Chapter I (8)

The Court of Directors, in their letter to the Select Committee at Bengal, dated the 8th of March, 1758, fully recognise the usage upon which presents were at that period given and received by their public servants. After stating their decision that the surplus of the sums received, after the reimbursement of losses, should be deposited in the Company's treasury, they add, "We do not intend, by this, to break in upon any sums of money which have been given by the Nabob to particular persons, by way of free gift, or in reward of their services." In the subsequent changes in the Direction, a more hostile spirit arose against Clive; and, among other accusations, one grounded on his acquisition of wealth by this present, and by the subsequent grant of a jaghire (or estate), was brought forward. To this charge we find an animated reply in his well-known letter to the Court of Proprietors. "The Nabob, then," Clive writes, "agreeable to the known and usual custom of Eastern princes, made presents, both to those of his own court, and to such of the English who, by their rank and abilities, had been instrumental in the happy success of so hazardous an enterprise, suitable to the rank and dignity of a great prince. I was one, amongst the many, who benefited by his favour. I never sought to conceal it; but declared publicly, in my letter to the Secret Committee of the India Directors, that the Nabob's generosity had made my fortune easy, and the Company's welfare was now my only motive for staying in India. What injustice was this to the Company? They could expect no more than what was stipulated in the treaty. Or, what injunction was I under to refuse a present from him, who had the power to make me one, as the reward of honourable services? I know of none. I had surely, myself, a particular claim, by having devoted myself to the Company's military service, and neglected all commercial advantages. What reason can then be given, or what pretence could the Company have to expect, that I, after having risked my life so often in their service, should deny myself the only honourable opportunity that ever offered of acquiring a fortune without prejudice to them, who, it is evident, could not have had more for my having less? When the Company had acquired 1,500,000_l._ sterling, and a revenue of near 100,000_l._ per annum, from the success of their forces under my command,--when ample restoration had been made to those whose fortunes suffered by the calamity of Calcutta,--and when individuals had, in consequence of that success, acquired large estates,--what would the world have said, had I come home and rested upon the generosity of the present Court of Directors? It is well known to every gentleman in Bengal, that the honour of my country and the interest of the Company were the principles that governed all my actions; and that had I only taken the advantageous opportunities that presented themselves, by my being Commander-in-chief, at the head of a victorious army, and what by the custom of that country I was entitled to, the jaghire itself, great as it is, would have been an object scarce worthy my consideration. The city of Moorshedabad is as extensive, populous, and rich as the city of London; with this difference, that there are individuals in the first possessing infinitely greater property than any in the last city. These, as well as every other man of property, made me the greatest offers, (which, nevertheless, are usual upon such occasions, and what they expected would have been required,) and had I accepted these offers I might have been in possession of millions, of which the present Court of Directors could not have dispossessed me; but preferring the reputation of the English nation, the interest of the Nabob, and the advantage of the Company, to all pecuniary considerations, I refused all offers that were made me, not only then, but to the last hour of my continuance in the Company's service in Bengal; and do challenge friend or enemy to bring one single instance of my being influenced by interested motives to the Company's disadvantage; or to do any act that could reflect dishonour on my country or the Company in any one action of my administration, either as governor or commanding officer."

That Clive was far from being influenced by sordid motives was never more clearly proved than during the period of which this chapter treats. While it was yet thought a settlement might be effected with Suraj-u-Dowlah, an offer had been made to pay the amount of 3500_l._, which he had personally lost at the capture of Calcutta. His reply to this communication was short, but conclusive: "Pray think no more of my losses," he states in a letter to Mr. Scrafton; "I would not be thought mercenary or selfish for the world."

His liberal behaviour toward Admiral Watson has been noticed. On this occasion, and on several others[189], he chose rather to diminish the amount of his own portion than allow further demands upon the Nabob. Of his great generosity to his family and friends I shall speak hereafter. Those who desire to detract from his title to praise for such conduct, on the ground of his wealth, are little acquainted with the effect that riches usually have upon men possessing less liberal minds; in whom they oftener generate a spirit of cupidity than a desire, such as Clive felt, to dispense to others the relief and blessings they can afford.

I have it in my power to add a remarkable testimony to show the circumstances under which Clive acted upon the occasion to which I have alluded.

A highly respectable gentleman, long resident in Suffolk, who had filled official stations in India, a few years ago addressed a letter to the present Lord Powis; in which, after stating facts that will be hereafter noticed, he informs his Lordship that it being known he was on personal grounds discontented with his father, he was summoned, in 1773, as an evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons who investigated the charges against him: "I of course attended," he observes, "but was far from being inimically disposed to his Lordship; and never can I forget what passed at the Committee on that day. Governor Johnstone, after some deliberation, suddenly rose, and with apparent exultation observed, 'It was now sufficiently proved on the proceedings, that his Lordship had received upwards of 100,000_l._ soon after the battle of Plassey;' when Lord Clive, rising from his seat, calmly replied, that 'If any gentleman of the Committee had privately asked him if that charge was true, he should have frankly acknowledged to him that he had received a much larger sum;' adding, 'but when I recollect entering the Nabob's treasury at Moorshedabad, with heaps of gold and silver to the right and left, and these crowned with jewels,' striking his hand violently on his head, 'by God, at this moment, do I stand astonished at my own moderation.'"

A guilty mind seeks concealment. Such, evidently, was not the object of Clive on this or any other occasion of his life; and those, even, who condemn his actions, must acknowledge that they were grounded upon a complete conviction in his own mind that they were not only defensible, but consistent with his principles of honour as a gentleman, and with those of his duty as a public servant.

I have, in this chapter, stated, with much freedom, my difference of opinion from Mr. Mill, on some points connected with the revolution at Moorshedabad; I have great pleasure, however, in referring to his subsequent general remarks on this subject.

The chairman of the Select Committee of the House of Commons of 1773, when he brought up its report, made a motion, that the House should inquire into the circumstances of the death and deposition of Suraj-u-Dowlah, the fictitious treaty, and other matters which took place on the elevation of Meer Jaffier. This was rejected, on the plea of the reports of the Committee not being evidence. Mr. Mill deems this ground of rejection a "subterfuge of the nature of a legal shuffle:"--"but there were other considerations," he states, "to which the House never adverted, which fairly recommended the rejection, or at least a very great modification, of the penal proceeding; that the punishment threatened was more grievous than the offence; that it was punishment by an _ex-post-facto_ law, because, however contrary to the principles of right government the presents received from Meer Jaffier, and however odious to the moral sense the deception practised upon Omichund, there was no law at the time which forbid them; that the presents, how contrary soever to European morals and ideas, were perfectly correspondent to those of the country in which they were received, and to the expectations of the parties by whom they were bestowed; that the treachery to Omichund was countenanced and palliated by some of the principles and many of the admired incidents of European diplomacy; that Clive, though never inattentive to his own interests, was actuated by a sincere desire to promote the prosperity of the Company, and appears not, in any instance, to have sacrificed what he regarded as their interests to his own; and that it would have required an extraordinary man, which no one ought to be punished for not being, to have acted, in that most trying situation in which he was placed, with greater disinterestedness than he displayed."[190]

FOOTNOTES:

[163] Though Clive, in his letter to Mr. Watts of the 19th of May, estimates this gift at 12 lacs, the precise amount, and the proportions in which it was to be given, were not settled by Mr. Watts till some time afterwards. The shares made public were as follows:--

To Clive, 280,000 rupees, or 28,000_l._

To each member of the Committee, 240,000 rupees, or 24,000_l._

The former amounts are given in the Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 145.; and we find a public letter from Clive, under date the 8th of July, to Mr. Franckland, to the following purport:--

"Please to acquaint the gentlemen of the Council, not of the Committee, that the Nabob has been so generous as to make them a present of 6 lacs of rupees, which is to be paid in like proportions as the public money; viz. half is paid down in money and plate, and the other half will be paid as soon as his circumstances will admit of it."

[164] Letter to Clive, June 26th, 1757.

[165] The officers and men so excluded became, in consequence, entitled to no more than their share with the naval force in the river, to whom was allotted half the donation given by the Nabob. This share appears to have been less than that of corresponding ranks in the army, with which they had acted, and with whom they had an undoubted right to be put on an equal footing.

[166] Maudipoor, June 26th, 1757.

[167] Cossimbazar, June 27th, 1757.

[168] June 23d. The very day on which the battle of Plassey was fought.

[169] Supposing Bussy neither came to Bengal, as was expected, nor sent any reinforcements to his countrymen, the strength of the party under Law was above two hundred men, and a large proportion of officers. Clive's whole strength of Europeans in September (the earliest time at which the season permitted his sailing to Madras) was only five hundred.

[170] Mr. Pigot was governor, and Colonel Lawrence commanded the troops.

[171] Sufficient evidence of their incompetency appears in this narrative. I refrain from quoting passages in the correspondence before me, in which more serious charges than those of incapacity are stated.

[172] Mr. Orme was, at this period, one of the Council at Madras.

[173] I leave, however, this question to the judgment of my readers, who will also decide on the assertion of Mr. Mill, that "Clive, on beholding an opening for exploits both splendid and profitable in Bengal, overlooked all other considerations, violated his instructions, and remained." This unqualified assertion appears to be a gratuitous assumption of motives of action, in no degree borne out or warranted by the facts of the case.

[174] In 1753 gomastahs (or agents) were sent to several parts of the country, where the cloths for the Company's investment were manufactured.

[175] The name of this messenger was Narraindass. He was brother to the Nabob's head spy.

[176] Orme, from whom we have taken the above facts, adds, "His (Omichund's) brother-in-law, Hazarimul, who had the chief management of his affairs, concealed himself in the apartments of the women until the next day, when the guard, endeavouring to take him, was resisted by the whole body of Omichund's peons and armed domestics, amounting to three hundred. Several were wounded on both sides before the fray ended; during which the head of the peons, who was an Indian of high caste, set fire to the house; and, in order to save the women of the family from the dishonour of being exposed to strangers, entered their apartments and killed, it is said, thirteen of them with his own hand, after which he stabbed himself, but, contrary to his intention, not mortally."

[177] Omichund received, upon the spot, one half of this amount: the date of the payment of the remainder was deferred, and it was probably to gain time to recover this sum, that he created those delays in the proceedings of the confederates, of which Mr. Watts accused him.

[178] Purneah is a province of Bengal.

[179] Orme, vol. ii. p. 182.

[180] Lord Clive's evidence goes to prove, that Admiral Watson did not object to his name being put by Mr. Lushington to the fictitious treaty; and his knowledge of the transaction, at the period it occurred, is established by the direct testimony of Mr. Cooke, Secretary to Government, who stated, "That, after the battle of Plassey, he waited upon Admiral Watson with a message from the Select Committee: that, among other things, the fictitious treaty was mentioned in conversation; and that the Admiral said he had not signed it, but left them to do as they pleased."--Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 152.

[181] One month after Omichund was informed of the fictitious treaty, Clive, in a letter to the Committee at Calcutta, requests their support to enable Omichund to perform his contract for the supply of saltpetre at Patna: and in a subsequent letter (dated August 6th, 1757) to the Secret Committee of the Directors, after stating that he had recommended Omichund to pay a visit of devotion to Maulda, he adds, "He is a person capable of rendering you great services, therefore not wholly to be discarded." These notices of this man do not imply that his reason was, at this period, so much affected as might be concluded from the perusal of Orme's narrative.

[182] History of India, vol. iii. p. 170.

[183] An author for whom I entertain sincere respect, and with whose sentiments my own, in most points, coincide, startled at the means taken to deceive Omichund, expresses an opinion, "That the principles of honour and integrity should have prescribed a more open conduct, even at somewhat greater expense of danger."--Grant's Sketches of India, p. 162. We should quite agree in this opinion, if the danger was personal to the individuals; but when it was that of the State, we should find it as difficult to point out the exact line of demarcation to be observed by men entrusted with its interests, as to define what should be the conduct of a lawyer in a particular case, where his personal feelings and general principles of action were in opposition to his duty to his client and to his professional reputation.

[184] I received from Lord Powis several trunks full of his father's papers unexamined by himself. In these were documents of every description, from copies of all his despatches, to the most private notes: and I have not discovered one line that can justify the sweeping assertion of Mr. Mill.

[185] Pol. India, vol. ii.

[186] A remarkable instance of this mode of paying those concerned in such important transactions, is afforded in the treaty of peace with Tippoo Sultaun, concluded by Lord Cornwallis in 1792. Thirty lacs of rupees were demanded, and given as _Durbar khurutch_ (or Durbar expenses), avowedly to be distributed amongst the officers concerned in settling the treaty. Lord Cornwallis, it may be observed, obtained no share of this money: but it may be answered, that while a commander, in Lord Clive's situation, had not 3000_l._ per annum of direct salary, and could have no expectation of pecuniary reward in England, Lord Cornwallis had 30,000_l._ per annum, besides a donation of 100,000_l._ from the Government he so ably served; which, with a liberal wisdom that does it honour, after that nobleman's death gave 60,000_l._ to his son and successor.

[187] Political India, vol. ii. p. 188.

[188] 180,000_l._

[189] It appears from his papers and accounts that he gave away large sums, not only to those who had personal claims upon him, but to others whose merit, as public servants, had not, he thought, been sufficiently rewarded.

[190] Mill's History of British India, vol. iii. p. 454.

CHAP. VII.

From causes which we have already been repeatedly called upon to observe,--the unity of action of Europeans, and the want of it in their Indian enemies,--the most extraordinary advantages have often been gained by apparently the most inadequate means. The work of force is easy; violence and strength can cast down, but wisdom alone can rebuild. This task is always far more difficult than the first, especially when the materials of which the new fabric is to be constructed must be taken from the ruins of the old. These are, in such cases, too often impaired and rendered unfit for use by the previous shock they have sustained.

Clive soon found the truth of these facts. Meer Jaffier had no qualities but as a soldier: his son was a headstrong youth; and his brother, whom he wished to employ, was weak and incompetent. These, and the Nabob's other relations and Mahommedan adherents, were alike desirous of removing and plundering the wealthy and experienced Hindus who were at the head of the administration, and governed the richest provinces of Bengal. Roy Dullub, who saw that his ruin was their object, had fenced himself round with his followers, and withdrawn from all personal communication with the Nabob. Addul Sing, the Rajah of Purneah, Rajah Ram, the Manager of Midnapore, and Rajah Ram Narrain, the Ruler of Patna, were within a few months driven to rebellion by acts of violence, which too plainly indicated that successful opposition was their only road to safety. The defection of Ram Narrain, at this period, was more unfortunate, as it afforded a safe progress towards Oude to the French party under Law, in pursuit of whom a detachment had marched, commanded by Major Coote.

The events which led to this general spirit of rebellion took place while Clive was at Calcutta, whither he had been called by urgent public and private concerns. His first melancholy duty after his arrival was to attend the funeral of his brave associate Admiral Watson. That gallant officer was seized, on the 12th of August, with a putrid fever, which terminated his existence in four days. No man appears to have felt more deeply than Clive the loss which was sustained by this event. In a letter to the Committee of the Direction, written immediately subsequent to its occurrence, he observes:--

"Mr. Watson is no more. Every one here received the melancholy news of his death with much concern: his generosity, disinterestedness, and zeal for the service, must for ever endear his memory to the Company. Unhappy fate! after having escaped all the risk of war, to be thus untimely cut off in the midst of his successes, crowned with glory and reputation. This is but one of the many lessons given us of the instability of human nature. Concern for this good man's death hastens me to a conclusion."

It appears from Clive's letter[191] to the Court of Directors from Calcutta, that he still cherished a hope that he might be able to return to Madras when the season admitted. "Your Honours may be persuaded," he observes, "that next to this province, the Carnatic takes up the whole of my attention. It gives me much concern the gentlemen on the coast should be displeased at my not returning a part of the forces: had I done so, nothing could have been effected here. Your Honours, who bestow an impartial attention upon all the Company's settlements, will, I hope, approve of my conduct. The time draws near when we may expect to hear of the new Soubah, Meer Jaffier's confirmation from Delhi, and that the Mahrattas are satisfied with the present change. I shall then proceed to the Carnatic with a force which, I hope, will give our arms the superiority in those parts. I make no doubt of being there soon after the breaking up of the monsoon, which will be as early as the two contending parties can take the field; and upon my arrival there I shall with pleasure resign the sword to my superiors."

During the period Clive was at Calcutta he was much occupied in settling the distribution of the sums allotted for the remuneration of losses, and the donation to the army and navy. The former appears to have been arranged on the justest principles, and to have given universal satisfaction, but the discussions regarding the latter, though they had been once settled, were revived, and took a more acrimonious shape; and it was not till after much trouble and vexation that they were ultimately adjusted.[192]

Clive, after having settled these disputes, found himself compelled to make preparations to accompany the Nabob to Patna; for, independent of the three rebellions before alluded to, Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Vizier of Oude, now threatened the frontier. This Prince, who held (like the Nabob of Bengal) a delegated power from the Emperor of Delhi, had become, like others, independent of the weak superior to whom he continued to give a nominal obedience. His territories, bounded on the west by the river Jumna, and on the east by the mountains of Nepaul, stretched to near Delhi on the north, and on the south bordered on Bahar, one of the richest provinces subject to the rule of Meer Jaffier. Sujah-u-Dowlah was to be dreaded both from his character and resources: he had, besides, the aid of the French party, and was believed to have established the ties of friendship with Ram Narrain, the discontented ruler of the country he was expected to invade.

Clive's force was at this period greatly reduced from sickness: he could not bring into the field more than five hundred and fifty Europeans, and fifteen hundred natives. He complains, in all his letters, of the bad effects the prize-money had produced, both on the health and discipline of those under his command. He had applied for, and obtained leave of the Admiral, Sir George Pocock, to employ the detachment of His Majesty's troops in Bengal; but the conduct of the officers (with two exceptions) made him decline accepting their unwilling services.

"Notwithstanding your offer," he observes in his reply[193] to the Admiral, "of putting the King's detachment under my command on this expedition, I am sorry to inform you I cannot accept it, without prejudicing the service; for all the officers (Captain Weller[194] and Captain Coote excepted) have expressed by letter a disinclination to go upon it. Under these circumstances, I think it is better for the Company to be served by those who are willing, and may be attached to their service, than by persons who seem to have lost all remembrance of what they owe to them! For my own part, though I have before represented to you the many disadvantages I must labour under, during the present expedition, I shall endeavour to surmount them, and be ready to render the Company all the service, which every wellwisher to his country is bound to do."

The rising talents of Major Coote were already employed in the command of a detachment. The death of Major Kilpatrick, an officer who had been highly distinguished throughout the scenes above described, occasioning a vacancy in the command of the military at Bengal, Clive recommended that the station should be offered to Colonel Forde[195], an officer of whom he entertained the highest opinion. The terms, in which this offer was conveyed, are honourable to the reputation of him to whom it was made, and reflect great credit on Clive's discernment; for no opportunities had been yet afforded to Colonel Forde of developing those talents as a soldier, which soon afterwards rendered him so distinguished. Notwithstanding the encouragement offered, from the distinction obtained by Coote and Forde, when Adlercron's regiment went to England a short time after, none of the other officers belonging to it availed themselves of the option given them, of remaining in the Company's service, except Captain Carnac, who joined Clive, by whom he was early noticed; and his subsequent career in Bengal did ample credit to the judgment of his penetrating commander.

I have deemed it of importance to dwell on these particulars. In nothing does the power of genius more strikingly display itself than in the selection of persons most fit to be employed, and in the application of their peculiar talents to the work for which they are suited. The personal efforts of one man can do little; but aided by the power of creating and employing subordinate instruments, can effect every thing. The sphere of Clive's selection, however, was very limited; and there are, in his private letters of this period, continual complaints of his being forced, from want of aid, to make personal efforts injurious to his health[196], which had never been good, and which he now represents as declining from the effects of a nervous complaint, to which he had been subject from his youth.

Affairs at Moorshedabad had, from the moment Clive left that city, become worse. Besides other evils, the Nabob had hitherto evaded compliance with several of the most important articles of the treaty; and he every day showed less disposition to comply with the reiterated demands made for its speedy fulfilment. Mr. Scrafton, who was at this period acting as political resident at his Court, urged Clive to hasten to Moorshedabad, with or without his force; as his presence appeared the only means of averting confusion and ruin.

"I shall march," said Clive, in answer[197] to several of Mr. Scrafton's letters[198], "with the whole army. I have wrote to the Nabob and Ram Narrain, of which copies are enclosed you. Do not suffer yourself to be unquieted beyond reason at the situation of affairs, but consider them coolly, and give me daily accounts of what is passing. The march of the army is absolutely necessary, as well to support the Nabob against his enemies, as to see justice done ourselves."

After Clive had joined the Nabob at Rajahmahul, he received a letter from the Select Committee, stating that as Sir G. Pocock was about to leave the river, were he to proceed to Patna the safety of Calcutta might be endangered. Clive observes in reply; "Without a foreknowledge of events, we cannot be at any certainty, whether the steps we take may or may not be for the advantage of the Company. By accompanying the Nabob to Patna, it is very possible, though I think not probable, for a French squadron to push up the river, and endanger Calcutta, and in consequence all of the Company's possessions in these parts; and by refusing to lend the Nabob our assistance, we must lose that influence with him which seems essentially necessary to obtain his fulfilling the rest of the treaty, and his continuing to us our valuable possessions.

"Yesterday the Nabob and his minister paid me a visit. After discoursing for some time on the promising prospect of his affairs, he desired I would march with him to Patna. This I consented to, on condition he gave us security for paying the rest of his debts. The orders upon Burdwaun, Nuddea, Hooghley, and Fugellie are making out, which I hope to send you in a day or two: I have reason to think you will receive in ready money the full of the half-year's payment. As Ram Narrain[199] refuses to trust his person in the Nabob's power without a letter from me, I have wrote him that he may come with safety, having the Nabob's authority for so doing, and I am in great hopes there will be no necessity for marching further than Telliagully. If the affairs of Patna can be settled in this manner, it will save the Nabob an expense which he is not well able to bear, and ease you of all apprehensions from the arrival of a French squadron."

In Clive's letter[200] from Rajahmahul to the Select Committee of the Directors, we find a concise and clear account of the condition of the Nabob's government, as well as the measures which were adopted for its settlement.

"In laying open the state of this government," he observes, "I am concerned to mention that the present Nabob is a prince of little capacity, and not at all blessed with the talent of gaining the love and confidence of his principal officers. His mismanagement threw the country into great confusion in the space of a few months, and might have proved of fatal consequence to himself, but for our known attachment to him. No less than three rebellions were on foot at one time; one at Midnapore, headed by Rajah Ram; another at Purnea, under Addul Sing; and a third at Patna, under Ram Narrain: all which may be very well attributed to the Nabob's own imprudence. Rajah Ram's two brothers, after being invited to Moorshedabad, were imprisoned, which was quite sufficient to deter him from surrendering himself as he intended. Meer Azuffee was appointed to the government of Purnea to the general satisfaction of the people; but soon laid aside for Cuddum Hussein Khan, a relation (it is true) of the Nabob, but a tyrannical, rapacious fellow, and odious to the last degree to the Purneans. As for Ram Narrain, after he made his submission, and the Nabob had sworn to continue him in his government, apparent measures were taken for his overthrow.

"The prime minister, Roy Dullub, who was one of the chief instruments of the Nabob's promotion, and had received in return solemn assurances of continuing his Dewan, was suspected to be engrossing the power in his hands, and rather to have encouraged the rebellions than endeavoured to suppress them. It is very certain that Roy Dullub had a powerful party in the state, and more than probable that he took measures to strengthen it, according to the common policy of all Dewans. However this might be, the Nabob's jealousy of him was arrived to such a height, that Suraj-u-Dowlah's brother, a young lad, and almost an idiot, was suddenly cut off, on a surmise of Roy Dullub's intending to make him Nabob, and having sent his own brother to Chandernagore to engage me in the design, which is altogether groundless. Roy Dullub no sooner knew of this sudden execution, and the motives for it, than he began to fear for his own life; and open hostilities might possibly have ensued if we had not been a check upon each party. The Nabob, who at this time was encamped in the neighbourhood of Moorshedabad, accompanied by a detachment of our troops, excuses himself from any knowledge of the transaction, and lays the whole blame on his son, who was left in government of the city; but many circumstances induced us to believe otherwise. Roy Dullub, on pretence of sickness, was still at Moorshedabad, having a large body of his own troops with him, as is usual in these governments; but it is not improbable the chief reason for his remaining behind was a view to his own safety. Affairs were in this situation when I arrived at Moorshedabad. I would willingly have engaged Roy Dullub to accompany me to the Nabob's, that I might have effected a reconciliation between them; but his illness not admitting him to set out immediately, I could only assure him of my protection, and engage his promise to follow me as soon as possible.

"The 3d instant, our army came up with the Nabob's at Fettiapoor, near Rajahmahul, where we still continue encamped, chiefly to wait the minister's arrival. I should have acquainted you that some days before I set out from Chandernagore, Rajah Ram, the Midnapore rebel, came and delivered himself up to me; on promise of the Nabob's pardon and our protection. This first unlinked the chain of the three rebellions, the chiefs of which had held a correspondence, and were connected together. Rajah Ram's submission may be deemed a very fortunate event in all respects; for his good sense, long experience in the affairs of this government, and the great influence he has in the country, would have made him as dangerous an enemy to the Nabob as he is now a useful friend to us. Upon our approach, and some of the Nabob's troops having passed the river into the Purnea country, the rebels of that quarter quitted their intrenchments and dispersed, but some of their chiefs were overtaken and made prisoners; so that two of the rebellions are effectually quieted, and the third is in a fair way of being peaceably accommodated. If it is in my power to bring about the thorough reconciliation which I intend between the Nabob and Roy Dullub, all domestic troubles may be fully put an end to in this country. As for any apprehensions of a foreign enemy, they are not very strong at present. The Vizier, with the assistance of the Mahrattas, drove Nujeeb Khan, the Affghân Bukhshee, out of Delhi; but the latter being reinforced with a large body of Patans, who are the Affghans that have settled for some time in Hindustan, is again making head in the neighbourhood of Delhi, and will be joined by Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude. So that all the powers from whom any danger might be expected are too much engaged among themselves to bend their thoughts this way for the present. The Nabob's confirmation is not yet procured at Delhi, nor can I judge when it will. The difficulty is in the price.

"I have waited for Roy Dullub's arrival with great impatience, as Durbar business cannot be transacted without him; and we have some points to settle of great consequence to your interest. We have already had occasion to observe the difficulties attending every application for money to the Durbar, and I foresee they will increase as the Nabob grows stronger, and we become less necessary; therefore I have determined not to leave this ground till I procure sufficient assignments on the revenues of some country near Calcutta for the annual payment of the money still due by treaty; together with proper writings from the Zemindars of such country for the regular discharge of the same, which we may enforce if necessary. We have already obtained the Nabob's promise to comply as soon as his minister arrives; but it was not without much private opposition from Jugget Seit, who, following the same method with regard to all debts due to him from the government, has already demands on most of the Zemindars. However, on being threatened with the loss of our friendship, he desisted. It is not impossible but we may find Roy Dullub likewise averse to our carrying this point, as he may become, by it, a good deal less necessary to us, than when our applications were to be directed to him; but as the Nabob has given his promise, and the matter now wholly rests with him, he cannot find any way of evading a compliance, without a manifest breach of friendship, which I think he would not venture on in his present situation."

Major Coote, who pursued M. Law, till the French party passed Benares, made a complaint of the conduct of the ruler of Patna, from whom he states that he met with obstruction instead of aid. This letter was dated on the 8th of August, a period when Ram Narrain had sufficient proofs of the hostile disposition of the Nabob, but was ignorant what part the English commander meant to take. The moment he received the assurance of protection which Clive gave him, he not only submitted, but went to Meer Jaffier's camp, which had then reached the vicinity of Patna.

Intrigues were commenced, which, notwithstanding the promises made to him, had for their object, the removal of this powerful Hindu, in whose place the Nabob desired to put his brother. On the other hand, Ram Narrain united his interests with Roy Dullub, who, though assured of protection from the English, appeared still to entertain doubts of his own safety. All parties looked to Clive, who was encamped at Bankapore, a village a few miles west of Patna.

While affairs were yet unsettled, an affray occurred in the market between some of the English sepoys and Ram Narrain's horsemen, in which several lives were lost. The excited state of men's minds was such, that this trifling dispute had nearly been attended with the most serious consequences. Apprehension of the recurrence of such accidents induced Clive to move his troops to an island in the Ganges, opposite to his former position.

Though Meer Jaffier does not appear to have entertained, at this period, the treacherous designs imputed to him, he continued irresolute, until Clive, in a personal conference, succeeded in convincing him that both his honour and his interests were concerned in the re-establishment of Ram Narrain. Clive has stated what occurred on this occasion in a letter[201] to the Court of Directors. "The Nabob," he observes in this despatch, "applying to me to accommodate between him and Ram Narrain, and promising that if he would submit himself, his life and property should be secure, and his government continued to him, I wrote him conformably, engaging myself to be security for the Nabob's promise. On receipt of my letter, he immediately left Patna, and met me the 25th ultimo at Hybut-Gunge. It was the 29th before he could wait on the Nabob, for want of a lucky day, and then I sent Mr. Watts to introduce him. The wavering disposition of the Nabob, and the ear he gives to evil counsellors, who endeavour to inspire notions into him of our having too great an influence in the country, have occasioned me some trouble in these mediations. However, as he perceives in the end that my endeavours are entirely directed to his good and the public quiet, his jealousies are quickly effaced. The distance between us during the march prevented any interview from my leaving Rajahmahul till our arrival at Patna; which time was industriously made use of, by the envious and self-interested, to alienate him from the English, and induce him to break his promise to Ram Narrain. Their artful suggestions were too easily admitted; and many signs appeared of coolness towards us, as well as an intention of giving the province of Bahar to his brother Meer Cassim Ali Khan. Having occasion, however, to wait on the Nabob the 14th instant, to congratulate him on his entry into Patna, I represented to him the impossibility of retracting the promise he had made through me to Ram Narrain; and intimated, as well as the nicety of the subject would bear, the advantage of trusting the government to a person of his moderate and peaceable disposition, rather than putting it into imprudent, and at the same time dangerous, hands. My discourse had weight, and Ram Narrain was confirmed."

In a private letter, written the day after this despatch, to his friend Mr. Pigot, Clive gives a forcible description of the actual condition of affairs at Meer Jaffier's court, and of his own situation at this period. He observes, "The Nabob's conduct is weak beyond conception; and you may be assured, whenever we are wanting in a force to overawe and protect him, ruin will ensue. You cannot imagine the trouble I have had these three weeks past, in our march to this place; and, since his arrival, he has been wanting to make his brother, who is a greater fool than himself, Nabob of Bahar, in prejudice of Ram Narrain, a Gentoo, universally beloved and respected, and that in breach of his promises to me, whom he desired to write to him to engage him to come down and pay his respects. Not one of his rajahs would come to or treat with him, without letters of assurance from me. His Prime Minister, Roy Dullub, who has more than half the army under his command, is entirely in our interests, as is Ram Narrain and all Bahar; so that, in spite of his folly, we can oblige him to act for his own interest and that of the Company.

"Though there is nothing I so earnestly wish for as returning to the coast, that I may have a good plea for quitting the service entirely, yet I have set my heart so much upon a happy conclusion of the Moorshedabad expedition, that I am determined to stay in Bengal another year, if no news from England prevents it; for there is such a connection between the Nabob, myself, and his great men, that I greatly fear my absence would throw all into confusion, and there would be an end of the remaining part of the debt and of the fortifications. Whereas, by staying till this time twelve months, two thirds of the debt will be paid, and the fortifications in great forwardness. Besides, so large a sum has been advanced by the Company to the navy and army, I think myself bound to see the major part of it repaid by the Nabob. By that time eighteen of the twenty will be received.

"I hope my good friend will acquit me of the crime of vanity in expressing my apprehension of the evil consequences of quitting Bengal at this juncture. These foolish people ground their opinions and confidence in one man's abilities alone. Before we took the field, it was with the greatest difficulty he could be prevailed upon to issue out of his treasury 10,000 rupees; and since my joining him he has already paid twenty-five lacs, and given security for the payment of ten more."

Clive's negotiations with the Nabob were finally attended with all the success that such a court and so weak a character allowed. A supply of money was procured for the extraordinary expenses of the army; the perwannah, or grant of lands yielded to the Company, was passed in all its forms; orders were issued for the immediate discharge of all arrears on the first six months of the Nabob's debt, and the revenues of Burdwan, Nuddea, and Hooghley assigned over for payment of the rest: "so that," says Clive, writing[202] to the Court of Directors, "the discharge of the debt is now become independent of the Nabob, which precaution is become absolutely necessary, as his calls for money are greater than he can answer. Nothing but a total revolution in the government can well interrupt your payments." These matters being settled to his satisfaction, he had accompanied the Nabob, at his urgent request to Patna, that by his presence he might assist him in settling that province, and by showing himself on the frontier along with the Nabob, and his numerous army, he might at once awe all foreign enemies, and hasten down the Sunnud in favour of the Nabob, from Delhi. "All domestic troubles," he adds in the same letter, "are now happily ended; and the Nabob seems so well fixed in his government, as to be able, with a small degree of prudence, to maintain himself quietly in it. For ourselves, we have been so fortunate in these transactions as to attach to us the most considerable persons in the kingdom; and, by the constancy with which we successively supported Rajah Ram, Roy Dullub, and Ram Narrain, to acquire the general confidence, and make our friendship be solicited on all sides. On the whole, we may pronounce, that this expedition, without bloodshed, has been crowned with all the advantages that could be expected or wished, both to the Nabob and the Company."

Clive, nevertheless, saw every moment more and more the necessity of the English permanently emancipating themselves from dependence upon their native allies. The Select Committee at Fort William, alarmed lest the French should make an attempt on Calcutta, wished him to apply to the Nabob to send a large force to Hooghley, to act in co-operation with them in the event of an attack. The reply from Clive, and Mr. Watts, who was associated with him in his civil and political duties, while it exposes the impolicy of such an application, shows their opinion regarding the little reliance that could be placed on the friendship of Meer Jaffier, however recent and great his obligation to the English.

"We cannot," they observe[203], "avoid differing greatly in opinion from you, gentlemen, on the subject of requesting the Nabob to have a large force down at Hooghley, to be ready for assistance against our enemies the French. Such a publication of our fear and weakness would, we think, be a step the most impolitic and most prejudicial to the Company's interest that could possibly be taken. Meer Jaffier (according to the practice of all Mussulmen) has long since forgot the services rendered him by the English, and looks upon them as encroachers upon his power, reputation, and authority. It is now some months, gentlemen, that we have been fully convinced that the Nabob has looked upon the English with an envious eye, and that he is influenced by his fears only to do them justice.

"The consequence of our application to the Nabob would occasion a great coolness in his behaviour towards us, and a refusal to fulfil the rest of his treaty; neither does this prospect of danger appear to us so near as to oblige us to make known our apprehensions to the whole province."

The same feeling of the necessity of the Presidency of Bengal providing for its own security, led Clive at this period to express to the Select Committee at Fort William his pointed disapprobation of their delays in repairing their fortifications.

"I cannot conclude," he observes in a letter[204] written the day he left Patna, "without representing to you, gentlemen, in the strongest terms, the great stake the Company have in Bengal, and how much that stake is exposed for want of a fortification. It gives me concern, beyond what I can express, to hear from all hands that the works go on very slowly. At a time like this, no private workmen should be allowed, but all employed for the public service; and if the want of hands arise only from the want of a few pice[205] more, I think such a saving does not merit one moment's consideration, or that such economy can meet with the Company's approbation at this juncture. Be assured, gentlemen, if Calcutta be left defenceless through any neglect of ours, and should fall into the hands of our enemies a second time, we shall entail upon ourselves a censure never to be effaced."

Clive obtained, before he quitted Patna, a monopoly of the saltpetre of that province for the Company. This grant was, in every respect, very advantageous to the English; and no less so to the Nabob, who received as much revenue, and more certain payment, than he had done before. The officers of Meer Jaffier were, however, discontented with an arrangement by which they lost the bribes and presents which they formerly received from the contractors for that article. After this and other matters were settled, Clive proceeded to Moorshedabad, accompanied by Roy Dullub, with whom he had to adjust many points connected with the full performance of the treaty.

The object of Clive, throughout this short expedition to Patna, was to reconcile, as far as he could, the jarring interests which distracted the court of Meer Jaffier, and threatened to disturb the peace of the country. His honour, and the public interests, strongly attached him to the Nabob; though, at the same time, it was not only politic, but indispensably necessary, to keep the power of that prince within limits. He felt himself especially bound to protect Roy Dullub from the enemies by whom he was threatened. That minister, it will be recollected, was one of the chief instruments in effecting the revolution; and had subsequently received, both from Clive and Meer Jaffier, the fullest assurances of safety to his life and property.

Clive, on the expedition to Patna, and on all other occasions, communicated with Meer Jaffier upon every subject. He often visited him; and giving scope to the natural bent of his temper, entered into his amusements. But it was impossible to reconcile that prince to his condition; which was more humiliating from the circumstance of his presenting to his countrymen the first instance, in Bengal, of the power of a proud Mahommedan sovereign being overshadowed by that of a body of merchants, who, before this great change, had never appeared at the court of his predecessors but as humble supplicants endeavouring to obtain commercial privileges. Many of the nobles and generals by whom the Nabob was surrounded had been, a year or two before, courted by bribes and flattery to protect the persons, or to promote the trade, of the very English agents on whose pleasure or policy their fortune and character now depended. To add to the strong and rankling feelings which such a change must have excited, the Mahommedan prince and his chiefs found themselves deserted by the wary and pliant Hindus, who, possessing greater foresight, and expecting security and advancement from the change of masters, were ready, on the first alarm of danger to their life or property, to seek the protection of the English. This the latter were in many cases under the necessity of granting; for, from the first, they had not intrinsic strength which could enable them to cope with those with whom they were hourly exposed to come in collision. They could not have remained in Bengal without the means of self-defence; they could not repel or retaliate an attack without counteracting and defeating their enemies; they could not retreat without ruin, from the ground to which their successes had advanced them; and they could only maintain themselves by forming and improving their connections in the country. Though the cultivation and support of the ties, which this course led them to establish, created divisions among those whose union would have been their destruction, it had at the same time the evil of cherishing feuds, rebellions, and revolutions. Supposing those who had lost all but the name of authority by our progress had been so well satisfied of our decided superiority as to become patient wearers of the degraded trappings of state, could they have reconciled their proud followers to obedience and submission to those whom they deemed foreign upstarts, and whose power became every day more galling from the abuses committed by the meanest of the natives[206] of India employed in their service, or guarded by their protection?

It is not meant, by these observations, to question the necessity which compelled our advance to power in Bengal. There was no alternative between its attainment and abandoning that country altogether; but while we do justice to ourselves, we should not be unjust to those who opposed us by intrigue or in battle. We should, at all events, judge them according to their habits, their knowledge, and the feelings and opinions of the community to which they belonged. Alarm for their lives, hatred and distrust of each other, or the lust of power, might make them confederate with us for the purpose of the moment. To this they might also be induced by that arrogant confidence, which is ever the concomitant of ignorance. They might hope to direct or command those with whom they had combined to destroy their enemies. But when this dream of self-delusion was dispelled, when they found that they themselves had been made the instruments of subverting the dominion of the race to which they belonged, and that their power was now controlled by the very persons by whom it had been so recently established,--it became natural for them, and for all whose fame and fortune were associated with them, to seek, through every means, emancipation from such humiliating thraldom. I have expressed my sentiments very strongly upon this subject, and may be condemned by those who, alike regardless of usage and of feeling, are guided in their judgment of every public and private act by partial principles, and by a local and limited scale of moral rectitude; but I shall appeal from such a decision to all who, true to the feelings and affections which are implanted in every breast, cherish attachment to their family, their tribe, and their country. I ask of these, what would have been their conduct, if placed in the depressed and degraded condition of Meer Jaffier, his kindred, his nobles, and their followers?