Chapter I (10)

"The incorporation of the troops having been determined on as a necessary measure, the several officers of the three different establishments being now united, were, of course, to take rank according to the date of their respective commissions, in the same manner as the officers of different corps in His Majesty's service, when they happen to meet. Now, as Captain Govin had been ordered here by the Presidency of Bombay, to take the command of their detachment, without their knowing that such incorporation was to take place, it is evident they could have no design of injuring the officers of this establishment, as has been injuriously represented; and, therefore, to have sent him back, after having been so formally ordered here, would have been the highest indignity to the Council of Bombay, as well as to the gentleman himself; and, as he remained here, he had an undoubted right to maintain that rank which the seniority of the commission gave him.

"The truth of the matter is, the most of the gentlemen who have been so violent in their remonstrances were grown sufficiently rich in your service to be desirous of any pretence for quitting it. They will prove, however, no great loss, as no services can be expected from men who have so little spirit and gratitude as to resign their commissions at this critical time, and on ill-grounded pretences.

"I flatter myself it will be now obvious to every unprejudiced person, that I have been unjustly charged by these gentlemen with having superseded them, the doing of which, I readily agree, ought to be practised as seldom as possible. Yet such is the nature of the service in this country, that the preservation of your settlement may at times depend upon the taking of such a step; and as, by the want of field officers, your captains are often intrusted with the conducting of expeditions of the utmost importance, in such case, if you be desirous of insuring success you must have regard to the man only, and not the rank."

No reasoning could be more clear, no opinions more correct, than those contained in this letter. The principles inculcated, both as to general rules and exceptions, are alike just. It breathes, also, that calm but high spirit of command, and that firmness of purpose, which could alone support discipline in an army so constituted and so situated. It is often from such instances of conduct, more than from the most brilliant achievements, that we are enabled to form a true estimate of individual character. Clive, as appears from the correspondence in my possession, was censured by many as hazarding the territories of Bengal by the expedition under Colonel Forde; but all his private letters show that he was very sanguine in his anticipation of that brilliant success which was the result of this measure. After expressing to one of the Directors[233] his hope of expelling, by the operations of this detachment, the French from Golconda, and aiding the Presidency of Fort St. George, he concludes his letter in the following words:--"Success is in the hands of the Almighty; but I own I entertain the most sanguine expectations from the late armament."

With respect to the safety of Bengal, he evidently trusted in a very great degree to the influence of his own name and character. He was perfectly acquainted with the natives of India; and he knew that, with them, personal confidence, and a belief in the good fortune of an individual, had an almost superstitious influence, and gave him a strength which more than made amends for the inefficiency of his force.

In the beginning of the year 1759, intelligence was received that the Shah Zada[234], Shah Alum (eldest son of the Emperor of Delhi), had arrived at Benares, accompanied by a force of eight thousand men, and that his purpose was to invade Bahar, to which it was reported he was invited by Ram Narrain, the Governor of that province, whose fidelity to his allegiance continued to be suspected by the Prince Meeran, and by the Mahommedan nobles of Meer Jaffier's court.[235] Before we detail the measures which the advance of the Prince led the Nabob and the English to adopt, it will be useful to say a few words upon the actual condition at this period of the imperial family of Delhi.

The power of the Emperors of Delhi, subsequent to the death of Aurungzebe[236] had rapidly declined. That artful prince had struggled through life to maintain the appearance of health in an empire which was in a disordered and decaying state before he attained it; and by his crooked policy accelerated that destruction which was completed by the weakness of his successors.

Forty years after his decease, and after the murder or death of five intermediate princes, Mahommed Shah ascended the throne, and reigned twenty-seven years. The direction of the limited power he possessed was, during the whole of that period, an object of violent contention to the turbulent and ambitious nobles by whom he was surrounded; and, while these were engaged in intrigues and hostile struggles for the possession of the Emperor's person and his capital, others took advantage of their divisions, and of the general confusion, to usurp the fairest provinces of the empire, and to transmit them as an inheritance to their descendants.

The Mahrattas, who had only fifty years before emerged from obscurity, were so powerful in the reign of Mahommed Shah, that they plundered the suburbs of Delhi; and that capital was, during the same unpropitious period, taken and sacked by Nadir Shah, who, after his terrible invasion, restored to the unhappy sovereign of India his degraded throne and distracted dominions.

Mahommed Shah died in 1747. He was succeeded by Ahmed Shah, who reigned but a few years, when he was dethroned, and had his eyes put out in 1753. He was succeeded by Alumgeer the Second, with whom perished even that semblance of authority which his immediate predecessors had preserved. Soon after his accession, he became a mere instrument in the hands of his vizier (or minister) Ghazee-u-Deen[237], the grandson of the celebrated Nizam-ul-Mûlk.

Shah Alum[238], the eldest son of the Emperor of Delhi, fled from that capital. His first object was emancipation from that thraldom in which his father and family were kept by the cruel and ambitious Ghazee-u-Deen. When at a distance from court, he began to collect followers. India, at this period, abounded with military adventurers; and the high name of Shah Alum, and the reputation of his minister Ali Murad Khan, brought many to his standard. He was kindly received by some of the principal chiefs in Hindustan; but, according to the reports at Moorshedabad, it was Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Vizier of Oude, who directed his views to the invasion of Bahar. That prince, however, artfully kept in the back-ground, until he saw the result of the attempt upon Patna, the capital of that province.

The belief of the Shah Zada being connected with the Vizier, combined with the report of his being joined by the French party under Law[239], (added to the doubts entertained of Ram Narrain's fidelity), created serious alarm to the Nabob, whose mind was agitated by other causes. His son[240] continued to pursue a conduct calculated to give him very serious uneasiness, while his troops mutinied, and refused to march unless their arrears were paid. To add to these difficulties, Jugget Seit and his brother, who have been often mentioned as the principal soucars (or bankers) of the country, had obtained leave to proceed on a pilgrimage to Pursnath[241], and had commenced their journey, when information was received that they were in correspondence with the Shah Zada, and had actually furnished him with the means of paying his new levies. The Nabob, giving credit to this report, sent to stop them; but they refused compliance with his orders, and proceeded under the guard of the two thousand men which he had furnished for their escort. These troops, on receiving a promise of the liquidation of their arrears, readily transferred their allegiance from the Prince to his bankers. The Nabob, if he had had the disposition, would probably have found himself without the means of coercing these wealthy subjects into obedience. The principal bankers of India command, through the influence of their extensive credit, the respect of sovereigns, and the support of their principal ministers and generals. Their property, though often immense, is seldom in a tangible form. Their great profits enable them to bear moderate exactions; and the prince who has recourse to violence towards one of this class is not only likely to fail in his immediate object of plunder, but is certain to destroy his future resources, and to excite an impression of his character that must greatly facilitate those attempts against his life and power to which it is the lot of despots to be continually exposed.

Amid his difficulties and distresses, Meer Jaffier looked exclusively to Clive, to whom he wrote every day; and Mr. Hastings's letters of similar dates represent that not only that prince, but all classes (even to the mutinous troops), confided in him, and in him alone.

Clive, before these occurrences, had been appointed by the Directors to the station of Governor of Bengal; and his nomination was accompanied with such marks of regard and esteem, as induced him to forego his intention of going to England, and to determine to remain fourteen or fifteen months longer, "by which time," he observes, in a letter[242] to the Council at Fort William, "I persuade myself the treaty with the Nabob will be fulfilled, the fortifications in a state of defence, and such a force arrived from England as may secure to the Company their valuable acquisitions. These three objects are what I have always had much at heart; and if they can be completed, I flatter myself the Court of Directors will think I have answered their expectations, and will approve of my returning to Europe, to enjoy the fruits of war, which has been carried on for upwards of seven years almost without intermission."

Clive complains in this letter of the intention signified by several of the members of Council to quit the service, and particularly calls upon Mr. Manningham and Mr. Frankland to alter their resolution, and to continue to him and to the public their valuable aid. He concludes this despatch with a merited compliment to Mr. Watts[243], whom he considers to have had just cause given him for resigning the service.

The moment the report of the Shah Zada's advance was confirmed, Clive gave the Nabob every assurance of complete support. He wrote also to Mr. Hastings[244], directing him to give confidence to the court of Moorshedabad. "The dissensions," he states, "subsisting between the Nabob and his people give me much more concern than the news of the Shah Zada's motions, as there would be little to fear from the latter, did the former take the proper measures to secure his being well served."

Alluding to the mutinous commanders who had signified, through Golam Shah[245], their willingness to march, and do their duty, if Clive would give them his protection, he observes in the same letter, "I don't think it would be right to enter into any engagements with Golam Shah; but you may assure him from me, that, on my arrival in the city (which I expect will be in five or six days), I will endeavour to settle matters, that the jemidars shall have nothing to apprehend in future."

Ram Narrain had with reason taken alarm at the Nabob's designs, and communicated his fears through Mr. Amyatt[246], the chief of the factory at Patna. Clive desired he might be assured of his constant support and protection. "Should any movements," he wrote, "be made with an ill design towards him, I will march myself in person to his assistance."

When Clive found that the Shah Zada was advancing to Allahabad, and had summoned Ram Narrain to obey his orders, he wrote to Meer Jaffier, stating that he did not think there was much to be apprehended from the Emperor's son. "I would not," he observes[247], "have you think of coming to any terms with him, but proceed to take the necessary measures to defend your city to the last. On Monday, the last of this month, I shall take the field, and will have every thing in readiness to march to your assistance if necessary. Rest assured that the English are your stanch and firm friends, and that they never desert a cause in which they have once taken a part."

Clive subsequently wrote[248] Meer Jaffier that, though he considered the troops at Patna quite equal to repel the Shah Zada, the apprehension entertained of the latter being joined or supported by Sujah-u-Dowlah required that an army should march. In this letter he entreats the Nabob to have confidence in Ram Narrain.

"He is not a great sepoy (soldier)," he observes, "but he is an honest man."

A letter[249] from Ram Narrain to Clive, at this period, showed that his allegiance depended exclusively upon the assurances of support he received from the English Government.

"I have from time to time," he writes, "advised you of the Shah Zada's coming this way; but Mr. Amyatt's letters will make you acquainted with every circumstance; for I always acquaint him as soon as I have any fresh intelligence. My dependance is solely upon you. Troubles are very near at hand: this is the time for assisting me. I beg you will without delay send me your orders in what manner I am to act. I am very impatient for an answer to this letter."

"Since writing the above, I learn some wicked people have been representing me in a bad light to the Nabob, and that he is very angry with me. God knows, it is on your account that I am the Nabob's servant. If at this time the Chuta Nabob[250] only should be sent with forces to my assistance, it will raise doubts in many people's minds, and I myself shall be suspicious. I have no dependance on any soul living but yourself. Mr. Amyatt's letter will give you many particulars about this city."

The suspicions which Ram Narrain entertained of the Nabob's hostile disposition were well founded: many documents prove this fact. Mr. Hastings, in a letter[251] to Clive, observes, "What the Nabob's design is in sending Cassim Ali Khan to Patna, or in deferring his own departure, I am not informed; but, as it is past a doubt that the Nabob is no friend to Ram Narrain, and has almost openly accused him of treachery in this late affair, there is but too much reason to suspect that something is intended to Ram Narrain's prejudice."

The Court of Moorshedabad continued to pursue its favourite object--the removing and plundering an able but rich Hindu, at a moment when the safety or loss of Bahar depended upon his fidelity or defection. Clive saw, and pitied this wretched policy, which he was successful in counteracting, in a manner that gave confidence to the alarmed Ram Narrain, without outraging the feelings, or bringing into public disrepute the conduct, of Meer Jaffier. There is no transaction of his life in which he more displayed that temper and consideration which the character and circumstances of those with whom he was associated required, or more calmly and firmly maintained that high reputation for good faith on which the stability of the British power so much depended.

The fears of Meer Jaffier were so great, that he proposed, as one expedient, to purchase the retreat of the Shah Zada; but Clive, the moment he heard of this intention, wrote to dissuade him from a measure which could have no effect but that of inviting others to like profitable inroads. "I have just heard," Clive writes to the Nabob, "a piece of intelligence[252], which I can scarce give credit to; it is, that your Excellency is going to offer a sum of money to the King's son. If you do this, you will have Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Mahrattas, and many more, come from all parts to the confines of your country, who will bully you out of money, till you have none left in your treasury. If your Excellency should pursue this method, it will be furnishing the King's son with the means to raise forces, which, indeed, may endanger the loss of your country. What will be said, if the great Jaffier Ali Khan, Subah of this province, who commands an army of sixty thousand men, should offer money to a boy who has scarce a soldier with him? I beg your Excellency will rely on the fidelity of the English, and of those troops which are attached to you."

To Ram Narrain Clive reiterated his assurances of aid and protection. "It was," he states, in a letter[253] to that ruler, "on account of your strictness for justice, your courage, and your fidelity, that I got the Nabob to confirm you in the Subahship of Patna. It surprises me much to hear that you suffer yourself to be under such apprehensions of the King's son, who has not more than two thousand men. I would have you march out of the city with your forces, and encamp at a distance. Mr. Amyatt will accompany you. I have this day pitched my tent, and (with the blessing of God), if it be necessary, I will come to your assistance."

Clive received a very flowery and complimentary letter[254] from the Shah Zada, and another from his minister Maddar-u-Dowlah. The purport of both was to invite him to pay his personal respects; and a letter from Fyaz Ali Khan, received at the same time, intimated that the Prince had thoughts of doing great things by Clive's counsel, and in conjunction with him."

Conceiving, no doubt, that a knowledge of this correspondence might alarm Meer Jaffier, Clive sent him copies of all the letters. He also informed him that some of the Shah Zada's agents had been with him. "They made me," he observes, "offers of provinces upon provinces, with whatever my heart could desire; but could he give, as well as offer me, the whole empire of Hindustan, it would have no weight with the English. I am well assured, too, that he wrote to every man of consequence in these parts; which convinces me that he has designs against these provinces. It is the custom of the English to treat the persons of ambassadors as sacred, and I told the Shah Zada's agents as much; but at the same time warned them never to come near me again, for, if they did, I would take their heads for their pains."

Clive, having received a request from the Nabob, marched on the 25th of February; and, after remaining a short time at Moorshedabad, he proceeded, accompanied by the Nabob's son, towards Patna.

Though the Emperor of Delhi possessed, personally, no authority; though his mandates were evaded or disregarded throughout the greater part of his dominions, on the just ground of their being issued by one notoriously not a free agent; still there existed the greatest reverence for his name. He was, as yet, deemed the sole fountain of honour; and every outward mark of respect, every profession of allegiance, continued to be paid to the person who filled the throne of the house of Timour. Until his sunnud (or commission) was received, no possession, whether obtained by inheritance or usurpation, was deemed valid, and no title of nobility was recognised as legitimate unless conferred by him. In countries like India, where the community is almost in a primitive state, usage has a power, of which it is difficult to convey an idea to those accustomed only to a more artificial and advanced state of society. At the period here treated of, when the Emperor was known to be quite powerless, and to act under personal restraint, such was the impression throughout India of the nominal allegiance to which he was entitled, that no usurper, however daring, could outrage the general feeling so far as to treat his name with disrespect, or neglect forms to which consequence continued to be attached long after all the substance of authority was fled from that family for whose support they were instituted.

Clive appears to have been deeply impressed with the necessity of attention to this popular feeling, and to have studiously established an influence at the Court of Delhi. When Meer Jaffier obtained the sunnud (or commission) and investiture as Nabob of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, Clive was honoured, at the same time, with a high title[256] of nobility, and the grade of Munsubdar, or Commander in the Imperial Army; distinctions to which he appears to have attached considerable importance, and which were, no doubt, of value, as they increased his consequence in the eyes of the natives.

I have elsewhere given my opinion very fully upon this subject, and have expressed my sentiments as to the motives by which Clive was governed in all his intercourse with the Court of Delhi. I have stated "that, though general reasoners may deem such conduct a sacrifice to prejudice, a reverence to a shadow; yet the fact cannot be denied, that, by making that sacrifice, and by reverencing that shadow, Clive went in unison with the feelings and opinions of millions of men. Such inconsistencies as those which exist in our connection with the fallen descendants of the house of Timour are frequent in political communities, and particularly as they have existed from time immemorial in India. They grow out of the habits, the sentiments, and sometimes the superstition, of human beings; and wise statesmen, referring to their source, will ever treat them with consideration and respect."[257]

Clive, when he dismissed the agents of Shah Alum, wrote to that prince in a manner which left him without the slightest hope of success in forming a connection with the English. The substance of this letter[258] was as follows:--"I have had the honour to receive your Highness's firman.[259] It gives me great concern to find that this country must become a scene of troubles. I beg leave to inform you that I have been favoured with a sunnud from the Emperor, appointing me a Munsubdar of the rank of six thousand foot and five thousand horse, which constitutes me a servant of his; and as I have not received any orders, either from the Emperor or Vizier, acquainting me of your coming down here, I cannot pay that due regard to your Highness's orders which I would otherwise wish to do. I must further beg leave to inform you, that I am under the strictest engagements with the present Subadar of these provinces to assist him at all times; and it is not the custom of the English nation to be guilty of insincerity."

This communication was expressed in terms which could not be misunderstood; but it, at the same time, preserved that tone of respect, and professed obedience to the Emperor, which it would have been prejudicial to the interests of the English Government and its ally to have neglected.

Clive, when he arrived at Moorshedabad, on his march to Patna, had a long conference with the Nabob, the substance of which he details in his letters to the Select Committee. He laid before him the causes of the internal danger with which he was threatened from seditious nobles and a mutinous army. His own conduct, he informed him, had produced these effects; and his loss of the confidence of all classes of his subjects had the natural consequence of inviting foreign invasion. These truths, he appeared to hope, might make some impression; and he further informed the Committee, that, though he had stated his sentiments so frankly, he had, at the same time, complied with the Nabob's solicitation to ride on the same elephant with him, and adopted every measure that could support him in his administration.

In a letter, dated the 12th of March, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, Clive informs them of the cause of the expedition to Patna, the strength of his force, and his expectations of the result.

"The Select Committee," he observes, "have already acquainted you that we were threatened with a storm from the north, and that the Mogul's son, who has for some time been in-arms against his father, or rather the Vizier, his father's minister, had entered the frontiers of these provinces in a hostile manner. As the Prince is daily advancing, though but slowly, it was judged expedient that our forces should march to the northward, in order, in conjunction with those of the Nabob, to put a stop to his progress. As I flatter myself my presence will be of service to the common cause (my former successes having gained me some degree of influence in the country), I have put myself at the head of the forces. They consist of about four hundred and fifty Europeans, and two thousand five hundred sepoys; and with these, few as they are, I trust we shall give a good account of the Shah Zada, though his army is said to be thirty thousand strong, provided the Nabob's people keep firm to him: and should even the contrary happen, and the Subadar's troops desert him, we shall be able to make our party good, and to maintain our own. Indeed, the only danger, in my opinion, to be apprehended is from the dissatisfaction among the Nabob's principal officers, occasioned by his treachery towards and ill-usage of them. However, in the several conferences I have had with him, since my arrival here, I have so strongly pointed out to him the danger of such like behaviour, as cannot fail inducing him to a change of conduct for the future; and the confidence which I know the jemidars have in the English will, I hope, retain them in their allegiance to their sovereign.

"We shall leave this to-morrow; and I propose marching with the utmost expedition to the relief of Patna, which is in great danger of being lost, as well as the whole province of Bahar, the Shah Zada being actually arrived at the Caramnassa, the river which divides the countries of Oude and Bahar. It is yet uncertain whether M. Law, with his few fugitives, will join him, or not."

When the troops reached Shahabad, advices reached Meeran[260] that Ram Narrain had actually gone over to the Shah Zada. This, however, proved incorrect; the wary Hindu had only faltered in his allegiance until he heard Clive was advancing.

His visit to the Shah Zada, which gave rise to the report of his defection, was merely to gain time. It was now learnt from subsequent accounts that he was defending the city, and had already repelled two attacks. Clive, who was making very rapid marches to join him, directed Ensign Mathews, who was in advance in command of a battalion of sepoys, to hasten to Patna and co-operate with Ram Narrain; a service which was effected by that young officer in a way which gave promise of the eminence which he afterwards attained.

Confident from the efforts which were made to support him, and the near approach of his friends, Ram Narrain made the most gallant exertions to save the city. Every assault was repelled, and the enemy drew back after they had possessed themselves of some of the bastions. Discouraged at these defeats, and alarmed at the near approach of the corps under Mathews[261], and Clive's rapid advance, the Shah Zada broke up his camp, and retreated.

Clive, in a letter to Mr. Spencer of the Bombay establishment, thus shortly describes the Shah Zada's advance and flight:--"The King's son, who, about a year ago, escaped out of the Vizier's hands, has been ever since fishing in troubled waters; he has been with the Rohillas, the Jauts, the Mahrattas, and Patans; and, about three months ago, fled for protection to Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude, a mortal enemy to the Vizier, and was received by him with great respect. He sent his brother-in-law, Mahommed Kooli Khan, with five thousand horse, into these parts, in hopes of effecting a revolution: and, indeed, the name of the King's eldest son was so great, that, as soon as he entered the province, he was joined from all parts; and, by the time of his arrival before Patna, his army was forty thousand strong. The ruler of this place being entirely in the English interest, what with small presents and negotiation, delayed the attack of the city for some time: but on the 23d of March the fighting began, and lasted till the 4th of April, when our advanced guard arrived within four coss of the city, upon which the Shah Zada and his forces retired with the utmost precipitation, and are now getting much faster out of the province than they came in. We shall continue following them to the bank of the Caramnassa. I hope to secure the peace of these provinces for one year longer at least, by which time the whole of the Nabob's treaty will be concluded.

"The enemy made several vigorous attacks upon the city, and were once in possession of two bastions, but were driven off with great slaughter: they have certainly lost a great many men. M. Law, with his small party, joined the King's son on the day of their retreat, but could not prevail upon him to make another attack."

While Clive was advancing towards Patna, a letter[262] from Meer Jaffier informed him that he had received the command of the Emperor to seize the person of the Shah Zada. The imperial edict was enclosed; its contents were as follows:--"Know that you are under the shadow of my favour. Some ill-designing people have turned the brain of my beloved son Mahommed Ali Gohur[263], and are carrying him to the eastern part of the empire, which must be the cause of much trouble and ruin to my country. I therefore order you, who are my servant, to proceed immediately to Patna, and secure the person of my son, and keep him there. You are likewise to punish his attendants, that other people may take warning thereby. In doing this you will gain my favour and have a good name. Know this must be done."

The Vizier[264], Ghazee-u-Deen, addressed a letter of the same purport to Clive, who, as well as the Nabob, appears to have considered it an object to proclaim, that, in opposing the Shah Zada, they were acting in conformity with the commands of his offended father.

The retreat of the Shah Zada was precipitate. He hastened to cross the Caramnassa, a river which divides the territories of the Nabob of Bengal from those of the Vizier of Oude; but the latter, who would have been ready to support him had he been successful, now proclaimed himself the enemy of that unhappy prince, who, abandoned by his followers, and not knowing whither to fly, sought the protection of the English Government.[265]

Clive communicates the overture which he made in a letter, under date the 24th of April, to Mr. Manningham.

"The force of the Shah Zada," he observes, "is now entirely broken: he has himself been obliged to repass the Caramnassa for fear of Sujah-u-Dowlah, who sent a body of troops to prevent his entering into his dominions. The Prince, reduced to no more than three hundred followers, has again written to me; and, from the conversation I had with the horseman who brought the letter, a person greatly in his confidence, I find he wants, in his present distress, to throw himself upon the English, from a conviction that there is none else in whom he can trust. I have consulted with Ram Narrain, who is of opinion[266] that the Nabob can never be safe, should a person of his high rank be admitted into these provinces; and that his presence would expose the country to continual commotions. I have therefore answered him, that my connections with the Nabob were of so solemn a nature, as would not allow of my affording him any protection; and on that account advised him to keep out of the way, as I was now on the point of marching to the Caramnassa. M. Law has passed the Great River[267], but, we are informed, has only from twenty to thirty men with him: if so, a great number must have deserted from him, and it is probable we shall soon have some of them with us."

Notwithstanding the decided terms of this letter, the Shah Zada continued to hope that he might yet prevail upon the generosity of Clive to afford him the protection of the British Government. This, however, would have been attended with more hazard to the peace of the country than Clive thought himself justified in incurring; but, while he was compelled by policy to refuse his request, he did so in a manner calculated to add as little as possible to the distress and difficulties with which he was surrounded.

"I have had," he observes in a letter[268] to Mr. Manningham, "repeated letters from the Shah Zada, evidently intending to throw himself upon us; but, for the reasons alleged in my last, have absolutely determined against receiving him. I have indeed, (so great is his distress), sent him a present of five hundred gold mohurs[269], to enable him to get out of our country; and he has, in consequence thereof, passed the Caramnassa, and is endeavouring to cross the Great River, with intention, it is said, to take refuge in the Gazipoor country."

Clive's letter to the Prince (of the 30th of April), though kind, is at once decided and explicit. "The only letter," he observes, "I had the honour to write you was by Fyaz Ali Khan's brother from Calcutta. I therein acquainted your Highness that I was under the strictest alliance with Meer Jaffier, and bound by oath to assist him. Since that time I have received repeated orders from the Vizier, and even from the King, not only to oppose your Highness, but even to lay hold of your person. I am sorry to acquaint your Highness with these disagreeable things, but I cannot help it. Were I to assist your Highness in any respect, it would be attended with the ruin of this country. It is better that one should suffer, however great, than that so many thousands should be rendered unhappy. I have only to recommend your Highness to the Almighty's protection. I wish to God it were in my power to assist you, but it is not. I am now on my march to the Caramnassa, and earnestly recommend it to you to withdraw before I arrive there."

Clive, as already stated, had received several letters[270], written by command of the Emperor, to urge him to act against the Shah Zada. When all was settled, he addressed a letter[271] to the Vizier, in which he states, that, "after putting an end to the troubles in Bahar, agreeable to his Excellency's orders, he had set out for Bengal."

Clive had proceeded with the troops of the Nabob against the Rajpoot and hill chiefs, who had invited and aided Shah Alum. These were soon compelled by his operations to submit to terms; and this settlement enabled him to return to Calcutta, leaving a small force to aid Ram Narrain in his local administration.

Before Clive left Patna, the dangers which three months before threatened Bengal were completely dispelled; and it is not too much to aver, that the happy result of this unpromising expedition was exclusively to be ascribed to his personal efforts, and to the influence of his character. His prompt and open manner allayed, for the moment, the jealousy of the Nabob and the violence of Meeran. Their disaffected chiefs and mutinous soldiers were alone prevented from defection or excess by his presence and exhortations. It was exclusive confidence in Clive that preserved the fidelity and animated the courage of Ram Narrain to those exertions which saved the city of Patna from being plundered, and the rich province under his rule from being laid waste; and, when the Shah Zada fled, the personal reliance of the Rajpoot chiefs of Bahar on the British commander accelerated the settlement of those districts which the advance of the Prince had incited to rebellion.

We have stated how much Clive studied popular feeling throughout this service, by acting in conformity with the wishes and commands of the Court of Delhi. The information of the modern historian of India appears here very defective, from the observations he has made upon this part of Clive's conduct. In describing the invasion of Bahar, Mr. Mill[273] states, that "the Prince (Shah Alum) having obtained from the Emperor legal investiture as Subadar of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, crossed the Caramnassa;" and, after detailing the result of his enterprise, observes[274], "The hardihood of Clive was seldom overcome by scruples. Yet the Emperor Alumgeer was legitimate sovereign of Bengal, and had undoubted right to appoint his eldest son to be his deputy in the government of that province: to oppose him, was undisguised rebellion."

The facts of the case are directly opposed to the statement here given by the historian. The Prince Shah Alum, who invaded Bahar, had fled from Delhi, and was deemed to be in open rebellion against his father. He might have been, before this period, titular Subah of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, such rank being often given to princes of the imperial family; but we have shown that, before he crossed the Caramnassa, even that title was given to his younger brother, and Meer Jaffier appointed his naib, being a confirmation of the sunnud (or patent) he had before received from the Emperor, empowering him to rule over these provinces. Further, the Emperor Alumgeer had called upon the Nabob by his allegiance as his viceroy, and upon Clive by his duty as a commander in the imperial army, to oppose his rebellious son in his unwarranted invasion of Bahar, and urged them to seize and imprison his person, and to attack and punish his seditious followers. The first commands of the Court of Delhi upon the subject were written in February. They were frequently repeated; and in a letter, dated 18th of June, 1759, from the Prime Minister at Delhi to Clive, the commands of the Emperor were conveyed in very strong language.

"The faithful services," the Vizier observes, "which you have performed, and the pains which you have taken in the late affairs, have given me great joy; nor can I sufficiently express your praises for what you have done. Continue to behave with the same fidelity; seize the rebel, and send him to court. By the will of God, this service performed, the King will show you the greatest favour, and your honours shall be increased."

The impression made at Alumgeer's court by Clive's conduct is further proved by the invitation given in this letter to the English to establish a factory in the city of Delhi.

"In the same manner," the Vizier adds, "as your factories are settled at Calcutta, Azimabad, and Moorshedabad, send and establish a factory at the royal city."

From these facts, of the correctness of which there cannot be the slightest doubt, it must fully appear that the Nabob and Clive, so far from being guilty of rebellion against the legitimate sovereign of India, with which they are charged, were acting throughout in conformity with the reiterated mandates of the imperial court, and were congratulated and applauded by the Emperor and his minister upon the successful results of their efforts.

Meer Jaffier remained in Bengal during the whole time Clive was in Bahar. He appears to have continued his inveterate hatred to Roy Dullub, and to have devised every means to obtain possession of his person. Mr. Hastings at one time thought he would have recourse to force for this purpose; and conjectured that a body of Mahrattas, approaching from Cuttack, which the Nabob had first invited from dread of his own troops, and the invasion of the Shah Zada, were meant to be subsequently employed in seizing the person of Roy Dullub. He appears to have given more attention to this affair than Clive thought it merited; the latter being satisfied that Meer Jaffier, however he might enter into intrigues, would never openly commit any act which could place him in the light of an enemy to the British government, by whom he had been raised to a throne, and whose friendship and support, he must be sensible, were indispensable to enable him to preserve his power.

Meer Jaffier appears, from the correspondence of the resident, to have from the first looked to Clive as the only person who could save him in this period of difficulty and alarm; and it is but justice to his character to state that, when the danger was past, his sentiments underwent no change. His gratitude was excessive: nor was it limited to words. He conferred upon the man whom he now considered as the preserver of that throne upon which he had established him, a jaghire (or estate) of the reputed value of thirty lacs of rupees.

The first mention of his intention to bestow this gift on Clive is in a letter[275] from Mr. Hastings, in which he observes, "He (the Nabob) expresses the most grateful sense of the services which you have performed for him, and declared to me his resolution to use every means in his power to procure an order from the Court[276] for your jaghire, being ashamed that you should do so much for him without the prospect of reaping any advantage to yourself by it."

This letter was written immediately after the Nabob had received full accounts of the flight of the Shah Zada, and the happy result of the expedition to Patna. It was not surprising that he, knowing the source to which he owed his safety on this occasion, should be anxious to reward Clive; but we learn from Mr. Sykes, who, a few months afterwards, was appointed to act for Mr. Hastings at Moorshedabad, that Meer Jaffier was influenced by additional motives to this munificent act.

In his evidence before the House of Commons, Mr. Sykes stated to the Committee[277], that the Nabob, speaking to him of the expedition to Patna, "mentioned the sense he entertained of Lord Clive's conduct towards him, and likewise in reducing the Shah Zada to such necessity as to apply to his Lordship to put him under the English protection; he mentioned, also, that he owed his government to Colonel Clive before, and this was the second time he was indebted to him for it; that he had been a means of having honours conferred on Colonel Clive, in creating him an Omrah of the Empire, but that he had given him nothing to support these honours: he had frequently had it in his thoughts, but never entered seriously upon it till now; that he had thoughts of giving him a jaghire in the Patna province, but found it would be attended with inconvenience to the officers of his government; and that Jugget Seit had fallen upon a method of obviating these difficulties, by giving him the quit-rent arising from the lands ceded to the Company to the southward of Calcutta; that he thought it would interfere the least with his government, and stood the clearest in relation to the Company's affairs.

"Mr. S. said that, to the best of his remembrance, he mentioned to the Nabob that he thought it was a large sum; but the Nabob told him that it was very little adequate to the services he had received from the Colonel, but more especially for his behaviour upon the capture of Moorshedabad, when the whole inhabitants expected to be put under contribution; and that none of them had experienced a conduct of that kind, for that their persons, as well as their properties, were entirely secured to them."

Mr. Sykes states, that the Nabob, having prepared the deeds, desired him to be present at the delivery of them to Clive; which took place when the Nabob went to meet and welcome him on his return from Patna.

The next mention of this subject is made in a letter[278] to Clive from Mr. Hastings, after his return to Moorshedabad, in which he observes, "The Nabob desired me to draw out the form of the letter to be written to the Council about your jaghire." This letter was a few days afterwards transmitted to Calcutta.

I shall have occasion, hereafter, to speak of this grant, which gave rise to great discussion; but we must, nevertheless, make some observations upon the subject in this place.

Though Clive appears to have thought that the high titles obtained for him from Delhi should have been accompanied[279] by a jaghire, there exists no evidence, amongst all the documents I have examined, to show that he had any previous intimation of its amount, or that he, in any shape, compromised either his personal honour, or his duty to the government he served, by accepting of this grant. Conscious that he had performed great services to the Nabob, he received this reward as a recompence which that prince had a right to bestow, and which was one conformable to the usage of the country, and rendered more appropriate, according to that usage, from the high honour which the Emperor of Delhi had, at the request of Meer Jaffier, conferred upon him. Clive gave a complete proof of his anticipation of the approbation of his superiors in England, and of his wish to give publicity to this transaction, by accepting, as his jaghire, an assignment of the quit-rent, or government share, of the lands farmed by the Company in the vicinity of Calcutta. This arrangement, which placed his income in the hands of the Company, though it presented the best possible security, would never have been consented to by a person who had not acted with a perfect consciousness that he was violating no duty, and inflicting no injury on the interests either of individuals or the public.

These were evidently Clive's sentiments; and the transaction, at the time of its occurrence, appears to have been generally viewed in the same light. If some argued (as they might with reason) that, though no existing regulations forbade individuals from accepting such gifts, when spontaneously made by the Princes of India, a person in Clive's situation ought not to have received a reward of a nature so likely to establish a precedent dangerous to the future integrity of the service: it was probably answered, that this was no doubt correct as a common rule; but that the circumstances in which he was placed were altogether peculiar, and never likely to recur to any individual; that he first saved from ruin, and afterwards established upon a firmer and more extended basis, the British interests in India; that he had, in his career, overcome the army of one prince whose hostility to the English was unconquerable, and raised and preserved upon his throne another, by whom the ruined inhabitants of Calcutta were restored to affluence, and a defenceless factory and a precarious trade converted into a strong government and a flourishing commerce. Was he, they would ask,--the sole and acknowledged author of this almost miraculous change,--to obtain no benefit except empty honour? Restricted by his military occupation from trade,--denying himself, upon principle, every advantage from a corrupt source,--inadequately paid by the government he served, and without a hope of any remuneration from a fluctuating body of Directors,--was he, when he compromised no duty, when he offended no law, when he injured neither the interests of individuals nor of the state, to reject ungraciously the munificent reward spontaneously proffered to him by a prince, who, though he had already enriched him with a liberal share of the treasures which he distributed to the English government and its army when they placed him upon the throne, now owed him an obligation of almost equal magnitude? For there could be no doubt, the defenders of Clive would argue, that to him Meer Jaffier was exclusively indebted for the successful issue of the late campaign: and his merits and claims were enhanced from his having, by his qualities of a soldier and a statesman, and by the influence of his great name, reaped all the fruits of the most decided victory without shedding one drop of blood.

Such were the arguments by which the great majority became satisfied with Clive's conduct on this occasion. Their force cannot be denied; nor can their validity be impugned on any ground unconnected with his peculiar situation and extraordinary achievements. It is, assuredly, a great injustice to his memory, to view his conduct on this and similar points without the fullest reference, not only to the singular circumstances in which he was placed, but to the usages of the service to which he belonged, to those of Eastern governments, and to the principles of action which, at that period, governed the Directors of the East India Company. Besides, if, even with ourselves, there is not a man who thinks the more meanly of Cornwallis or Wellesley for the large pecuniary donations which they received from the Company, or of our Marlborough and our Wellington for the splendid estates which they received from the government of a grateful country; can it be deemed honest or fair to apply a different rule to the similar testimony of gratitude which Clive received from the prince (the sole representative of the government) whom he had so eminently served? According to the ideas of that country, the reward was not excessive: no native of the East certainly deemed it so. And, if it be objected to as conferred by a foreign potentate, Clive must be content to share, in his fortunes as his fame, the fate of the Prince of Mindelheim, the Duke of Bronte, and the Duke of Vittoria.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

LONDON: Printed by A. SPOTTISWOODE, New-Street-Square.

FOOTNOTES:

[214] Orme, vol. ii. p. 363.

[215] The country usually known by the name of the Northern Circars, which had been ceded by the Soubah Salabut Jung to the French.

[216] A modern writer has noticed Clive's conduct on this occasion in less favourable terms:--

"Clive," Mr. Mill observes[217], "chose to remain in Bengal, where he was master, rather than go to Madras, where he would be under command; and determined not to lessen his power by sending troops to Madras, which the Presidency, copying his example, might forget to send back. An enterprise at the same time presented itself, which, though its success would have been vain had the French in the Carnatic prevailed, bore the appearance of a co-operation in the struggle, and afforded a colour for detaining the troops."

I conceive no remark is necessary upon the first part of this paragraph. Every one acquainted with our condition in India at this period must be sensible that Clive's presence was comparatively of little consequence at Fort St. George[218], and that it was essential to the very existence of our power in Bengal; he, therefore, having the option, very properly chose to remain where he was most urgently required.

[217] Vol. iii. p. 247.

[218] Mr. Pigot was governor, and Colonel Lawrence commanded the troops.

[219] Calcutta, 14th August, 1758.

[220] Calcutta, 15th September, 1758.

[221] Two companies of Draper's regiment.

[222] Calcutta, 26th December, 1758.

[223] Calcutta, 25th December, 1758.

[224] M. Moracin.

[225] Mr. Scrafton.

[226] In a letter from Mr. Hastings to Clive, of the 13th August, 1758, he observes:--

"As I look upon myself to be principally indebted to you for my appointment to this office (of what advantage soever it may prove to me with respect to my own particular interest), I think it incumbent upon me to make my sincere acknowledgments to you, for your favourable intentions herein; which I cannot do better than by a constant attention to the business entrusted to my charge, and my earnest endeavours to promote the interests of the Company, as far as my capacity will enable me; in which, I hope, I shall always have the happiness to meet with your approbation."

[227] Mr. Hastings could not have been above twenty-five years of age when appointed to this arduous and responsible situation.

[228] Mr. Hastings, in a letter to Clive of the 18th September, reports the suspicious circumstances that led to the dismission of Cajah Haddee, who was accused of having armed his followers with an intention of murdering the Nabob when he went on a visit to his son. This accusation was probably false, and invented, as the ground of the fictitious plot, before alluded to, against Meer Jaffier's life, said to be formed by Roy Dullub, with the knowledge and approbation of Clive.

[229] Tunkaws are the orders upon the revenue of the country.

[230] 6th October, 1758.

[231] The Nabob gave a copy of this letter to Mr. Hastings, to forward to Clive. Its purport was as follows:--

"Your acceptable letter I have received: the purport of it I have duly attended to. You write that the sepoys are all unanimous in this affair, which I am very glad of. At present, it is your business to put in immediate execution the affair in which you are engaged. I will be with you in time: with regard to the expenses, I have wrote to Meer Allee, who will supply you.