Chapter XXXVII: Appendix: NOTE R: Page 227

[Gen. Longstreet, concerning the military situation in East Tennessee, Nov., 1863.]

Whether or not the movement of Longstreet against Burnside originated with Mr. Jefferson Davis, as Gen. Grant was informed, it appears from the following letter published in 1871,[64] that Gen. Longstreet was dissatisfied with the way in which Gen. Bragg had ordered things and was conducting operations in front of Chattanooga; that he attributed the idea of his own expedition to Bragg’s mind; that he thought it was the least favorable of opportunities for relief to the situation, but that having heard of it, he had proposed, without avail, a plan to make the movement greatly advantageous. Gen. Grant in his Memoirs, puts the force with which Longstreet left Chattanooga “to go against Burnside” at about 15,000 troops besides Wheeler’s Cavalry, 5,000 more.

Extract from a letter written by Gen. Longstreet, dated July 12th, 1871:

“I have just concluded to send you a copy of a letter written by me just on the point of mounting my horse to start upon the East Tennessee campaign. It was written after my tent was struck, sitting in the rain, (a light drizzle) from the head of an empty flour barrel; but I think that, concise and hurriedly as it was written, it plainly indicated that I understood what Grant’s campaign would be; that is, I understood the conditions and situations of the two armies well enough to know what Grant _should_ do, and it is always safe to assume, with such a man, that he will do what he should do. Seeing the letter that I send a copy of, amongst my papers that I was overlooking. I determined to send it, in order that you might be assured of our force and of my appreciation of the campaign when it was projected by General Bragg:”

HEADQUARTERS, CHATTANOOGA, Nov. 5, 1863.

S. B. BUCKNER, MAJOR GENERAL.

MY DEAR GENERAL--I start to-day for Tyner’s Station, and expect
to get transportation to-morrow for Sweetwater. The weather is so
bad, and I find myself so occupied that I shall not be able to
see you to say good-bye.

When I heard the report around camp, that I was to go into East
Tennessee, I set to work at once to try and plan the means of
making the move with security, and the hope of great results.

As every other move had been proposed to the General and
rejected, or put off till time made them more inconvenient, I
came to the conclusion as soon as the report reached me, that
this was to be the fate of our army; to await till all good
opportunities had passed, and then, in desperation, to seize upon
the least favorable one.

As no one had proposed this East Tennessee campaign to the
General, I thought it possible that we might accomplish something
by encouraging his own move, and (I) proposed the following
plan, viz: To withdraw from our present lines, and the forces
now in East Tennessee: the latter to be done in order to give
the impression to the enemy that we were retiring from East
Tennessee, and concentrating here for battle or for some
other movement, and place our army in a strong (concentrated)
position. The moment the army was together, make a detachment
of 20,000 to move rapidly against Burnside and destroy him; and
by continued rapid movements, to threaten the enemy’s rear and
his communications to the extent that might be necessary to draw
him out from his present position. This, at least, is a tedious
process, but I thought it gave promise of some results, and was
therefore better than lying here destroying ourselves.

The move, as I proposed it, would have left this army (Bragg’s)
in a strong position and safe, and would have made sure the
capture of Burnside. That is, the army here could spare 20,000 if
it were in the position that I proposed, better than it can spare
12,000, occupying the lines that it now does. Twenty thousand
men well handled could surely have captured Burnside and forces.
Under present arrangements, however, the lines are to be held as
they now are, and the detachment is to be of say, 12,000. We thus
expose both to failure, and really take no chance to ourselves
of great results. The only notice my plan received was a remark
that General Hardee was pleased to make: ‘I don’t think that
that is a bad idea of Longstreet’s.’ I undertook to explain the
danger of having such a long line under the fire of the enemy’s
batteries, and he concentrated, as it were, right in our midst,
and within twenty minutes march of any portion of our line.
But I was assured that he would not disturb us. I repeated my
ideas, but they did not even receive notice. ’Twas not till I had
repeated my plan, however, that Gen. Hardee even noticed me.

Have you any maps that you can give or lend me? I shall need
every thing of the kind. Do you know any reliable people living
near and east of Knoxville, from whom I might get information of
the condition, strength, &c., of the enemy. I have written in
such hurry and confusion of packing and striking camp, that I
doubt if I have made myself understood.

I remain very sincerely your friend,
(Signed) J. LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant General.