Chapter II (2)

“Bishop Simpson, in referring to this incident, said that ‘the
Almighty had interposed to prevent Captain Ericsson from succeeding
there, so that he might become disgusted with England and shake the
dust of that country from his feet and depart for America, in order
that he might be here ready to save the country.’

“In using the words ‘in saving the country,’ Bishop Simpson looked
on the fight between the ‘Monitor’ and the ‘Merrimac’ as a great
many other people did; that is to say, if the ‘Merrimac’ had
escaped, she would have bombarded Philadelphia and New York and
other cities of the North, thereby compelling the government to
submit to the South. But the ‘Monitor’ having destroyed her before
she got out, John Ericsson was therefore entitled to all the credit
due to a person who had been specially delegated by the Almighty for
saving the country. John Ericsson had already become famous on
account of conspicuous efforts in promoting screw propulsion in the
United States generally, and particularly with reference to the use
in war-ship construction. In view of his unceasing labors in this
direction his name had become inseparably associated with the screw
propeller. This added much to the enthusiasm that prevailed at that
time, and all minor considerations being overlooked. It was
discovered a very short time after the war was ended that, even if
the ‘Merrimac’ could have escaped at that time from her encounters
with the ‘Cumberland,’ ‘Congress,’ and ‘Monitor,’ it would have been
impossible for her to go as far north as Philadelphia or New York.
It was found that she was in a very badly crippled state as a result
of her ramming the ‘Cumberland’ and ‘Congress;’ and the statement
was made by those who temporarily repaired her in Norfolk that her
bow was split to a great distance below the water.

“To use the words of one of the workmen, he had ‘put more than a
bale of oakum in the opening.’

“The construction of the ‘New Ironsides,’ ‘Monitor,’ and ‘Galena’
had already been practically taken out of the hands of the
Construction Department of the Navy by the Secretary of the Navy,
who became a convert to the monitor craze after the battle with the
‘Merrimac.’ The ‘Monitor’ had become the ideal type of armored
war-ship, and a sort of sub-department of the navy was created and
located at New York for the sole purpose of building and fitting out
monitors.

“This establishment in New York was placed under the immediate
supervision of Admiral Gregory, the active head being Chief Engineer
A. G. Stimers, who had been the chief engineer of the ‘Monitor’
during her engagement with the ‘Merrimac.’ He had associated with
him Isaac Newton and Theodore Allen, the nephew of Mr. Allen of the
Novelty Works in New York. This board was in direct communication
with the Secretary of the Navy.

“The monitor party, which may be described as the executive of the
ring or the New York section of the Navy Department, soon assumed a
position of great power and responsibility; the balance of the
Department amounting to practically mere nothing in the way of new
construction.

“Mr. Stimers and Mr. Allen were autocrats. They spent money
lavishly, ordered vessels, designed them, made contracts,
sub-contracts, made purchases, and carried everything with a high
hand.

“Mr. Lenthall, the Chief Constructor of the Navy, and Mr. Isherwood,
who was on his staff as engineer, were entirely set aside, and
practically disappeared from the scene as far as new constructions
were concerned.

“A large number of monitors were built, slightly improved in
structural detail over the original, and were engaged as soon as
finished in the operations before Charleston.

“The head-quarters in New York was often called the ‘draughtsmen’s
paradise,’ on account of the great number of draughtsmen employed
there, and who were getting twenty dollars a day. The most
extraordinary displays of drawings were issued to the various
machine-shops which were building monitors at that time. They were
particularly noticeable on account of the extravagant character of
the shading of the circular form of the turrets, smoke-stacks,
conning-towers, etc.

“The inspectors of construction that were employed by the New York
party emulated their superiors in carrying things with a high hand
at the various concerns where they inspected the vessels.

“Up to that time our concern had not built any monitors. We were not
in what was called the ‘Monitor Ring,’ not having indorsed the type
nor manner of construction, besides being the authors of the ‘New
Ironsides’ type, which the ring had determined to suppress.

“Immediately after the ‘New Ironsides’ had been engaged in a small
way in the first fight at Charleston, we recommended that the
government should build other vessels like her, but with twin screws
and with other improvements.

“By request of Assistant Secretary Fox, we prepared plans of the
proposed ships, some all iron, and others of iron and wood in the
construction of the hull; but the Department in Washington refused
to listen to or recommend anything. The New York section continued
to be paramount, and we were ruled out of naval construction for a
time.”

LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.

“The next development of the craze was that of the so-called
‘Light-draught Monitors.’ These were intended to operate in
Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds and various other shallow waters in the
South. Twenty of them were authorized, and we responded to the
advertisement of them by bidding for one or more.

“It was found that, with the exception of Harlan & Hollingsworth, we
were the lowest bidders. We were a little higher than Harlan &
Hollingsworth, but the time in which we offered to build them was
shorter than theirs.

“The government promptly gave us one and the Harlan yard one, and
notified eighteen other bidders that they could have one each at the
same price as ours, which amounted, as near as I can remember, to
$350,000.

“Some of the bids ran as high as $750,000, and these bidders had
some delicacy in accepting prices at one-half, because, to accept
the contract at one-half, it would be an acknowledgment that they
did not know what they were about, or that they were trying to rob
the government.

“The fact is, that none of the bidders except Harlan & Hollingsworth
and ourselves were ship-builders. They were in other lines of
mechanical construction, and of course they did not have the
slightest idea of what was to be done or what it would cost.

“The drawings on which the vessels were to be built were of the
crudest character; only a midship section and one or two vague
longitudinal sketches being furnished as a guide or basis of
construction.

“Notwithstanding, as I said before, we were the lowest bidder,
thereby saving millions of dollars to the government, only one was
awarded to us. The balance was offered to the other bidders at our
price, and the offer was accepted by most of them.

“Having received our contract, we promptly visited New York to get
the details of construction and engines in order to begin work and
procure materials. The demand for materials was greater than the
supply, and all were in a feverish state of excitement. To get our
orders out quickly, I immediately made application to Mr. Stimers
for plans, and had a long and detailed conversation with him and
Theodore Allen over what plans they had developed, and numerous
alterations were made to the plans as drawn.

“Their first plan permitted the boilers to come within three and
one-half inches of the bottom plating of the ship, practically
landing the boilers on the three and one-half inch angle-bars, which
had at that time no floors.

“I suggested in a rather strong way that this would not do, and
after considerable discussion they concluded to make the vessels a
little deeper, give the deck more spring, and put shallow floors in.
Other important alterations were made as the work progressed.

“We would have had our vessel overboard first, but the northward
march of General Lee previous to the battle of Antietem interfered
with the furnishing of materials, and also with our own working
force in the shipyard.

“Our employees, with those of the rolling-mills supplying materials
near Philadelphia, organized themselves into military companies for
the purpose of defence. Two companies were formed in our
establishment.

“While these delays affected us, they did not interfere with the
progress of the monitor which was building in Boston; but when this
vessel was launched, she sank to the bottom from lack of buoyancy,
and a halt was called on the nineteen other vessels.

“These vessels had been constructed on very vague plans and
conditions. Mistakes were made in the original design, and weights
added without investigating the correctness of the original sketch,
which, with the so-called ‘calculations,’ were furnished by Mr.
Ericsson; at least they had been examined, approved, and signed by
him. They were not furnished to bidders.

“The day after this launch, the ‘Monitor Ring’ was in a state of
collapse! Mr. Lenthall and Mr. Isherwood now reasserted their proper
authority. They ordered Mr. Stimers and Mr. Allen to reduce the
weights in the turrets, and wherever else it was possible to do so
sufficiently to make the vessels float.

“These reductions in equipment, outfit, etc., were communicated to
the builders at Chester, before they launched the ‘Tunxis’; but
these vessels, by the reductions, were rendered entirely useless for
their designed service, or any other.

“Finding that the Boston vessel and the ‘Tunxis,’ built at Chester,
notwithstanding the alterations, lacked efficiency to a serious
degree, they decided to rebuild most of the others by deepening
them, and the whole matter was placed in my hands by Chief Engineer
King, who with some others were designated by the Secretary of the
Navy to investigate and prepare plans for the deepening, and to
ascertain the cost of the alterations.

“After a careful investigation, I found it would be necessary to
increase the depth of the hulls about thirty-three inches, involving
the necessity of raising the solid oak decks to that extent with the
hull proper, and the armor backing and armor which had to be taken
off and replaced.

“A so-called expert was detailed to assist me in my calculations,
but, having no use for him, I did not avail myself of his services.

“When I sent my plans and our price for the deepening of the vessel
to the Secretary, he immediately awarded us the contract for
deepening ours (the ‘Yazoo’), and accepted our price, and notified
the eighteen other people that he would give them the same price for
deepening theirs. The other contractors would not accept my price,
and they denounced me for not having put a ‘higher price on the
job,’ when I had the opportunity to do so. I told them that I had
estimated that we would make 30 per cent. profit, and I contended
that that was enough, notwithstanding we were under the influence of
war prices, and that I had been delegated to do what I considered
was right. In other words, I held that the Secretary had placed me
upon honor.

“These eighteen other builders ultimately got higher prices than we
did. They made all sorts of claims to the government through their
representatives, and made life a burden to the Secretary by showing,
or endeavoring to show, him that wages were higher everywhere else
in the localities where these vessels were built than they were in
Philadelphia.

“In fact, every one of the other builders ultimately received higher
prices than we did, and later on some were awarded additional sums
by act of Congress, notwithstanding that the drawings,
specifications, plans, and designs for the alterations were made by
me without pay! without even thanks!

“Subsequently the Department decided not to alter all alike, and
about one-half of them were finished without the turrets, and the
big guns were taken out, thereby relieving their builders of the
necessity of making them deeper. The decks were finished, and they
were designated as a sort of torpedo boat for harbor defence. These
vessels, as altered according to my recommendations, would have been
efficient factors in the operations in the southern waters if the
war had not ended before they were finished.

“The ‘Sub-Department’ in New York, with all its investitures and
appointments, was abandoned, and the Navy Department took up the
monitor matter from that time onward. But the mischief had been
done. The service had been debauched and the Treasury robbed of
millions, which an intelligent policy from the start might have
saved.

“During the alterations on the ‘Yazoo,’ the Chester light-draught
monitor was sent to our place to be altered. Notwithstanding she had
been finished with the reduced weights recommended by Mr. Stimers,
she still continued defective, and was sent to our yard to be
altered according to my new plan.

“As it was necessary to raise the turret in order to raise the deck,
and as we were compelled to haul the vessel out of the water, we
took the guns out of the turret and proceeded to remove it also.
Hoisting out the guns was an easy accomplishment, but the removal of
the turret was a difficult problem.

“At first sight, cutting out the rivets and bolts, taking apart and
rebuilding it, appeared the most feasible. This, however, was an
expensive transaction. After careful investigation, we concluded
that it could be hauled off the ship on to the dock on sliding-ways
if the work was done with the greatest rapidity with the best men at
it. The removal of guns and turret to the dock was successfully
accomplished.

“On account of the great cost due to occupying a dry-dock long
enough to make the change, it was determined to haul her out on
sliding-ways, reversing the process of launching, and that without
using a coffer-dam for laying the ground-ways.

“The vessel was hauled out by the use of six 12-inch falls, two of
which were attached to end of upper ways, two to a chain that passed
around the stem extending to amidships, the ends lashed to the ship
just above high-water mark, and the other two to holes in the bow
made for the purpose.

“When the six large ‘crabs’ were started with all of the men that
could be put on them, they never stopped until the vessel was
entirely out of the water, taking a day and a night for the
operation.

“This was by all odds the heaviest vessel ever hauled out on ways in
this country, and, in view of the simplicity of its preparations and
the limited cost, was one of the great achievements of the time
occupied by the Civil War. But little or no notice was taken of it
by the papers, as battles lost and won were the sensation of the
day.

“While the craze for constructing monitors had possession of the
country, the government built nothing else in the way of armored
vessels.

“Mr. Lenthall and Mr. Isherwood, who was on Mr. Lenthall’s staff at
that time, had no power to antagonize the monitor craze
successfully, and a large one of wood was ordered to be built in
each navy-yard, to be designed by the constructor of that particular
yard as far as the hulls were concerned. But little money of the
vast expenditures of the navy during the war was devoted to other
iron-clad constructions than that of the monitor class.

“The ‘Miantonomah,’ which was one of these vessels built in one of
the navy-yards and designed by the constructor at the navy-yard in
which she was built, was sent to Russia under command of Commodore
John Rodgers with Assistant Secretary Fox, as Special Envoy to
convey to the Emperor certain congratulations. The idea was that the
government of Russia would construct a number of large monitors. The
trip, so far as that was concerned, was a failure. Commodore
Rodgers, who went in command, was formerly in command of one of the
original monitors which had been engaged in the contests before
Charleston, and also in the Savannah sounds in the Civil War, and he
was one of the strongest of the captains in favor of that type. As a
rule, the captains and other officers were all adverse to them.

“While the Navy Department and Naval Committee of Congress were
favorable to the monitor type, Messrs. Lenthall and Isherwood were
against it; but they were very backward in doing or in recommending
anything else, and permitted themselves to be overlooked. In view of
this negligence on their part, it was argued that it was better to
try to do something, even if it turned out wrong, than to do nothing
at all.”

ORIGIN OF FAST CRUISERS.

“On account of the heavy loss of our ships captured by the
Confederate cruisers, and our failures to capture any of them with
the exception of the ‘Alabama,’ which was accidentally discovered
and destroyed by the ‘Kearsarge,’ our Navy Department conceived it
necessary to have constructed a number of very fast cruisers, faster
than any known afloat.

“The Department delegated Messrs. Stimers and Allen, when in the
height of their power in their ‘Sub-Department’ in New York, to
design and have them constructed.

“Not being naval architects, and not having any naval architect of
competent knowledge in connection with their ‘Sub-Department,’ but
having an exalted idea of their own abilities not only as naval
architects and engineers, and everything else in that direction,
they designed some ships of a peculiarly fantastic model, and
engines of equally fanciful character which they called, for short,
the ‘grasshopper engine.’

“Having the power to design these vessels and contract for them,
they invited me to inspect the plans and build two of them.

“On looking over these designs, I began to criticise them, and
recommended modifications.

“I was wound up suddenly by the observation that, as they intended
to give us two ships and give us what they considered a fair price
for them, we must build them exactly as they were designed.

“As the price they offered was high, and feeling that we would
practically have our own way with them, provided we adhered to the
general type of design, and having no responsibility, we thought
that we had better take them and make a handsome sum out of them
than to stand out on trifles and fight for glory alone.

“I had commenced at the beginning of the war with criticising the
monitors, and our concern got nothing, and the grass might have been
growing in our yard if we adhered to that course. So the price was
fixed for these ships, and we were about going on, when the fatal
contretemps of the launching of the Boston light-draught monitor
occurred. The ‘fast cruiser’ contracts of Stimers and Allen were set
aside, and a large sum of money saved to the government. The ring
was broken. They who had had unlimited power heretofore suddenly
found themselves without the power to contract for a dingy.

“This was really a great disappointment to us and several other
contractors, because the price they fixed for the cruisers was
liberal, and, as they would not listen to suggestions, they were
naturally expected to take the responsibility.

“After the matter of the fast cruisers was taken out of the hands of
the ‘Sub-Department of the navy’ after the sinking of the Boston
monitor, the Navy Department ordered each of the four navy-yards to
design one on a scheme of general dimensions, and giving the engines
out by contract to the various engine-builders, the engines, with
two exceptions, being designed by Mr. Isherwood. The machinery for
the ‘Madawaska’ was designed by Ericsson!

“At the same time, to encourage private enterprise, one was given to
us, hull and machinery of our own design. We awarded the engines to
Merrick & Sons, who built them on their own designs. All of these
vessels were constructed of wood. Our ship was called the
‘Chattanooga,’ and that built at the Philadelphia Navy-Yard was
called the ‘Neshaminy.’

“The engines designed by Mr. Isherwood were geared, the propellers
making two and one-half revolutions to the engine’s one. When these
engines were designed, gearing was supposed to be an indispensable
necessity in screw-engine practice.

“The engines designed for the ‘Madawaska’ by Ericsson were of the
same design as that of the ‘Dictator,’ and would be considered of
fantastic character at the present time; that, however, might be
said of most marine engines of that period.

“Much was expected of the ‘Madawaska’s’ engines by Mr. Ericsson’s
friends, but after a trial of twenty minutes it was stopped, as the
crank-pin and main-bearing brasses ran out into the crank-pit before
they had attained their required performance.

“The engines were subsequently taken out and compound engines of
poor design were put in by parties who had never built a compound
engine before. The performance of these engines was but little
better than that of the original.

“Having been eminently successful in the introduction of compound
engines in this country, by the construction of four compound
engines for the American Line and one set for the ‘George W. Clyde’
of our own design, we made application to the government to
substitute the design of compound engines in place of the first set
of ‘Madawaska,’ but our offer was not accepted, unfortunately for
the government.

“All of these vessels were of good model, and all built according to
the latest improvements of the great ship-builders and contractors,
and the devices in the way of rigging, spars, and other outfit,
besides the model and general arrangements were from the stand-point
and designs of the naval constructor and ship-builder at the yard
where they were built. No ships in modern times have been superior
to them in design, construction, and ship-building technique. The
engines, however, were not up to the standard, and, no matter what
else may be said of them, they were much too small.

“Some time after these vessels were laid up, an effort was made by
private parties in New York to utilize them in a trans-Atlantic line
to carry the mail, and a proposition was made to the government
covering certain conditions under which they could be operated. The
proposition meeting a favorable consideration, an exhaustive
examination of the engines was made by Mr. Norman Wheeler, of New
York. He found that the gearing of the driving-wheels and pinion had
been worn down five-eighths of an inch during their trials; the
project was abandoned, and the ships gradually disappeared.

“It has been stated that the ‘Wampanoag’ made her designed speed
from New York to Charleston in one trial.

“The British government was very much interested in this scheme of
building fast cruisers for our navy. Captain Bye-the-sea, who was
Naval Attaché of Great Britain, was ordered to investigate the
matter here. He decided to obtain the plans and drawings of the
‘Chattanooga,’ and applied to the Secretary of the Navy for his
approval. The Secretary sent a letter to us stating that, so far as
he was concerned, he had no objection. So we furnished Captain
Bye-the-sea with the drawings of the ‘Chattanooga’ in return for
some valuable information that he had, which we expected to utilize
in some construction of our Navy Department. We did not, however,
realize anything in that direction.

“The ‘Inconstant,’ built by the British government, was practically
the same model as that of the ‘Chattanooga,’ but with another deck
added to her, which gave her an entirely different appearance, and
which made her look a good deal heavier above the water than the
‘Chattanooga’ did, particularly as far as the stern was concerned.

“The ‘Wampanoag,’ one of the ships built at one of the navy-yards,
made what was designated as one quick trip from New York to
Charleston; but in doing so the teeth of the gearing were worn to
the extent of five-eighths of an inch, practically ruining her
usefulness for any future service. The vessel was laid up and never
sent to sea again.

“The ‘Chattanooga’ did not make a successful trial. The engines were
too small, and a long contest between the engine-builders and Mr.
Isherwood occurred over the construction of the machinery, ending in
the engine-builders making modifications, and the vessel was laid
up.

“As these ships were considered at that time too expensive to equip
for sea service in time of peace, they were laid up; being wooden
and very much neglected, they rotted at their wharves.

“The failure of these vessels to demonstrate the propriety of
building fast cruisers was due altogether to defective machinery and
to defective marine engineering as it generally existed at that date
in this country, and to the material of their construction being of
wood.”

EVOLUTION OF MODERN MARINE ENGINE.

“At that time a large majority of the marine engineers of the United
States were adherents of the paddle-wheel, walking-beam type of
engine, and nothing would do but that type of engine. That was
particularly the case in the city of New York.

“Philadelphia, at a very early period in the history of steam
propulsion, advocated the propeller engine, and as far as the
working of propeller engine was concerned, the degree of workmanship
and skill in its design attained there was never excelled in Europe
or America. These engines were generally small in power, and the
prejudices of the people were against them, particularly as all New
York ship-builders and marine engineers spoke of propeller engines
with the most profound contempt.

“Now and then some one in New York would build a propeller engine of
poor design which would prove disastrous, so in large enterprises
the walking-beam, side-wheel type of engine prevailed and was the
fashion.

“This was done to such a great extent that when the first line of
steamships was established between Philadelphia and Charleston,
side-wheel engines were put in them by parties who had a great deal
of interest with the management of the steamship company.

“In fact, it was this craze for the walking-beam engine and
side-wheels in New York which ruined us as a steamship building
country, and was one of the many causes for the supremacy in ocean
commerce that Great Britain ultimately attained.

“After the government had stopped the subsidy, the Collins Line,
which was run at an enormous expense, was withdrawn. We were
completely out of the business. The influence of Philadelphia, as we
had no large ships or large steamship companies, was not listened
to.

“Rather than adopt the propeller and go to Philadelphia to have the
engines built, steamship owners in New York permitted the whole
steamship business, together with all the foreign trade, to go to
foreign countries. The British began early to establish large
machine shops and to perfect the propeller engine. Though slow, they
were sure.

“There was not a time in the history of steam navigation that we did
not feel that we could equal or even excel the English builders of
propeller steamships that were coming to this country. But, as I
said before, we could not induce the New York merchants to embark in
the enterprise.

“I am sure that if we had abandoned the side-wheel and commenced
with the propeller at the time the British did and continued with
steadfastness, we never would have lost it.

“The ships of this country were right, of the best form and model,
and they were in advance of anything in Great Britain, as far as
hull construction and design were concerned; but, while the
ship-builders in New York were among the greatest in the world, the
builders of marine engines there were the poorest in the world.

“When it was discovered that the propeller steamship was in every
respect the best and had come to stay, it was too late to try to
recover our trade.

“The construction of monitors and machinery during the latter end of
the war was very demoralizing, and had its effect upon naval
constructions long after the war was over.

“The Construction Department, which had not shown much enterprise
during the war, had become very much deteriorated, and the system
was inaugurated, principally by Mr. Isherwood, which exists at the
present day, of dividing the executive department into many bureaus;
and, to strengthen their heads and give them power, it was also
provided that the appointment of these heads of bureaus should be
made by the President and confirmed by the Senate, thus making the
Senate a coördinate factor in their existence, and the heads of
bureaus independent of the Secretary of the Navy.

“This was started, as I said before, by Mr. Isherwood, who was on
Mr. Lenthall’s staff. He organized the Bureau of Steam Engineering
as an independent bureau, not subordinate to the Secretary, and
having its head appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. Of course he was made its Engineer-in-Chief.”

That being started, other bureaus as they practically exist at present, the heads of which are independent of the Secretary, were established the same way. A great deal of friction occurred between the various branches of the Navy Department at that time, the effects of which continued for a good while. Nothing was built by the government, although the Secretary of the Navy had full power to do practically as he pleased with the appropriations. The appropriations in Congress at that time were made in bulk, and the Secretary could give vessels out by private contract or build them in the navy-yards.

Some few vessels involving antique ideas were started in the navy-yards and were principally of wood. The engines were contracted for by the various engine-builders of the United States. They were constructed practically on one general design.

On account of some irregularities and misunderstandings in the way of giving out contracts and certain favoritisms, together with the jealousies and bickerings of the various heads of the Departments and officers of the Navy, Congress became more and more exacting in their appropriations, until at last nothing was done in the Navy Department without a special appropriation for the particular purpose.

At the end of the Civil War in 1865, a large number of United States vessels under contract were uncompleted. In some cases, notably of the monitor type, work was immediately suspended upon them, and settlements were made after long and tedious delays. The Cramp concern, as already mentioned, had one vessel in hand under these conditions, the first-class fast cruiser “Chattanooga;” but the government provided for her completion, which was carried out, and her delivery concluded the relations of Mr. Cramp to the navy of the Civil War.

------------------------------------------------------------------------