Chapter LVII: Appendix: The Kantian Conception of Free Will

[_Reprinted, with some omissions, from_ MIND, 1888, _Vol. XIII., No. 51_.]

My aim is to show that, in different parts of Kant’s exposition of his doctrine, two essentially different conceptions are expressed by the same word freedom; while yet Kant does not appear to be conscious of any variation in the meaning of the term.

[In the one sense, Freedom = Rationality, so that a man is free in proportion as he acts in accordance with Reason.] I do not in the least object to this use of the term Freedom, on account of its deviation from ordinary usage. On the contrary, I think it has much support in men’s natural expression of ordinary moral experience in discourse. In the conflict that is continually going on in all of us, between non-rational impulses and what we recognise as dictates of practical reason, we are in the habit of identifying ourselves with the latter rather than with the former: as Whewell says, “we speak of Desire, Love, Anger, as mastering us, and of ourselves as controlling them”--we continually call men “slaves” of appetite or passion, whereas no one was ever called a slave of reason. If, therefore, the term Freedom had not already been appropriated by moralists to another meaning--if it were merely a question of taking it from ordinary discourse and stamping it with greater precision for purposes of ethical discussion--I should make no objection to the statement that “a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally.” But, what English defenders of man’s free agency have generally been concerned to maintain, is that “man has a freedom of _choice_ between good and evil,” which is realised or manifested when he deliberately chooses evil just as much as when he deliberately chooses good; and it is clear that if we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also say, in the same sense of the term, that it is by his free choice that he acts irrationally when he does so act. The notions of Freedom must be admitted to be fundamentally different in the two statements: and though usage might fairly allow the word Freedom to represent either notion, if only one or other of the above-mentioned propositions were affirmed, to use it to represent both, in affirming both propositions, is obviously inconvenient; and it implies a confusion of thought so to use it, without pointing out the difference of meaning.

If this be admitted, the next thing is to show that Kant does use the term in this double way. In arguing this, it will be convenient to have names for what we admit to be two distinct ideas. Accordingly, the kind of freedom which I first mentioned--which a man is said to manifest more in proportion as he acts more under the guidance of reason--shall be referred to as ‘Good’ or ‘Rational Freedom,’ and the freedom that is manifested in choosing between good and evil shall be called ‘Neutral’ or ‘Moral Freedom.’[385]

But before I proceed to the different passages of Kant’s exposition in which ‘Good Freedom’ and ‘Neutral Freedom’ respectively occur, it seems desirable to distinguish this latter from a wider notion with which it may possibly be confounded, and which it would be clearly wrong to attribute to Kant. I mean the “power of acting without a motive,” which Reid and other writers, on what used to be called the Libertarian side, have thought it necessary to claim. “If a man could not act without a motive,” says Reid, “he could have no power”--that is, in Reid’s meaning, no free agency--“at all.” This conception of Freedom--which I may conveniently distinguish as ‘Capricious Freedom’--is, as I said, certainly not Kantian: not only does he expressly repudiate it, but nowhere--so far as I know--does he unconsciously introduce it. Indeed it is incompatible with any and every part of his explanation of human volition: the originality and interest of his defence of Neutral Freedom--the power of choice between good and evil--lies in its complete avoidance of Capricious Freedom or the power of acting without a motive _in any particular volition_.

[This] distinction helps me to understand how [it is that] many intelligent readers have failed to see in Kant’s exposition the two Freedoms--Good or Rational Freedom and Neutral or Moral Freedom--which I find in Kant. They have their view fixed on the difference between Rational or Moral Freedom, which Kant maintains, and the Freedom of Caprice, which he undoubtedly repudiates: and are thus led to overlook with him the distinction between the Freedom that we realise or manifest in proportion as we do right, and the Freedom that is realised or manifested equally in choosing either right or wrong. When we have once put completely out of view the Freedom of Caprice, the power of acting without a motive, or against the strongest motive when the competition is among merely natural or non-rational desires or aversions,--when we have agreed to exclude this, and to concentrate attention on the difference between Good Freedom and Neutral Freedom--I venture to think that no one can avoid seeing each member of this latter antithesis in Kant. It will be easily understood that, as he does not himself distinguish the two conceptions, it is naturally impossible for the most careful reader always to tell which is to be understood; but there are many passages where his argument unmistakably requires the one, and many other passages where it unmistakably requires the other. Speaking broadly, I may say that, wherever Kant has to connect the notion of Freedom with that of Moral Responsibility or moral imputation, he, like all other moralists who have maintained Free Will in this connexion, means (chiefly, but not solely) Neutral Freedom--Freedom exhibited in choosing wrong as much as in choosing right. Indeed, in such passages it is with the Freedom of the wrong-chooser that he is primarily concerned: since it is the wrong-chooser that he especially wishes to prevent from shifting his responsibility on to causes beyond his control. On the other hand, when what he has to prove is the possibility of disinterested obedience to Law as such, without the intervention of sensible impulses, when he seeks to exhibit the independence of Reason in influencing choice, then in many though not all his statements he explicitly identifies Freedom with this independence of Reason, and thus clearly implies the proposition that a man is free in proportion as he acts rationally.

As an example of the first kind, I will take the passage towards the close of chap. iii. of the “Analytic of Practical Reason,”[386] where he treats, in its bearing on Moral Responsibility, his peculiar metaphysical doctrine of a double kind of causation in human actions. According to Kant, every such action, regarded as a phenomenon determined in time, must be thought as a necessary result of determining causes in antecedent time--otherwise its existence would be inconceivable--but it may be also regarded in relation to the agent considered as a thing-in-himself, as the “noümenon” of which the action is a phenomenon: and the conception of Freedom may be applied to the agent so considered in relation to his phenomena. For since his existence as a noümenon is not subject to time-conditions, nothing in this noümenal existence comes under the principle of determination by antecedent causes: hence, as Kant says, “in this his existence nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action ... even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being, is in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but the result of his causality as a noümenon.” This is the well-known metaphysical solution of the difficulty of reconciling Free Will with the Universality of physical causation: I am not now concerned to criticise it,--my point is that if we accept this view of Freedom at all, it must obviously be Neutral Freedom: it must express the relation of a noümenon that manifests itself as a scoundrel to a series of bad volitions, in which the moral law is violated, no less than the relation of a noümenon that manifests itself as a saint to good or rational volitions, in which the moral law or categorical imperative is obeyed. And, as I before said, Kant in this passage--being especially concerned to explain the possibility of moral imputation, and justify the judicial sentences of conscience--especially takes as his illustrations noümena that exhibit bad phenomena. The question he expressly raises is “How a man who commits a theft” can “be called quite free” at the moment of committing it? and answers that it is in virtue of his “transcendental freedom” that “the rational being can justly say of _every unlawful action_ that he performs that he could very well have left it undone,” although as phenomenon it is determined by antecedents, and so necessary; “for it, with all the past which determines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of his character which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he imputes to himself” the bad actions that result necessarily from his bad character taken in conjunction with other causes. Hence, however he may account for his error from bad habits which he has allowed to grow on him, whatever art he may use to paint to himself an unlawful act he remembers as something in which he was carried away by the stream of physical necessity, this cannot protect him from self-reproach:--not even if he have shown depravity so early that he may reasonably be thought to have been born in a morally hopeless condition--he will still be rightly judged, and will judge himself “just as responsible as any other man”: since in relation to his noümenal self his life as a whole, from first to last, is to be regarded as a single phenomenon resulting from an absolutely free choice.

I need not labour this point further; it is evident that the necessities of Kant’s metaphysical explanation of moral responsibility make him express with peculiar emphasis and fulness the notion of what I have called Neutral Freedom, a kind of causality manifested in bad and irrational volitions no less than in the good and rational.

On the other hand, it is no less easy to find passages in which the term Freedom seems to me most distinctly to stand for Good or Rational Freedom. Indeed, such passages are, I think, more frequent than those in which the other meaning is plainly required. Thus he tells us that “a free will must find its principle of determination in the [moral] ‘Law,’”[387] and that “freedom, whose causality can be determined only by the law, consists just in this, that it restricts all inclinations by the condition of obedience to pure law.”[388] Whereas, in the argument previously examined, his whole effort was to prove that the noümenon or supersensible being, of which each volition is a phenomenon, exercises “free causality” in unlawful acts, he tells us elsewhere, in the same treatise, that the “supersensible nature” of rational beings, who have also a “sensible nature,” is their “existence according to laws which are independent of every empirical condition, and therefore belong to the autonomy of pure [practical] reason.”[389] Similarly, in an earlier work, he explains that “since the conception of causality involves that of laws ... though freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary, it must be a causality according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise, a free will would be a chimæra (_Unding_).”[390] And this immutable law of the “free” or “autonomous” will is, as he goes on to say, the fundamental principle of morality, “so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.”

I have quoted this last phrase, not because it clearly exhibits the notion of Rational Freedom,--on the contrary, it rather shows how easily this notion may be confounded with the other. A will subject to its own moral laws _may_ mean a will that, so far as free, conforms to these laws; but it also _may_ be conceived as capable of freely disobeying these laws--exercising Neutral Freedom. But when Freedom is said to be a “causality according to immutable laws” the ambiguity is dispelled; for this evidently cannot mean merely a faculty of laying down laws which may or may not be obeyed; it must mean that the will, _quâ_ free, acts in accordance with these laws;--the human being, doubtless, often acts contrary to them; but then, according to this view, its choice in such actions is determined not “freely” but “mechanically,” by “physical” and “empirical” springs of action.

If any further argument is necessary to show that Kantian “Freedom” must sometimes be understood as Rational or Good Freedom, I may quote one or two of the numerous passages in which Kant, either expressly or by implication, identifies Will and Reason; for this identification obviously excludes the possibility of Will’s choosing between Reason and non-rational impulses. Thus in the _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_,[391] he tells us that “as Reason is required to deduce actions from laws, Will is nothing but pure practical reason”; and, similarly, in the _Kritik der praktischen Vernunft_, he speaks of the “objective reality of a pure Will or, _which is the same thing_, a pure practical reason.”[392] Accordingly, whereas in some passages[393] the “autonomy” which he identifies with “Freedom” is spoken of as “autonomy of _will_,” in others we are told that the “moral law expresses nothing else than autonomy of the pure practical _reason_: that is, Freedom.”[394]

I think that I have now established the verbal ambiguity that I undertook to bring home to Kant’s account of Free Will; I have shown that in his exposition this fundamental term oscillates between incompatible meanings. But it may, perhaps, be thought that the defect thus pointed out can be cured by a merely verbal correction: that the substance of Kant’s ethical doctrine may still be maintained, and may still be connected with his metaphysical doctrine. It may still be held that Reason dictates that we should at all times act from a maxim that we can will to be a universal law, and that we should do this from pure regard for reason and reason’s law, admitting that it is a law which we are free to disobey; and it may still be held that the reality of this moral freedom is to be reconciled with the universality of physical causation by conceiving it as a relation between the agent’s noümenal self--independent of time-conditions--and his character as manifested in time; the only correction required being to avoid identifying Freedom and Goodness or Rationality as attributes of agents or actions.

I should quite admit that the most important parts both of Kant’s doctrine of morality, and of his doctrine of Freedom may be saved:--or I should perhaps rather say that the latter may be left to conduct an unequal struggle with the modern notions of heredity and evolution: at any rate I admit that it is not fundamentally affected by my present argument. But I think that a good deal more will have to go from a corrected edition of Kantism than merely the “word” Freedom in certain passages, if the confusion introduced by the ambiguity of this word is to be eliminated in the manner that I have suggested. I think that the whole topic of the “heteronomy” of the will, when it yields to empirical or sensible impulses, will have to be abandoned or profoundly modified. And I am afraid that most readers of Kant will feel the loss to be serious; since nothing in Kant’s ethical writing is more fascinating than the idea--which he expresses repeatedly in various forms--that a man realises the aim of his true self when he obeys the moral law, whereas, when he wrongly allows his action to be determined by empirical or sensible stimuli, he becomes subject to physical causation, to laws of a brute outer world. But if we dismiss the identification of Freedom and Rationality, and accept definitely and singly Kant’s other notion of Freedom as expressing the relation of the human thing-in-itself to its phenomenon, I am afraid that this spirit-stirring appeal to the sentiment of Liberty must be dismissed as idle rhetoric. For the life of the saint must be as much subject--in any particular portion of it--to the necessary laws of physical causation as the life of the scoundrel: and the scoundrel must exhibit and express his characteristic self-hood in his transcendental choice of a bad life, as much as the saint does in his transcendental choice of a good one. If, on the other hand, to avoid this result, we take the other horn of the dilemma, and identify inner freedom with rationality, than a more serious excision will be required. For, along with ‘Neutral’ or ‘Moral’ Freedom, the whole Kantian view of the relation of the noümenon to the empirical character will have to be dropped, and with it must go the whole Kantian method of maintaining moral responsibility and moral imputation: in fact, all that has made Kant’s doctrine interesting and impressive to English advocates of Free Will (in the ordinary sense), even when they have not been convinced of its soundness.

FOOTNOTES:

[385] The terms ‘rational’ and ‘moral’ seem to me most appropriate when I wish to suggest the affinity between the two notions: the terms ‘good’ and ‘neutral’ seem preferable when I wish to lay stress on the difference.

[386] _Werke_, v. pp. 100-104 (Hartenstein).

[387] _Werke_, v. p. 30.

[388] _Ibid._ p. 83.

[389] _Ibid._ p. 46.

[390] _Werke_, iv. p. 294.

[391] _Werke_, iv. p. 260 (Hartenstein).

[392] _Werke_, v. p. 58. See an acute discussion of Kant’s perplexing use of the term “Will” in Prof. Schurman’s _Kantian Ethics_, which has anticipated me in the above quotations.

[393] _E.g._ _Werke_, iv. p. 296.

[394] _E.g._ _Werke_, v. p. 35.

INDEX

‘Absolute’ and ‘Relative’ Ethics, 18 note 2, 177 note 1

‘Act,’ meaning of, 200 note 3, 201, 202

Action, ultimate end of, 3, 4, etc.;
motive to, may be non-rational, 5;
instinctive, 24, 61;
deliberate, 24, 61;
deliberate and impulsive, 61

Acuteness, 236

Æsthetic Intuitionism, 228, 392;
implicit reference to Ultimate Good in, 392, 393

Æsthetic sensibility, theories of, 189

Affections, Duties of the, 345-349

Affections, social and domestic, 138, 153, 156, 157, 433, 434

‘Altruism,’ 439

ἀνδρεία, 456

‘Apathy’ as ideal of happiness, 125

Aristotle, 59 note 1, 92, 92 note 2, 98-99, 99 note 1, 121-122,
180, 180 note 1, 181 note 1, 215, 224, 231 note 1, 264 note 2,
281, 375 note 1, 376, 403, 456

Art, Definition of, 4

‘Art of conduct,’ 4

Austin, 300 note 1

Aversion, 42, 43, 46, 145

Axioms, 215, 338-343, 379-389 _passim_;
must (_a_) have the terms clear and precise, 338, 339;
(_b_) be really self-evident, 339-341;
(_c_) not conflict with any other accepted proposition, 341;
(_d_) be supported by consensus of experts, 341, 342

Axiom--of Justice or Equity, and Rational Benevolence, 387;
of Prudence, the logical basis of Egoism, 386;
of Rational Benevolence, the logical basis of Utilitarianism,
387, 388;
-s of Impartiality, 379-383, 496, 497

Bacon, 338

Bain, 43 note 2, Note 54-56, Note 87-88, 125, 126, 127, 477 note 1;
(_The Emotions and the Will_) 54, 55 Note, 126 note 1;
(_Mental and Moral Science_) 127 notes 1-3, 177 note 1

Bastiat, 278 note 1

Beauty, 114

Benevolence, 238-263 _passim_, 391, 393;
comprehensiveness and supremacy of, 238, 238 note 2;
common maxim of, 238-239;
axiom of, 382, 385, 387, 496;
prescribes promotion of others’ Happiness rather than Perfection,
240, 241;
principles of its distribution, 241, 242, 261, 262, 263;
and Justice, spheres of, 242, 243, 268;
virtue of, 244, 253;
duty of, 252, 253, 253 note 1, 258;
Kant’s view of the duty of, 239, 240;
intellectual _versus_ emotional excellence of, 244 note 1;
conflicting claims to, 246;
duties of, classified, 248;
rational, cf. _Rational Benevolence_;
Intuitional and Utilitarian notions of, reconciled, 430-431

Benevolent--emotion, 239;
disposition, 239

Bentham, 10, 41, 41 note 1, 84, 85, 86, Note 87-88, 92, 94, 119,
124 note 1, 143, 164, 203, 292, 364, 414, 417, 423 note 2, 424;
(_Memoirs_) 10 notes 2 and 3,
(_Deontology, Works_, Bowring’s edition) 87, 88 Note,
(_Principles of Morals and Legislation_) 26 note 1,
(_Constitutional Code_) 41 note 2

Bequest, change of view respecting, 246, 247

Berkeley, Bishop, 120

Blackstone, _Introduction_, 302 note 1

Bouillier, 180 note 2

Butler, 7, 39, 44, 44 note 2, 81, 86, 93, 94, 119, 133 note 2, 136,
172, 200, 222, 366, 366 note 3, 371, 372, 378, 386, 401, 405,
501;
(_Analogy_) 378;
(_Dissertation Of the Nature of Virtue_) 86 note 2, 176 note 1,
327 note 1;
(_Sermons on Human Nature_) 7 note 1, 86 note 2, 93 note 2,
120 note 1, 200 note 2, 323 note 1

Candour, 355

Cardinal Virtues, 375

Carelessness, Culpability of, 60, 292

Casuistry, 99

Categorical Imperative, 7, 8, 15, 35, 36, 37, 209, 209 note 1

Caution, 236, 236 note 1, 237

Celibacy, 487, 488

Charity (Philanthropy), 222, 239, 430, 431, 434

Chastity and Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2

‘Chief Good’ (Summum Bonum), 134, 407 note 1

Chivalry, 326

Chrysippus, 376

Cicero, 376;
_De Finibus_, 125 note 1

Clarke, 86, 104, 120, 120 note 2, 384, 384 notes 3 and 4, 385;
_Boyle Lectures_, 120 note 2, 385 notes 1 and 2

Classification of Duties, 312-315

‘Cognition,’ use of, 34 note 2

“Common good of all Rationals,” Cumberland’s ultimate end, 104, 423

Common Morality, 215-216; (cf. _Morality of Common Sense_)

Common Sense aversion to admit Happiness as sole ultimate Good,
explanation of, 402-406

Compassion, 262, 371

Conditional prescriptions (Hypothetical Imperatives), 6, 7

Conjugal relation, the duties relating to it, 254, 255, 256,
255 notes 1 and 2, 347, 348, 348 note 1

Conscience, popular view of, 99;
jural view of, 100-101

Conscience (Moral Faculty) and Benevolence, Butler’s view of the
relation between, 86, 86 note 2;
and Self-love, Butler’s view of relation between, 119, 120, 200,
200 note 2, 327 note 1, 366

Conscious Utilitarianism rather the adult than the germinal form
of morality, 455-457

Consciousness not normally without pleasure or pain, 125

Consequences of actions, ulterior, 96, 97;
may be judged desirable without reference to pleasure or pain, 97

Contract, claims arising from, 269;
and Freedom, 276, 276 note 1

Courage, 332-334;
defined, 332;
Greek view of, 456;
and Fortitude, are subordinate duties, 332, 333;
Moral, 333 note 3;
Virtue of, 313, 333, 334;
and Foolhardiness, distinguished by Utilitarian considerations,
334, 355

Courtesy, 253

Cudworth, 103 Note

Culture, 157, etc.

Cumberland, 86, 86 note 1, 104;
and Utilitarianism, 423, 423 note 1

Custom, alterations in, 247

Decision, 236, 237

Deductive Hedonism, 176-195

Descartes, 338, 339

Desert--Good, how determined, 284-290;
Ill, how determined, 291-292;
requital of, as principle of Ideal Justice, 280, 281, 283, 294, 349;
and Freedom, 280, 287;
and Right of Property, 280, 280 note 1;
and Determinism, 284, 285;
Utilitarian interpretation of, 284 note 1;
and Free Will, 71, 72, 284, 291

‘Desirable,’ confusion in Mill’s use of, 388 note 2

Desirable consciousness is either happiness or certain objective
relations of the conscious mind, 398-400

Desire, 43, 45-47;
non-rational, 23-24;
irrational, 23, 24;
and Pleasure, relation between, 39-56 _passim_

Determinism and Free Will, 57 _seq._;
Aristotelian, 59 note 1;
and Materialism, 62;
arguments for, 62-65;
argument against, 65, 66

Determinist meaning of ‘desert,’ etc., 71, 72, 284 note 1

Development as ethical aim, 90 _seq._, 192 _seq._, 473

‘Dictates,’ how used, 96 note 1

δικαιοσύνη, two meanings of, 264 note 2

‘Disinterested action,’ 57

Distribution, Principle of Equality a _prima facie_ reasonable
Principle of, 417

Divine penalties, 31

‘Doing good,’ ambiguity of, 239, 240

Dualism of the Practical (or Moral) Reason, 200, 205, 206,
366, 404, 404 note 1;
need of harmonising, 507-509

Dumont, 180 note 2

‘Duties to God’ and ‘duty to man,’ 218

Duties, division of, into Self-regarding and Social, 163, 312, 313

‘Duties to oneself,’ 7

‘Duty’--meaning and use of, 78, 217, 218, 220 note 3, 239, 504-505;
and ‘right conduct’ distinguished, 217

Duty relativity of, 218, 219;
and Happiness of agent, 36, 162-175 _passim_, 495 _seq._;
implies conflict of impulses, 81;
of self-preservation, 356;
of promoting others’ happiness, Kant’s arguments for, 389-390;
most of the received maxims of, involve reference to Ultimate
Good, 391, 392

‘Egoism,’ 11, 80 note 1, 89 _seq._;
ordinary use, and ambiguity of, 89;
indefiniteness of, 95;
and Greek ethical controversy, 91-92

Egoism, cf. _Egoistic Hedonism_

Egoism--meaning of, 120-121;
and Self-love, 36, 89-95 _passim_;
Principle and Method of, 119-122;
precepts of, not clear and precise, 199-200;
rationality of, 119-120, 199, 200 note 1;
sense of ignobility of, 199-200, 200 note 1 (cf. 402 _seq._), 501;
= Pure (or Quantitative) Egoistic Hedonism, 95;
and Utilitarianism, relation between, 497 _seq._;
and Utilitarian sanctions, 499-503

‘Egoist,’ meaning of, 121

Egoistic End--and Positive Religion, 121;
and Natural Religion, 121

Egoistic Hedonism designated as Egoism or as Epicureanism, 11, 84, 95

Egoistic Hedonism, 42, 119-121;
End of, 93;
Pure or Quantitative, defined, 95;
Fundamental Principle of, 93, 120, 121;
Empirical-reflective Method of, 121, 122, 131 _seq._;
and Conscience, 161 note 1;
Fundamental Paradox of, 48, 130, 136, 137, 173-174, 194

Empirical Hedonism, 123-150;
fundamental assumption of, 123, 131, 146;
objections to, 460;
Method of, takes advantage of traditional experience and of
special knowledge, 477, 479

Empirical Quantitative Hedonism, 146

Empiricism, 104

‘End,’ ethical use of the term, 134

End, Interdependence of Method and, 8, 83, 84;
adoption of any, as paramount, a phenomenon distinct from Desire, 39

Ends accepted as rational by Common Sense, 8, 9

Energy, 237

Epicureanism, 11, 84

Epicurus, 158

‘Equal return,’ ambiguity of, 261 (cf. 288 _seq._)

‘Equality of Happiness,’ as Social End, 284 note 2

Ethical--judgment, 23-38, 77;
Principles and Methods, 77-88 _passim_;
Method, three principal species of, 83 _seq._;
controversy, ancient and modern, 105, 106, 392;
Hedonism, fundamental proposition of, 129;
and Psychological Hedonism, 40-42, 412, 412 note 1;
and Physical Science, structure of, compared, 509

Ethics--boundaries of, 1;
Study or Science? 1, 2;
forms of the problem of, 2, 3, 391;
and man’s ‘True Good,’ 3;
definition of, 4, 15;
Absolute and Relative, 18 note 2, 177 note 1;
and geometry, analogy between, 18-19;
and astronomy, analogy between, 19;
concerned with Duty under present conditions, 19;
aim of, 40, 77;
and Rational or Natural Theology, 504-506;
mutual relations of the three Methods of, 496-509

Ethics and Politics (cf. _Law_), 15-22 _passim_, 266, 457;
distinguished from Positive sciences, 1, 2;
Utilitarian, 457 (cf. 274, 298);
in an ideal society, 18 _seq._

εὐδαιμονία (= Well-being = the Good attainable in
human life), 91, 92;
misunderstanding of Aristotle’s use of, 92 note 2

Excellence (cf. _Perfection_)

‘Excellence’ and ‘Perfection,’ 10 note 3

Excellence beyond strict duty, Utilitarian attitude towards, 492, 493

_Explanation_ essentially different from _Justification_, 2

Fame, 9, 155, 157, 159, 368, (Posthumous) 156 note 1

Feeling--preferableness of, other than pleasantness, dependent on
objective relations of the feeling mind, 127, 128, 399;
_quâ_ feeling, can only be judged by the person who feels, 128,
129, 398

Fidelity (cf. _Good Faith_), 258, 259

Firmness, 235, 236

Fitness and Desert, 350

‘Formal’ and ‘Material’ Rightness, 206-207, 206 note 1

Fortitude defined, 332

Free choice as virtuous, 504 note 1

Freedom--sentiment of, 39;
as absolute end of ideal law, 274 _seq._, 293, 297, 350-351;
sphere of, must be limited, 275;
ambiguity of, 275, 276, 293;
and Contract, 276, 276 note 1;
and Property, 276, 277;
Civil and Constitutional, 298, 351

Free Will--controversy, 57-76 _passim_, 59, 61-62, 65 note 1, 74, 75;
conception of, applied (_a_) in judging the conduct of others,
63 note 1, 66, 67, (_b_) in forecasting our own future, 64;
partial illusoriness of the belief in, 64, 65;
and Happiness, 68;
and Perfection (or Excellence), 68, 68 note 2;
and Moral government of the world, 69, 69 note 2, 70;
and Determinism, practical unimportance of issue between, 67,
68, 72-76, 285;
and Justice, 71, 72, 284, 291;
and Desert (or Merit), 68 note 2, 285, 291;
and Duty, 78;
(or Freedom of Will)--two senses of, 57-59;
and Moral responsibility, 58;
conception of, involved in ordinary meaning of ‘responsibility,’
‘desert,’ etc., 71;
metaphysical--ethical import of, as regards (_a_) choice between
rational and irrational alternatives, 67, 68, 70-71, (_b_) view
of what is rational, 68, 69, (_c_) forecasts of future action,
69, 70, 70 note 1

Friendship and its duties, 257-259, 257 note 1, 437

‘General Good,’ 392

Generosity, 219, 326

Gentleness, 253, 321

God’s Will--conformity to, 79;
as ultimate reason for action, 79, 80

‘Golden Rule,’ the, unpreciseness of, 379-380

‘Good,’ 105-115 _passim_;
indefiniteness of, 91-92;
use and force of the term, 86 note 1, 105, 107 _seq._, 112, 113;
and not ‘Right’ the fundamental notion in Greek ethics, 105;
has not the same connotation as ‘pleasant,’ 107, 108, 109, 110;
implies reference to an universally valid standard, 108-109, 114;
adjective, and ‘Good’ substantive, 109;
notion of, distinct from ‘Pleasure’ and ‘the Pleasant,’ and = ‘what
ought to be desired,’ 109 _seq._

Good, The, 3, 92, 106;
(human) or Well-being, its relation to Happiness and to Duty, 3;
(human) is either (_a_) Happiness or (_b_) Perfection or Excellence
of human existence, 114, 115;
the absolute and unconditional, in Kant’s view, 222;
in English ethical thought, 423 note 1

Good conduct, 106, 107, 112-113;
standard of, needed, 113;
Greek conception of, 107 note 1, 404-405, 405 note 1

Good Faith, 224, 303-311 _passim_, 352-354, 355;
stringency of the duty of, 304-305;
obligation of, affected by (_a_) fraud or force, 305-306,
306 note 1, (_b_) material change of circumstances, 306-308,
(_c_) misapprehension, 309, (_d_) use of a prescribed formula,
309, 310

Good Taste, 108

Good humour, 321

Goodness, implies relation to consciousness or feeling, 113-114,
113 note 2;
(Moral) and Beauty, 107-108, 107 note 1, 228

Government--by Consent of Subjects, 297, 351;
Aristocratic and Democratic Principles of, 299;
established, difficulty of identifying, 300, 301

Governmental Authority, conflicting claims to, 296, 297, 299-301;
ideal, 297-299

Grant Allen, 187;
_Physiological Æsthetics_, 187 note 1

Gratitude, 259-261, 437-438;
universalised, furnishes the principle ‘that desert ought to be
requited,’ 279, 279 note 1, 280;
Kant on, 223, 223 note 1

‘Greatest Happinesss,’ meaning of, 121, 413;
Utilitarian notion of, its extent, 414;
total and average, distinguished, 415, 416

‘Greatest Pleasure,’ explanation of, 44 note 3

Greek ethical thought, the problem of, 106;
tautological maxims of, 375-376

Green, T. H., 132 _seq._, 134 note 3, 135 note 3;
(_Introduction to Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature_) 132 note 2,
133 note 3;
(_Prolegomena to Ethics_) 93 note 1, 133 note 1, 134 notes 1 and 2,
135 notes 1 and 2, 363 note 1

Grote, J., _An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy_, 432 note 1

Gurney, E., 123, 184; (_Tertium Quid_) 123 note 1;
(_Power of Sound_) 184 note 1

Hallam, 423 note 1

Hamilton, 139, 180-182;
(_Lectures on Metaphysics_) 180 note 3

Happiness--as End, 7, 8, 78;
and Duty, connexion between, 162-175 _passim_;
and Duty, are they coincident? 162, 163, 165, 176;
and Duty, Plato’s view of relation between, 171-172;
and Virtue, 174-175, 459;
and Virtue, connexion of, in Aristotle’s view, 121-122;
determination and measurement of, an inevitable problem for
Ethics, 176;
production of, 176-177;
relation of, to mental concentration and dissipation, 193;
and Self-development, 192-193;
rejection of, as end, leaves us unable to frame a coherent account
of Ultimate Good, 406;
an objection to, as Ultimate Good, considered, 407 note 1;
principle of distribution of, required, 416, 417;
universal, as divine end, 503-505;
Christian view of, 120, 138;
Sources of, 151 _seq._

‘Happiness,’ 41 note 1, 92, 92 note 2, 93 note 1;
ambiguity of, 92;
precise meaning of, 120

Harm, 292, 293

Harmony as cause of Pleasure, 189

Health, 153, 154, 159

‘Hedonism,’ meaning of, 93

Hedonism (Ethical), the two Methods of, are Universalistic and
Egoistic, 11;
connexion between the two Methods of, 84, 497 _seq._;
objections to, stated and considered:--(_a_) that the calculation
required by the Empirical-reflective method is too complex for
practice, 131, 132;
(_b_) that “pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived,” 132, 133;
(_c_) that “a sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning,”
133, 134;
(_d_) that transient pleasures are unsatisfying, 135;
(_e_) that the pursuit of pleasure tends to defeat its own end,
136 _seq._;
(_f_) that the habit of introspective comparison of pleasures
is unfavourable to pleasure, 138-140;
(_g_) that any quantitative comparison of pleasures is vague and
uncertain, 140-150;
Deductive, 176-195 _passim_;
deductive, Spencer’s view of, 177 note 1;
Method of, must be empirical, 195;
Empirical, method of, 460;
and Intuitionism, 461;
and Pessimism, 131 Note

Hedonistic Zero (or neutral feeling), 124, 125

Helvetius, 88

Highest Good, the (cf. _The Good_ and _Ultimate Good_), 106

Hobbes, 44 note 1, 56, 86, 89, 103, 109, 300 note 1, 423, 476;
(_Leviathan_) 89 note 1

Holmes, O. W., jun., _The Common Law_, 281 note 1

Honour, Code of, 30, 31, 168, 340

Hume, 23, 86, 104, 220, 384, 419, 423, 424, 423 notes 1 and 2,
426, 440, 441, 493;
(_Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals_) 44 note 2,
220 note 2, 424

Humility, 334-336 _passim_, 355, 356 note 1, 429

Hunger, 45, 46

Hutcheson, 44 note 2, 50, 86, 86 note 2, 104, 366;
(_System of Moral Philosophy_) 366 note 1

Hypothetical Imperatives imply an ulterior end, 6, 7, 37

Ideal and Actual, relation between, 79;
connected (_a_) in the conception of “God’s Will,” 79,
(_b_) in the notion of “Nature,” 80-83

Ideal--Government, no consensus as to what kind is legitimate,
299 _seq._;
and Traditional Authority, 296;
Society, ethics of, how far useful, 22-24, 465

“Idols of the Cave” and “Idols of the Tribe,” 152

Impulse to do acts _quâ_ recognised as right (= Moral Motive), 77

Impulses, extra-regarding and self-regarding may conflict, 51, 52, 136

Indifference (Neutrality) of feeling, cf. _Hedonistic Zero_

Individualistic--Ideal, 286-287;
and Socialistic Ideals, 293, 294, 444-445

Inequality, Reasonable, 268 _seq._

Ingenuity, 236

Intention, 60 note 1, 202, 202 note 1

Interest, meaning of, 7, 120;
ethical character of, in Butler’s view, 176 note 1

‘Internal acts,’ 204

Instinctive impulses regarded as inherited experience, 193, 194

Intrinsic value, how determined, 288, 289

Intuition of rightness of acts, excludes consideration of (_a_)
ulterior consequences, 96, 97, (_b_) “induction from experience”
of pleasures, 97, 98 (cf. 102 note 1)

Intuitional--Method, cf. _Intuitionism_;
moralists, English, may be broadly classified as Dogmatic and
Philosophical, 103, 104

‘Intuitional’--sense in which used, 96, 97, 98;
wider and narrower senses of, 97, 102 note 1, 201

Intuitionism, 3, 8, 17, 20, 96-104 _passim_, 199-216 _passim_;
differences of its method due to two causes, 103;
its method issues in Universalistic Hedonism (Utilitarianism),
406-407;
chronological development of the method of, in England, 103-104;
and Utilitarianism, 85-86, 388-389, 423-457 _passim_, 496-497;
Philosophical, 102-104, 373-389 _passim_;
Perceptional, 98-100, 102;
Dogmatic, 100-101 (cf. _Intuitionism_, _Intuitive Morality_,
_Positive Morality_, _Morality of Common Sense_);
Dogmatic, fundamental assumption of, 101, 200, 201;
three phases of, 102, 103;
a variety of, constituted by substituting for ‘right’ the notion
‘good,’ 105-107;
Æsthetic, 228, 392;
Jural or Rational, 228-229

‘Intuitive’ or ‘_a priori_’ Morality generally used to mean Dogmatic
Intuitionism or Morality of Common Sense, 101-102

Irrational choice--sometimes conscious and deliberate, 36, 37-38,
41-42, 58, 59, 110;
Socratic and Aristotelian view compared with modern view of,
59 note 1

Jural method of Ethics, 100-101

Just claims--arising from contract, 269;
arising from natural and normal expectations, 269, 270, 270 note 1

‘Justice,’ ‘justify,’ etc., uses of, 264 note 2, 270, 286, 442

Justice, 20, 99, 264-294 _passim_, 349-352, 355, 440-448 _passim_;
or Equity, essence of, 496;
specially difficult to define, 264;
intuitional view of the definition of, 264;
involves notion of distribution, 265, 266, 268, 271;
and Law, connexion between, 265, 266, 267 note 1;
distinct from Order (or Law-observance), 265;
and Equality, 266, 267, 267 note 1, 268, 268 note 1, 279,
285 note 1;
and taxation, 266, 266 note 1;
Conservative and Ideal, 272-273, 273 note 1, 274, 293, 294;
Ideal, 273, 274, 293, 294, 444, 445;
Ideal, and Natural Eights, 274, 275;
Ideal, and Freedom, 278, 279;
Corrective, 281;
Reparative, 281, 282, 281 note 1, 282 note 1, 293;
Reparative and Retributive, distinguished, 282-283, 282 note 2;
and Free Will, 71, 72, 284, 285;
and ‘Equity’ or ‘Fairness,’ 285, 286;
Hume’s treatment of, 440

Kant, 6, 7, 11 note 1, 36, 58, 58 note 1, 209, 210, 210 note 1,
222, 223, 239, 240, 315, 327 note 1, 366, 385, 386, 386 note 1,
389-390 Note, 486, Appendix 510;
(_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_) 209 note 1, 389-390 Note;
(_Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre_) 223 note 1,
327 note 1, 366 note 3, 386 note 2, 389 Note;
(_Kritik der reinen Vernunft_) 366 note 3

Kant’s Fundamental Moral Rule or Categorical Imperative as criterion
of rightness, 209-210, 209 note 1, 210 note 1, 339 note 1, 386,
389 Note, 486

Knowledge--as an End, 114, 399, 401;
and Feeling (= Cognition and Pleasure or Pain), relation between,
139, 140;
and Feeling, Hamilton’s view of the relation between, 139

_Laisser faire_ and economic production, 445 note 2

Law, 295-303; and Morality, relation between, 29, 457;
and Positive Morality, 164;
Austin’s definition of, 300 note 1

Laws--just, characteristics of, 266, 267, 271-272;
that ought to be obeyed, are laid down by rightful authority, 296

Law-observance (or Order), 295-303 _passim_, 352, 440, 441;
and Good Faith, 295, 303;
in regard to _mala prohibita_, 302 note 1

Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 50 note 1, 399 note 1, 427 note 1

Legal obligation and punishment, 29

Liberality, 324-326, 325 note 1, 355

Libertarian position, 58, 64-65, 66

Liberty, Sentiment of, 58

Locke, (_Essay_) 205, 280 note 1, 503;
ethical view of, 205, 206

Love, 50, 244, 245, 367, 368;
common sense estimate of, 245, 258, 258 note 1

Loyalty, 223, 244, 254

Mackenzie, J. S., 47, 48

Maine, Sir H., (_Ancient Law_) 461 note 2

Malevolence--character of, as motive, 364;
sometimes sweepingly condemned, 321, 324;
sometimes partially approved on Utilitarian grounds, 322, 323, 324

Malevolent affections natural and normal, 320, 321

Marcus Aurelius, 376 note 1

‘Market value,’ 286 _seq._

Marriage, Plato’s ideal of, 358-359 (cf. 348 note 1)

Martineau, 366, 367, 369, 370, 371, 372;
(_Types of Ethical Theory_) 367 note 1, 369 note 1

Maxims--of Virtue, dependence or independence of, 313;
of Justice, Prudence and Benevolence, self-evident element in,
380-382

‘Maximum Happiness’ as criterion of conduct, 134

Meanness, notion of, examined, 325, 326

Meekness, 321

Mercy, 321

Merit, 68 note 2, 284 _seq._;
(cf. _Desert_)

Method of Ethics, definition of, 1;
only one rational, 6, 12;
more than one natural, 6

_Methods of Ethics, The_, purpose of, 11-14, 78

Mildness, 321

Mill, J. S., 44, 85, 87, 94, 121, 177 note 1, 412 notes 1 and 2,
414, 418, 440, 478, 504;
(_Utilitarianism_) 93 note 1, 461 note 1, 499 note 1;
(_On Liberty_) 478 notes 1 and 2

_Mind_, 87 Note, 477 note 1

Modern ethical thought quasi-jural in character, 106

Moral Faculty--a function of Reason, 23-38 _passim_;
why subject of ethical discussion, 4, 5;
Utilitarian theory of origin of, 461, 462, 497

Moral Judgment, 23-38;
object of, 60, 61, 201-202, 202 note 1, 222, 362, 364;
(or Practical) Reason, 33-34, 34 notes 1, 2, 3; 39, 40, 100 _seq._;
Sense, 34;
Reasoning, the most natural type of, 6, 12 _seq._, 102-103, 493-494;
Sentiment, 26-28, 77;
Sentiments, (_a_) difficulties of admitting or rejecting them as
motives, 365-367, (_b_) theory of their derivation from
experiences of pleasure and pain, 461, 462;
and Quasi-moral Sentiments, 28, 173, 174;
Motive, 77, 204 _seq._, 223;
Motive, varying forms of:--(_a_) Reverence for Authority,
(_b_) Religious Sentiment, (_c_) Self-respect,
(_d_) sentiment of Freedom, (_e_) Admiration or Aspiration,
39-40;
instincts and crude Utilitarian reasonings--discrepancy between,
466, 467;
Intuitions, 211-216 _passim_;
Intuitions, existence of, 211, 212, 337;
Intuitions, connexion between (_a_) Existence and Origin of,
211, 212, (_b_) Origin and Validity of, 34 note 1, 212-213,
212 note 2, 214;
Intuitions, Particular and General, 99-102, 214-216;
Rules, imperative and indicative forms of, 101 note 1;
Rules and Axioms, importance of, 229;
Axioms, abstract but significant, 379-384, 505;
Axioms, Kant’s view of, 385-386, 386 notes 1 and 2;
Maxims, 337-361 _passim_;
Maxims which _are_, and which are _not_, directly self-evident,
distinction between, 383;
Responsibility, 59-60;
Obligation, 217;
and non-moral excellence distinguished, 426, 427

‘Moral’ (in narrower sense) and ‘Prudential’ distinguished, 25-26

Moral Courage, 333 note 3

Moral Philosophy, some problems of modern, 374

Morality--‘inductive’ and ‘intuitive,’ double ambiguity of antithesis
between, 97-99;
_a priori_ and _a posteriori_ (or inductive and intuitive), 97;
and growth of Sympathy, 455-456, 455 note 1

Morality of Common Sense (Intuitionism), 85, 102, 229, 263 Note,
337-361 _passim_;
and Positive Morality, 215;
and Egoism, 498-499 (cf. _Happiness and Duty_);
development of, not perfectly Utilitarian, 455-456;
axiomatic character of its maxims questioned, 338, 342, 343;
furnishes valuable practical rules but not ultimate axioms,
360, 361;
and Utilitarianism, 361 note 1, 423-457 _passim_, 461, 498, 499;
first principles of, as “middle axioms” of Utilitarianism, 461;
Mill’s view of, 461 note 1;
not to be accepted by Utilitarianism without modification,
461 _seq._, 467

Motive meaning of, 202, 362, 363;
and Intention, 202, 203, 203 note 1;
-s, different views of Right, 204-207;
and Desire, Green’s view of, 363 note 1;
and Disposition, Utilitarian estimate of, 493, 494

Motives to action, 23;
as subjects of moral judgment, 362-372;
as affecting morality of actions, 60-61, 224;
regarded as _better_ and _worse_ rather than _good_ and
_bad_, 363-364;
‘seductive,’ 364;
(“Springs of action”) Dr. Martineau’s table of (369)
ethically estimated, 371, 372;
‘higher’ not always to be preferred to ‘lower,’ 369, 370, 371;
moral regulation of, 370

Natural, The--Interpretation of, 80 _seq._;
gives no definite practical criterion of right conduct, 82

Natural--Selection, effect of, on impulses, 194;
and normal claims, indefiniteness of, 270, 271, 272, 272 note 1;
expectations, ambiguity of, 272, 273, 352;
Rights--difficulty of determining, 298;
Good, 477

Nature--Life according to, 79 _seq._, 377, 378;
conformity to, 80;
Stoic use of, 377, 378 note 1;
Butler’s use of, 378

Neighbourhood and Nationality, duties of, 250, 251, 252

Neutral excitements, 186 note 1 (cf. _Hedonistic Zero_)

‘Objective’ and ‘subjective,’ ethical application of, 207, 207 note 1,
208 notes 1 and 2, 208, 209, 210, 344 note 2, 394, 395, 429, 430

Objective Hedonism, meaning of, 151;
and Common Sense, 151-161;
advantages of, 151;
defects of, 151 _seq._, 458, 459

Objective relations of conscious mind, how far desirable, 400, 401

Objectivity of Moral Judgment, 27, 33

Order, cf. _Law-observance_

Origin of Moral Intuitions, ethical importance of, 383, 384,
384 note 1

‘Ought,’ 23-38 _passim_;
relative and unconditional uses of, 6, 7, 39;
implies reasonableness, 25;
and ‘right’ imply the same notion, 1 note 1, 23, 25;
does not refer to matters of fact, 25;
implies objectivity, 27, 33;
does not merely signify (_a_) appropriateness of means to ends,
26, (_b_) an emotion of the person judging, 26-28, nor
(_c_) bound under penalties, 29 _seq._;
an elementary and irresolvable notion, 32-33;
narrower and wider sense of, 33, 34, 34 note 4;
carries with it an impulse to action, 34;
implies possible conflict with reason (thus distinguishable from
‘right’), 34, 35, 217;
determinist sense of, 78;
loose meaning of, 508

Owen, Robert, 291

Pain--definition of, 42-43 note 1, 180, 191;
the negative quantity of pleasure, 124, 125;
physical concomitant of, 183 _seq._;
Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 _seq._, 180 note 1,
181 note 1;
Mr. Stout’s theory of, 182, 188, etc.;
Mr. Spencer’s theory of, 183 _seq._;
Grant Allen’s view of, 187;
biological theory of, 190 _seq._

Paley, 86, 121

Parents and children, duties of, 243, 243 note 1, 248-250,
248 note 1, 346, 347

Patriotism, 223, 244, 245;
duties of, 251, 252, 252 note 1

‘Perception,’ ethical use of, by Dugald Stewart, 103 Note

Perfection or Excellence as End, 10, 11, 10 notes 3 and 4,
20 note 1, 78, 114, 115;
and Intuitionism, 11, 83, 84, 97;
Kant’s treatment of, 386 note 2

Perfectionists, view of, 97

Philosophical Intuitionism, its relation to Common Sense Morality, 373

φρόνησις, 231 note 1

Pity or Compassion, 262

Placability, 321

Plato, (_Republic_) 21, 171, 172;
140, 145, 148, 171, 172, 281, 345, 348 note 1, 358, 375 note 1, 376;
(_Gorgias_) 405 note 1; 441

Pleasure--definitions of, 42, 43, 43 note 1, 125, 127 _seq._,
131, 190;
ambiguities of, 43, 44, 93 _seq._;
forecast of, must take account of moral or quasi-moral pleasures,
40, 173;
the less sometimes chosen in preference to the greater, 41, 42,
42 note 1, 136;
of Virtue, its ‘disinterestedness’ not abnormal, 50, 51;
as aim of unconscious action, 52, 53;
as ‘original’ aim of action, 53, 54;
application of the term, 93;
has only quantitative differences, 94, 95, 121;
maximum, deductive methods of determining, 121, 122;
rational as opposed to impulsive pursuit of, 124 note 1;
‘quality’ of, 94, 95, 121, 128-129, 128 note 1;
as Feeling, conceivableness of, 132, 133;
permanent sources of, 135, 136, 153;
how estimated, 141 _seq._ (cf. 127, 128, 398);
from others’ pain, various modes of, 321 note 1;
and Appetite, identified by Hobbes, 44 note 1;
and Desire, controversy as to relation between, 39-56;
Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 _seq._, 180 note 1,
181 note 1;
Mr. Stout’s theory of, 182, 188, etc.;
Mr. Spencer’s theory of, 183 _seq._;
Grant Allen’s view of, 187;
biological theory of, 190 _seq._;
and Desire, (_a_) Mill’s view of, 43-44, (_b_) Butler’s view of,
44, (_c_) Bain’s view of, 54-56;
effect of desire on estimate of, 144, 145;
and Preservation, 190, etc.;
(Hobbes’ view of) 89;
and Perfection or Reality, (Self-development), Spinoza’s view
of, 90;
and ‘quantity of life,’ 192;
‘pure’ 143;
of pursuit, 46 _seq._, 47 note 1, 55-56;
of attainment, 47;
of business, 49;
intellectual and æsthetic, 107-108, 153, 157, 472;
benevolent and sympathetic, 49, 50;
of virtue, 153, 170, 171, 174, 175;
-s, of the animal life, 154, 157, 159;
of wealth and greatness, Adam Smith’s view of, 155 note 1--(cf.
_Health_, _Wealth_, etc.);
Stoic view of, 129;
Green’s view of, 132 _seq._;
Plato’s view of its illusoriness, 140;
Spencer and Grant Allen’s ‘Intermittence’ theory of, 187

Pleasures and Pains, Moral, 170 _seq._, 171 note 1;
of Sympathy, 49, 50, 499-502, 499 note 1;
scale of, involves assumption of a Hedonistic zero, 124, 125;
commensurability of, 123-125, 124 note 1, 128 note 1, 131,
132, 140-150;
difficulties of a clear, definite and consistent evaluation of,
140-150;
incommensurable intensity of, doubtful, 123, 124;
intensity of, commensurable with duration, 124;
Bentham’s four dimensions of, 124 note 1;
volitional efficacy of, 125-127;
their relation to normal activities, 185, etc.;
Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 _seq._;
Stout’s theory of, 182;
Wundt’s theory of, 184;
Spencer’s biological theory of, 190 _seq._

Plutarch, 376

Politeness (Good Breeding, Fashion, Etiquette), 253;
Code of, 30, 340, 341

Political order, Rousseau’s view of an ideally just, 298

Politics--and Ethics, 15-22;
definition of, 1 note 1, 15 (cf. Law)

Positive Morality--and Morality of Common Sense, 215;
relation of, to preservation and to happiness, 464, 465;
alteration of, 164, 480

Power, 156, 157, 159

Practical efficacy and speculative truth, relation between, 507 note 1

Practical Empirical Hedonism, an assumption of, 131

Practical (or Moral) Judgment, 23 seq.

Practical (or Moral) Reason, 23-38 _passim_;
its relation to Interest and to non-rational and irrational
desires, 36;
and Nature, 81;
a postulate of, 6, 12;
Dualism of, 404 note 1, 366, 200, 205-206, 499, 507-509 (cf.
_Happiness and Duty_)

Praise, common sense award of, explained by utility, 428, 429

Priestley, 88 Note

Promise, 303-311 _passim_;
conditions and meaning of, 304;
conditions of bindingness of a, 311

Proof of a first principle, how possible, 419, 420

Proof--of Egoism may be demanded, 418, 419;
of ordinary moral rules is often required and given, 419

Proof of Utilitarianism, 418-422 _passim_;
clear demand of common sense for, 418, 419;
addressed to Egoism, 420, 421, 497-498;
addressed to Intuitionism, twofold character of, 421, 422

“Proof” of Utilitarian principle, Mill’s, 387, 388

Property and Right of Bequest, 277

Prudence (or Forethought), 7, 36, 96, 391;
common sense view of, 327, 328;
Kant’s and Butler’s views of, 327 note 1;
self-evident maxim of impartiality educible from the rule of, 381;
and Benevolence, subordination of other virtues to, 496-497

‘Prudential’ and ‘Moral,’ 25-26

Psychological Hedonism, 40 _seq._;
of Bentham, 85;
ethical import of, 41, 205

Public Opinion, Code of, 30

Public and private virtue, Utilitarian and Intuitionist estimates
of, 495

Punishment, 281, 290 _seq._, 290 note 1, 291 note 1;
preventive and retributory views of, 71-72

Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2, 357-359

Quantitative Hedonism, 129

Quasi-moral Sentiment, 27-28, 173-174

Quasi-moral Sentiments and Rational Self-love, 173-174

Rank of Motives, difficulties of estimating, 365-367, 369;
conflicting estimates of, by moralists, 366;
difficulty due to complexity of motive, 368

Rational action, not to be identified with (_a_) disinterested or
(_b_) free action, 57;
Spinoza’s view of the principle of, 89-90

Rational Benevolence, 96;
may be self-limiting, 385;
Kant’s treatment of, 385-386 Note, 389-390

Rational Self-love (Rational Egoism, Prudence)--and Conscience,
172, 200, 200 note 2, 366;
and Rational Benevolence, 386 note 4, 498 _seq._

Reason--and Ultimate Ends, 9, 77, 77 note 1;
relation of, to Will and Desire, 23 _seq._;
reference of moral judgments to, signifies merely their
_objectivity_, 33;
conflict with, implied in the terms _dictate_, _precept_,
_imperative_, _ought_, _duty_, _moral obligation_, 34, 35;
dictate or precept of, is a rule which may be deviated from, 41;
dictates or imperatives of, 34, 36, 77;
and the Divine Will, 79, 80;
dictate of, implied by _right_, _rightness_, and their equivalents,
105;
and instinct, 193-195;
may be self-limiting, 345;
_dictates_ and _dictation_ of, 345, 395, 404

Reason for doing what is seen to be right, why men demand a, 5-6

Reasonableness of Self-love, Butler’s view of, 119, 120;
Clarke’s view of, 120;
Christian view of, 120;
common sense view of, 120

Rebellion, when justifiable?, 299, 300, 301, 352

Reciprocity, principle of, 167, 168

Religious deception, 316, 316 note 2

Renan quoted, 108 note 1

Reputation, 155

Resentment, instinctive and deliberate, 322, 323;
deliberate, Butler’s view of, 323 note 1, 371;
universalised the principle of retributive (criminal) justice, 281;
evaluation of, 449

Resolutions, 37;
general, may be contradicted by particular volitions, 37-38

Respect, tokens of, 336, 336 note 1

Reverence for Authority, 39

‘Right’--notion involved in, is unique, 25;
and ‘good,’ 3, 4;
and ‘ought,’ distinction between, 34, 35;
conduct and ‘good’ conduct, 106, 113

Right Conflict and Ultimate Good, 3

Rights, 274, etc.

Rightful authority, how known?, 296;
what are its limits?, 301, 302

Rousseau, 298;
his political ideal, difficulty of realising, 298, 299

‘Rule of Equity,’ Clarke’s, 384-385

‘Rule of Love or Benevolence,’ Clarke’s, 385

‘Rules of Righteousness,’ Clarke’s, 384, 384 note 4, 385

Rules prescribing actions as _good_ or _right_ open to Utilitarian
interpretation, 430

Sagacity, 236

Sanctions, 164-175 _passim_, 498, 499, 500 _seq._, 502, 505, 507-508;
conflict of, 164, 165;
legal, and happiness, 165, 166, 165 note 1;
social, and happiness, 166, 167;
social, and extra-legal duty, 167, 168;
internal, and happiness, 170, 170 note 1, 171, 171 note 1, 172,
173, 501-502

Scottish School of Ethical Thought, 104

Self-control, 235-237, 331, 344, 345, 356

Self-development (Self-realisation), indefiniteness of the notion,
90, 91;
as ethical aim, 192, 193;
understood as = _yielding to instinctive impulses_, 193-194

Self-evidence, difficulty of discerning real, 339, 340, 341

Self-interest, 25, 26

Self-love, ordinary use and ambiguity of, 89;
and certain elevated impulses, 137-138;
Butler’s view of, 93;
and benevolence and affection, 138, 403, 502

Self-preservation, 89

Self-realisation, 80, 90, 95

Self-regarding virtues, 327-331

Self-sacrifice, 109 note 1, 138, 431, 432

Self-satisfaction, Green’s view of, 133, 135, 135 note 3

Selfishness, 499

Services, comparative worth of, how determined, 286, 287;
reward of, how determined, 290

Shaftesbury, 86, 86 notes 1 and 2, 138, 423, 423 note 1, 433, 501

Sidgwick, _Principles of Political Economy_, 267 note, 445 note 2,
446 note 1

Sincerity, 355

Smith, Adam, 424, 461, (_Wealth of Nations, Theory of Moral
Sentiments_) 155 note 1

Social Contract, 17, 297-298, 303, 351

Social rank and status, 153, 155

Socialistic ideal, 289, 293-294

Sociology--scope and subject of, 2;
present condition of, 472, 473

Socrates, 59 note 1, 98-99, 215, 231 note 1, 299

Socratic Induction, 98-99

Socratic principle of “Government by experts,” 299

σοφία, σοφός, 231, 231 note 1

Sources of Happiness, 135, 136, 153 _seq._;
judgments of common sense respecting them, only roughly
trustworthy, 158-160;
common sense estimates of (_a_) at best are only true for
ordinary persons, (_b_) are vitiated by mal-observation,
(_c_) confuse between objects of natural desire and sources of
experienced pleasure, 151, 152, (_d_) mix moral and æsthetic
preferences with hedonistic, 153, (_e_) are found to be full
of inconsistencies, 153-158

Sovereign power, Hobbist and Austinian views of, 300 note 1

Special moral codes, 30, 31, 168, 169, 340, 341

Special need, duties arising out of, 261, 262

Spencer, H., 125-126, 177 note 1, 183 _seq._, 194 note 1, 470,
471, 470 notes 1 and 2, 473;
(_Social Statics_), 18 note 2, 194 note 1;
(_Data of Ethics_), 18 note 2, 177 note 1, 194 note 1, 470 note 1

“Sphere of individual option” determined by Utilitarian calculation,
477-479

Spinoza, 90

Stephen, Leslie, 319 Note, 471, 471 note 2, 472, 473;
(_Science of Ethics_), 42 note 1, 471

Stewart, Dugald, 454, 455;
(_Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers_), 92 note 2, 454 note 1

Stoic system, its place in the development of ethical thought, 106;
ethics, circular reasonings of, 376, 377

Stoicism, later compared with earlier, 376 note 1

Stoics, 92, 105, 129

Stout, G. F., 180 note 2, 182, 186;
(_Analytic Psychology_), 182 note 1

Subjective, cf. _Objective_

_Suggestio falsi_, 317

Suicide prohibited by Common Sense, 327, 331, 356

Sully, _Pessimism_, 136 note 1, 186 note 1

_Suppressio veri_, 317

Sympathy--and Moral Sensibility, relation between, 170 note 1,
500-501;
with impulses prompting to action, 463, 463 note 2;
limitations and perversions of, 464;
twofold operation of, on moral impulses, 483;
confusion in Mill’s view of, 499 note 1;
and happiness of agent, 170 note 1, 499 note 1, 499-503

Systematic Morality, explanation of indifference or hostility
to, 99-100

Tautological propositions offered as ethical axioms, 374 _seq._

Temperance, 224, 328, 329, 344 note 1, 356

Torquemada, 226 note 1

‘True Good,’ 3 (cf. _Good_, _Ultimate Good_)

Truth, Cartesian Criterion of, 339

Ultimate End, for the individual and for the whole, 404, 497-498

Ultimate Good, My, 109 _seq._, 109 note 1, 497-498

Ultimate Good, The (the Good), 3, 106 _seq._, 391-407 _passim_

Ultimate reasonableness, different views of, implicit in ordinary
thought, 6

Ultimate reasons for conduct, 78, 79;
differences in, correspond to different aspects of human
existence, 78 (cf. 79)

‘Ultra-intuitional,’ 100

‘Unconscious Utilitarianism’ of Common Sense Morality, 453 _seq._,
489, etc.

Universal Happiness as standard and motive, 413

Universalistic and Egoistic Hedonism, connexion between (_a_) in
Bentham’s view, 87 Note;
(_b_) in Paley’s view, 121

Unveracity, common, 316 _seq._, 486

Utilitarian--formula of distribution not really at variance with
Common Sense, 432, 433;
justification of special affections, 433, 434;
ideal code, difficulties of constructing such, for present human
beings, 467-470;
rectification of Common Sense Morality must proceed by empirical
method, 476-480;
innovation, negative and destructive, probable effects of
(_a_) on the agent, 481, 482-483, (_b_) on others, 482, 483;
innovation, positive and supplementary, as affecting the agent
and others, 483, 484;
innovation in relation to degree of publicity and generality of
acceptance, 489-490, 489 note 1;
reform, consists largely in enforcing old rules, 484;
exceptions to current morality (_a_) may generally be stated as
fresh rules, 485, 489, (_b_) special and rare cases of, 486-487;
Duty and Religious Sanction, 503-506;
Sanction, 500 _seq._

Utilitarianism, 8, 11, 119;
(= Universalistic or Benthamite Hedonism), 84, 119, 411;
Proof of, 418-422;
Principle of, 87, (Mill’s view of) 387, 388;
Method of, 460-495;
meaning of, 411-417 _passim_;
to be distinguished from (_a_) Egoistic Hedonism, 411, 412,
(_b_) any psychogonical theory of the Moral Sentiments, 412-413;
_motive_ and _standard_ of, to be discriminated, 413;
contradictory objections to, 87;
and Intuitionism, relation between, 85-86, 386 _seq._, 496-497;
and Intuitionism, history of relation between, in English
ethical thought, 86, 423, 424;
and Egoism, relation between, 497, 498;
and Egoism, harmony of, (_a_) not empirically demonstrable, 503,
(_b_) required by Reason, 506;
and Common Sense Morality, 8, 423-457 _passim_, 468, 469, 475,
476, 480 _seq._, 498, 499;
justifies the unequal distribution which Common Sense approves,
432 _seq._;
more rigid than Common Sense, 499, 504;
function of, as arbiter to Common Sense, 454, 455;
reasonable attitude of, to Common Sense Morality, 473-474, 475-476;
aims at remedying imperfections of Common Sense Morality, 476;
and Axiom of Benevolence, 387, 388, 496-497, 498;
and Conjugal and Parental Duties, 435, 436;
and Duties of Special Need, 436, 437;
and Gratitude, 437, 438;
and benevolent Duties, 435 _seq._;
and Law-observance, 440, 441;
and Impartiality, 441, 442, 447, 447 note 1;
and Normal Expectations, 442-443;
and Good Faith, 443, 444, 443 note 3;
and Freedom, 444, 445;
and distribution according to Desert, 445-447;
and Justice, 440 _seq._, 447;
and Veracity, 448, 449, 483;
and Malevolence, 449;
and Self-regarding virtues, 450;
and Purity, 449-450;
and Sympathy, 500 _seq._;
and Christianity, 504

‘Utility,’ Hume’s and Bentham’s uses of, 423 note 2

Veracity, 97, 224, 313, 314-319 _passim_, 355, 448, 449;
and Good Faith, 303, 304, 313, 314

Virtue (Moral Perfection or Excellence), 10, 14, 78, 106,
219, 219 note 1, 220, 220 note 3, 221, 222, 226, 227;
or Right Action, its relation to the Good, 106;
and Happiness, 119, 120, 174-175, 461;
Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of, 376;
involves reference to an Ultimate Good which is not Virtue,
393, 394, 395;
and Duty, 217-230 _passim_;
and emotion, 222-223, 226;
voluntariness of, 220, 227;
and motive, 223-224;
and habit, 227;
and moral effort, relation between, 224, 225, 429;
intellectual conditions of, 225;
is Knowledge, Socratic doctrine that, 227 note 1;
felicific character of, 424, 425

Virtues, intellectual, 231-237 _passim_;
self-regarding, 327-331 _passim_

Virtuous conduct, commonly regarded as disinterested, 77, 78

Virtuous motives, admitted by some moralists, 365, 366;
Dr. Martineau’s rejection of, 367

Vivisection controversy, 402, 406 note 1

Volition, analysis of, 61, 62;
Determinist view of, 62 note 1;
conception of, how far inevitably Libertarian, 67, 71;
causes muscular contractions, 73;
affects thought and feeling, 73, 74;
acting through resolutions alters men’s tendencies to action,
74, 75, 75 note 1;
its emotional antecedents of secondary ethical importance, 77

Voluntary action, definition of, 59

Voluntary choice and irresistible impulse, 67 note 3

Wayland, _Elements of Moral Science_, 256 note 2

Wealth, 153, 154, 155

Well-being (the Good attainable in human life), 92, 92 note 1;
Stoic view of, 92;
Aristotle’s view of, 92, 92 note 2;
not = mere promise of future being, 396, 397

Whewell, 58, 86;
(_Elements of Morality_), 58 note 2, 317 note 1, 329 note 1

Will--Subjective Rightness of, and Ultimate Good, 394, 395;
divorced from Objective Rightness is fanaticism, 395

Wisdom, 230, 231-236 _passim_, 344, 345, 393, 430;
meaning and use of term, 231;
Greek view of, 231;
common sense definition of, 233;
refers to ends as well as means, 231-233;
in selection of ends and means, how far voluntary, 233-235;
in adoption of selected ends, 235;
comprehensiveness of, 238;
and Temperance and Justice, tautological maxims of, 375;
and Caution and Decision, do not furnish independent rules, 237 Note

Wundt, 184 note 3

Zeal or Moral Ardour, 237, 392

Zeno, 376

THE END

_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.

* * * * *

Transcriber's Note

Many references in the index are to the original numbers of the notes, which do not correspond to the renumbering used in this e-text.

The following apparent errors have been corrected:

p. ix "more that" changed to "more than"

p. xii "chap iv." changed to "chap. iv."

p. xix "chap iv." changed to "chap. iv."

p. xxviii "201" changed to "201-207"

p. xxxv "legal code" changed to "legal code."

p. 44 "his own," changed to "his own."

p. 55 "adapted by" changed to "adopted by"

p. 272 (note) "§ 2" changed to "§ 2."

p. 318 (note) "chap i." changed to "chap. i."

p. 415 (note) "appear" changed to "appears"

p. 492 "let as" changed to "let us"

p. 518 "285:" changed to "285;"

p. 519 "cf. Law" changed to "cf. _Law_"

p. 519 "cf. Perfection" changed to "cf. _Perfection_"

p. 520 "180-182," changed to "180-182;"

p. 521 "Hedonistic Zero" changed to "_Hedonistic Zero_"

p. 522 "Note; 486" changed to "Note, 486"

p. 523 "203 note 1," changed to "203 note 1;"

p. 524 "84, 97:" changed to "84, 97;"

p. 526 "Good, Ultimate Good" changed to "_Good_, "Ultimate Good"

The following possible errors have been left as printed:

p. 177 evaluing

p. 524 405 note 1; 441

The following are used inconsistently in the text:

Common-sense and Common-Sense

counterbalancing and counter-balancing

fairminded and fair-minded

goodwill and good-will

highminded and high-minded

lawgiver and law-giver

note and Note

truthspeaking, truth-speaking, Truthspeaking and Truth-speaking

twofold and two-fold

_vice versâ_ and _vice versa_

wellbeing, well-being, Wellbeing and Well-being

widespread and wide-spread

wrongdoing and wrong-doing