Chapter IV (2)

“After the bids were opened, it was found that ours was the lowest
in Class II, and lower than any other bid, taking the competition as
a whole. The Secretary then called a conference, at which all the
bidders and the Chief Constructor were present, and, after thorough
discussion of all the points involved, awarded the contract to the
Cramp Company under the bid in Class II on the modified plan I had
suggested and offered as to boiler arrangement and other details
conformable to it.

“The ship was named the ‘New York,’ and on trial trip she largely
exceeded her contract speed and requirements of coal endurance and
in all other respects; while the ‘Blake’ on trial was a failure; her
engines had to be practically rebuilt, and then did not come within
the scope of reasonable competition.

“Mr. Tracy can fairly claim credit for the design of the ‘New York,’
and the project for the construction of the ‘Indiana,’
‘Massachusetts,’ and the ‘Oregon’ class of battleships was also due
to his foresight.”

It is not within the scope of this Memoir to trace the progress of the new navy ship by ship, or even by naval programmes from year to year. For the purpose of this work, it suffices to say that, of the total number of battleships, armored cruisers, and first-class protected cruisers actually in service at this writing (1903), Mr. Cramp has built about a majority as against all other American ship-builders combined. There are ten battleships in commission, of which Mr. Cramp has built five; two armored cruisers, both built by him; ten protected cruisers of the first class, of which five hail from Cramps’ shipyard: that is to say, a total of twenty-two vessels, all first-class in their respective types, of which Mr. Cramp has built twelve as against ten by all other American ship-builders put together, navy-yards included.

Of course, we exclude from this reckoning the two show-ships built by Armstrong for a South American government and foolishly bought by our Navy Department in the paroxysmal flurry incident to the outbreak of the Spanish War. The main excuse for buying them was that, if we did not, Spain would. So be it. Better to have let Spain buy them, if they could not have strengthened her navy more than they did ours. At any rate, had Spain bought them, we might have captured or destroyed them, as we did nearly all her ships. They would probably have been worth capture or destruction, but they were never worth buying.

Since 1887, a period of sixteen years, Mr. Cramp has completed fifteen ships for the navy (including the “Vesuvius” and “Terror”), and is building three more at this writing. In every case these ships embody in plan and design more or less of his own knowledge, skill, and experience. In some cases the designs are altogether his own. In others the machinery is his, with important modifications of the Department’s hull. In no case has he built a ship wholly upon the plans of the Department. While this has redounded to the benefit of the navy, it would be idle to say that it has been in the long run advantageous to Mr. Cramp. On the other hand, its tendency has been otherwise: A certain class of naval officers have chosen to consider Mr. Cramp’s constantly recurring propositions to modify and improve their designs as having the force and effect of criticisms, and, to say the least, they have not been grateful to him for his pains. On the contrary, no little jealousy and some resentment have been the results, and he has been made to feel their consequences more than once. The chief misfortune of this state of affairs is that it precludes the cordial co-operation which should exist between officers of the Navy Department and a contractor engaged in building naval vessels, and creates in its stead a sense of antagonism which tends to augment the difficulties of naval construction, which are great and perplexing enough at the best.

But Mr. Cramp has not concerned himself with the building of naval ships alone. He has delved into the problems presented by the uses to which the ships are put when completed. The results of his observations in this direction were embodied in an address to the Naval War College read before that institution, June 18, 1897, by invitation of the Commandant, a little less than a year before the Spanish War. The experience of that struggle, brief as it was, and decided almost wholly by sea power, made this paper little short of prophetic.

Some extracts from it will serve to exhibit the trend of Mr. Cramp’s thought in the direction of the practical uses and needs of ships-of-war after they leave the ship-builder’s hands. Among other things he said:

“The accomplishment of the objects of sea-warfare will depend partly
upon the character of the armaments and partly on the wisdom with
which their operations are directed; nor can any one gainsay that
the wisdom of direction will depend on the conversancy of officers
with the nature and necessities of the material units of which the
armaments are composed.

“These propositions being taken for granted, it becomes clear that
there can be no effective system of teaching the art of naval
warfare which does not embrace exhaustive study of and consequent
close familiarity with the instruments by which the principles of
the art are to be carried into force and effect.

“From this point of view it must be admitted that questions within
the province of the naval architect and problems which he is best
qualified to solve form an essential part of such a curriculum in
its largest and most comprehensive aspects.

“The unvarying tendency of naval progress is to exalt the importance
of the naval architect and to augment the value of the constructor
as a factor in the sum-total of sea power.

“The naval armament of to-day is a mechanism. If we view it as a
single ship, it is a mechanical unit whose warlike value depends on
its excellence as a fighting machine. If we view it as a fleet, it
is an assembly of mechanical units, the warlike value of which will
depend alike on the excellence of each unit as a fighting machine,
and on the adaptation of each unit to its consorts to produce the
most symmetrical efficiency of the group as a whole.

“For this reason, the word seamanship, in the old-fashioned or
conventional sense, has ceased to cover adequately the requirements
of knowledge, skill, and aptness which the modern conditions of
naval warfare impose upon the officer in command or subordinate.

“By this I mean not to depreciate seamanship pure and simple, but to
point out that modern conditions require an enlargement of the
meaning of the term and a broadening of its scope of function far
beyond the exactions of any former period.

“In the old days there was no essential difference in ships except
in size. Experience in a sloop-of-war qualified an officer to
assume, at once and in full efficiency, equivalent duties in a
frigate, a seventy-four, or a three-decker. Familiarity with one
ship, irrespective of rate, was familiarity with all ships. Tactical
lessons learned in manœuvring one fleet were alike applicable to the
manœuvring of all fleets. Even the application of steam as a
propulsive auxiliary in its earlier stages did not radically alter
the old conditions. At all events, it did not practically erase
them, as the present development has done.

“This growth of complexity and elaboration, and this almost infinite
multiplication of parts and devices in modern ships, have entailed
upon the naval architect and constructor demands and difficulties
never dreamed of in the earlier days. The staff required to design
and construct an ‘Iowa’ is multiplied in number, and the complexity
of its organization augmented, as compared with that required for
the design and construction of the ‘New Ironsides,’ almost
infinitely.

“Similar conditions apply to command and management; so that, while
the building of a modern battleship entails enormous work and
responsibility on the naval architect, constructor, and staff, the
effective use of her as a tool in the trade of war presents an equal
variety and intricacy of problems to students of the art of naval
warfare in this college.

“Such questions and such problems cannot be relegated to the
category of details. Even if we consider the art of naval warfare in
the aspects only of strategy and tactics, both will be affected for
better or for worse by the behavior and performance of the units
composing the force in operation. This being admitted, it follows
that the behavior and performance of the units will be as the
knowledge and capacity of captains and their staffs, and that no
extent of skill and capacity in the admiral directing the whole can
overcome or evade the consequences of incapacity and failure on the
part of a captain commanding a part.

“As the speed of any fleet is that of its slowest ship, so will its
manœuvring power be limited by the capacity of its poorest captain.
As it might easily happen that the slowest or least handy ship and
the poorest captain would be joined, the quality of the other ships
and the ability of the other officers would go for nothing.

“In view of the complex character of the ships themselves, and the
difficulty and danger of manœuvring them under the most favorable
conditions, as pointed out, the experience of the first general
action will demonstrate the necessity of having all the battleships
in a fleet as nearly alike as possible in size, type, and capacity
of performance. Such provision would not equalize the personal
factor of different commanding officers, but it would at least give
them all an equal chance at the start.

“For this reason I have always considered it unwise to multiply
types or to modify seriously those which the best judgment we are
able to form approves.

“These considerations seem conclusive against multiplication of
types, and in favor of adhering to one that plainly meets the
requirements of our national situation and policy.

“The composition of a battleship fleet under such conditions would
minimize the tactical dangers and difficulties referred to earlier,
but they would still remain very great, and nothing can mitigate
them except frequent and arduous drill in squadron of evolution, so
that our captains may become familiar with their weapons before
being called upon to use them in actual battle. There will be scant
opportunity to drill a battleship squadron after the outbreak of
war.

“In my judgment, it is hardly possible to overvalue the importance
of homogeneity in fleet organizations, and I am sure that the very
first and perhaps greatest lesson taught by an encounter between
fleets of modern battleships will be the advantage of similarity of
type and equality of performance in the units of action.

“To this element of the art of naval warfare, then, I would invite
your most earnest and penetrating attention and study.

“Assuming this problem to be satisfactorily solved and the material
of the fleet in the most effective possible condition, so far as
relation of units to each other and to the sum-total is concerned,
we have still left for consideration the difference between men, the
lack of uniformity in _personnel_. Homogeneity of material may be
attained by adherence to a wise programme of design and
construction; but homogeneity of _personnel_, in the sense of
uniform capacity and efficiency among individuals, is beyond human
art or science to produce, because the difference between men is the
decree of a higher power. The existence of this college is itself a
devout recognition of that great fact, because its whole objective
is to mitigate or minify as much as possible this inherent human
frailty, by exhausting the resources of training and study, of
precept and example.

“I do not by any means argue that the commander of a ship should be
a naval architect or constructor. But, having familiarized himself
with the principles of that art which touch directly and immediately
his function of handling his ship under sea conditions of common
occurrence, and having gained sufficient knowledge of her traits, he
should be able to form an instant and correct judgment as to her
point of best behavior in any sea-way. It goes without saying that
sea experience is the only school in which these problems can be
worked out.

“Knowledge of that character cannot be acquired by study of the
experience of others. Close and earnest attention to this course of,
at best partial, information cannot serve as a substitute for
experience of one’s own. At most it can only provide a sound basis
on which to take quick advantage of one’s own experience, when
confronted with an actual situation.

“This brings me to the proposition that the modern battleship, with
all its complexities, weights, and peculiarities of design and
model, entails upon commanding officers a new requirement which I
can find no better terms to describe than ‘battleship seamanship.’
It is a development of the seafaring art which, as events have
proved, is by no means yet mastered in the greatest and most
actively exercised navy of the world; therefore it would be too much
to expect its mastery in navies of far less magnitude and, hence,
less means for distribution of opportunities to gain experience.

“It therefore follows indisputably that navies of the lesser
magnitude should constantly exhaust their means of enabling officers
to gain sea experience by keeping all their large ships in active
evolution all the time.

“Having thus viewed the modern battleship as a mechanical unit
herself, we may profitably pass to brief consideration of the great
number and variety of mechanisms composing her. In the strict
professional or technical sense, these mechanisms concern mainly the
engineer and the electrician. But as the foundation of all warlike
efficiency in _personnel_ is discipline, and as the foundation of
all discipline is the inevitable principle of a single head, one
commander, who is to all intents and purposes an absolute monarch,
it should follow that ‘the king can do no wrong.’

“I have already remarked that the captain need not be a naval
architect or constructor to comprehend and be able to apply the
group of principles of that art which touch his functions directly
in managing his ship as a whole; likewise, I would say here that he
need not be engineer or electrician in his relation to the numerous
and diverse mechanisms whose proper operation and control are
essential to the efficiency of his command.

“But, if he really commands, he must know enough about the
instruments that do his work to know when they are doing it well and
when not; to know whether his subordinates immediately in charge of
the several devices are operating them properly or not; to know when
defects exist and when they have been made good. If he does not know
or cannot learn these things, he must depend wholly on subordinates
immediately in charge; and their reports will be law to him, or if
not law, at least decisions from which he has no appeal. Manifestly
such a situation is utterly incompatible with the independent and
self-relying autocracy which is the essential and fundamental
principle of naval command, without which discipline must sooner or
later vanish into mere empty form or conventional myth. These facts,
even more than any other considerations, argue for uniformity of
type, previously touched upon, so that in learning the traits of one
battleship the officer acquires experience and knowledge applicable
at once to the discharge of his duties in another.

“The foregoing discussion is limited to matters affecting the unit
of action, the single ship, and the captain. Passing to
consideration of the unit of operation, the fleet and the admiral,
we find another array of problems equally within the scope of this
paper.

“Let us assume that the composition of the fleet has been made as
nearly homogeneous as possible, by carrying out the principles
previously stated for ships and their captains, and that the admiral
finds himself in command of an ideal fleet as to material and
_personnel_. Actual differences in efficiency among the several
units of action will still remain, and it will become the first duty
of the admiral to ascertain and locate these diversities with
unerring judgment and unsparing perception. He should know to a
nicety the personal equation of every captain and the effective
individuality of every ship.

“Among the captains he should be able to differentiate the traits of
relative quickness of perception, promptness of action, readiness of
responsibility, and boldness of execution.”

Among the most important services of Mr. Cramp to the new navy was his instrumentality in bringing about the system of classifying bids. Prior to 1885, whenever contract construction was to be done, the plans of the Department, pure and simple, were the standard. If any bidder proposed to deviate from them in any way,—no matter how palpable the improvement,—his bid would be held irregular and thrown out. The issue came on the machinery of the ships authorized by the Act of March 3, 1885. Of these four ships, the “Baltimore’s” plans had been purchased abroad, hull and machinery, and were accepted practically without change. But the Department’s design involved the then nearly, if not quite, obsolete compound engine for the other three, “Newark,” “Yorktown,” and “Petrel.” Mr. Cramp, desiring to bid on the “Newark” and “Yorktown,” was doubtful whether he could develop the indicated horse-power, which the form of contract required him to guarantee, with the Department’s compound engines. He was, however, confident that he could do it with triple-expansion engines of his own design.

To overcome the difficulty, he suggested to Secretary Whitney that, in issuing the circular asking for proposals, a classification of bids be provided for. This suggestion was at once adopted, and bids were authorized to be offered in three classes: Class I, the Department’s plans pure and simple; Class II, the Department’s plans modified by the bidder as to hull or machinery or both; and Class III, the bidder’s plans wholly. This arrangement broke up the embargo of the Bureaus, and admitted the results of the study, experience, and skill of practical ship-builders. Some of the Bureaus fought the plan with all their energy, but the contest they made had no other result than to convince them that Mr. Whitney was the _de facto_ as well as the _de jure_ head of the Department,—a quite novel experience for them! Some time afterward Classes II and III were merged, so that all departures from the Department’s plans, whether modifications of them or complete substitution of bidder’s plans for them, were grouped under Class II, which has become the established practice in inviting proposals. Mr. Cramp’s bids have usually been in Class II; involving in most cases more or less extensive modifications of the Department’s plans, and in two cases, the “Philadelphia” and the “Maine,” his own plans complete. The value of this new departure lay in the fact that it gave the Navy Department the benefit of all the progress of the country in the ship-building art as actually practised by men who were building ships for a living, and emancipated it from the dominion of the cloister. It has become a part of the permanent policy of the government.

The history of Mr. Cramp’s contributions to the new navy must, at this writing, be left an unfinished chapter. Having built and delivered to the government five first-class battleships, two first-rate armored cruisers, five first-class protected cruisers, together with a double-turreted monitor, a gunboat and a torpedo vessel, he is yet building three armored cruisers of the largest dimensions and most approved type. His contributions to the literature of the subject, ranging over a score of years, have been in their way of hardly less importance and interest than his achievements in producing its warlike material. Their full test, in all forms and through all channels,—hearings before committees, communications to the Navy Department and its Bureaus, newspaper interviews and magazine papers,—would, if reproduced in extenso, fill two volumes larger than this one. Suffice it to say here that there is no practical subject pertaining to naval art or science, from the design and construction of ships-of-war to their management in service, which he has not from time to time discussed as opportunity offered or occasion required. If he has at times shown a spirit approaching intolerance when dealing with invasions of his profession by inexperienced, untrained, or incapable men, it may be explained by the logic of a favorite quotation of his own, “Fools rush in where angels fear to tread!” Be this as it may, it is yet to be said that, if not always charitable in his criticisms and not always liberal in the standard of competency which he has set so high and maintained so vigorously, his professional motives have always been worthy and his efforts sincere and earnest. Whatever may be the future growth or achievements of the modern American navy, the name of Charles H. Cramp will ever be found indelibly stamped upon its historical origin and primary development. The ships he has built have won battles, gained campaigns, and vanquished the enemies of the country in war. They have held the lead in renewing the one-time waning naval prestige of our flag, and in restoring the sea power of the United States to its rightful rank among the nations.

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