Chapter III: Ethical Judgments

1. By ‘Reasonable’ conduct--whether morally or prudentially reasonable--we mean that of which we judge that it ‘ought’ to be done. Such a judgment cannot be legitimately interpreted as a judgment concerning facts, nor as referring exclusively to the _means_ to ulterior ends: in particular, the term ‘ought,’ as used in moral judgments, does not merely signify that the person judging feels a specific emotion: 23-28

2. nor does it merely signify that the conduct in question is prescribed under penalties: 28-31

3. The notion expressed by “ought,” in its strictest ethical use is too elementary to admit of formal definition, or of resolution into simpler notions; it is assumed to be objectively valid; and judgments in which it is used when they relate to the future conduct of the person judging, are accompanied by a special kind of impulse to action. 31-35

4. This ‘dictate of reason’ is also exemplified by merely prudential judgments; and by merely hypothetical imperatives. 35-38

CHAPTER IV

PLEASURE AND DESIRE

1. The psychological doctrine, that the object of Desire is always Pleasure, is liable to collide with the view of Ethical judgments just given: and in any case deserves careful examination. 39-42

2. If by “pleasure” is meant “agreeable feeling,” this doctrine is opposed to experience: for throughout the whole scale of our desires, from the highest to the lowest, we can distinguish impulses directed towards other ends than our own feelings from the desire of pleasure: 42-51

3. as is further shown by the occasional conflict between the two kinds of impulse. 51-52

4. Nor can the doctrine derive any real support from consideration either of the ‘unconscious’ or the ‘original’ aim of human action. 52-54

Note 54-56

CHAPTER V

FREE WILL

1. The Kantian identification of ‘Free’ and ‘Rational’ action is misleading from the ambiguity of the term ‘freedom.’ 57-59

2. When, by definition and analysis of voluntary action, the issue in the Free Will Controversy has been made clear, it appears that the cumulative argument for Determinism is almost overwhelming: 59-65

3. still it is impossible to me in acting not to regard myself as free to do what I judge to be reasonable. However the solution of the metaphysical question of Free Will is not important--Theology apart--for systematic Ethics generally: 65-70

4. it seems however to have a special relation to the notion of Justice: 71-72

5. The practical unimportance of the question of Free Will becomes more clear if we scrutinize closely the range of volitional effects.72-76

CHAPTER VI

ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND METHODS

1. The Methods indicated in chap. i. have a _prima facie_ claim to proceed on reasonable principles: other principles seem, in so far as they can be made precise, to reduce themselves to these: 77-80

2. especially the principle of “living according to Nature.” 80-83

3. In short, all varieties of Method may conveniently be classed under three heads: Intuitionism and the two kinds of Hedonism, Egoistic and Universalistic. The common confusion between the two latter is easily explained, but must be carefully guarded against. 83-87

Note 87-88

CHAPTER VII

EGOISM AND SELF-LOVE

1. To get a clear idea of what is commonly known as Egoism, we must distinguish and exclude several possible meanings of the term: 89-93

2. and define its end as the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain for the agent,--pleasures being valued in proportion to their pleasantness. 93-95

CHAPTER VIII

INTUITIONISM

1. I apply the term Intuitional--in the narrower of two legitimate senses--to distinguish a method in which the rightness of some kinds of action is assumed to be known without consideration of ulterior consequences. 96-98

2. The common antithesis between Intuitive and Inductive is inexact, since this method does not necessarily proceed from the universal to the particular. We may distinguish Perceptional Intuitionism, according to which it is always the rightness of some particular action that is held to be immediately known: 98-100

3. Dogmatic Intuitionism, in which the general rules of Common Sense are accepted as axiomatic: 100-101

4. Philosophical Intuitionism, which attempts to find a deeper explanation for these current rules. 101-103

Note 103-104

CHAPTER IX

GOOD

1. Another important variety of Intuitionism is constituted by substituting for “right” the wider notion “good.” 105-106

2. The common judgment that a thing is “good” does not on reflection appear to be equivalent to a judgment that it is directly or indirectly pleasant. 106-109

3. “Good” = “desirable” or “reasonably desired”: as applied to conduct, the term does not convey so definite a dictate as “right,” and it is not confined to the strictly voluntary. 109-113

4. There are many other things commonly judged to be good: but reflection shows that nothing is ultimately good except some mode of human existence. 113-115

BOOK II

EGOISM

CHAPTER I

THE PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF EGOISM

1. The Principle of Egoistic Hedonism is the widely accepted proposition that the rational end of conduct for each individual is the Maximum of his own Happiness or Pleasure. 119-121

2. There are several methods of seeking this end: but we may take as primary that which proceeds by Empirical-reflective comparison of pleasures. 121-122

CHAPTER II

EMPIRICAL HEDONISM

1. In this method it is assumed that all pleasures sought and pains shunned are commensurable; and can be arranged in a certain scale of preferableness: 123-125

2. pleasure being defined as “feeling apprehended as desirable by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it.” 125-130

Note 130