Chapter XXXIII: Appendix: NOTE M: Page 194

[From the Official Report of General Carter.]

A movement of troops into East Tennessee was proposed as early as November 25, 1862, but was not ordered until December 19, when arrangements for it had been completed. It was hoped that the force to be sent on this hazardous but important expedition, would have been much larger than that which the Commander of the Department felt could be detached for that service when the time to enter upon it arrived.

The original design was to divide the force into two columns, and strike the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad at two points at the same time, distant 100 miles apart, and by moving towards the centre, destroy the road for that distance.

A junction of the forces (consisting of two battalions 2nd Michigan Cavalry, Lieut. Col. Campbell; the 9th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Major Russell; and one battalion 7th Ohio Cavalry. Major Raimey) was made near the mouth of Goose Creek, Clay County, Kentucky. As ordered by Gen. Burnside, Col. Charles J. Walker of the 10th Kentucky Cavalry was placed in command of the cavalry brigade.

The troops were ordered to move without baggage, with ten days rations, and 100 rounds of ammunition; but as it was feared some difficulty would be met with in obtaining forage, a supply train was ordered to proceed some 60 miles on the route and then transfer forage and rations to a train of pack mules. On the 22nd December Gen. Carter, who left Lexington on the 20th, came up with the two battalions of the 2nd Michigan and the 9th Pennsylvania at McKee, Jackson county, Kentucky, and after one day’s necessary detention, they effected a junction on the 26th with the remainder of the troops, (1st Battalion of 7th Ohio Cavalry) at Heard’s on Goose Creek. The whole force amounted only to about 1,980 men, and of that number a considerable portion were in the field for the first time.

The marches, owing to the roughness and narrowness of the roads, (being merely bridle paths along the banks of creeks and over steep and rugged mountains) were of necessity slow and tedious, and their length had to be governed by the distance to the several points at which forage could be obtained. It was not until about meridian of the 28th, that they reached the foot of the Cumberland mountain (on the north side,) opposite “Crank’s Gap,” 12 miles to the southward and eastward of Harlan Court House. The pack train was sent back in charge of a detachment of the Kentucky State Guard.

A little before sunset they reached the summit of the Cumberland mountain, and had the field of their operations, with its mountains and vallies spread out before them. Gen. Carter then consulted with the officers of his command, and it was the unanimous opinion that the force was entirely too small to venture on a division according to the original plan. This decision seemed to be the more necessary from the news they had received through East Tennessee refugees at the foot of the mountain, relative to the disposition of the rebel forces along the line of the railroad.

Soon after dark, the advance commenced the descent of the mountain, hoping to make a long march before sunrise, but owing to the steepness, narrowness and roughness of the way, the rear of the column did not reach the foot of the mountain, until 10 p. m., having consumed four hours on the way. Gen. Carter was told there were 400 rebel cavalry in the vicinity of Jonesville one mile distant. As it was important to move through Lee County, Virginia, without exciting suspicion, he moved down Cane Creek, and passing through a Gap in Poor Valley ridge, crossed Powell’s Valley about five miles east of Jonesville. On leaving the valley road, his guides were at fault and valuable time was lost in finding the way. The march was continued through the night and at daylight the troops reached the top of Wallen’s Ridge, 22 miles distant from the foot of Cumberland Mountain, and halted. Thus far they had advanced without giving any alarm, or even exciting any suspicion as to their character. The village of Shelbyville lay immediately below, and but for the imprudence of an officer in allowing the men to visit the village, they could have passed on as rebel cavalry. A number of rebel soldiers belonging to Trigg’s battalion were within Carter’s lines, supposing they were among friends and were captured.

In a short time the U. S. troops were again in the saddle,--passed through Stickleyville, across Powell’s Mountain, and through Pattonsville. Before sunset, they crossed Clinch River 12 miles from Estillville, Scott County, Virginia, and halted for a couple of hours. News of their approach had gone before them, but few of the rebels were disposed to credit it, believing it impossible that a Government force would venture so far within their territory. Upon arriving at Estillville at 10 P. M., they were told that a considerable rebel force was in possession of “Moccasin Gap,” prepared to resist their passage. Gen. Carter could not afford to lose time. The Michigan Battalions were dismounted, and under Lieut. Colonel Campbell, a portion was deployed and moved through the Gap. Being unacquainted with the ground, and having to guard against an ambuscade in this strong pass,--which could have been held by a strong force against greatly superior numbers--they advanced with great caution. It was midnight before the rear of the column had passed through. The enemy, deterred by this resolute advance, fled towards Kingsport, East Tennessee, without firing a gun. A rebel Lieutenant and several soldiers with their arms, were captured on the south side of the Gap, on the Blountville road. During the remainder of the night the men moved forward as rapidly as was practicable over unknown roads,--picking up rebel soldiers by the way. Owing to the darkness of the night, a portion of the command lost their way and became separated from the main body. A small force of the enemy’s cavalry, hovering about the rear, killed a Sergeant of the 2nd Michigan, and captured two others who had wandered from the road. At daylight on the morning of 30th December, the troops reached the town of Blountville, Sullivan County, East Tennessee, surprised and took possession of the place, captured some 30 soldiers belonging to the 4th Kentucky Rebel Cavalry and paroled them. They were there informed that at Bristol, some eight miles distant, there was a large amount of stores, besides the meat of a considerable number of hogs, belonging to the Rebel authorities, but as the place was guarded, according to the best information obtained, by a regiment of Infantry under Colonel Slimp, (said to be 900 strong,) a Cavalry force under Colonel Gettner and a battery, they were reluctantly compelled to leave it on their left, and move towards the railroad bridge at Union, six miles from Blountville. The General sent forward Lieut. Colonel Campbell, with a portion of the 2nd Michigan under the direction of Col. Jas. P. T. Carter of 2nd East Tennessee Infantry, towards Union, with orders to take the place and destroy the railroad bridge across the Holston river. As soon as the remainder of the troops which had been separated during the night, came up, he moved them rapidly forward in the same direction. When he reached Union, he found the town in the possession of his men, and the railroad bridge, a pine structure some 600 feet in length, slowly burning. The rebel force, about 150 strong, consisting of two companies of the 62nd North Carolina troops under command of Major McDowell, had surrendered without resistance; the Major himself having been first captured by the advance of the U. S. troops while endeavoring to learn if there was any truth in the report of their approach. The prisoners were paroled, and a large number of them were that afternoon on their way to the mountains of North Carolina, swearing they would never be exchanged. Their joy at being captured seemed to be unbounded.

The stores, barracks, tents, a large number of arms and equipments, a considerable amount of nitre, a railroad car, the depot, &c., &c., were destroyed; also a wagon bridge across the river, a few hundred yards below the railroad bridge. As soon as the work of destruction was fairly under way. Gen. Carter dispatched Colonel Walker with detachments from the 2nd Michigan, 9th Pennsylvania and 7th Ohio Cavalry,--in all 180 men, the whole under the guidance of Col. Carter,--towards the Watauga bridge at Carter Depot, 10 miles west of Union. On their way they captured a locomotive and tender, with Col. Love of the 62nd North Carolina troops, who having heard of the approach of the “Yankees,” had started on the locomotive to Union, to ascertain the truth of the rumor. On the detachments reaching the Station about sunset, they found the enemy, consisting of two companies of North Carolina troops, estimated by Colonel Walker at nearly 200 men, falling into line. Col. Walker gallantly attacked them and after a brief but warm resistance, they broke and fled to the woods. The gallant Major Roper of the 6th Kentucky Cavalry, with two Companies of the 9th Pennsylvania Cavalry under Capt. Jones of that Regiment, made a dashing charge and captured and destroyed many of their number. Maj. Roper’s loss was 1 killed, 1 mortally, 1 severely and 2 slightly wounded. The entire loss of the enemy, owing to the darkness of the night, could not be learned with certainty, but it was in killed, 12 to 16. The railroad bridge across the Watauga River, some 300 feet in length, was soon in flames and entirely destroyed; also a large number of arms and valuable stores. The captured locomotive was run into the river and completely demolished, destroying in its passage one of the piers of the bridge.

The men and horses, especially the latter, were much worn and jaded from constant travel and want of rest. The alarm had been given. The rebels had the road open to Knoxville and could move up a strong force. The General also learned that some 500 cavalry and 4 guns, under Col. Folks, were within three miles; that an Infantry force would be concentrated at Johnson’s depot, six miles west of Carter’s station by daylight; and further, that Humphrey Marshall, who was at Abingdon, Virginia, was moving his troops to occupy the mountains and thus cut off his egress. It was deemed prudent therefore to return. The command left Watauga, and after a hard march, reached Kingsport at the mouth of the North Fork of the Holston River at sunset on the 31st of December. After feeding and resting a short time and issuing meat to the men, they were again in the saddle, passed eight miles north of Rogersville, and reached Looney’s Gap on Clinch Mountain late in the afternoon, passed through without opposition, and about 11 P. M., January 1st, reached a place on the edge of Hancock County, Tennessee, where forage could be procured, and bivouaced for the night. This was the first night’s rest the men had been able to take since the night of the 27th ult. They had been annoyed during the day and night by bushwhackers, but Providentially escaped with only two men slightly wounded.

Soon after daylight on the morning of the 2d inst., the command proceeded towards Jonesville, Lee County, Virginia, with the intention of reaching the foot of Cumberland Mountain on the Kentucky side before halting. Its march was much impeded during the day by bushwhackers, who constantly annoyed the front and rear. Just before reaching Jonesville, they endeavored to check Gen. Carter by occupying the hills in his front with two companies, (supposed to be Larimore’s and Staley’s); but they were soon driven from their strong position by the skirmishers of the 2d Michigan. The command reached Jonesville late in the afternoon; but before its rear guard had passed, it was attacked by about 200 rebels. Col. Walker took charge of the rear guard, reinforced by two light companies and drove the assailants back to the woods. Several of their number were killed,--one in the village of Jonesville and some twenty were captured during the day, without suffering any loss. From prisoners the General learned that the passes in Powell’s and Clinch mountains, through which he marched in going to Union, had been blockaded and were occupied by three or four companies of infantry. He reached the foot of Cumberland Mountain, passing through “Crank’s Gap,” at 11 P. M., and bivouaced;--men and horses completely jaded and worn, having been in the last five days and seventeen hours, but thirty hours out of the saddle.

On the 5th inst., the command reached Manchester, Clay County, Kentucky, and rested on the following day.

Gen. Carter says in conclusion, that “notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather, the severity of the march and the scanty supply of rations, for no inconsiderable portion of the time; both officers and men bore their hardships without a single murmur or word of complaint. They returned after a journey of 470 miles, 170 of which were in the enemy’s country, in high spirits and in good condition, proud to think they had accomplished a feat which for hazard and hardship has no parallel in the history of the war.”