Chapter IX (2)

Governed by these considerations, they determined to await, within the walls of Madras, the approach of the French army. The siege which took place has been minutely described by a cotemporary historian.[46] It continued for two months, the French having taken up their ground on the 14th of December, 1758, and retreated on the 15th of February, 1759.

The enemy's force consisted of two thousand seven hundred European infantry, besides their cavalry, artillery, and sepoys. The garrison was not more than a third inferior in number; and when, to that circumstance, was joined the established character of the Governor, Mr. Pigot, and of Colonel Lawrence, the commander of the troops, who was aided by some of the most distinguished officers in India, there appeared, from the first, but little doubt of the result. The most remarkable event of the siege was a sally, soon after the enemy took up their ground, by Colonel Draper; which, though not altogether successful, was attended with a great loss to the French as well as to the English: and Lally had to regret, which he did deeply, the loss of two of his best officers, Major-General Saubinet and Count D'Estaing, the former of whom was killed and the latter taken prisoner.

During the siege a corps of observation was kept by the French, under the partisan Lambert; but this did not prevent their receiving almost as much annoyance from the activity of the English parties without the walls, as from the courage of those within. Two small corps, sometimes acting separately, but oftener co-operating, hung continually upon the outskirts of their camp, attacking and intercepting their supplies. One of these, which had come from the southern territories, was commanded by the celebrated Mahommed Esoof; the other by Captain Preston[47]: but Captain Caillaud, who had been summoned from Trichinopoly, took the command of both, and by his operations greatly increased the distresses of the enemy.

While Madras was well stored with provisions, and had abundance of money supplied from Bengal[48], the treasury of Pondicherry was completely exhausted, and the conduct of Lally had destroyed credit. The violent and irregular means adopted, to anticipate the revenues of the country, had left the districts which the French occupied without the means of furnishing either the money or the supplies that were necessary for the subsistence of the troops. Notwithstanding the privations to which they were subjected, the French European soldiers performed their arduous duty with spirit and alacrity; and Lally fully appreciated their merits. With the natives, however, his contempt and severity produced their natural effects: they were loud in their clamours for pay, and, actuated by discontent and resentment, deserted in bodies, and began to plunder the country, under the pretext of obtaining payment of their arrears.

These circumstances, and the despair of success,—for he had made little or no serious progress in the siege[49],—made Lally resolve upon retreat; and that measure was almost converted into a flight by the arrival of six ships with the reinforcements from Bombay. Not only his battering train and camp equipage were left, but the sick and wounded. The latter he recommended to the care and humanity of the government of Fort St. George, from whom they received as much kindness and attention as if they had belonged to the garrison.

Lally, before he left Madras, blew up the bastion and powder mill at Egmore, and destroyed the Governor's garden-house, and many private buildings. He had threatened to reduce the Black-Town of Madras to ashes; and nothing, probably, prevented this threat from being put into execution but the hurry of his retreat. This may be inferred from the numerous instances of wanton severity he showed in the prosecution of hostilities against the English. Among other acts, the seizure of the persons of some ladies[50] at Nagapatam, and their harsh treatment, was one of the least pardonable, as alike contrary to the usage of civilised nations, and the boasted habits and character of his country. The proceeding, as will be hereafter stated, forced the English to measures of retaliation.

Clive had, from the moment he heard of Lally's intention to attack Madras, anticipated his complete failure: he dreaded nothing but the arrival of more troops from France, and the want of support from England; but his alarm on these grounds was considerable, as we find from a letter which he wrote to Mr. Pitt, (under date the 21st of February, 1759,) informing him that accounts had been received of the arrival at Mauritius of a third armament from France, and of the expectation of a fourth.

"I presume," Clive observes, "it must have been in consequence of this intelligence, that M. Lally took post before Madras, as I cannot think he would have been so imprudent as to come there with a force not double that of the garrison, were he not in expectation of a reinforcement. Should that arrive upon the coast before our squadron from Bombay, or should the enemy's fleet, by the addition of this third division, prove unfortunately superior to ours, the event is to be feared. Much, very much indeed,—perhaps the fate of India,—now depends upon our squadron. Should it miscarry, our land forces, without some extraordinary occurrence, will be in danger of being obliged to yield to the great superiority of the enemy. Advice has been just received, that the French were still carrying on the siege of Madras on the 25th of January. They had been before it upwards of six weeks; but I have so high an opinion of the gentlemen within, that I dare answer they will make such a defence as will do honour to our nation, and end in M. Lally's disgrace."

"The repeated supplies," Clive adds, "furnished the French from home, compared with the handful of men sent out to us, affords a melancholy proof, that our Company are not, of themselves, able to take the proper measures for the security of their settlements; and, unless they are assisted by the nation, they must at last fall a sacrifice to the superior efforts of the French Company, supported by their monarch. Within these eighteen months, have arrived at Pondicherry two thousand five hundred men, and the third division will probably bring half that number; whereas, we shall not have received, including Colonel Draper's battalion, more than one thousand. It looks as if the French Government were turning their arms this way, in hopes of an equivalent for the losses they have reason to apprehend in America, from the formidable force sent by us into that country. But I cannot bring myself to believe that so valuable a possession as the East Indies, and which may make a material difference in bringing about a peace, will be abandoned; and therefore trust that the French armament will have been followed so closely by one from us, as to get in time to prevent the designs of our enemies.

"A son of the Great Mogul (but at present at variance with his father) has approached the northern frontiers, where he has been joined by a few disaffected people. As he has no authority from his father, he can neither, I think, have wealth nor influence enough to make any considerable progress. However, I have got every thing ready, and, in case he advances further, I have determined to proceed myself to the northward, in order to assist the Nabob in driving him out of his dominions, which I make no doubt will be easily effected, even with the small force we have. Would to God we could as easily remove our European enemies from India!"

In a letter to Mr. Sulivan[51], of the same date[52], Clive anticipates the result of Lally's operations.

"To give you my own opinion," he observes, "I think Lally will fail in his attempt, so great is my confidence in the strength of the garrison, and the experience and valour of the officers. The arrival of Captain Caillaud with the sepoy and Tanjoreen horse, will distress our enemies greatly, if not oblige them to raise the siege; and if they continue till the arrival of our reinforcements, daily expected from Bombay, they run the risk of a total defeat. I can no otherwise account for this undertaking of the French general, than from his distressed situation for want of money. He is really risking the whole for the whole."

Clive had from youth been engaged in efforts to prevent the establishment of the French power in India, and his mind was constantly and intently fixed on that object. He viewed the period of which we are writing as a crisis: but he had no doubt of the result, except from overpowering reinforcements arriving from France, and the English settlement being left unsupported. From the moment he learned Lally's proceedings on his march to Fort St. David and Tanjore, he foretold, that if our resistance was protracted, that general must destroy himself. In a private letter[53] to Mr. Pigot, he recommends him to employ native horse[54] in laying waste the French territories. "By ruining the country," he observes, "you will infallibly ruin M. Lally. Remember, that he and his forces were obliged to eat gram before Tanjore. May he be reduced to the same necessity in Pondicherry itself!"

Clive's letter to Colonel Lawrence, of the same date, exhibits, in an equally strong manner, his sentiments upon this subject, as well as the affectionate respect he continued to cherish for his friend and commander. It is as follows:—

"My dear friend,

"I have heard with some surprise, that M. Lally has set himself
down before Madras, not with an intent, I believe, to besiege it in
form, or carry on approaches; if he does, I think he must be either
mad, or his situation desperate; at all events, I hope it will be
the means of adding fresh laurels to those already gained by my
dear friend.

"Colonel Forde has orders to join you with his forces; and we are
endeavouring to send you a complete company of one hundred rank and
file from hence. In short, we have put every thing to risk here to
enable you to engage Lally in the field. I hope Mr. Bouchier will
spare you some men from Bombay. I enclose you a short sketch of our
strength in these parts; and, considering how much depends upon
keeping up our influence in Bengal, you will say there never was a
smaller force to do it with.

"God give you success, which will be an increase of honour to
yourself, and of much joy to

"Dear Colonel,

"Your affectionate friend and servant,

(Signed) "ROBERT CLIVE."

_State of the European Force in Bengal, 6th Feb. 1759._

Doing duty. Military Artillery
Captains. 6 1
Lieuts. 6 8
Ensigns. 9 0
Serjeants. 36
Corporals. 29 5
Drummers. 20 2
Privates. 314* 86
* Whereof 140 are recruits.

The delight of Clive at the result of the siege was very great: it was heightened by his warm feelings of friendship towards those who had so nobly supported the reputation of the service of Fort St. George, to which he had a pride in belonging. He congratulates Mr. Pigot[55] on the fame he had acquired; but his greatest joy, as he repeatedly expresses, was, that his venerated friend, Colonel Lawrence, should so brilliantly close his Indian career.

The events upon the coast subsequent to the siege of Madras do not relate to our subject. Suffice it to say, that, after some indecisive operations in 1759, Lally, next year, suffered a signal defeat at Wandewash, from an English army under the command of Colonel Coote. He was soon after compelled to shut himself up with the remains of his army in Pondicherry, which was immediately invested by the English. Before this period, the increased irritability of his temper had led to discontent in the local government, and among the inhabitants of that settlement, almost amounting to sedition. The troops had been in a state of serious mutiny from want of pay. They nevertheless did their duty upon this occasion; but Lally had neither money nor provisions, and was forced to surrender.[56] This unfortunate commander left Pondicherry amid the insults of his countrymen; and on his return to France, he was tried, condemned to death, and executed for crimes[57] of which he was not guilty: for though his prejudice, violence, and tyranny, had no doubt been one cause of the misfortunes of his country in India, his courage, his zeal, and his loyalty were unimpeachable. But the voice of his enemies was loud and vehement, and the ministers of France were glad to save themselves from the disgrace brought upon the country by their own want of foresight and judgment. The Count Lally was the victim they offered to an incensed public. The principles of justice and the feelings of humanity appear to have been alike violated by this act, which a philosopher[58] of France truly denominated, at the period of its perpetration, "A murder committed with the sword of justice."

Bussy, with a zeal and temper that do him equal honour, continued to serve under Lally, and to offer his best advice, which was, however, seldom regarded. Basâlut Jung, the brother of the Subah of the Deckan, had evinced an anxiety to preserve the friendship of the French; and Bussy strongly recommended that he should be declared Nabob of the Carnatic, and invited to aid their operations. No measure could have been more likely to support them. But Lally had precipitately proclaimed the son of Chunda Sahib Nabob: a person who had neither influence nor character to be a useful ally; and he was not only reluctant to repeal his own measure, but disinclined to attend to any proposition of Bussy. Overcome, however, by a sense of the urgent necessity of the expedient, he detached that officer with a small body of troops to the camp of Basâlut Jung at Kurpah. The French commander was received with honour; but not being able to comply with the demands made by Basâlut Jung, one of which was the immediate advance of four lacs of rupees, he was compelled to return without being able to conclude an alliance with that prince. He brought back with him, however, a body of four hundred excellent horse, whom he had taken into service; and he was enabled, through the credit he had with some of the native chiefs of the Deckan army, not only to supply this party with money, but also the French detachment by whom he was accompanied, who, like all Lally's troops, were many months in arrear, and almost destitute of clothing, as well as the means of obtaining food.

Bussy was made prisoner at the battle of Wandewash, (January, 1760,) but was instantly released by Colonel Coote, from respect for his character, and as a return for that kindness and consideration which he had invariably shown to English prisoners.[59] Soon after this occurrence, he returned to France, leaving behind him a name as fondly cherished by the natives of India as by his countrymen. That further acquaintance with the true history of remarkable events, which often diminishes the fame of military commanders and statesmen, has hitherto tended only to increase the reputation of Bussy. His courage and conduct as a soldier stood high, before the genius of Dupleix, appreciating his character, sent him into the Deckan.

Acting in that extensive country with a force, which, before he obtained the cession of the northern circars, had only an uncertain and imperfect communication with the coast, he supported, for a series of years, the influence and interests of his country, in a manner which reflects the highest honour on his qualities as a man, and on his talents as a statesman. He thoroughly understood and held in respect the usages of the people among whom he was placed. He united a kindness and consideration for their errors and weaknesses with such a good faith and firmness of purpose in the prosecution of his own objects, as to extort respect even from those to whom he was opposed. This testimony to his character is not wholly taken from the page of history, though all writers agree in doing justice to his memory. The facts stated have been confirmed to the writer of these pages, by many who acted with and against Bussy, whose reputation, though now deservedly high in France, is not, even at this period, so great in that country as it continues to be with natives of the Deckan!

Clive, unless where their conduct compelled him to acts of severity, was kind and liberal in his treatment of French prisoners. This appears from a very voluminous correspondence[60], both official and private, with individuals of that nation; but the wanton outrages of Lally made him deem acts of retaliation indispensably necessary.

In several of his letters from Patna, Clive urged the committee at Calcutta to destroy the buildings at Chandernagore, and transmitted to them letters from Mr. Pigot and Mr. Vansittart, in proof of the wanton outrages committed by Lally at Madras, particularly in levelling with the ground the Company's country-house, and in having, without any object, destroyed the country-houses of several private gentlemen, and among others, that of Colonel Lawrence at St. Thomas's Mount. The Committee could not deny these facts, nor the right of retaliating such injuries; but, hesitating between the desire of attending to Clive, and their alarm at the future consequences of the measure pressed upon their adoption, they proposed to throw the odium of its execution upon the Nabob. Of this Clive wholly disapproved, stating, at the same time, his resolution, when he returned to Calcutta, to take the responsibility of this act exclusively upon himself.

"As to your proposal," he observes in a letter[61] from Patna, "of effecting it through the Nabob, I do not see what end it will answer. Our known interest with him is such, that it will never be questioned we were the advisers; and should an opportunity of retaliation ever offer, (the apprehension of which I presume suggested the proposal to you,) it will avail us little to attribute the fate of Chandernagore to the Nabob. If the French should hereafter have it in their power to destroy Calcutta, it will be matter of small moment whether they do it immediately themselves, or make use of a like evasion, and employ some of the country powers to effect it. So far from endeavouring to conceal our being the authors of the destruction of Chandernagore, we ought to make a merit of publishing it, as a laudable national revenge for the unfortunate treatment we have received from the French. The rules of war established among all civilised nations authorise and applaud reprisals in such cases. I shall, therefore, very readily on my return take the risk upon myself: and the more so, as (if I forget not) last year we received directions from our masters[62] to that purpose."

I shall proceed in the next chapter to detail events which occurred previously to Clive's leaving Calcutta. The material changes in those vested with authority at Madras took place before that period, except the resignation of Colonel Lawrence, who took the field on the siege of Fort St. George being raised, but finding that his age and infirmities disabled him from active service, retired to his native land, to enjoy that repose in private life, which he now required, and to which he was entitled by the active and able fulfilment, during more than twenty years, of the most arduous public duties.

Colonel Lawrence must ever stand high among those officers who have distinguished themselves in India. He neither was, nor pretended to be, a statesman, but he was an excellent officer. He possessed no dazzling qualities, and his acts never displayed that brilliancy which men admire as the accompaniment of genius; but he was, nevertheless, a rare and remarkable man. We trace in all his operations that sound practical knowledge of his profession, which, directed by a clear judgment and firm mind, secured to him an uninterrupted career of success, under circumstances of great difficulty and danger. As one of the chief causes of this success, we may notice the absence of that common but petty jealousy, which renders men afraid lest they should detract from their own fame by advancing that of others, and the influence of which is, consequently, most fatal to the rise of merit. Lawrence early discovered, and fully employed, the talents of those under his orders; and we find him on all occasions much more forward to proclaim their deeds than to blazon his own. To this quality, which is the truest test of a high and liberal spirit, England is principally indebted for all the benefit she has received from the services of Clive. It was the fostering care and the inspiring confidence of his commander that led to the early developement of those talents, which, by the opportunities afforded him, were matured at an age, when most men are only in the rudiments of their military education. Clive continued, through life, fully sensible of the magnitude of his obligations to Lawrence, towards whom he ever cherished the most affectionate gratitude.

When his venerated commander was on the point of retirement, with a very moderate fortune, Clive settled 500_l._ per annum on him during life.[63] "It gives me great pleasure," he observes to Lawrence on this occasion, "that I have an opportunity given me of showing my gratitude to the man to whom my reputation, and, of course, my fortune is owing." This liberal annuity must have added to the comfort of his old age; but its value was greatly enhanced by the warmth and delicacy of the sentiments which Clive expressed upon this occasion. These expressions of grateful obligation gave the retired veteran a right to associate his own fame with that of the successful pupil to whose progress to fortune and renown he had, by his early notice and encouragement, so greatly contributed.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 9

Footnote 1:

Vide Vol. I. p. 183.

Footnote 2:

The particulars of the storm of Boobilee are narrated, by Orme (vol.
ii. p. 254.), with the clearness and a feeling which do honoured to
that historian. Such scenes as are here described are but too common
in the history of India; where Hindus, of a high tribe, often take the
heroic, but barbarous, resolution of not leaving a living being for
their enemies to triumph over.

Footnote 3:

The other two remained concealed; but they were bound, by a vow, to
murder Vizeram Raz if the first attempt failed.

Footnote 4:

Rangarow, and his tribe, considered themselves of much higher race
than the Rajahs of Vizianagur; and their contempt of his family was
one cause of the inveteracy of Vizeram Raz.

Footnote 5:

"Bussy promised the English their property; and all they claimed as
such was resigned to them, without question or discussion."—Orme, vol.
ii. p. 263.

Footnote 6:

The father of Hyder Jung was governor of Masulipatam when Dupleix made
himself master of that important fortress, and is believed to have
betrayed his trust.

Footnote 7:

The small fortress of Dowlatabad stands at the distance of eight miles
to the north-west of Aurungabad. It is defended by walls and bastions:
but what renders it impregnable is the solid rock being scarped
perpendicular all round; and in no place is the scarp less than one
hundred and eighty feet. The entrance is by a long tunnel, in which
there are several traverses cut out of the rock. Shahnavaze Khan had
obtained possession of this fortress. The manner in which it was
seized by Bussy is minutely described by Orme, vol. ii. p. 345. Bussy
himself, attended by a number of officers and three hundred men, went
on the pretext of seeing the fort and paying a visit to the Killadar
(or Governor); and when the garrison were so stationed by the
Killadar, through respect for their guest, that they could make no
resistance, he was made a willing prisoner by the French general, and
such of his followers as made opposition expelled from the fort.

Footnote 8:

The rapidity of his flight was great: he is said to have reached
Burhampore in twenty-four hours. The distance is one hundred and fifty
miles.

Footnote 9:

A correspondence, between this petty prince and Clive, was opened
through the medium of an English merchant named Bristow.

Footnote 10:

Clive's answer to Nizam Ali Khan is dated 27th July, 1758.

Footnote 11:

17th September, 1758.

Footnote 12:

7th July, and 17th September.

Footnote 13:

Clive appears to have despatched treasure for this corps the moment he
learned that none was likely to be recovered either from Anunderauze
or the revenues of the country: but the activity of the French corps
of observation prevented, for some period, Colonel Forde from
receiving the benefit of this supply.

Footnote 14:

Native Christians, generally the descendants of Portuguese and Indian
parents; called Topasses, from their wearing hats (topees) like
Europeans, instead of turbans.

Footnote 15:

The killed and wounded were nearly one third of the whole; so that the
assailants, probably, hardly exceeded nine hundred, while the
prisoners were three thousand and thirty-seven. Arunderauze, with his
irregular native forces, was, indeed, at hand.

Footnote 16:

The troops in the ravelin, beyond the main gate, were kept at their
post by alarm at the false attack of the Rajah's troops, till the
assailants, who entered at the breach, shut the gate on them.

Footnote 17:

Orme, vol. iii. p. 489.

Footnote 18:

Letter received at Calcutta, 17th July, 1759.

Footnote 19:

Mr. Call, the chief engineer at Madras, writing to Clive, under date
the 11th October, 1758, observes, "I cannot but say you have added
much to your reputation by the detachment (Colonel Forde's) which you
have sent to our assistance on the coast. No sooner were your
apprehensions for the safety of Bengal somewhat lessened, than you
determined to support us."

Footnote 20:

Including prisoners, and the corps under Moracin, at least one
thousand Europeans, and nearly three thousand native troops, were
subtracted from Lally's force by the effects of Colonel Forde's
success.

Footnote 21:

26th August.

Footnote 22:

Captain Caillaud suffered two repulses before he succeeded in his
attack on Madura.

Footnote 23:

This party was commanded by Colonel Forde, then belonging to
Adlercron's regiment. The circumstances attending the repulse were
such as reflected no imputation on his character.

Footnote 24:

Neazballa.

Footnote 25:

Nazir Mahommed held Chittaput, and a small surrounding district, by a
sunnud, or grant, from the Subadar of the Deckan.

Footnote 26:

Mahommed Esoof was best known, in the early part of his career, by the
name of "the Nellore Commandant."

Footnote 27:

Vide Vol. I. p. 402.

Footnote 28:

The six colonels who signed this memorial were, D'Estaing, De
Landivisan, De la Fuère, Breteuil, Verdière, and Crillon. Their names
merit to be recorded. They belonged to the noblest families of their
country; and this act shows their patriotic feeling to have been as
honourable as their birth.

Footnote 29:

1st September, 1758.

Footnote 30:

Letter to Mr. Pigot, 14th August.

Footnote 31:

Ibid.

Footnote 32:

14th August.

Footnote 33:

Nazir Mahommed. I have before adverted to his gallant conduct: vide p.
26.

Footnote 34:

Colonel Lawrence.

Footnote 35:

Almost all communications between Madras and Bengal, at this period,
were by sea, which often occasioned a considerable interval between
the writing and despatch of a letter.

Footnote 36:

21st August, 1759.

Footnote 37:

Mr. Orme appears to have embarked for England about six months after
the date of this letter, but was obliged to leave the ship at the
Cape, being unable, from serious indisposition, to proceed further
until his strength was recruited.—(Letters from Mr. Vansittart to
Clive, 28th June, and 3d July, 1759.)

Footnote 38:

Letter to Sir G. Pocock, 14th August, 1759. A postscript is added to
this letter, of the 26th August; the same date as that to Mr. Orme.

Footnote 39:

This man's name was Gotica; he was uncle to the deposed King of
Tanjore, whom the English had supported in 1749.

Footnote 40:

Col. Kennedy was one of the hostages sent to Tanjore.

Footnote 41:

A breach had been made, but it was not deemed practicable. Two of the
principal French officers, General Saubinet and Count D'Estaing,
strongly advised a storm; deeming the breach, though imperfect, to be
assailable.

Footnote 42:

A considerable body, cavalry and infantry, of Tanjore troops, with
fifty Europeans, and one thousand English sepoys, were engaged in this
attack; which is chiefly remarkable for the attempt made upon the
person of the French General. A body of fifty horsemen advanced, at
daylight, to the French outposts: they inquired for Lally, saying they
wished to take service. They were conducted to the General, who, being
informed of their request, came out from a choultry to speak to them:
at this moment one of the Tanjore horsemen, supposed to be
intoxicated, fired his pistol into a tumbril, which, by its explosion,
gave a general alarm. The leader of the party, observing this, rode at
Lally, who, however, defended himself with a stick, and the man was
shot by an attendant, while the French guard succeeded in repelling a
charge made by his comrades.

Footnote 43:

Orme's History, and Clive's MSS.

Footnote 44:

A species of pulse upon which horses are fed in India.

Footnote 45:

The north-east monsoon commences, on the coast of Coromandel, in the
end of October; and military operations are difficult, and in some
parts almost impracticable, till towards the end of November.

Footnote 46:

Orme, vol. iii. p. 385.

Footnote 47:

Captain Preston's corps was from the garrison of Chingliput.

Footnote 48:

Orme, vol. iii. p. 453.

Footnote 49:

Mr. Vansittart, a member of the Council at Fort St. George, in a
private letter to Clive, dated 2d March, 1759, gives a general account
of Lally's operations, from which the following is an extract:—

"I am very glad," he observes, "to begin with acquainting you
that the siege of Madras is raised. Certainly it was an undertaking
too great for M. Lally's force, and it was undoubtedly a want of
men that obliged him to confine his approaches to so narrow a
front. I will send you a plan of them as soon as I can find one of
our engineers at leisure. The trenches are the weakest that ever
were seen, and yet they pushed them up close under our nose. Three
or four times small detachments sallied, and took possession of the
head of their sap almost without resistance. Our people retired
after destroying a little of the work, and then the enemy returned
and worked on. Their grand battery, the first that they opened,
tore our works a good deal, but our men were active, and got them
repaired in the night. This continued for a few days, but our fire
was not decreased. The enemy then lost all patience, and advanced
with all our defences in good order; when they got to the foot of
the glacis, they erected a battery against the east face of the
north ravelin, but they could never stand there for an hour
together, as we had a heavy fire both on their flank and front. In
three or four days they abandoned that, but still kept pushing on
their sap, and presently got up to the crest of the glacis, where
they erected another battery close to the north-east angle of the
covered way. This cost them very dear, and they well deserved to
suffer; for all our defences were yet perfect, nay, we had more
guns than we had at first.

"For six mornings running they opened this battery at daybreak, and
were obliged in an hour or two to shut up their embrasures. Their
loss there must have been very great; for it was raked from one end
to the other by the flank of the royal bastion, had a front fire
from the north-east bastion, and was overlooked by the demi-bastion
so with musketry, that it was absolutely impossible for a man to
live. At the end of six days they gave it up, and at the same time,
I believe, gave up all hopes of success. It is true they had opened
a narrow passage through the counterscarp of the ditch by a mine,
and had beat down so much clay from the face of the demi-bastion,
that there was a slope which a nimble man might run up, and that is
what M. Lally calls a breach; but his people were wiser than he, if
he proposed to assault it, and they refused. That letter of M.
Lally's is a most curious piece. I am glad it was intercepted, that
he may not say the arrival of the ships obliged him to raise the
siege, and that the officers and men of the garrison may have the
honour they deserve. Their duty was really severe, and what was yet
worse, they had not a safe place to rest in when off duty; for
there is not a bomb-proof lodgement in garrison, except the grand
magazine, and the casemates under the Nabob's bastion, where the
sick and wounded lay. Nevertheless there was a universal
cheerfulness from the beginning to the end; and (what M. Lally so
much expected) a capitulation never entered, I believe, into the
head of any one man in the garrison.

"The enemy retired by the way of Poonamallee, and, by our last
advices, were at Arcot. Our army is just now moving after them. We
had a difficulty to get coolies and bullocks for a camp, by which
many days have been lost. A large body of Mahrattas are upon the
borders of the province: we have made them handsome offers. If they
join us, it will be difficult for the French army to get to
Pondicherry, or if they only stand neuter, Colonel Lawrence will
have no objection to a trial of skill with the Lieutenant-general.

"I should not forget to mention that your old friend the Nellow
Subhadar was of great service during the siege. He brought a large
body of country horse and sepoys from Tanjore and Trichinopoly; and
being joined by Captain Preston with about fifty Europeans from
Chingleput, and afterwards by Major Caillaud, they occasioned a
powerful diversion. The French were obliged four times to send out
considerable detachments; but our people always kept their post,
till a scarcity of provisions forced them to move further off. The
enemy, however, lost many men in these different actions, besides
the hinderance it gave to their work."

Footnote 50:

Mr. Vansittart, in his letter to Clive of the 2d March, 1759 (quoted in the last note), observes, "I believe I shall be obliged to apply to you to lay hands upon some of the Chandernagore ladies, in order to exchange against Mrs. Morse, Mrs. Vansittart, and some others, whom we sent away in a boat for Sadras, just at the time that M. Lally borrowed that settlement from the Dutch. They were received by the French officer, and told they were prisoners. They have been kept there ever since; and two days after the siege was raised I wrote to M. Lally, desiring he would let me know his resolutions concerning my family: he sent back the peon without an answer; nor have I got one yet. All this I could excuse if they had but been treated with politeness; but it has been far otherwise, as you will see by a letter I lately received from Mrs. Vansittart, and which I send enclosed. I beg you will let Carnac explain it to the French ladies at Bengal, that they may see, with thankfulness, the different usage they have met with."

Footnote 51:

Mr. Sulivan was Chairman of the Court of Directors.

Footnote 52:

21st February, 1759.

Footnote 53:

6th September, 1759.

Footnote 54:

This advice, as appears from Mr. Vansittart's letter, (note, p. 50.) was adopted.

Footnote 55:

"Your defence of Madras," Clive observes, in a letter to Mr. Pigot of the 21st August, 1759, "and your foiling a man of Lally's rank, will certainly gain you much honour at home; but what affords me most pleasure is, the principal part you have acted in this famous siege. I always said my friend would shine whenever an opportunity offered, by what I saw of his behaviour, some years ago, near Verdiachelum woods."

Footnote 56:

Pondicherry surrendered to Colonel Coote in January, 1761. It had been blockaded four months before the active operations of the siege, and there were only two days' provisions for the fighting men when it surrendered. The gallant regiments of Lorraine and Lally were reduced to a small number, and these worn out with famine, disease, and fatigue.—(Orme, vol. iii. p. 722.)

Footnote 57:

Mr. Orme justly remarks, that "if abuse of authority, vexations, and exactions, are not capital in the jurisprudence of France, they ought not to have been inserted, as efficacious, in the sentence of death." The same author informs us that Lally was charged with treason, which deprived him of the aid of counsel. Among other crimes, this unhappy commander was accused of selling Pondicherry to the English; and was believed (so credulous is national vanity) to have betrayed the interests of his country to promote those of a nation that he hated, and whom he treated (on all occasions when he had the power) with a severity hardly consistent with the usage of civilised nations. The haughty spirit of the veteran was unbroken by the persecution of his enemies. His conduct throughout his protracted trial was collected, but proud and indignant. When he heard his sentence he threw up his hands to heaven, and exclaimed, "Is this the reward of forty-five years' service?" and snatching a pair of compasses, which lay with maps on his table, struck it to his breast; but it did not pierce to his heart: he then gave loose to every execration against his judges and accusers. His scaffold was prepared, and his execution appointed for the same afternoon. To prevent him from speaking to the spectators a large gag was put into his mouth before he was taken out of prison, whence he was carried in a common cart, and beheaded on the Grève. He perished in the sixty-fifth year of his age.—(Orme, vol. iii. p. 736.)

Footnote 58:

Voltaire.

Footnote 59:

So high did M. Bussy stand in the public opinion, that when the Nabob Mohammed Ali wrote Mr. Pigot, the governor of Madras, congratulating him on the recent victory, he added, that M. Bussy's being taken prisoner was of itself equal to any victory, and at the same time suggested the propriety of his being sent to him, when he would take good care of him!

Mohammed Ali even then, after some years' acquaintance with the English, was astonished that M. Bussy was allowed to go on his parole to Pondicherry; and as much afterwards, when he heard how well he was received at Madras by every body there, before his departure for Europe. D. H.

Footnote 60:

The letters of Clive's agents, also, mention many sums which he appears to have given and sent to French officers. Mr. Vansittart, writing from Madras, notices several individuals who have received considerable aid (two captains one thousand rupees each); stating that they are grateful, and have every disposition to repay Clive, but no ability; and that he will lose his money.

Footnote 61:

27th May, 1759.

Footnote 62:

The instructions from the Court of France to Lally had been intercepted, in which he was directed to destroy such of the British settlements as fell into his power: in consequence of which the Court of Directors gave orders to retaliate the same measures upon the French settlements.—(Orme, vol. iii. p. 726.)

Footnote 63:

Extract from Clive's letter to his agents in England, 25th December, 1758:—"Having granted Stringer Lawrence, Esq., an annuity of 500_l._ per annum during the term of his natural life, I desire you will pay the same yearly to him or his order."

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CHAP. X.

While Clive was exulting at the advantages gained over the French in the Deckan and at Madras, and congratulating himself on the success which had attended his personal efforts in Bengal, a new and alarming danger arose, from a quarter altogether unexpected. Accounts had been received that the Dutch were preparing a strong armament in Batavia: and it was further added, that its destination was Bengal. To this report Clive at first refused his belief. Mr. Hastings[64] had written him, that the Nabob was led from several reasons to suspect that the Dutch were in league with the Sovereign of Oude, and that the armament at Batavia was meant to strengthen their factory at Chinsura; but Clive, in his answer to this letter, did not give credit to the surmise. "Although it will be necessary," he states[65], "to be upon our guard against the Dutch, yet I have reason to think that the armament fitted out at Batavia is only intended to garrison their settlements in Ceylon. Some intelligence lately received confirms me in this opinion."

It was not easy for Clive, or for any person, to foresee such a course of measures as the Dutch Government in India adopted at this period of profound peace between the two nations in Europe. I shall, before narrating what occurred, take a short review of the conduct of those in charge of their factory at Chinsura, from the capture of Calcutta till the period at which we are arrived.

The Dutch at Chinsura had, like others, suffered from Suraj-u-Dowlah, who had compelled them to pay a fine of five lacs of rupees. This and other oppressive acts made them rejoice at his downfall, and they addressed to Clive a letter[66] of congratulation on his success in dethroning that prince. Nevertheless, they did not recognise Meer Jaffier as Subah of Bengal; and the consequence was, so hostile a feeling towards them in the mind of that prince, that it required the continual good offices[67] of Clive to preserve terms betwixt them. This was not easy; for their not recognising him was a cause of just and frequent irritation to Meer Jaffier. Clive notices the subject in a letter[68] to the Dutch Governor, written in answer to one full of complaints.

"I am well acquainted," he observes, "with your attachment to the English, and the service you have at all times been ready to show them; but give me leave to observe, Sir, that good offices have always been reciprocal between the two nations: and, indeed, this is no more than we mutually owe each other, considering the close alliance and union of interests that have so long subsisted between us. It gives me, therefore, much concern that you should do me the injustice to reproach me with being in any shape accessory to the obstruction which the Subah has thought proper to lay upon your trade. I have, indeed, heard him make frequent complaints of the ill behaviour of your government towards him; and was really much amazed at his patience, in putting up so long with indignities which you would not have ventured to offer either to Mohabit Jung[69] or Suraj-u-Dowlah. I shall not pretend to inquire into your reasons for not acknowledging Meer Jaffier, in the same manner as the preceding Subahs have always been, more especially as you cannot be ignorant that he has received his sunnud from the Mogul; but, for my own part, I cannot conceive how you and your Council will be able to exculpate yourselves to your superiors for the present stoppage of their trade, since it appears evident to me that you have brought it upon yourselves, by your disrespect to a person of his high station."

The act which gave rise to stopping the trade was one of public disrespect to the Nabob, to whom the Dutch factory did not even pay the compliment of a salute, when he passed Chinsura on his way to Calcutta. The mode in which he resented this insult had its full effect. The Governor and Council of Chinsura made a very humble apology, which was accepted, and the prohibition on their commerce removed.

The chief complaints of the Dutch against the English were, the latter having the monopoly of saltpetre at Patna, and their insisting that Dutch vessels, coming into the river, should take English pilots. To the first it was answered, that saltpetre had always been a monopoly, and that, since the English obtained it, the Dutch had even bought the article cheaper[70] than they had ever done before. With regard to the insisting upon no pilot being employed in the river but English, it was stated to be a measure forced on the Committee of Calcutta, by considerations of their own safety; and that, until the danger was over, they could not allow those of any other nation to be employed. These facts should have been satisfactory to the Dutch, could the Superior Government at Batavia have been contented to abandon, without a struggle, to another European power the political pre-eminence in India: calculating, however, upon the encouragement given them at the court of Moorshedabad, previous to the expedition to Patna, they determined to make a bold effort to establish such a force at Chinsura as might enable them to balance the predominating power of the English in Bengal. I find among Clive's papers an account[71] of this transaction; and as it exhibits, in a very clear manner, the progress of this serious difference between the two nations, from its commencement to its conclusion, I shall insert it at length. It is entitled "A Narrative of the Disputes with the Dutch in Bengal," and is as follows:—

"About the month of November, 1758, a prevailing party at the Nabob Jaffier Aly Khan's Durbar, headed by Meeran his son, had prejudiced him to look with an evil and jealous eye on the power and influence of the English in the provinces, and taught him to think and look upon himself as a cipher, bearing the name of Subah only. From subsequent concurring circumstances, it must have been at that period, and from this cause, that, we imagine, a private negotiation was set on foot between the Nabob and the Dutch, that the latter should bring a military force into the provinces to join the former, and balance our power and sway. The Dutch, stimulated by envy at our very advantageous situation, and a sense of their own very small importance, readily embraced the overture, and hoped another Plassey affair for themselves.

Actuated by these golden dreams, and encouraged by the absence of our troops on the Golconda expedition, the Director and his Council at Chinsura forwarded remonstrances to Batavia, for this purpose, where, by the event, it appears they had the intended effect. Subsequent to this private negotiation was the advance of the Shah-Zada, and Governor Clive's march to Patna in support of the Nabob and his Government, which perfectly convinced him and his son of our faithfulness, affection, and attachment, and struck an iniquitous party at the Durbar dumb, who were ever insinuating to them that the English were aiming to be Subahs of the country in breach of their treaty.

"Early in August we received advice that a powerful armament was fitting out and embarking at Batavia, its destination not perfectly known, but rumoured to be for Bengal. The Governor sent early notice of this to Meer Jaffier, who immediately sent a Purwannah to the Dutch Governor, a copy of which he forwarded to Governor Clive, demanding withal, by virtue of the treaty subsisting with the English, that he should join his forces to oppose and prevent any foreign troops being brought into his country.

"About this time a Dutch ship arrived in the river with European troops and buggoses, of which the Governor advised the Nabob, who was much embarrassed at the news; he, however, despatched a second Purwannah to the Dutch, and ordered Omarbeg Khan Fouzdaar of Hooghley, immediately to join the Governor with a body of troops, and repeated his demand of our assistance, to prevent the Dutch troops or ships advancing up the river. To the Nabob's first Purwannah, the Dutch sent a reply and solemn promise of obedience to his orders; to the second, they as solemnly assured him, the ship which was arrived came in by accident for water and provisions; that she was drove from her destined port of Nagapatam by stress of weather, and that she and her troops should leave the river as soon as they were supplied.

"Notwithstanding these solemn assurances from the Dutch, it was judged expedient to send a detachment of troops, joined with one of the Subah's, under the command of the Fouzdaar's officer, to take possession of Tanna Fort and Charnoc's Battery opposite to it, with orders to stop and search all boats and vessels that passed, without giving them further molestation; and parties were likewise sent out on each side of the river to prevent any foreign troops advancing by land. In consequence of these orders, every Dutch boat and budgerow was brought to, and those that had no troops suffered to pass; amongst others, Mynheer Suydland, the Dutch master-attendant, not only refused for sometime being either brought to or searched, but struck the commanding officer at Charnoc's Battery. Himself and another Dutch gentleman with him were made prisoners for a few hours, until an order from the Governor went down for releasing them and the budgerow, on board of which were found concealed eighteen buggoses, which were conducted down under a guard by land, until within sight of their ship at Fulta, and released. On these transactions, we received very long remonstrances from the gentlemen at Chinsura, to which we replied, that, as principals, we had, by the custom and laws of nations, a right to search all vessels whatever, advancing up this river, not knowing but they might introduce French troops into the country; and that as auxiliaries to the Mogul, we were under a necessity, by solemn treaty, to join his Viceroy in opposing the introduction of any European or foreign troops whatever into Bengal; and that we should absolutely and religiously do our duty to the utmost of our strength and power in both capacities.

"Early in October, Jaffier Ally Khan arrived here on a visit to the Governor. During his stay with us, advice came from below, of the arrival of six or seven more Dutch capital ships, crammed with soldiers and buggoses. Now the Dutch mask fell off, and the Nabob (conscious of having given his assent to their coming, and at the same time of our attachment and his own unfaithful dealings with us,) was greatly confused and disconcerted. He, however, seemed to make light of it; told the Governor he was going to reside three or four days at his Fort of Hooghley, where he would chastise the insolence and disobedience of the Dutch, and drive them soon out of the river again.

"On the 19th of October he left Calcutta; and in place of his going to his Fort at Hooghley, he took up his residence at Cajah Wazeed's garden, about half way between that and Chinsura; a plain indication that he had no apprehensions from the Dutch, whom he received there in the most gracious manner he could, more like friends and allies than as enemies to him and his country. In three or four days after his departure from Calcutta, the Governor received a letter from him, wherein he informed him of 'some indulgence he had granted the Dutch in their trade, and that they had engaged to leave the river with their ships and troops as soon as the season would permit.' The season permitting their immediate departure with the greatest safety and propriety, the last condition in the Nabob's letter, joined to his whole behaviour, convinced us, that leaving the river was no part of their intention, but that, on the contrary, they had his assent to bring up their troops if they could; which Colonel Clive was determined they should not, as the Nabob had not withdrawn his orders to oppose them, and in this he was heartily joined by his Council. Ruin to the Company, if not to the country, must have been the inevitable consequences of their junction with the troops they had in garrison at Chinsura; which once accomplished, would have been beyond all doubt attended with a declaration from the Government in their favour, and as probably a union between them, which must have ended in our destruction. A very few days justified our suspicions and resolutions; for in place of the Dutch leaving the river, we received certain intelligence of their moving up, and that they were enlisting troops under every denomination, at Chinsura, Cossimbazar, and Patna, and this plainly with connivance of the Nabob.