Chapter XVI: Appendix: B

THE INSURRECTION OF HERZEGOVINA AND BOSNIA, AND THE BERLIN NOTE

On the 2nd July 1875, Consul Holmes, writing to Lord Derby from
Bosna‐Serai, says:[63] “I have the honour to report to your Lordship
that there is disturbance in the Herzegovina. Early last winter some
164 of the inhabitants of the district of Nevesinje left their homes
and went into Montenegro. After remaining there some months, however,
they petitioned the Porte to be allowed to return to Nevesinje. The
Governor‐General advised the Porte to reply, that, as they had chosen
to leave their country for Montenegro, they might remain there. The
Government, however, decided to grant their request, and allowed
them to return. Shortly afterwards they appeared in revolt, declared
that they were oppressed, refusing to pay their taxes or admit the
police amongst them, and they have been endeavouring by intimidation
to cause their neighbours in the surrounding districts to join them.
The Mutesarif of Mostar invited them to come to that place to state
their grievances, which he assured them would be redressed, but they
refused, and the Governor‐General tells me that they cut to pieces
a man quite unconnected with them, who had gone to Mostar to seek
redress for some grievance, and threatened with the same fate any
within their reach who should do so in future. The Governor‐General
informs me that at present he has no intention of sending troops
against them, but will prevent their efforts to extend their revolt
by surrounding those districts with policemen, and he will probably
send some of the notables of Serajevo to endeavour to bring them to
reason.”

In a subsequent despatch dated a week later, Consul Holmes adds
that “Haidar Bey and Petrarchi Effendi, two notables of Serajevo,
were sent to communicate with the rebels, but before they reached
Nevesinje they found that the rebels had forced and persuaded many
others to join them, and had attacked and captured a caravan of
twenty‐five horses on the road from Mostar to Nevesinje, belonging
to some merchants of Serajevo, laden with rice, sugar, and coffee,
which they carried off to the village of Odrichnia. At the same time,
they murdered and decapitated five Turkish travellers, named Salih,
Hassosunovich, Marich, Sarnich, Ali of Nevesinje, and another whose
name is not yet known, a native of Erassni. One of the insurgents,
named Tschoubate, at the head of some three hundred followers, drove
away forty Zaptiés placed in the defile of Stolatz, and, separating
into small bands, have, for the moment, interrupted the various
roads in the neighbourhood. One band is stationed out at the bridge
over the Krappa, and renders the road between Mostar and Meteorich
unsafe. The detached bands of insurgents are endeavouring to force
others to join them by burning the houses of those who refuse to do
so, and by other means of intimidation. The Governor‐General has
received telegrams from Mostar signed by the two Commissioners and
the Mutesarif and Commander of the troops at Mostar, stating these
facts; also that the headless bodies of the Turks have been recovered
and burnt. Under these circumstances, the Commissioners hesitated
to continue their journey; and the authorities at Mostar state that
great excitement prevails throughout the Mussulman population, who
are impatient to attack the insurgents and avenge the savage murders
of their co‐religionists, whose decapitation has particularly roused
their feelings, and requesting five battalions to keep order.”[64]

The methods adopted by the insurgents were the same as those adopted
in Bulgaria, and wherever an organised attempt at insurrection was
made in the Ottoman provinces by agents _provocateurs_ and foreign
bands with a view to provoke the Mussulmans to deeds of retaliation
which would be exploited by the Committees and excite indignation in
the world. It will be remembered that when Midhat Pasha was Governor
of the Danubian vilayet (p. 43), the band that crossed into Bulgaria
from Sistovo began by massacring five Mussulman children between the
ages of eight and twelve. When the Consuls, sent on a peace message
to the insurgents visited Nevesinje, they “found all the Eastern part
of the town towards the plain and all the bazaar, burnt and in ruins.
Dead bodies were lying in various corners unburied; and we noticed
the head of a boy in one of the streets blackening in the sun. A
little Turkish girl was brought to us, wounded in the throat, and we
were told that an insurgent was on the point of cutting off her head
when she was snatched from him by one less bloodthirsty, and allowed
to escape.”[65]

Another aim of the insurgents was to force an emigration _en masse_
into Austrian territory by promises that they should be well fed and
cared for by the Austrian authorities until favourable conditions
were secured for them. Montenegro, too, was let loose on Turkey and
well supplied with the sinews of war. It was determined at Vienna
that no time should be lost in “putting their pin in the game,” and
in taking the lead in negotiations that must necessarily precede
an occupation. The principle of interference once admitted, all
the rest would follow in due course. On the 24th August 1875, Lord
Derby writes to Sir H. Elliot that: “Her Majesty’s Government have
had under their consideration your telegraphic despatch of the 20th
inst., in which you report that a proposal, _concerted at Vienna
by the three Northern Powers_, had been made to the Porte by their
Ambassadors. Your Excellency states that they propose that Consuls
should be delegated by the Embassies to proceed to the scene of
the insurrection and inform the insurgents that they must expect
no support or countenance from their Governments. They are also to
advise the insurgents to desist from hostilities, but to make known
their complaints to a Commission.... The proposal is favourably
received by the Porte, and the Grand Vizier (Mahmoud Nedim) had just
been to beg you not to stand aloof.... Her Majesty’s Government
consent to this step with reluctance, _as they doubt the expediency
of the intervention of foreign consuls. Such an intervention is
scarcely compatible with the independent authority of the Porte
over its own territory, offers an inducement to an insurrection as
a means of appealing to foreign sympathy against Turkish rule, and
may, not improbably, open the way to further diplomatic interference
in the internal affairs of the Empire._”[66] Prophetic words on the
part of Lord Derby. Of course the consular farce came to nothing.
The rebels would not even meet the Consuls. Facts were more eloquent
than words, and they had their cues from the Committees. Now was
the time, if the Powers had been in earnest, to shut the Dalmatian
frontier to the rebels, as they had undertaken to do. We shall see
how Austria fulfilled this part of the bargain. Instead of occupying
themselves in the slightest degree with this part of the business,
they immediately set about concocting another diplomatic move.

On 11th December 1875, the Austrian Ambassador, Count Beust, called
on Lord Derby, and said that “The Turkish Ministers had hitherto
directed their energies exclusively to the task of preventing
anything which could be construed into an interference of any kind
with the internal affairs of Turkey. This standpoint, however
respectable it may be, has the disadvantage the Austro‐Hungarian
Government considered, of prolonging a regrettable state of things,
and therefore of aggravating the danger. _Negotiations respecting
the affairs of the East are now being carried on between Vienna and
St Petersburg_, the result of which will be communicated as soon as
an agreement has been arrived at, to Her Majesty’s Government, not
in the light of an accomplished fact, but for their consideration,
and for them to state their own opinions on the propositions agreed
upon.”[67]

On the 3rd January 1876, Lord Derby received from Count Beust a
copy of the famous despatch, which goes by the name of the Andrassy
Memorandum, of the 30th December 1875, which, after stating that
the three Courts of Austria‐Hungary, Russia, and Germany, after
exchanging their views on this subject, “have united for the
purpose of employing in common their efforts for pacification,
and this object appeared too much in conformity with the general
wish for them to doubt that _the other Cabinets when invited to
associate themselves in the movement_, through their representatives
at Constantinople, would hasten to join their efforts to ours,”
proceeded to recommend to the Porte the following five points:—

(1) Full and entire religious liberty.

(2) Abolition of the system of farming the taxes.

(3) A law guaranteeing the produce of direct taxes being employed in
the interest of the provinces.

(4) The institution of a special commission composed of an equal
number of Christians and Mussulmans, to control the execution
of the reforms.

(5) The improvement of the position of the rural population.

And in submitting these proposals to the English Minister, Count
Beust added that “they were not regarded by his Government in the
light of mere good advice. _They wanted a pledge_ that the reforms
that they recommended should be carried into execution, failing
which, they would not undertake to use their influence with the
Christian population to advise them to lay down their arms.”[68] And
in another interview, the next day, he spoke again of an “explicit
engagement” from the Porte, adding that “there could be no doubt that
the postponement of the pacifying influences of the Powers _even
by single days_ might in the present state of affairs be fraught
with incalculable danger.”[69] The Austrian Government, however,
repudiated any idea “of armed intervention, and stated that it had
no desire to constitute itself guardians of the peace beyond its own
frontiers,” and that if the Porte accepted, and the insurgents did
not submit, “then the Porte would be left to subdue them by force
of arms, and that they (the insurgents) would be prevented from
obtaining the support derived by them from exterior aid.”[70]

This was six months after the so‐called insurrection had broken out,
and had been all the time “obtaining continuous support from exterior
aid,” and three months after the Consular Commission, which had been
obtained from the Porte by a formal promise to shut the frontier to
the rebels if they refused the advice of the Consuls. Lord Derby,
after distinctly stating that he would be no party to any pressure
being brought to bear on the Porte to carry out these reforms, and
having ascertained that the Turkish Government desired England’s
adhesion to the Note, consented to support it at Constantinople.

In connection with this famous Memorandum, it is interesting to
note an interpolation that took place in the Hungarian Diet on 11th
March with respect to it. In answer to Deputy Pollit, Mr Tisza, the
Minister President, stated “in the answer to the question as to
whether the Hungarian Government approves of the intervention, _there
is no question of intervention, but only of good advice_, which had
been given in concert with the European Powers, and which had been
accepted in the most friendly manner by the Porte.... In answer to
the question as to the action of Hungary if the pacification was not
effected, and if Servia intervened, _such an eventuality was most
improbable_ ... but in that case the policy of the Empire would be
guided by the interests of Europe.... With reference to the question
of the refugees, the Empire had not disregarded the interests of
humanity ... as was shown by the subvention amounting to nearly
1,000,000 florins which had been already given to them.... The
speaker concluded by expressing a hope that the House would accept
his explanation.” If they did, they were easily satisfied, these
Hungarian Deputies. Not a word about the capital question of shutting
the frontier to the rebels. Servia, too, was arming to the teeth, and
was to declare war on Turkey three months later.

We shall see the literal fulfilment of this prediction. Bosnia
was the first to follow suit with the Herzegovina. On the 8th
February 1876, Sir H. Elliot writes to Lord Derby: “The Porte is
much disturbed by the unsatisfactory account received from the
Governor‐General of Bosnia, who has applied for fresh troops. _Bands
supposed to consist of old Grenzers are stated to have passed the
Save from Austria at four different points, but have been repulsed.
The body which invaded Bosnia is stated to have consisted of 400 or
500 men all well‐armed._ Much excitement is said to prevail on both
sides of the Servian frontier, and apprehensions are entertained
of an aggression from that quarter. Reschid Pasha tells me that
Count Zichy has given him, on the part of Count Andrassy, the
strongest assurance ... that measures shall be adopted to prevent the
recurrence of such acts, and has promised ... that those who have
taken part in them shall be disarmed and _internés_.”[71]

It would be difficult to carry intentional bad faith further. All
this time, notes and memorandums were flying about the Chancelleries
of Europe to force the Porte to give guarantees for suppressing
an insurrection which was being organised and fed by bands “all
well‐armed” across a friendly frontier, its suppression being thus
rendered materially impossible. As well might one try to extinguish
a conflagration, over an unlimited area, that was being continually
fed by petroleum springs, the sources of which could not be got
at. Nor let it be supposed that to guard such a line of frontier
was impossible. The rebels had it all their own way. And so had
the Diplomatists of the “Allied Courts of Berlin, Vienna, and St
Petersburg.” Russian Committees were joining their efforts to
Austrian.

On the 14th February 1876, Sir H. Elliot writes to Lord Derby: “The
accounts of the encouragement given to the insurgents at Ragusa
greatly exceeds all that I was prepared for. The Russian Consulate is
the open resort of the insurgent chiefs; their correspondence is sent
to the Consul, who is a party to all their projects, and associates
himself intimately with them. He does not appear to make any attempt
to conceal the part he is playing, for on the occasion of the death
of the chief Maxima, in one of the late encounters, the Russian flag
at the Consulate was hoisted at half‐mast, and M. Jomini himself
joined the funeral procession.

“Some of the wounded when asked why they continue the struggle when
the Porte is ready to grant all their demands, have answered plainly
that they are bound to go on as long as they are told by Russia to do
so. The assurances given at St Petersburg of the wish of the Imperial
Government that the insurgents would lay down their arms, must
naturally go for nothing as long as its official Representative, with
whom they are in communication, encourages them to go on.”[72] Pretty
plain speaking this! and Austria that continued the “exequatur” to
a foreign Consul, acting thus on its territory towards a friendly
Power. So gross and palpable was this assistance given by Austria
to the insurgents, whilst pretending all the time to be so keenly
anxious for its suppression, that Lord Derby thought it necessary
on the 10th March 1876, to give the following instructions to Sir
A. Buchanan, the English Ambassador at Vienna: “I have to inform
Your Excellency that it has come to the knowledge of Her Majesty’s
Government, through Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople,
that the Porte had received information that a severe fight took
place on the Dalmatian frontier on the 4th inst., and that on the
following day, the combat was renewed by a force said to be _700
strong, who came from Austrian territory with large supplies of
ammunition, and that this having occurred so immediately after the
assurances of the Austro‐Hungarian Government that their frontier
would be officially guarded_, has caused great discouragement to
the Turkish Government, and it is feared that the effect of it in
Montenegro will be very mischievous, and I have therefore to request
Your Excellency to call the serious attention of the Imperial
Government to this matter.”[73] But these remonstrances, which were
evidently sincere and well‐meaning, had not the very slightest effect
at Vienna. The Hungarian Chancellor was always ready to give any
amount of assurances and promises to the credulous Sir A. Buchanan.
On the 3rd April 1876, Sir H. Elliot was obliged to write again:
“I learn that the Porte has received information of the passage
of considerable bands _said to be accompanied by two pieces of
artillery_ from Dalmatia and Croatia, into the north‐western district
of Bosnia.”[74] And further, on the next day, 4th April, he writes:
“A telegram from the Governor‐General of Bosnia, which has been read
to me by Reschid Pasha, gives a very alarming account of the state
of things in that province. _Armed bands are passing freely from the
Austrian territory_, and there are symptoms indicating a probable
insurrection of the populations along the rivers Save and Una. The
Governor‐General states that he has been unable to re‐establish the
line of telegraph along the Save, _as the workmen are continually
fired at from the Austrian bank of the river, and his remonstrances
addressed to the Austrian authorities have been unattended to_.”[75]
The reason why Austria was not content to confine her operations
to Herzegovina, but had extended them to Bosnia, was clear. The
Porte was succeeding, in spite of all difficulties, in pacifying
the former, and as the Berlin note was being drawn up at Berlin for
the three “Allied Powers” and would be presented in a month, such a
precipitation would derange all their plans.

The following despatch of Sir H. Elliot of 7th April 1876 clearly
indicates this state of things. “The enclosed report from Mr Sandison
of the account received at the Porte from Haidar Effendi (the Turkish
Commissioner) gives a very serious aspect to the state of affairs
in Bosnia. It is evident that the Austro‐Hungarian Government _have
failed lamentably in their engagement to guard their own frontier,
and by means of well‐armed bands coming from their territory, a
formidable insurrection has been excited in districts which have
hitherto remained quiet. Although the news received from the
Herzegovina is good, and gave hopes of a pacification_, it would be
too much to expect that the movement in Bosnia should not produce its
effect in the districts which have been so long in insurrection.”[76]

In the month of May we arrived at another stage of the business. It
is time that diplomacy should register another point of “terrain
acquis.” On the 4th May 1876 Lord Derby, writing to Sir A. Buchanan,
says: “The Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and
placed in my hands for perusal a despatch which he had received from
his Government. The purport of the despatch was to state that there
is _an entire agreement between the Governments of Austria, Germany
and Russia as to affairs in the East_, and that any reports that may
have been circulated to the contrary are simple inventions.”[77]

The purport of making this communication could be no other than a
warning to all whom it may concern, that they could join or not
join the “European Concert,” as they thought proper. It would make
no difference to the European Concert. It was a notice certainly
calculated to open the eyes, even of the blind, to what was going on.

As the fact of armed bands could not be disputed, it was obviously
the interest of Austria to endeavour to throw the blame on others,
Montenegro and Servia especially. We shall come to these little

States later, but _à propos_ of shifting the blame on Servia, there
is a very significant despatch from Consul‐General White, dated
Belgrade, 28th April 1876. “The Prince (of Servia) takes no pains to
conceal that, more than ever, he considers a collision with the Porte
as within the range of possibilities; but he continues to disclaim at
the same time any intention to act as the aggressor. He pointed out
to me the other day that the portion of Bosnia which is conterminous
to Servia has been entirely free from armed bands since last
November, when the Papas Zarko was repulsed into Servia, _whilst the
insurgents who had within the last few weeks made their appearance
on the river Unna between Bihatch, Novi and Kostainitza, were all in
proximity to the Austrian frontier_, and he defied anyone to show
that Servia had been instrumental in fostering insurrection in that
department of Bosnia, though he added that such an accusation had
been made somewhere, evidently alluding to Austrian Authorities.”[78]
The explanation of these apparent mysteries was really simple enough.
Servia was reserving herself for Bulgaria, which was within the
sphere of her action, as she herself was within the orbit of Russia’s
influence, and she had no intention of playing Austria’s game for
Austria’s sole benefit.

Unless strongly backed by Russia, Servia knew well enough that
Austria, posted in the conterminous province of Bosnia, would be a
most awkward neighbour, and render any hope of future independence
on her part purely illusory. Turkey’s yoke would be light indeed
in comparison to that of Austria, if she were surrounded on three
sides by the Kaiserlich. A great deal of the apparent contradiction,
see‐sawing and hesitation of this period is to be accounted for by
these conflicting inner currents, set in motion by two of the three
allied Governments, whose agreement Count Beust was instructed to
inform Lord Derby was “entire.” It was entire as regarded Turkey,
there was no doubt about that, but there was a very pretty little
by‐play going on besides, within the circle of the larger drama. No
wonder this state of things created a situation, as Consul Holmes
pithily described it, “in which everyone seems to profess precisely
what he fails to practise.”

BERLIN NOTE.

Whatever light friction there may have been between Russia and
Austria in the Spring of 1876, it seems to have been smoothed over,
probably by the intervention of the third disinterested partner in
the Alliance; for on Saturday, the 13th May 1876, Lord Odo Russell,
the British Ambassador at Berlin, received an invitation from Prince
Bismarck to call on him that day in order to meet Count Andrassy
and Prince Gortchakoff, together with the Ambassadors of France
and Italy; M. de Bülow and Baron Jomini were also present at the
interview. “After a few preliminary words from Prince Bismarck,
Prince Gortchakoff and Count Andrassy confirmed the cordial
understanding that exists between them, and expressed their sincere
hope and anxious desire that the Governments of England, France
and Italy, _who have given their moral support_ to the attempted
pacification of the Herzegovinians, will equally agree to support
the further attempts they have now met to concert, in consequence
of the alarming state of affairs in Turkey. Baron Jomini was then
invited to read the enclosed document to us, and the proposal to
which they solicit the co‐operation of the Great Powers.... Prince
Gortchakoff observed that he and Count Andrassy would remain till
Monday (15th inst.) at Berlin, and that they hoped the Governments of
England, France and Italy would be able to express an opinion on the
telegraphic summary of their proposal, before they left.”[79]

It is no part of the purport of this book to comment on the
_procédés_ of the “three Allied Powers” vis‐à‐vis of the other
so‐called Great Powers, England, France and Italy. That is a matter
of their interior _ménage_. We are exclusively concerned with their
conduct, severally and collectively, towards Turkey. If it were
otherwise, one might have something to say concerning the strangeness
and singularity of the proceeding among Great Powers, supposed to
stand on a footing of equality, of three of their number convoking
the rest to hear a document of the very highest international
importance read to them for their assent to it, if possible by
telegraph, within two days! But let us proceed with the narrative.

The document referred to, which goes in history by the name of
the “Berlin Note,” was a very curious document. It started with
the declaration that “the alarming tidings which come from Turkey
are of a nature to _impel the three Cabinets to draw closer their
intimacy_. The three Imperial Courts have deemed themselves called
upon to concert among themselves measures for averting the dangers of
the situation, _with the concurrence_ of the other great Christian
Powers.” After referring to the history of the question up to the
Andrassy Memorandum, by which the Powers acquire a moral right and an
obligation to insist on “pacification,” and enumerating the causes
that have prevented the success of that action, and especially the
agitation caused by the prolongation of the strife in other parts of
the Turkish Dominions, and laying stress on the deplorable events at
Salonica, it declares that it is most essential to establish certain
guarantees of a nature to insure beyond doubt the loyal and full
application of the measures agreed upon between the Powers and the
Porte.”

As the first step in this direction, the three Imperial Courts
propose to insist with the Porte on a suspension of arms for
two months, and to open negotiations between the Porte and the
rebel delegates _on the basis of the wishes that the latter have
formulated_, and which may be enumerated as follows:—

(1) That materials for the reconstruction of their houses should be
provided the refugees by the Turkish Government.

(2) The appointment of a mixed commission to superintend reforms.

(3) The concentration of the Turkish troops on some points to be
agreed upon.

(4) Christians and Mussulmans to retain their arms.

(5) The Consuls or Delegates of the Powers to keep a watch over the
application of the reforms in general, and on the steps relative
to the repatriation in particular.

And then the Note concludes: “If, however, the armistice were
to expire without the efforts of the Powers being successful in
attaining the end they have in view, the three Imperial Courts
are of opinion that it would become necessary to supplement their
diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement with a view to such
efficacious measures as might appear to be demanded in the interest
of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development.”

It is not intended here to criticise at length these five heads,
but one interesting and significant point must be noted. The Note
says, in a passage _underlined_ above, that these five heads were
framed “on the basis of the wishes formulated by the Bosnian and
Herzegovinian Delegates.” Who were these Delegates? On the 27th
May, the _Times_ quoted an article from the _Nord_ of April 1876,
in which another Note was addressed by one Golub Babitch, in the
name of the Bosnian insurgent chiefs, confirming full powers on one
Gabriel Vasilitchki (a Russian subject who had made himself very busy
in these matters) to treat on their behalf for peace on the basis
of four points which were absolutely identical with four points of
the Berlin Note.[80] Now, who was this Golub Babitch, who describes
himself in this Note as “voivode,” and who signs in the name and on
the behalf of the “chief Bosnian chiefs”? Mr Consul Freeman, who was
by no means prejudiced against the insurgents or in favour of the
Turks, and knew his _monde_ well, describes him. He was a “former
brigand,” now the chief of one of the principal bands, consisting of
3000 men, all well armed, that had invaded Bosnia.[81]

This, then, was the source of the inspiration of the five heads of
the famous Berlin Note. It might certainly be more justly described
in history as the “Golub Babitch Note.” The five heads, however, seem
to have been admirably adapted to secure the object perhaps intended,
viz., to perpetrate and aggravate the bloodshed between the armed
Mussulmans and the armed returning refugees, and so by “bleeding
Turkey to death” to justify the action of the last and most important
notice thrown in carelessly, and almost as an afterthought, and at
the end of the Berlin Note, but which was, of course, the whole point
of it, viz., that if the measures proposed did not produce their
effect (or, let us add, produced the exactly opposite effect), “the
three Imperial Courts would consider it necessary to supplement their
diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement,” etc., etc. If
ever there was a case of the sting being in the tail, it was in this
“Berlin Note.”

Lord Derby was not deceived either as to the intrinsic value, or
worthlessness, of the four points which he politely but mercilessly
dissected in an interview with Count Munster, the German Ambassador
in London, on the 15th of May 1876,[82] nor was he intimidated by
the “still closer intimacy of the three Imperial Courts,” which
the Note ostentatiously declared. France and Italy thought fit to
adhere to it. The rejection of it by England made its rejection by
Turkey doubly certain. It was certain in any event. The courteous but
unshakeable resolution of the English Cabinet to have nothing to do
with the Berlin Note, in spite of the “still closer intimacy of the
three Imperial Courts,” and the adherence of the other two Cabinets,
brought the whole proposal down like a house of cards. But the allied
quiver was not empty.

A stage, however, was reached in the Berlin Note which it is
necessary to note carefully, as a new departure, involving a
readjustment of compasses all round, became henceforth necessary.

We have seen the apparently unaccountable hurry that Austria was
in to get matters in Bosnia and Herzegovina diplomatically settled
to her satisfaction. The Consular intervention in August 1875, the
Andrassy Note in December 1875, General Rodich’s parley with the
insurgents in April 1876, and the Berlin Memorandum on 15th May
1876, were the different stages of this pragmatical interference.
The reason was clear. Austria was quite well aware, through her
Intelligence Departments, that Russia was making superhuman, albeit
unofficial, efforts to catch up the advance that Austria had secured
for her operations in the Turkish provinces, and that every day made
it less probable that the lead in the negotiations would be left in
her hands.

We shall see that from this moment, _i.e._, on the rejection of the
Berlin Memorandum, Austria’s precipitation no longer exists, and that
she takes ample time to readjust her compass to the altered condition
of things. The principal object of this Appendix being to describe
the conduct and follow the policy of Austria in these matters, it is
necessary to examine a little more closely the relations of Austria
with Montenegro, end the part played by this principality in this
so‐called rebellion.

It was generally taken for granted that Montenegro was completely
and exclusively under Russian influence and protection, that it was
a citadel and outpost of Russia in this part of the world, and that
its prince moved in obedience to orders from St Petersburg alone.
This belief, which assumed the character of an axiom in men’s minds,
served admirably the purpose of Austria in the general mystification
with which it suited her to surround her policy at this time.

As the active and effective action of Montenegro in the insurrection
was a secret to none in Europe, and as Russia exclusively pulled
the strings which moved its prince, it was obvious that Russia was
at the bottom of the Herzegovinian insurrection which Austria was
doing all she could to assist the Porte in suppressing—_quod erat
demonstrandum_. Now, there can be no doubt that Russia had for a
very long time past preponderating influence in the Black Mountains,
and that during the whole period that Austria followed what we have
called her “normal policy” with respect to the Ottoman Empire, the
influence of Russia over Montenegro was exclusive of any other
followed in the nature of things; but Consul‐General White, at any
rate, knew better than to suppose that this meant that no steps
had been taken by Austria (and the nature of the steps is evident)
to acquire that influence over the prince that the “new policy” of
Austria rendered desirable and necessary. In a despatch of the 25th
of February 1876, Consul‐General White, writing from Belgrade to
Sir H. Elliot, says: “I beg to inform Your Excellency that I have
been assured, from a source which I have hitherto found reliable,
that the chief reason that has prompted Prince Milan to assume a
bolder and quasi‐martial attitude is the growing suspicion in his
mind that a bait in the shape of an accession of territory was about
to be offered by Austria on behalf of the Porte to the Prince of
Montenegro. This opinion is strongly entertained here by persons _who
are supposed to be well acquainted with the nature of the relations
which have existed during the last two years between the Court of
Vienna and that Prince_.”[83]

Not only did money pour into the principality, and arms, munitions
and military science, as we shall presently see, were lavishly
provided to these interesting mountaineers, but when the conditions
of peace between Servia and Montenegro on one side, and the Porte
on the other, came to be discussed (in the month of August 1876),
Austria, who opposed the claim for any accession of territory to
Servia, advocated a considerable extension for Montenegro. There can
be slight doubt that this was one of the conditions of the bargain
arranged “during the last two years between the Courts of Vienna and
that Prince.” It is, of course, a noteworthy coincidence that the two
years mentioned at the beginning of these intimate relations brings
us exactly to the date when Count Andrassy became Chancellor of the
Austro‐Hungarian Empire.

Mr Monson, the English political agent at Ragusa—afterwards sent
on a special mission to Cettinje, and now H.B.M.’s Ambassador at
Paris, who will certainly not be accused of prejudice against the
Prince of Montenegro, by whom, on the contrary, he seems to have been
quite fascinated, be it said in passing—in writing to Lord Derby
from Ragusa, on the 14th June 1876, says: “The town of Ragusa, the
capital of Dalmatia, is daily visited by armed insurgents who, at
Vienna, are represented to be peaceful Dalmatians from the rural
districts ... or Montenegrins on their travels, whose costumes would
be incomplete without the traditional carbines and poniards....
During the period in which the export of munitions of war was
suspended, _the contraband traffic was openly carried on at Ragusa
and Meglina without hindrance; cases of dynamite were passed across
the frontier, to be used for the destruction of the Turkish forts
and block‐houses_; and it is alleged that certain _military stores_
have been furnished to the insurgents at Grebgi by way of Ombla....
_The share taken by Austrian subjects in the late battles of the
Douga Pass is notorious; it is now known that 179 Crevoscians were
killed during the three days’ fighting; but, as far as I am aware, no
measures have been taken to prevent a repetition of such violations
of neutrality_.... My own conviction is that had it not been for the
money spent by Russia and by Dalmatian Panslavic Committees upon
certain influential chiefs, _the insurrection would long since have
collapsed_.... If these considerations are correct, as I honestly
believe them to be, it is clear that, as far as the Herzegovina is
concerned, a great step in the suppression of the insurrection would
be effected _if the Austrian Government would dissolve the Panslavic
Committees, enforce a strict surveillance of the frontier, and would
absolutely forbid and put down the export of arms and ammunition to
Montenegro._”[84]

The facts stated in this important despatch need no addition, and
would be only weakened by any commentary.

Let us proceed with others. Consul Holmes, writing from Bosna Serai,
on the 15th June 1876, to Lord Derby, says: “On the 6th inst., the
authorities at Mostar announced to the Baron Rodich (Governor of
Dalmatia) the fact that 1800 cases of rifles and their cartridges
were being landed at Cattaro for the Montenegrins. On the 9th, Baron
Rodich thanked them for their information, and said he would order
an enquiry into the matter and punish any illegality. Of course, the
arms will all be at Cettinje before he commences....”[85]

This is what Consul Holmes, who had resided fifteen years in the
country, and who knew more of it than any foreigner alive (it was he
whom the English Government lent to Baron Calice at the Conference,
on account of his special knowledge of the country, and who received
the thanks of both Governments for his services), says: “To people
residing in these countries, and who know the real state of parties,
_and the true nature of the insurrection_, the idea of securing
pacification by concessions to the insurgents appears simply absurd.
In the first place, reforms and concessions cannot be executed until
pacification is obtained, and in the next, for reasons which I have
frequently explained to your Lordship, those who are in arms and who
keep up the insurrection, _care nothing about them; they have other
objects and other interests_.”[86]

Such was Austria, that was at peace with Turkey, entertaining
friendly relations with the Porte, and protesting in every tone of
diplomatic expressions to every Cabinet in Europe her earnest and
anxious desire for the pacification of the Turkish Provinces!