our attack, a sort of neutral ground where no one dared to
venture, either Russian or English. We found lots of ripe grapes
there. The Russians used to fire another description of grape
into it. One night I was working with a party at this very spot,
and out of 200 men we lost 30 killed and wounded. We are engaged
in clearing the roads, burning the rubbish, and deodorizing the
town, taking account of the guns, etc. Nothing is stirring; the
Russians fire a little into the town. We hear they are
retreating, but do not believe it. The French, it seems, took the
Malakoff by surprise. They had learnt from a deserter that the
Russians used to march one relief of men out of the place before
the other came in on account of the heavy fire; whilst this was
being done the French rushed in and found the Malakoff empty. The
Russians made three attempts to retake it, the last led by a
large body of officers alone. Whenever the Russians commenced a
battery they laid down first a line of wires to the magazine with
which they could blow it up at any time."

With this final tribute to the courage of the Russian garrison, Charles Gordon's account of the siege and fall of Sebastopol closes. He took part in the expedition to Kimburn, when General Spencer commanded a joint force of 9000 men intended to dislodge the Russians from a fort they had built at that place, and also to attack a corps of 10,000 men supposed to be stationed at the important town of Kherson. The fort surrendered after four hours' bombardment by the fleet--the garrison not being "the same style of soldiers as the Sebastopol men"--but the Kherson force was never encountered, retiring as the allies advanced, who in their turn retired for fear of being drawn too far into the country. In one of several letters while on this expedition Gordon says that the Czar Alexander the Second was near Kimburn during the attack, and that he sent the Governor a telegram, "Remember Holy Russia," which the Russian General did by getting drunk. The expedition was then withdrawn after installing a French garrison in the fort, and Charles Gordon returned to his old quarters before Sebastopol. A fortnight after his arrival he was appointed to take part in the destruction of the docks, which was to signalise the downfall of Russia's power in the Black Sea. This closing episode is very well described in several of his letters written during the month of December 1855:--

"I am now, as you see, stationed in the dockyard preparing the
shafts and galleries for the demolition of the docks. The French
will destroy one half and ourselves the other. The quantity of
powder we shall use is 45,000 lbs., in charges varying from 80
lbs. to 8000 lbs. The French do not sink their shafts so deep as
we do, but use heavier charges. The docks are very well made, and
the gates alone cost L23,000. We are taking one gate to London,
and the French another to Paris. Our shafts are some of them very
deep, and in others there are from eight to ten feet of water.
There is not much prospect of the Russians leaving the north
side. We can see them hutting themselves.... Our works at the
docks approach completion, and we hope to blow up some portion of
them on Saturday. The French blew up one last Saturday. The
explosion presented a splendid appearance and succeeded
admirably, not a stone being left standing. The powder for our
demolition will be upwards of twenty-two tons. The Russians still
(27th December) hold the north forts, and do not appear to be
likely to leave this year as their huts are all built. We can see
them quite distinctly on the other side.... _January 20,
1856._--We have blown up part of our docks, and are very busy
with the remainder, which we hope to get over by the end of the
month. I do not anticipate any movement of the army until March,
when I suppose we shall go to Asia to relieve Kars, and make the
Russians retire from the Turkish territory.... _February 3,
1856._--We all of us have been extremely busy in loading and
firing our mines in the docks, which required all our time, as we
were so very short of officers, having only three, while the
French had twelve. Our force of sappers was only 150 and the
French had 600. We have now finished the demolition, which is
satisfactory as far as the effects produced are concerned; but
having used the voltaic battery instead of the old-fashioned
hose, we have found that electricity will not succeed in large
operations like this, and I do not think that anyone will use it
if there is a possibility of using hose. I am now engaged in
making plans of the docks, and have not much time to myself. The
French have done their work very well, using more powder than we,
and firing all their mines with hose. I will try and get you a
photograph of the docks as they _were_ and as they _are_, which
will tell you more than a dozen letters would. We had an alarm
down here the other night about twelve o'clock. The Russians on
the north side opened a tremendous fire throughout the whole line
on us and on the French. We were all out under arms, expecting an
attack by boats, but after being well shelled for an hour, the
Russians left off, and all was again silent; but for the time it
lasted the fire was terrific. I heard afterwards that it was
caused by a French navy captain, who pulled over to the other
side of the harbour, and tried to burn a steamer which was lying
on its side. He and his companions arrived unperceived, found the
steamer quite new, and were getting into it, when the Russian
sentinel challenged. They answered 'Russe,' but the sentry called
'To arms,' and the Russians fired into the boat, and then
continued the fire from all their guns, I suppose expecting a
grand attack. Only one man, however, was hurt by a splinter on
the arm. The French will blow up Fort Nicholas on Monday. They
only got their order the night before last, and are obliged to
make a hasty demolition of it. They will use 105,000 lbs. of
powder in the demolition. The Russians had ruined this fort, but
had not had time to put in the powder; the excavations were
complete. It certainly is a splendid fort, mounting 128 guns, and
capitally finished for barracks. It would hold 6000 men. The
Russians evidently intended this to be an exceptionally strong
place, and they appear to have been making a quay all the way
round the dockyard creek. We have seen a great deal of the French
engineers; they are older men than ours, and seem well educated.
The non-commissioned officers are much more intelligent than our
men. With us, although our men are not stupid, the officers have
to do a good deal of work which the French sapper
non-commissioned officer does. They all understand line of least
resistance, etc., and what they are about. The Russians do not
molest us much now. We can hear them call out and sing,
especially on Sundays. We can see them drill, which they do every
day. They even have the coolness to go out and fish in the
harbour. We never fire, neither do the French. I do not think
they purpose leaving the north side; in fact, it would not be at
all wise of them to do so. We had some French engineers to dine
with us the other day; they were very agreeable, and we learnt a
great deal from them about their mining. They used to hear the
Russians mining within ten feet of them, and when they did this
they used to put in their powder as quick as possible and blow in
the Russian mines. The Russians had two systems or layers of
mines, one about ten feet below the surface of the ground and the
other about forty feet. The French only knew of the higher one,
and they found out after the place was taken that their advanced
trenches were quite mined and loaded in the lower tier. In the
Bastion du Mat there were no less than thirty-six mines loaded
and tamped. I saw one myself in the upper tier when I was
surveying it. They (the Russians) worked out a strata of clay
between two layers of rock, so that no wood was required to keep
the earth from falling in."

Soon after these letters a truce was concluded with the Russians in anticipation of the peace which was ultimately signed at Paris in March 1856. The prospects of peace were not altogether agreeable to the English army, which had been raised to an effective strength of more than 40,000 men, and was never in a better condition for war than at the end of the two years since it first landed in the Chersonese. Gordon's correspondence contains two or three remarks, giving characteristic evidence to the strength and extent of this sentiment.

In one passage he says: "We do not, generally speaking, like the thought of peace until after another campaign. I shall not go to England, but expect I shall remain abroad for three or four years, which _individually_ I would sooner spend in war than peace. There is something indescribably exciting in the former."

Another comment to the same effect is the following: "Suders, the Russian General, reviewed us and the French army last week. He must have thought our making peace odd."

Gordon did not obtain any honour or promotion for his Crimean services. He was included in Sir Harry Jones's list of Engineer Subalterns who had specially distinguished themselves during the siege. The French Government, more discerning than his own, awarded him the Legion of Honour.

The letters from the Crimea are specially interesting for the light they throw on General Gordon's character. They illustrate better than anything else he wrote during his career the soldierly side of his character. The true professional spirit of the man of war peers forth in every sentence, and his devotion to the details of his work was a good preparatory course for that great campaign in China where his engineering skill, not less than his military genius, was so conspicuously shown. As a subaltern in the Crimea Gordon showed himself zealous, daring, vigilant, and with that profound national feeling that an army of Englishmen was the finest fighting force in the world, combined with an inner conviction that of that army his kindred Highlanders were the most intrepid and leading cohort. This was a far more attractive and comprehensible personality than the other revealed in later days, of the Biblical pedant seeking to reconcile passing events with ancient Jewish prophecies, and to see in the most ordinary occurrences the workings of a resistless and unalterable fate. That was not the true Gordon, but rather the grafting of a new character on the original stem of Spartan simplicity and heroism. But to the very end of his career, to the last message from Khartoum, the old Gordon--the real Gordon, the one who will never be forgotten--revealed himself just as he was in the trenches before Sebastopol.

Gordon's connection with the Russian War and the Eastern Question did not terminate with the Treaty of Paris. On 10th May he received orders to join Colonel Stanton, for the purpose of assisting in the delimitation of the new frontier in Bessarabia. He imagined that the work would take six months; it really took a year. A not unimportant principle was involved in this question, and an error in a map was nearly securing for the Russians a material advantage. At the Paris Congress it was determined to eloin the Russians from the Danube and its tributary lakes and streams. The Powers therefore stated that the Russian frontier should pass south of Bolgrad, judging from the small scale-map supplied by the Russians that Bolgrad was north of Lake Yalpukh, which opens into the river Danube. When the Boundary Commission came on the ground, they found that Bolgrad was on Lake Yalpukh, and that if the frontier passed to the south of it the Russians would have access to the Danube; and therefore, knowing the spirit of the Treaty, the English Commissioners referred the question to the Paris Congress. A sketch was prepared by Gordon and his colleagues, to show the diplomatists its exact position, and led to the frontier being laid down north of Bolgrad and Lake Yalpukh. Austria, as well as France, Turkey, and Russia, was represented on this Commission, and Gordon's comrade was Lieutenant, afterward General Sir Henry, James, who had served with him in the trenches, and who had one day lost his way and walked into the Russian lines, as Gordon himself had so nearly done.

Gordon's letters give an interesting account of his work, and bring out with his usual clearness all the points at issue; but it is unnecessary to follow very closely the events of the year he passed in the lower Danube region. How excellent his work must have been can be judged from the fact that the Government sent him back some years later to act as British Consul at Galatz. The delimitation work commenced with a personal inspection of the frontier from Katamori on the Pruth to Boma Sola on the Black Sea, a distance of 200 miles. Then the frontier was defined on the map, and finally it had to be marked on the ground with the usual posts and distinctive marks. Thirty-two separate plans had to be prepared before the frontier could be adjusted, and the frequent bickerings and quarrels gave rise to many surmises that the negotiations might be broken off and hostilities ensue. The main point of dispute as to Bolgrad threatened to form a _casus belli_ with even a new arrangement of the Powers, as France gave up the case, and thus encouraged Russia to prove more obdurate. But England and the other Powers stood firm, and Bolgrad was included in Moldavia.

The following extracts give a tolerably complete account of what was done. Writing from Kichenief on 9th January 1857, Gordon said:

"We are now settled as to the frontier question. Russia has given
up Bolgrad and received a portion of territory in exchange equal
to that surrendered, both as to number of inhabitants and also as
to extent of land. This mode of compensation will give us more
than half our work to do over again. I had almost finished my
plans, and one-half of these will have to be redrawn. However, it
is a consolation to know that the thing is settled. We heard all
this by telegraph from Paris, and by the same message learnt that
we are to proceed at once to work on the frontier in order to get
it finished by 30th March, and thus allow of the ceded territory
being handed over to the Moldavians on that day. You may imagine
what a hurry they are in to get this finished. The Russians
pretend to believe that they have got the best of the dispute,
but it will be difficult to persuade the world to be of the same
opinion. Although so cold, there is not much snow, and it is
beautifully clear weather, capital for sledging. The new frontier
leaves Tobak and Bolgrad in Moldavia, and gives a piece of land
near the Pruth in exchange to Russia.... The territory will be
given over in two parts. The southern consists of Ismail, Kilia,
Reni, and Bolgrad, as well as the delta of the Danube. The
northern part consists of the land between the Pruth and
Yalpukh.... We have finished our work, everything has been
signed, and the total number of the plans we have made is upwards
of 100. For my part, I have had enough of them for my whole
life."

This wish was not to be gratified, for before Colonel Stanton's Commission was dissolved orders came for him to hand over his officers and men to Colonel--now Field-Marshal Sir Lintorn--Simmons, for the purpose of settling the boundary in Armenia, where a dispute had arisen about the course of the river Aras, the ancient Araxes. Gordon, who had now had two and a half years of foreign service without a break, did not relish this task, and even went to the expense of telegraphing for permission to exchange; but this effort was in vain, for the laconic reply of the Commander-in-Chief was: "Lieutenant Gordon must go." If Gordon had under-estimated the time required for the Bessarabian delimitation, he slightly over-estimated that for the Armenian, as his anticipated two years was diminished in the result to twenty-one months.