Chapter IX: Steam Navigation. the ‘great Britain’ Steam-Ship (1)

A.D. 1838--1847. ÆTATIS 33--42.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE BUILDING OF THE ‘GREAT BRITAIN’--REPORT ON THE
ENGINES (JUNE 13, 1839)--EXPERIMENTS ON THE SCREW PROPELLER--ITS
ADOPTION IN THE ‘GREAT BRITAIN’--COMPLETION OF THE SHIP--HER VOYAGE
ACROSS THE ATLANTIC--STRANDING OF THE ‘GREAT BRITAIN’ IN DUNDRUM
BAY--LETTER TO CAPTAIN CLAXTON ON THE CONDITION OF THE ‘GREAT
BRITAIN,’ AND ON THE MEANS TO BE ADOPTED FOR SAVING HER (DECEMBER
10, 1846)--REPORT TO THE DIRECTORS ON THE SAME SUBJECT (DECEMBER
14, 1846)--APPOINTMENT OF CAPTAIN CLAXTON TO SUPERINTEND THE
EXECUTION OF MR. BRUNEL’S PLANS--LETTER TO CAPTAIN CLAXTON ON THE
DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME (DECEMBER 29, 1846)--REPORT ENCLOSING
CAPTAIN CLAXTON’S ACCOUNT OF THE ERECTION OF THE BREAKWATER
(FEBRUARY 27, 1847)--REPORT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FLOATING OFF
THE SHIP (MAY 4, 1847)--SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE FLOATING
OPERATIONS--SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF THE ‘GREAT BRITAIN’--_NOTE_:
DIMENSIONS OF THE SHIP AND ENGINES.

The Directors of the Great Western Steam-Ship Company, encouraged by the success of the ‘Great Western,’ determined shortly after her first return to England to lay down a second ship of not less than 2,000 tons burden. As they did not at that time contemplate the use of iron, a portion of the timber was purchased, and drawings were put in hand for a wooden ship. The proposed vessel was intended to be in all respects a companion ship to the ‘Great Western;’ only she was to be of larger dimensions, as it was found that additional cargo space would be remunerative.

In October 1838, Mr. Guppy (one of the Directors) communicated to the Board the results of some calculations Mr. Brunel had made relative to the cost and efficiency of iron vessels as compared with wooden ones. Mr. Brunel then suggested that Captain Claxton and Mr. Patterson, accompanied by one of his assistants, should make a voyage to Antwerp and back in the ‘Rainbow,’ an iron steam-boat of 407 tons burden, and report on the subject. On receiving their report, which was revised by Mr. Brunel, and which was strongly in favour of the adoption of iron, the Directors resolved to build their ship of that material, and of not less than 2,000 tons measurement, the same size as that which they had intended for their wooden ship. They also determined to erect the shops, and provide the tools for building her themselves.

As in the case of the ‘Great Western,’ the details of construction were settled by the Building Committee--Captain Claxton, Mr. Guppy, and Mr. Brunel--who were assisted by Mr. Patterson.

The preparation of the design occupied some time. In each succeeding drawing an increased size was proposed; at length the fifth design, showing a ship of 3,443 tons burden, was finally approved of. On July 19, 1839, the flat keel plates were laid, and the construction of the hull was commenced.

It will be necessary to enter with some detail into the history of the construction of the engines of the ‘Great Britain,’ as it has often been stated that it was on Mr. Brunel’s recommendation that the Company built their own engines. It appears, however, that Mr. Brunel repeatedly urged upon the Directors the utmost caution and economy, and that they ultimately acted ‘against his suggestion.’

When the Directors determined, in May 1838, to build a second ship, they did not entertain any idea of undertaking so great a responsibility as the manufacture of the engines; nor had they any intention of doing so, even when, towards the end of the same year, they resolved to build the ship themselves, and to construct her of iron.

The dimensions of the proposed paddle engines (for at this date the use of the screw propeller was not contemplated) were sent, in November 1838, to Messrs. Maudslay and Field, Messrs. Hall, and Messrs. Seaward.[125]

Messrs. Maudslay declined to tender, and the negotiations seem to have fallen through at the time; but they were renewed in April 1839, when estimates for engines (with cylinders of 100 inches diameter and seven feet stroke) were again invited from several makers.

The contest lay eventually between Messrs. Maudslay and Mr. Humphrys (whose patent for trunk engines was worked by Messrs. Hall). At Mr. Brunel’s desire they prepared designs for engines with cylinders of 120 inches diameter. He twice induced the Directors to postpone coming to a decision on the subject, in order that Messrs. Maudslay might mature their new patent for double-cylinder engines.

When their tender was placed before the Board, the Directors were of opinion that it largely exceeded the estimate of Mr. Humphrys. Mr. Humphrys’ estimate, however, had been more than once sent back to him for revision, at the suggestion of Mr. Brunel, who expressed doubts as to the possibility of Mr. Humphrys being able to construct his engines within the sum named by him.

Messrs. Hall stated that if they tendered for the supply of engines on Mr. Humphrys’ plan, large tools would have to be purchased by them, and the cost charged on the one pair of engines; they therefore strongly recommended the Company to become their own engine makers.

Influenced by these considerations, the Directors determined to adopt the plan of Mr. Humphrys, and to construct their own engines; and they appointed him the superintending engineer of their works.

It appears from a report by the secretary, Captain Claxton, dated March 23, 1840, that ‘previous to coming to this decision, Mr. Brunel succinctly laid before the Directors his views of the matter, and his opinion of the great responsibility they would incur if they made their own engines; and doubtless the Directors would have yielded to his suggestions, but for the report of Mr. Humphrys, showing the utter hopelessness of getting the engines made piecemeal in Bristol.’

The following is the report of Mr. Brunel on the subject:--

June 12, 1839.

At the request of Mr. Maze and Mr. Scott, whom I had the pleasure
of meeting on Saturday last, I send you the following observations
on the two plans and the estimates of Messrs. Maudslay, and of our
Mr. Humphrys.

I have a copy of Messrs. Maudslay’s letter of the 29th ult.
containing their tender, and a subsequent letter of the 11th inst.
in reply to some enquiries of mine respecting their tender and Mr.
Humphrys’ estimates, according to which the total cost of a pair of
engines of 110 inches diameter and 8 feet stroke, upon his plan,
and I presume modified as last recommended by Mr. Guppy and myself,
including boilers and fixing on board, would be 29,296_l._, or, as
stated by Captain Claxton in a letter to me of the 1st inst.,
30,700_l._

First, as to the comparative merits of the plans, I consider them
both excellently adapted to our particular case, and that the
choice will depend upon other circumstances than the construction
of the engines, and these circumstances, I consider, would be, the
relative cost and the advantages of forming an establishment which
will eventually become necessary for the repair and maintenance of
our engines, contrasted with all the advantages to be derived from
the responsibility and experience in all the details of a
first-rate manufacturer, and to which I attach very great value,
particularly in the early proceedings of a Company like ours. As
regards the cost, I understand Messrs. Maudslay’s tender to be for
an engine of four 75-inch cylinders, which is equal to a pair of
ordinary engines of about 106 inches.

Engine, boiler, and paddle-wheels, fixed on board, supposing the £
vessel in London, and with reduced size of boiler, 41,400

Deduct allowance for coal-boxes and combings for hatchways as proposed
by Messrs. Maudslay, 500

40,900

Additional expense incurred by Messrs. Maudslay in consequence of
the engines being fixed on board at Bristol instead of London, I
estimate at, 250

Total amount to be paid Messrs. Maudslay, 41,150

In addition to this will be the freight and insurance, which we are to
pay, and also the unloading at Bristol and placing in the vessel,
which I take at Captain Claxton’s estimate, 2,000

Making a total of 43,150

It is to be observed that this includes Mr. Field’s apparatus for
changing water, Kingston’s cocks, casing the cylinders, and all
those extras which were applied to the ‘Great Western,’ and also
the paddle-beams and paddle-wheels. Without these latter the nett
cost of the engine, fixed in place, and including all other extras,
would appear to be about 40,000_l._ or 40,500_l._ If the cylinders
be increased to 77¾, which would be equivalent to the pair of 110
inch, and supposing the cost of the engines to increase in the same
ratio as the power resulting from this increase, but which ought
not to be the case, the total cost, according to Messrs. Maudslay’s
estimate, will be 46,500_l._, and deducting the paddle-beams or
framework for carrying the paddles, which do not, I think, form
part of Mr. Humphrys’ estimate, probably about 45,500_l._ as
compared with Mr. Humphrys’ estimate of 30,700_l._ With respect to
this latter estimate, I cannot help expressing the fears I
entertain that Mr. Humphrys is over-sanguine, and that the cost
would greatly exceed the sum named. The items seem to me to be
moderate prices only for each article named, and I see no allowance
for those alterations, damages, and waste of parts, and a variety
of other contingencies, which in a piece of machinery of this
magnitude and novelty is certain to amount to a very large sum.

In his estimate of the fittings and smaller parts, I think also he
has greatly underrated them.

The outlay for tools and tackle would, I think, also be greater
than he seems to anticipate, and on the whole I cannot but come to
the conclusion in my own mind, and I should not act rightly if I
did not communicate that opinion to you, that the first outlay will
be fully as large and probably larger by adopting the plan of
making our own engines than by employing a manufacturer. It is true
we shall have some valuable and costly tools and shops included in
this outlay, and a fine establishment formed, which may be rendered
fully competent in point of means to continue the manufacture of
engines for others, and to keep up the repairs of any number of
engines which the Company are likely to have at work. My only fear
would be that of the risk of the undertaking being too great for a
newly-formed establishment. The making of the vessel itself is no
mean effort, and to superadd the construction of the largest pair
of engines and boilers yet made, and upon a new plan, is
calculating very much upon every effort being successful, and
particularly upon the continued assistance of those who have
hitherto attended to the subject; as it must be well known to the
Directors that if Mr. Guppy, for instance, should be prevented from
giving his time as he has hitherto done, or if Mr. Humphrys should,
from illness or other causes, leave us, the manufactory would be
brought to a stand, and the loss would be serious. I have no wish
to deter the Company from becoming their own manufacturers--I think
it a course which must ultimately be adopted if the Company
thrive--but I should have much preferred that it had been adopted
gradually, that we had commenced with a vessel, and then proceeded
with boilers and repairs; and, as our establishment became formed
and matured, and when we might no longer depend entirely upon the
engineering talents and assistance of one Director, who may be
unable to attend to it, or upon the health of one superintendent
who, as yet, is alone in possession of all our plans and ideas, and
at present is alone capable of carrying them out, we might then
have ventured upon making the engines perhaps for the third vessel.
Circumstances may, however, render it necessary that we should
proceed more expeditiously, and I am only anxious that the
Directors should be aware of the difficulties that we may have to
encounter, and that they should not form expectations as regards
economy in which they may be disappointed. The result of the best
consideration I have been able to give to it is, that the question
does not seem to be one of cost. In that respect, according to my
view, the two modes of proceeding would be nearly balanced, but it
resolves itself into the following question:--Is it better in our
present position to enter at once upon the manufacture of the
engines and boilers, in doing which we shall in part repay the cost
of tools and shops, which must eventually be required, and by which
we shall be more independent, and more capable of expediting the
works, should it become desirable to incur any additional expense
for that purpose, or to throw all the responsibility and risk on
another party or contractor--the vessel, for which we could not
easily contract, being still made in the Company’s yard?

I have thus reduced the question to that state in which I can offer
no further opinion or advice; it is now for you to determine. The
question is one which has frequently to be decided upon by the
Directors of public works; it is very much a matter of feeling, but
it is simplified in the present instance by the circumstance that
the expense in either case will be, to my view at least, about the
same, and the work, I have no doubt, equally good in either case.

Upon this point, as perhaps upon the subject of cost, I have no
doubt there will be some difference of opinion. It will be said
that the work done under our own superintendence can be more relied
upon than the work of a manufacturer, and that even in the engines
of the ‘Great Western’ steam-ship, coming from one of the most
experienced manufacturers, many defects may be pointed out.

I should agree fully with both these arguments, but I think these
advantages are fully counterbalanced by that of the experience in
all the details which is brought into operation in an
old-established manufactory, and the great relief from
responsibility and risk obtained by contracting for the whole work.

The Directors having determined to make the engines, erected shops and fitted them up with proper tools. The services rendered to them by Mr. Brunel at this period were fully acknowledged at the next meeting of the shareholders.[126]

Mr. Brunel’s attention was now anxiously devoted to the consideration of the numerous questions involved in the construction of the ship and her engines; and, in order to obtain reliable information on many points, he sent one of his assistants, Mr. Berkeley Claxton, in the ‘Great Western.’ His sole occupation during six voyages was to note the amount of rolling and pitching, and the exact performance of her engines, with the effect of the use of the expansion valves on her speed, and on the consumption of fuel. These reports furnished Mr. Brunel with information which was of great value, especially when, shortly afterwards, he advised the Directors to adopt the screw propeller instead of paddlewheels.

The circumstances which led to the adoption of the screw propeller in the ‘Great Britain’ instead of paddlewheels were as follows:--

In the early part of the year 1840, the performances of the ‘Archimedes’ steamer began to attract the attention of scientific men. This vessel, which was fitted with the screw propeller patented by Mr. Francis Pettitt Smith, arrived at Bristol in May. A few trips were made up and down the Float, but the advantages of the screw propeller were not fully appreciated by those to whom they were explained.

But Mr. Guppy, who had attended some of these trials, went round in the ship to Liverpool. On his return he made a report to the Building Committee, and the Directors, on Mr. Brunel’s advice, passed a resolution delaying the progress of the engines of the ‘Great Britain,’ and of those parts of the frame which would be affected by any change of plans. Mr. Brunel was also requested by them to give his attention to the question of the adoption of the screw, and to report thereon.

During the next three months experiments were made by Mr. Brunel, assisted by Mr. Guppy and Captain Claxton, on the screw propeller in the ‘Archimedes.’[127] These experiments afforded ample opportunity of trying the performances of several forms of screws.[128]

On October 1, Mr. Brunel attended a special meeting of the Board, and read and explained a report he had drawn up, in which he laid before the Directors at great length the results of the different experiments he had made, and the advantages which he believed would attend the use of the screw propeller.[129] A resolution was passed adopting it for the ‘Great Britain.’

Mr. Brunel at first thought that he would be able to retain the form of engines which had been originally determined on for working the paddle wheels; but, on consideration, this was found impracticable. As the Company had by this time erected complete engine works, there could now be no question as to their undertaking the construction of the new description of engines required for working the screw propeller.[130]

Mr. Humphrys resigned the post of superintendent of the works, and Mr. Harman was appointed assistant engineer under Mr. Guppy, to whom the Directors, on the advice of Mr. Brunel, entrusted the supreme control of their manufacturing establishment.

The duties and responsibilities which devolved on the Building Committee--Captain Claxton, Mr. Guppy, and Mr. Brunel--were most arduous. To design and construct a steam-ship larger than any that had, up to that time, been launched, to make this ship of a material which had but lately been introduced into shipbuilding, and which had never before been employed on a large scale, to adapt to this ship a novel form of propeller which had not previously been used save in a merely experimental steamer, and to build in a newly opened manufactory marine engines of a much greater size than any that had hitherto been contemplated, and of a totally different character, was indeed a bold enterprise. Mr. Brunel had, as has been shown, recommended the Company not to undertake one part of the work, that, namely, of the manufacture of the engines, which he thought would have been better entrusted to the most experienced engine builders. But although the Directors had acted contrary to his advice, this circumstance in no way diminished the zeal with which he and his coadjutors entered upon their task.

A short statement of the principal dimensions of the vessel and engines is given in a note to this chapter; but some of the more remarkable features in the design may be mentioned here.

In the construction of the ‘Great Britain,’ the same care which had been spent in securing longitudinal strength in the wooden hull of the ‘Great Western,’ was now given to the suitable distribution of the metal. Over the transverse angle iron ribs at the bottom of the ship were laid ten deep longitudinal beams (see woodcut, fig. 13, _a_), which, over the greater part of the bottom of the ship, were covered with an iron deck (_b_) riveted to their upper edges by angle irons, thus forming a cellular structure which added greatly to the strength of the ship. It does not appear that this deck was designed to be watertight, so that it did not form the same security against accident as the inner skin of the cellular structure which Mr. Brunel afterwards adopted in the ‘Great Eastern.’

The upper part of the sides of the ship, in the middle of her length, were carefully designed so as to give her longitudinal strength. The side plates were thickened, and were riveted to iron shelf-plates three feet broad (_c_); and two bands of iron, six inches wide and one inch thick, with the joints strengthened, ran along the top of the ship’s side. There were bands of iron riveted to the shelf-plate, and iron deck beams crossed diagonally under the planking of the upper and main decks. Also at the junction of the ship’s side with the shelf-plate there ran longitudinally a tie of Baltic pine timber, 340 square inches in section (_d_); this being well secured to the shelf-plate and ribs, added considerably to the strength of this portion of the hull.

The ship had five watertight bulkheads, and was thus separated into six compartments.

Fig. 13. ‘Great Britain’ Steam-Ship.

_Transverse Section._]

She had no keel, as there did not appear to be sufficient advantage gained by such an appendage to make up for the increase of the ship’s draught by the amount of the depth of the keel. There were two side or bilge keels (_e_), reaching down to the level of the keel plate of the ship, so that when grounded in dock she might rest on three points in her width.

The ‘Great Britain’ had what is termed a balanced rudder, a portion of the rudder (in this case about one third) being in advance of the pivot on which it turned. The result of this arrangement was that, the pressures on either side of the pivot nearly balancing one another, there was no difficulty in putting the helm over rapidly. This rudder was knocked away when the ship ran ashore at Dundrum, and was subsequently replaced by an ordinary rudder.[131]

In the construction of the hull of the ship, instead of a mere imitation of the arrangements of the timber in wooden ships, the proper distribution of the material to receive the strains that would come upon it was carefully considered. In the result, the ship contained, in the structure of her bottom, bulkheads, deck shelves, and longitudinal kelsons, the longitudinal principle of construction which Mr. Brunel afterwards so fully developed in the ‘Great Eastern.’

Apart from their size, the design of the engines of the ‘Great Britain’ necessarily presented many peculiarities. The boilers, which were six in number, were placed touching each other, so as to form one large boiler about thirty-three feet square, divided by one transverse and two longitudinal partitions. This boiler, which was fitted in between the longitudinal bulkheads of the ship, had a double set of furnaces, and therefore of stoke-holes, one at the fore end, and the other at the after end, next the engine room.

It would seem that the boiler was only worked with a pressure of about eight pounds on the square inch.

The feed water for the boiler was passed through a casing surrounding the funnel, in which it was heated before passing into the boiler. This casing was open at the top, and the water flowed thence into the boiler by gravitation. A similar arrangement was adopted by Mr. Brunel in the ‘Great Eastern.’

The condensers were made of wrought iron, being in fact part of the frame of the ship. The main shaft of the engine had a crank at either end of it, and was made hollow, a stream of water being kept running through it so as to prevent heating in the bearings. An important point in the design was the method by which the motion was transmitted from the engine-shaft to the screw-shaft, for the screw was arranged to go three revolutions to each revolution of the engines. Where the engines do not drive the screw directly, this is now universally effected by means of toothed gearing; but, when the engines of the ‘Great Britain’ were made, it was thought that this arrangement would be too jarring and noisy. After much consideration, chains were used, working round different-sized drums with notches in them, into which fitted projections on the chains. The greater part of the length of the screw-shaft consisted of a hollow wrought-iron boiler-plate tube, the metal being thus very advantageously placed for taking torsional strain, and the shaft was in this way made very light. The engines were designed to work expansively, the steam being cut off at one-sixth of the stroke.

The completion of the ‘Great Britain’ was delayed many months, owing to the financial difficulties in which the Great Western Steam-Ship Company had become involved; the profit on working the ‘Great Western’ having been seriously diminished in consequence of the competition of the Cunard steamers.

At length, however, the ship was finished; and she was floated out of dock into the Floating Harbour on July 19, 1843, in the presence of His Royal Highness Prince Albert.

This seems a fitting place to insert the following letter from Mr. Brunel to Mr. Guppy, written at the beginning of August 1843:--

I have been thinking a great deal of your plans for iron-ship
building, and have come to a conclusion which I believe agrees with
your ideas; but I will state mine without reference to yours. At
bottom and at top I would give _longitudinal_ strength and
stiffness, gaining the latter by the former, so that all the metal
used should add to the _longitudinal tie_, while in the neutral
axis and along the sides, and to resist swells from seas, I would
have vertical strength by ribs and shelf-pieces, thus: the black
lines being sections of longitudinal pieces, the dotted lines
vertical and transverse diagonal plates, throwing the metal as much
as possible into the outside bottom plates, and getting the
strength inside by form, that is, depth of beams, &c., the former
being liable to injury from blows, &c., the latter being protected.

]

And now for the screw of which I am constantly thinking, and in the
success of which for the ‘Great Britain,’ remember, I am even more
deeply interested than you.

If all goes well we shall all gain credit, but ‘_quod scriptum est
manet_,’ if the result disappoint anybody, my written report will
be remembered by everybody, and I shall have to bear the storm--and
all that spite and revenge can do at the Admiralty will be done!
The words ‘better sailing qualities than could be given to the
“Polyphemus,”’ which I used in my first report to the Admiralty, I
believe have never been forgotten.

Well, the result of all my anxious thoughts--for I assure you I
feel more anxious about this than about most things I have had to
do with--is first that we must adopt as _a principle not to be
departed from_, that all mechanical difficulties of construction
must give way, must in fact be lost sight of in determining the
most perfect form--if we find that the screw determined upon
_cannot_ be made (but what cannot be done?), then it is quite time
enough to try another form; though even then _my_ rule would be to
try _again_ at making it....

The ‘Great Britain’ was built wider than the locks through which she would have to pass, as it was supposed that the Dock Company would allow them to be temporarily widened.[132]

After a good deal of discussion, negotiations were satisfactorily concluded, and the requisite alterations were made: the ship passed through into Cumberland Basin, and the upper lock was restored to its original state in a few days.

On December 10, everything was ready for her passing into the Avon through the lower lock. A steam-tug commenced towing her at high water, but, before she had moved half her length in the lock, it became evident to Captain Claxton, who was on board the tug, that there was not an inch to spare; she was touching the lock walls on either side--in fact, she had stuck between the copings. Upon this he gave orders to haul her back again as quickly as possible. This was hardly effected before the tide began to fall; a few minutes later, and the ship would have remained jammed in the entrance.

As the tides had passed their highest, it was necessary immediately to widen the lock, in order not to lose the spring tide; and this was accomplished under Mr. Brunel’s superintendence, just in time to get the vessel through that night.

Mr. Brunel described this occurrence in the following letter, written to excuse himself from keeping an important engagement in Wales:--

December 11, 1844.

We have had an unexpected difficulty with the ‘Great Britain’ this
morning. She stuck in the lock; we _did_ get her back. I have been
hard at work all day altering the masonry of the lock. To night,
our last tide, we have succeeded in getting her through; but, being
dark, we have been obliged to ground her outside, and I confess I
cannot leave her till I see her afloat again, and all clear of her
difficulties. I have, as you will admit, much at stake here, and I
am too anxious about it to leave her.

The ‘Great Britain,’ after making several experimental trips, sailed for London on January 23, 1845, and, although she experienced very severe weather, made an average speed of 12⅓ knots an hour.

The excitement caused by her arrival at Blackwall was very great. Thousands of persons flocked to see her, and she was honoured by a visit from Her Majesty and His Royal Highness Prince Albert.

She left Liverpool on her first voyage on August 26, and arrived at New York on September 10, having made the passage out in fourteen days and twenty-one hours. She made her return passage in fifteen days and a half.

She started again in October, taking sixteen days and a half across. On her homeward passage, she broke her screw, and got home under canvas after eighteen days of rough weather which fully tested her sailing qualities.

The experience of these voyages showed that the supply of steam from the boilers was defective; the necessary alterations were carried out during the winter months, and the ship was fitted with a new screw.

In the beginning of 1846, everything seemed to promise well for the success of the ‘Great Britain.’ She started on May 9, with her full complement of passengers and cargo, but again an accident happened, which prevented this passage from affording a trial of her steaming power. On May 13, the guard of the after air-pump broke; but up to that time her speed had averaged eleven and three-quarters knots.

She returned from New York in thirteen days and six hours, against adverse winds for ten days, with a speed varying from eight and a half to twelve knots. On one day of her voyage, June 13, she ran 330 knots in the twenty-four hours, or nearly sixteen statute miles an hour. This was said to have been the quickest passage which had, up to that time, been made under similar circumstances of wind and weather.

She left Liverpool again at the beginning of July, and arrived at New York in thirteen days and eight hours, or, deducting stoppages, in twelve days and eleven hours--the shortest passage then and for some time afterwards recorded. Her homeward passage was accomplished in thirteen days, including a stoppage of eighteen hours to repair the driving chains which had been damaged.

She started again from Liverpool on her outward voyage on the morning of September 22, 1846, having on board 180 passengers (a larger number than had ever before started to cross the Atlantic in a steamer), and a considerable quantity of freight. A few hours after her departure, and at a time when it was supposed that she was rounding the Isle of Man, the ship ran ashore, and all immediate efforts to get her off were unavailing. When daylight came, the captain found, to his surprise, that she was in Dundrum Bay, on the north-east coast of Ireland. The passengers were landed safely when the tide ebbed.

Captain Claxton, the managing Director of the Company, went at once to the ship. He found her lying at the bottom of a deep and extensive bay; the ground on which she rested had an upper surface of sand, but underneath this were numerous detached rocks. The ship had settled down upon two of them, and had knocked holes in her bottom. Her head lay NW., leaving her stern and port quarter exposed to a heavy sea, which, at Dundrum, always accompanies southerly gales.

When Captain Claxton got to the ship, he made arrangements for trying to get her off at the next spring tides, which were on the following Monday (September 28); but on the Sunday, a gale of wind from the southward sprung up, and at the night flood-tide the water broke over her; nothing remained to be done but to drive the ship higher up the beach into a position of greater safety. Sails were therefore set, and she was driven forward a considerable distance.

Mr. Patterson was sent by the Directors to Dundrum with Mr. Alexander Bremner (who had had considerable experience in floating stranded ships), and they endeavoured to protect the vessel by breakwaters. These, however, were soon carried away; and, after this misfortune, the Directors seem for a time to have lost all hope of saving their ship.

On December 8, when the immediate pressure of Parliamentary work was over, Mr. Brunel went to Dundrum, having some time before been requested by the Directors and underwriters to examine and report on the ship. He was delighted, he said, in spite of all the discouraging accounts he had received, to find the ‘Great Britain’ ‘almost as sound as the day she was launched, and ten times stronger and sounder in character,’ though at the same time he was grieved to see her ‘lying unprotected, deserted, and abandoned.’

Whatever may have been the misgivings of others, he felt no doubt as to the possibility of saving the ship, by at once protecting her by a breakwater made of fagots; and before he left Dundrum he set Captain Hosken at work at the new arrangements, and he guaranteed the immediate expense in the event of the Directors not sanctioning the measure.

Immediately on his return to town, he wrote the following somewhat vigorous letter to Captain Claxton:--

December 10, 1846.

I have returned from Dundrum with very mixed feelings of
satisfaction and pain, almost amounting to anger, with whom I don’t
know. I was delighted to find our fine ship, in spite of all the
discouraging accounts received, even from you, almost as sound as
the day she was launched, and ten times stronger and sounder in
character. I was grieved to see this fine ship lying unprotected,
deserted and abandoned by all those who ought to know her value,
and ought to have protected her, instead of being humbugged by
schemers and underwriters. Don’t let me be understood as wishing to
read a lecture to our Directors; but the result, whoever is to
blame, is, at least in my opinion, that the finest ship in the
world, in excellent condition, such that 4,000_l._ or 5,000_l._
would repair all the damage done, has been left, and is lying, like
a useless saucepan kicking about on the most exposed shore that you
can imagine, with no more effort or skill applied to protect the
property than the said saucepan would have received on the beach at
Brighton. Does the ship belong to the Company? For protection, if
not for removal, is the Company free to act without the
underwriters? If we are in this position, and if we have ordinary
luck from storms for the next three weeks, I have little or no
anxiety about the ship; but if the Company is not free to act as
they like in protecting her, and in preventing our property being
thrown away by trusting to schemers, then please write off
immediately to Hosken to stop his proceeding with my plans, because
I took the pecuniary responsibility of the cost of what I ordered
until he could hear from you, and of course I do not want to incur
useless expense, but still more I do not wish any proceeding taken
as from me to be afterwards stopped. I will now describe as nearly
as I can what I have seen, and what I think.

As to the state of the ship, she is as straight and as sound as she
ever was, as a whole. She is resting and working upon rocks, which
have broken in at several places, and forced up perhaps 12 to 18
inches many parts of the bottom, from the fore stoke-hole to about
the centre of the engines, lifting the boilers about 15 inches and
the condenser of the fore engine about 6 or 8 inches; the
after-condenser, perhaps, half an inch. The lifting of the
fore-condenser has broken that air-pump, the connecting rod having
been unwisely left in, and the crank being at the bottom of the
stroke. Of course the air-pump could not help being broken; except
this, the whole vessel, machinery, &c., are perfect. I told you
that Hosken’s drawing was a proof, to my eye, that the ship was not
broken: the first glimpse of her satisfied me that all the part
above her 5 or 6 feet water line is as true as ever. It is
beautiful to look at, and really how she can be talked of in the
way she has been, even by you, I cannot understand. It is
positively cruel; it would be like talking away the character of a
young woman without any grounds whatever.

The ship is perfect, except that at one part the bottom is much
bruised, and knocked in holes in several places. But even within
three feet of the damaged part there is no strain or injury
whatever. I think it very likely that she may have started leaks
where she has been pounding away upon the rocks, but nothing more;
and as I said before, all above her 5 or 6 feet water line is
uninjured, except her overhanging stern; there is some slight
damage to this, not otherwise important than as pointing out the
necessity of some precautions if she is to be saved. I say ‘if,’
for really when I saw a vessel still in perfect condition left to
the tender mercies of an awfully exposed shore for weeks, while a
parcel of quacks are amusing you with schemes for getting her off,
she in the meantime being left to go to pieces, I could hardly help
feeling as if her own parents and guardians meant her to die there.

Why, no man in his senses can dream of calculating upon less than
three months for the execution of any rational scheme of getting
her off; and no man in his senses, I should think, would dream of
taking her across the channel in the winter months, even if he had
got the camels or floats fast. Of this I don’t feel so competent to
form an opinion, though I think I can judge, and I should consider
it a wanton throwing away of my shares if the Directors allowed
her to be taken out, even if afloat; but at all events I am
competent to judge of the probable time occupied in getting means
to float her, and I maintain that it would be absurd to calculate
upon less than two or three months. It is not therefore the mode of
getting her off that we ought to have been all this time thinking
of, but how to keep her where she is. I feel so strongly on this
point that I feel quite angry. What are we doing? What are we
wasting precious time about? The steed is being quietly stolen
while we are discussing the relative merits of a Bramah or a
Chubb’s lock to be put on at some future time! It is really
shocking.

Having expended a little of my feeling, I will tell you what I have
done, and what I should recommend.

First, instantly to disconnect the engines and air-pumps, and
remove all the working gear, so at least to leave the mischief to
the lower part. By the bye, the cylinders are not disturbed or hurt
in any way at present, but with the engines exactly at the bottom
of the stroke, and the connecting rods on, it is a wonder they are
not. If the air-pump had been disconnected it would not have been
broken. I have taken upon myself to order this.

Secondly, I suggested to Hosken, in which he quite agreed with me,
to take off all strain from her extreme stern. At present she has
cables out from this prodigious mass overhanging nearly 30 feet
from any part capable of bearing the strain.

I recommend his taking the chain cables through the ship’s side,
and making them fast with a spar or timber outside the starboard
side, about as far forward as the capstan. At present she is canted
seaward.

I thought she was better so than presenting the hollow lines of her
quarter to the sea, and both Hosken and Bremner came round to my
opinion.

Thirdly, there is a stream of water which now washes away the sand
from her bottom. I think it essential this should be diverted, and
kept so.

Fourthly, my plan for protecting her is totally different from any
that have been proposed, and if we have not such excessively bad
weather as would prevent anything being done, I believe it may
easily be done. And if done will, I am convinced, be perfectly
good; while any solid timbering, even if made, would, I think, be
most likely the cause itself of tremendous damage, if once beat by
the sea. I will only premise by saying that both Hosken and
Bremner came to the conclusion that it was the best thing that
could be done.

I should stack a mass of large strong fagots lashed together,
skewered together with iron rods, weighted down with iron,
sandbags, &c., wrapping the whole round with chains, just like a
huge poultice under her quarters, round under her stern, and half
way up her length on the sea side.

The detail of the mode, and the precautions of detail, I have not
time now to describe. I am as certain as I can be of anything that,
once made, such a mass of fagots would stand any sea for the next
six months, and the chances of making it (after one or two
failures, no doubt) are so good, that if properly taken in hand, I
look upon it as certain. I will write more fully to-morrow--in the
meantime I have ordered the fagots to be begun delivering. I went
myself with Hosken to Lord Roden’s agent about it, and I hope they
are already beginning to deliver them. Write and stop them or
not--if not, of course my responsibility ceases. I will write again
to-morrow, but let me know by train how we stand with the
underwriters.

This letter was a few days later supplemented by the following formal report to the Directors, which was printed and circulated amongst the proprietors.

December 14, 1846.

According to your request I have, as soon as my engagements would
allow of my leaving London, paid a visit to the ‘Great Britain,’
and I now beg to report to you the state in which I found the
vessel, and my opinion of the best means to be taken for recovering
the largest possible amount of the property invested in her. If I
state these opinions concisely, and without any qualifications, you
will not suppose that I have the presumption to think them
infallible, but merely that I am compelled, by the shortness of the
time left me to write to you, to avoid all circumlocution, and to
give you as simply and briefly as possible the opinions I have
formed--at the same time I am bound to say that I have not formed
them hastily, and that my convictions upon the several points upon
which I may express my feelings are very strong.

First, as regards the present state of the vessel, I was agreeably
disappointed, after the reports that had reached me, to find her as
a whole, and, independently of the mere local damages of which I
will speak presently, perfectly sound, and as strong and as
perfect in form as on the day she was launched.

In receiving this statement you must bear in mind the great
difference between an iron vessel and a timber-built ship. In the
former, parts may be considerably damaged or even destroyed, and
the remainder may not only be untouched, but may be left unstrained
and uninjured. In a timber ship this can hardly be the case; if any
considerable portion of a ship’s bottom is stove in, the timbers or
ribs completely across the ship and the planking longitudinally,
cannot fail to be strained to a very considerable distance in both
directions. You must therefore remove from your minds all
impressions derived from your experience of damages sustained by
timber-built ships in order to understand my statement, which is
strictly correct:--that, except the parts actually damaged, the
extent of which is comparatively small, the ship is perfectly
sound, and as good as at the hour when she struck. This soundness
and freedom from any damage extends from about the 5 feet water
line to the top (with the exception of the injury sustained by the
knocking away of the rudder post and a blow under the stern);
nearly the whole of the vessel is therefore sound: the principal
injury is in her bottom under the boilers and engines. The vessel
has evidently been thumping upon the rocks, and almost entirely
upon this part of the bottom from the first few days after she
grounded; and at present in all probability her whole weight is
resting upon this part; yet notwithstanding this she is perfectly
straight, and has not broken nor even sprung an inch in the whole
length. The boilers have been forced up about 15 inches, and one of
the condensers has been lifted about 8 inches, breaking the
air-pump. At present this is nearly the extent of the damage done;
all of which could easily be repaired if the vessel were in dock.

I will now state my opinion of the best means of recovering the
largest possible amount of the property which has been invested in
her. In this view I can only imagine two alternatives--the one to
break her up on the spot and make the most of the materials; the
other to get her afloat and into port, and restore her into good
condition, or sell her to those who would so restore her.

The first alternative may I think be discarded at once; the plates
and ribs of an iron vessel are difficult enough to convert into
useful materials for any other purposes, even in the midst of
workshops and with tools and appliances at hand. In such a place as
Dundrum Bay I do not believe the materials would pay the expense of
cutting up; the masts, spars, chains, &c., in fact the stores and
perhaps a few of the lighter part of the engines, might repay the
cost of removal, but the whole would certainly not amount to many
thousands; probably hundreds would be a safer estimate of the
amount to be realised clear of all expenses. To remove the vessel
and take her into port, and either restore her or sell her, is then
the only means of recovering any part of the whole of the capital
invested in this ship. If she is so brought into port she may be
worth, unrepaired, 40,000_l._, 50,000_l._, or 60,000_l._, according
to the opportunities that may offer themselves of employing her
usefully or selling her. The only question is, then, how at the
least expense, and at the smallest risk, is the vessel to be got
into port? But, as I will now endeavour to prove to you, the mode
of getting the vessel off the shore and into port is again quite
secondary to the consideration of how to preserve her where she is
so that she may be in a condition to be removed, _and to be worth
removing_, when the means of doing this are ready, and the proper
time is arrived for attempting it.

In the first place I assert unhesitatingly, that no man in his
senses and who thoroughly understands the circumstances of the
case, the weight and position of the vessel, the amount of the rise
and fall of the tide, and the draught of water around her, and the
extraordinarily exposed situation, would dream of calculating upon
completing the requisite means for floating her under three months.

_In the meantime the ship must be protected._ Even if it were
practicable to construct the necessary apparatus, and to float the
vessel to-morrow, it would be little short of madness to go to sea
with her at this time of the year; but I am doing wrong to discuss
a case which cannot arise. The vessel cannot, according to any
rational calculation of chances, be got off under three months, and
it is equally against all probability that, if left unprotected,
there would be anything worth taking off at that time. It is
useless, therefore, at this moment discussing the best mode of
floating the vessel; and I think, under such circumstances, it
would be most unwise hastily to determine upon any plan. The first
thing is to know whether there are any means of preserving the
vessel, and whether any such plans can be carried into effect at
some reasonable cost, which it may be worth incurring. I have
looked at the vessel, and considered the very exposed situation in
which she is placed (and a more exposed one could hardly be found),
and I am convinced that no fixed breakwater of ordinary
construction could be made at any reasonable expense, or in time to
prevent mischief. There is no depth of sand into which to drive
piles, and the rock is too uneven and broken to allow of any
framing being constructed and secured to it; and any framework
would be liable to be destroyed during the progress of its
construction, as that already attempted has been, and the timber
might be the cause of serious damage to the ship. The plan I should
recommend would at least be free from these objections, would be
comparatively inexpensive, and I am firmly convinced would be
perfectly effectual as a protection. At the same time few persons
who have not seen the effect of a sea beating against fagots will
share in that conviction; what I recommend is, to form under the
stern and along the exposed side of the vessel a mass of fagots
made of strong and long sticks, and used in the manner which has
been so successfully practised in Holland and elsewhere, for the
repair and protection of banks against the sea. The fagots should
be packed closely, and for a considerable thickness against the
ship’s side and up to the level of the decks, and secured with rods
run vertically through the mass, and chains laid horizontally and
binding the whole tightly to the ship. The heaviest sea has no
effect upon such a mass, and I believe the vessel would remain as
uninjured and indeed as unaffected by the sea as if in dock; 8,000
or 10,000 fagots, 300 or 400 fathoms of 1 inch or ¾ inch
second-hand chain cable, none of which need be lost, 300 or 400 ¾
inch rods sharpened at the ends, 1,000 bags to fill with sand, with
what stores you have on board, would suffice; and, if next coming
springs and the gales which have hitherto accompanied them are
safely passed, I cannot foresee any difficulty whatever in the way
of completing the protection I propose. Of course, in all works
dependent upon wind, weather, and tides, certainty cannot be
obtained; but of one thing I am quite certain, that no other plan
offers the same chance of success, or at so small a cost. I have
communicated to Captain Claxton the steps which I took, in
conjunction with Captain Hosken, for procuring the fagots before I
left Dundrum; I have also communicated to him the directions which
I gave with respect to the engines, &c., and it is unnecessary
therefore that I should repeat them. I will only recapitulate in a
few words the substance of the advice I have above given, and of my
reasoning. You have a valuable piece of property lying on a most
exposed shore; if preserved for a few months that property will in
all probability be worth 40,000_l._ or 50,000_l._; if neglected for
a few weeks longer it will probably be worth nothing. Can you, as
men of business, under such circumstances, waste your time at this
moment in discussing what you will do in three months hence, and
what plan you will then adopt to take your property to market, but
will you not rather first and immediately adopt decisive steps for
preserving that property, and then consider what you had best do
with it?