Chapter XXI: Part 21

The third objection and doubtless the most important one of all is the superficial and unradical character of the remedy. It is not here implied that the project is useless although inclusive. The point made is this, that whatever the "General" may do to dredge the bogs of sin and clean the streets of beggars, the idlers, the unemployed, the waifs, the prostitutes, the drunkards, and the criminal class, and put all such in the way of usefulness, manliness, and respectability, what does he do or what is to be done to keep the new or fresh material from sinking into mire? While the "General" is working among the lowest, thousands are being prepared among the highest for the inevitable fate from which he is plucking the helpless ones as brands from the burning. While he is gathering up the submerged and placing them in his machine, the mill without still grinds on and on, crushing as large a number year by year as he may help and save. His method might consistently be compared to one where a man would transform rotten apples into good ones without affecting the tree that produces them. Although the criminal and sinful classes influence the innocent and unsophisticated, yet it cannot be proven that the bulk of the people will remain pure, true, honest, upright, if there were no sinful or criminal class! And hence even if all such who are avowedly sinful were made better and their pernicious influence removed from the world by the method here proposed, sin itself would still inhere in the nature of man's life and would drag thousands down to ruin and misery. Like the mosaic paintings which can only be destroyed by destroying the stones upon which they are impressed, so sin seems to be bound up in human nature. To get at it and destroy it utterly by one _coup_ one must annihilate the constitution of the universe. The problem of civilisation is such that it cannot be solved by one specific reform. For to develop man it seems to be necessary that he should pass through the treatment which the long and inevitable process of experience and education can give. Although sin like poverty is but relative, yet it is the name for the conduct into which man is led either by a neglect or abuse of opportunity, or by some inevitable fatality. It is not here contended that man cannot rid himself or society of any disposition to sin. What is maintained is that it cannot be abolished from the world by any spasmodic effort such as that which characterises the present project, but that it will pass away only where and when humanity becomes perfectly educated. And this state of civilisation, by the way, does not seem to be so surprisingly near at hand. Nor can material help, such as food, shelter, clothing, and what not, altogether effect or even change the moral status of a man's life. Thousands whose material wants are amply provided for revel in sin and corruption, and the dreadful orgy where vice holds carnival reels and swaggers in the palaces where amid gilded refinements and dazzling splendor the so-called better classes disport themselves. It is true that when a man is starving or naked, bread and clothing are the things which will satisfy his most immediate wants, and not prayers or sermons. To supply such wants is easy enough, but to so arouse or kindle into a flame of fortitude and manliness, the diseased conscience and the perverted judgment, to so operate upon the will as to make the man able to not only choose but do the right, is the great and radical difficulty which is not so easily overcome. Psychology and medicine seem to have no remedy to offer, while religion for these many years has simply touched the hem of the garment—while the abandoned classes have seemingly multiplied on our hands.

In concluding these remarks we cannot forbear to express our regret that the real author of the book has given it over to "General" Booth and allowed him not only the credit of authorship, but most likely also the privilege of mixing up a scheme of social reform with the politics of the Salvation Army. The book was "boomed" in this way, but we fear that it will at the same time be doomed in this way. The Salvation Army and its founder have reaped much undeserved praise. "General" Booth has received incredible sums from enthusiasts to support the scheme, and these sums have to a great extent been used to advertise it. It appears to us that "General" Booth has contracted a debt which he will be unable to pay. The better situated classes of society do not lack in sympathy for their wretched fellow-men, and it sets us thinking, how strong human sentimentality must be that the propagation of the mere idea of curing the evils of mankind proposed in this book as feasible with the aid of one million pounds furnishes ample means to a religious enthusiast whose method of salvation is rather noisy than thorough, representing a kind of barbarous relapse and only adapted to the lowest and most uneducated classes. We should know that sentimentality cannot save. Sentiment and sympathy are good things, but unless they are backed by a cold consideration of fact and rational foresight, they are worse than useless.

It will be wise to consider the propositions made in "In Darkest England" without taking into consideration the rôle to be played in the scheme by the Salvation Army. But while the reader may be just enough to consider the plan of social reform on its own merits, "General" Booth is in possession of the funds and will be the general manager of the experiment.

Γκ.

PLANKTON-STUDIEN. Vergleichende Untersuchungen ueber die Bedeutung
und Zusammensetzung der pelagischen Fauna und Flora. By _Ernst
Haeckel_. Jena: Gustav Fischer.

The first systematic studies of the innumerable organisms which almost everywhere drift about in the ocean, were made by Professor Johannes Müller who some forty years ago made excursions in the North Sea. Haeckel, then a student twenty years old, accompanied him on one of these excursions to Heligoland. Since then these investigations have been conducted on a larger scale. The English vessel "Challenger" cruised in different oceans for no less than forty months, and the results of this great undertaking were published by John Murray in the "Voyage of H. M. S. Challenger"—a voluminous work consisting of eighty-two zo-ological reports, to which Professor Haeckel also has contributed his "Report on the Deep-Sea Keratosa." The German government sent out the German cruiser "National" on the same errand. The scientists of the expedition were Hensen, Brandt, Dahl, Schütt, Fischer, Krümmel. They were at sea altogether ninety-three days making a circuitous trip on the Atlantic ocean, touching at the Bermudas, Brazil, and the Azores. The results of the expedition, published in reports by Hensen, Brandt, Du Bois-Reymond, and Krümmel, were considered as very satisfactory and received the unreserved applause of the German press. Professor Haeckel is of a different opinion. He considers the reports as standing in flat contradiction to former valuable observations, especially to those of the English "Challenger" and the Italian "Vettor Pisani" expeditions. Hensen's results rest upon a weak supposition and contain wrong generalisations; even his method is, according to Haeckel, entirely useless, giving a wrong presentation of the problems of pelagic biology.

The word "plancton" was introduced by Hensen. Haeckel adopts it because he considers the Greek term preferable to Johannes Müller's _Auftrieb_ or pelagic _Mulder_ (the latter has been adopted also by English, French, and Italian planctologists). By plancton (πλαγκτόν), derived from πλάζω, to roam about, is understood the drifting micro-organisms of the sea.

Professor Haeckel in the present volume not only corrects Professor Hensen's errors, but also gives a report of his own observations. Not the least valuable part of the brochure is the exact terminology which Professor Haeckel proposes in order to escape the confusion necessarily resulting from a looseness of terms.

Κ.

DIE ALLGEMEINE WELTANSCHAUUNG IN IHRER HISTORISCHEN ENTWICKELUNG.
Charakterbilder aus der Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften. By
_Carus Sterne_. Mit zahlreichen Porträts und Textabbildungen.
Stuttgart: Otto Weisert.

Dr. Ernst Krause, better known by the _nom de plume_ of "Carus Sterne," has here undertaken to present the modern world-conception as contrasted with the olden one. We have scarcely ever met with a book that contains in so popular a form all the noteworthy facts of the great progress that has been achieved in science since the time of Copernicus. The results of the evolution-theory are generally known, but the road and the stations of the road on which science has reached its present position, now almost universally recognised among men, are almost forgotten. No one perhaps is better able to tell us of this great struggle for truth than the enthusiastic disciple of Darwin, Carus Sterne. Carus Sterne and his friend Prof. Ernst Haeckel, have done no small work in obtaining recognition for the theory of evolution in Germany. While Haeckel's work has been confined to the field of exact science, Carus Sterne has complemented the labors of his co-worker by pointing out the moral truths contained in Darwinism. We are aware of the fact that Carus Sterne has also written purely scientific works, "Werden und Vergehen," for instance; but what we wish to emphasise as his especial merit is that he was, so far as we know, the first to call attention to the moral workings of nature in her great cosmic empire. As an article characteristic of this trait in Carus Sterne's writings we refer the reader not familiar with German literature to his article "The Education of Parents by their Children," a translation of which appeared in Nos. 22 and 23 of _The Open Court_.

The present book (over 400 pages) discusses the following subjects: Pagan and Christian Cosmology; Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, and Kepler; The Controversy Concerning the Geo-centric View; The Infinitude of Habitable Worlds; From Bacon to Newton; The Beginnings of an Animal- and Plant-Geography; The Doctrine of Spontaneous Generation; The Discussion Concerning the Origin of Birds; The Terrestrial Globe and Its Fossils; Diluvianism; The Mongrel Theory; The Doctrines of Preformation and Metamorphosis; The Doctrine of Catastrophes; Persistence or Mutability; The Controversy on the Anthropocentric View; The Origin of Language; On the History of Evolution.

Κ.

UEBER DIE AUFGABEN EINER ALLGEMEINEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT. By Dr. _Alb.
Herm. Post_. Oldenburg and Leipsic: A. Schwartz.

The author of this little book, Dr. Albert Hermann Post, a Judge of the courts of the free city of Bremen, Germany, has made the study of ethnological jurisprudence the scientific work of his life. His idea and purpose are to establish a positive science of jurisprudence in the widest and most comprehensive sense of the word, on the basis of an investigation of all the forms of law, available to research, that have ever appeared. A universal science of jurisprudence, according to this conception, would have for its subject-matter the contents of the jural sense or consciousness of the entire human race,—the jural facts of the totality of human society. In other words, this science must be, not only historical, but _ethnological_. It must include the jural life not only of the civilised, but also of the uncivilised races of mankind: it must comprehend _all_. It thus constitutes a step beyond that great movement of the beginning of this century which gave us the science of the history of law. It extends the latter, supplements it, and aims to find in the juro-social existence of undeveloped and uncivilised races the germs of legal practices and institutions that the literary history and traditions of civilised peoples would never supply.

The matter of the present work of Dr. Post takes up some 215 pages. It treats of the available sources of such a universal science of law, of the elaboration of these sources; it gives a concise and illustrative epitome of the most important parallel phenomena met with in the jural life of the human race,—e. g. in the departments of the Law of Inheritance, of Property, of Marriage, etc., etc.,—and a survey of the separate ethnic divisions of law over the whole earth.

It is a grand task—the realisation of this conception. And its execution in its enormous magnitude is only possible through the speedy and intelligent co-operation of scientists and travellers as well as jurists. It will make of jurisprudence a _natural science_, as distinguished from the _a priori_ character this study has up till now assumed; and its prosecution will impart into the science a light and freshness which it sadly needs. Next to theology, the science of law is least pervaded with the spirit of modern research. And this is eminently so in our country, where hardly the history, let alone the ethnology of law, is studied.

We are tempted to give a much more thorough and detailed exposition of Dr. Post's ideas. But an original article will appear from his pen in a future number of _The Monist_, and therefore we are brief.

μκρκ.

PERIODICALS.

MIND. January, 1891. No. LXI.

CONTENTS:

ON PHYSIOLOGICAL EXPRESSION IN PSYCHOLOGY. By Prof. _A. Bain_.

APPERCEPTION AND THE MOVEMENT OF ATTENTION. By _G. F. Stout_.

HELMHOLTZ'S THEORY OF SPACE-PERCEPTION. By _J. H. Hyslop_.

THE PRINCIPLE OF INDUCTION. By _L. T. Hobhouse_.

THE UNDYING GERM-PLASM AND THE IMMORTAL SOUL. By _R. von
Lendenfeld_.

CRITICAL NOTICES: Pikler's "The Psychology of the Belief in
Objective Existence"; Ferrier's "The Croonian Lectures on
Cerebral Localisation"; Jevons's "Pure Logic and other
Minor Works"; Marshall's "Principles of Economics, I";
Mackenzie's "An Introduction to Social Philosophy"; Fouillée's
"L'Evolutionnisme des Idées-Forces"; Koenig's "Die Entwicklung
des Causalproblems."

_On Physiological Expression in Psychology._ In opposition to the "subjective purism" in psychology advocated by Mr. Stout and Mr. Bradley. The mixture of the psychical with the physical is such as to prove that mental processes, however distinct from bodily processes, have never owned even a vocabulary of their own. Pleasure and pain are psychical states, but we cannot theorise fully upon them without adverting to their physical causes or conditions. The action of drugs proves that the physical constitution of the nerve-substance is a paramount condition of our sensibility, pleasurable or painful. By taking the organs of special sense in separation we can exhaust the modes of sensibility under each, and when we look minutely into the anatomy of the several organs, we obtain further helps to the subdivision and distinction of the individual sensations. Connected with the physics of the brain, apart from the nervous substance and its conditions, is the important state known as excitement, with its opposites quiescence, languor, repose, drowsiness, sleep, and insensibility. The theory of the Will must rely, in the first instance, upon subjective sequences, but the physical consequences of pleasure and pain are a two-fold activity—Expression and Volition, and for verification of any hypothesis as to priority between these two forms of the physical outcome of feeling, the sequence must be taken on the physical side alone. As regards the emotions, taken in themselves, the tracing of physical concomitance is unavoidable. In Psycho-physics the experiments are made upon the physical side, though not to the exclusion of subjective reference. A law relating to the seat of ideas obtained in the first instance through the senses, declares the nervous tracts to be the same in both, thus connecting Sense with Intellect. It has always been impossible to avoid describing ideas as modified repetitions of sensation, and employing for that purpose the materialism of the sense-organs. While eminently applicable to all the phenomena of mind at their elementary stage—Sensation, Intellect, Emotion, Will—physiological conditions cease to have the like bearing in the higher complications. In all that part of Association that states the order of recurrence of our ideas in Memory, subjective investigation is paramount and exclusive. But the state described as conscious intensity, excitement, mental concentration, attention, interest, is expressible both subjectively and physiologically. The constant application of spiritual remedies to bodily ailments is an important aspect of the union of mind and body, and their interaction in those instances is of great significance.

_Apperception and the Movement of Attention._ Thinking is action directed towards intellectual ends. Intellectual ends are attained by an appropriate combination of movements of attention. Attention and apperception, as this word is applied by Steinthal, reciprocally determine each other. The nature of attention is explained in accordance with the monoideism of M. Ribot, but contrary to his view it is declared to be a constant character of our mental life, although the monoideism is not always complete. Apperception is the process by which a mental system incorporates or tends to incorporate a new element. The effect of attention is largely dependent on the apperception which accompanies it, and of which it is an auxiliary process. The movement of attention fastening upon the presentation to be apperceived, fixes it in the focus of consciousness, until the appercipient system has finally succeeded or failed in assimilating it. The reason why one ideal group becomes appercipient in preference to the others lies mainly in its greater affinity with the presentation to be apperceived. The conditions determining the strength of apperceptive systems may be either extrinsic or intrinsic. The extrinsic consist in passing circumstances which from time to time favor its activity. The intrinsic conditions are inherent in the constitution of the system itself. Among the former are the co-operation of another system; the recovery or the intensity of its own previous action; the influence of organic sensation; its own freshness arising from previous repose. Of these the organic sensation is of fundamental importance. The influence of the cœnæsthesis pervades the whole mental life. Every specific kind of emotion is accompanied by a characteristic mode of organic reaction. The intrinsic conditions are the comprehensiveness of the system; its internal organisation, of which the philosophy of Hegel is cited as an example; the strength of the cohesion between its parts; the nature of the sensory material which enters predominantly into its composition, that is, the comparative excitability of ideas derived from different senses. The normal working of competition, co-operation, and conflict, may be illustrated by contrasting it with the pathological state called _suggestibility_, in which those processes are more or less completely in abeyance. The conditions which determine the train of ideas arise from the fact that attention, being a motor process, depends on feeling, which dependence cannot be separated from that on apperception. Feeling gives unity to mental process, and is a simple mode of consciousness resulting from the excitement of a multiplicity of elements, and it causes attention to be concentrated on the central presentation from which the wave of excitement is radiated. The essential characteristic of a train of _thought_, as distinguished from a mere train of ideas, is that the relation linking each idea to its predecessor forms also a source of the interest through which it attracts attention. The ground of the distinction is that thinking involves the activity of a proportional system as such, that is "a system adapted to apperceive objects in other respects most diverse from each other, merely because they agree in being capable of entering into certain relations." The modified working of the principle of association through the apperceptive activity of a proportional system, is _proportional_ or _analogical production_, which may possibly operate in every instance of the suggestion of one idea by another. A reversion of attention to a previous link in a chain of ideas, giving rise to a modified repetition of it, is a distinctive feature of _thinking_. In a separate article will be dealt with the special part played by language, which from a psychological point of view is "a peculiar movement of attention having a peculiar influence on apperceptive process."

_Helmholtz's Theory of Space-Perception._ The doctrine of "unconscious inference" is explicitly founded upon the general theory of knowledge formed by Helmholtz, which is identical with that of Kant, and Helmholtz's investigation into the genesis of space-perception applied to the problem which Kant did not consider, namely, the perception of particular or concrete spaces. The distinction made by the former between the inference from the data of sense and that in which the data are consciously known to be signs, by calling the inductive inferences of the sciences _conscious_, and those involved in external perception of world _unconscious_, is open to the charge of involving a contradiction. On the one hand, the theory of "unconscious inference" supports the empirical doctrine of perception only in consequence of calling the process an inference. On the other hand, to call the process "unconscious" is to restore the conception of immediacy which the idea of inference is supposed to exclude. This contradiction may not be insisted on, but, as the phenomena of binocular adjustment discussed in a previous article showed in the visual consciousness a _quale_ which, with or without its relation to tactual and muscular extension, was other than plane dimension, Helmholtz must, unless this _quale_ can be proved to be result of inference, limit the application of his theory to the synthetic connection between touch and sight. _Parallax of motion_, which consists of the different afferent movements or velocities of bodies in horizontal meridians, and situated at different distances from the observer, seems to do the same for monocular vision that adjustment and fusion do for binocular vision. The phenomena attending certain experiments in which the parallax of motion was observed "correspond exactly to the conception of those who hold that the representative of plane dimension in the retinal image decides the nature of all perceptions whose character is not presented in the image except as a visual sign, and hence that aught beyond magnitude must be the result of influence." An examination of Helmholtz's fundamental principle, "the denial of all pre-established harmony between the nature of impressions and the nature of the external world," confirms the view that the conception of space may be properly a visual one, requiring the superior constancy of touch to correct illusions growing out of the complexities of vision. If we limit visual phenomena as data to mere variations of kind and distinctness in color, we cannot account for such cases as the appearance and inversion of mathematical perspective, binocular localisation and translocation, and the distinct effect of the monocular parallax of motion, qualities which are dimensional in their nature. "While the complexities of space-perception make the co-operation of inferential agencies very probable, yet the spacial quality must be originally given somewhere in consciousness either as an object of perception or as a mental construction, in order to furnish a basis for inferences to its existence or its relations where they are not immediately cognised. This makes the developed conceptions of abstract and synthetic space a complex of inferences and intuitions."

_The Principle of Induction._ The ultimate major premiss of Induction according to Mill is the Law of Causation which, as he treats it, is a wide generalisation true of sequences just as other generalisations are true of the facts of space. Hence it is itself an induction like other inductions. What is wanted is "an axiom expressing in general terms what we do when we make a particular statement universal, which makes explicit the truth implied by the making of any generalisation whatever." The Law of Causation will be found to be a particular application of this wider axiom, and the axiom itself must be sought from the analysis of ordinary simple generalisations. When we connect truths together, or reason, we _support_ an inferred judgment by some other assertion. That we should be able to reason at all involves that any fact, as _B_, should have some other fact, as _C_, to which it is always related; that is, "any fact precisely resembling this _B_, whatever its other attributes and concomitants may be, will be found in a precisely similar relation to a precisely similar _C_." A relation exists between two facts whenever the mind can at once distinguish the facts as two, and at the same time attend to them together and assert something of them considered together. We may speak of a relation between different aspects of the same existing thing. The three alternatives afforded by the axiom as ultimately stated correspond to the three cases in which _A_ is the "sum of the conditions of _B_," or in any way a universal correlate of _B_; in which it is the cause of _B_ in the popular sense of the term; and in which its connection with _B_ is merely 'causal,' that is, "the Law of Causation is the Axiom of Reasoning as applied to the sequences of phenomena." Every fact observed stands in universal relation to some other fact. The judgment of that relation "is implied in the rudimentary inference which states only the particular fact observed and the particular fact now expected. It is explicit in the reason that is conscious of its own grounds and methods, and takes there the form of the universal judgment, or major premiss."

_The Undying Germ-Plasm and the Immortal Soul._ All unicellular beings such as the Protozoa and the simpler Algæ, Fungi, etc., reproduce themselves by means of simple fission, and consequently they are immortal. All the single individuals of a family of unicellular beings belong to each other, although they be isolated. Amongst certain infusoria they do, in fact, remain together and build up branching colonies. Later on, division of labor made its appearance and increased the dependence of the individuals upon one another, so that their individuality was to a great extent lost. By the development of this process, multicellular Metazoa arose from colonies of similar Protozoa, and at length culminated in the higher animals and man. All the cell-series are immortal, but they all must die because the structure which is built up by them collectively is mortal. The reproductive cells are the only kind adapted for existence outside the body, and from time to time some of the human reproductive cells succeed in conjugating, and from them a new individual arises. The whole structure of man is acquired with the one object in view of maintaining the series of reproductive cells, of which he is, so to speak, the slave. They are the most important and essential and also the undying parts of the organism. The series of reproductive cells thus possess the essential attributes of the human soul. If we compare the conception of the soul as held by various related religions, and take the characteristics invariably ascribed to the soul, we find that they hold also for the series of reproductive cells continually developing within the body. The ordinary conception of the fate of the soul after death agrees fundamentally with the result of observation on the prosperity of the series of germ-cells. That fate depends on conduct in the body, and the only possible definition of a good deed, that is approved by conscience, is one which will benefit the series of germ-cells arising from one individual, that is ourselves and our family, and further which will be of use to others with their own series of germ-cells, and that in proportion to the degree of connection or relationship. Thus, "the apparently enigmatical conception of the eternal soul is founded on the actual immortality and continuity of the germ-plasma." (London: Williams & Norgate.)

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. January, 1891. Vol. I. No. 2.

CONTENTS:

THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES. By _D. G. Ritchie_.

A NEW STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. By _Prof. Josiah Royce_.

THE INNER LIFE IN RELATION TO MORALITY. By _J. H. Muirhead_.

MORAL THEORY AND PRACTICE. By _Prof. John Dewey_.

MORALS IN HISTORY. By _Prof. Fr. Jodl_.

THE ETHICS OF DOUBT—CARDINAL NEWMAN. By _W. L. Sheldon_.

THE ETHICS OF SOCIALISM. Steinthal—The Social Utopia;
Paulsen—Socialism and Social Reform. By _Prof. Franklin H.
Giddings_.

ETHICAL AND KINDRED SOCIETIES IN GREAT BRITAIN. By _Mrs. M.
McCallum_.

_A New Study of Psychology._ There are three fairly distinct types of treatment in text-books of psychology. The first type, is the science of the "mind" considered as an entity, of whose nature we might otherwise know much or little, but of which we at all events knew that it had a certain substantial unity. This was supplemented, or succeeded, by the theory of the 'ideas,' and their 'associations.' A third method confines its investigations to the facts and laws of the nervous system, with only such use of introspection as was found absolutely indispensable. Professor James, in his "Principles of Psychology," does not accept primarily any one of these views. The unit he adopts in mental analysis might be defined as "so much of the mental process as may be supposed to run parallel to a relatively simple nervous function in the cortex of the living brain, in so far as this cortex functions with a certain unity." Professor James rejects the unconscious in every form, and above all the unconscious mind-atom. He says, "the special natural science of psychology must stop with the mere functional formula. If the passing be the directly verifiable existent, which no school has hitherto doubted it to be, then that thought is itself the thinker, and psychology need not look beyond." This life of passing thoughts needs only the fundamental hypothesis that the moments as they pass really know one another, that the present is actually acquainted with the past, in order to give as a resultant of the whole life such unity as we need for purposes of psychological science. In relation to volition and freedom, Professor James holds that the idea of the end tends more and more to make itself all-sufficient, and that "motives," so-called, are "ideas of ends" which owing to their conflict, are unable to pass over into acts so long as they remain mere motives. The experience of deciding a conflict of motives is "the experience of the triumph of one idea of the end over other ideas." The act of voluntary decision is experienced as an act of "conscious attention to an idea," and nothing else. Volition is primarily a relation, "not between ourself and extra-mental matter, but between ourself and our own states of mind." Professor James's own belief is that the question of freewill is insolvable on strictly psychological grounds, although on ethical grounds he ascribes to the alternative of freedom. In relation to the question of pleasure and pain as motives, he points out that the 'idea-motor' acts, even on a very high plane, express the presence of the 'idea of an end,' and this end may itself be very painful, yet it tends to carry itself out. It wins because we attend to it, and whether or no attention is free, certain it is that attention often rather determines pleasure and pain themselves, than is determined by them. In conclusion Professor Royce says in relation to Professor James's book: "His 'passing moments,' which can 'know' and which can freely 'attend,' which are 'self-related,' and which have 'unity,' and which are still so intimately bound to the 'neural process,' have just the paradoxical and hypothetical character which requires one, in one's philosophy, to go beyond them, and to declare them but illusory expressions in phenomenal form of an infinitely deeper truth."

_The Inner Life in Relation to Morality._ The emotions that are called up by the thought of the world as an organic whole constitute the inner life, that which Clifford calls 'cosmic emotion.' These emotions, although they do not end in the human soul, impart a spirit and diffuse an air over the rest of life: they have no separate external expression of their own. The pivot of man's inner life is the thought of himself as a part or member of a universal order. The object of the paper is to answer the questions: what this thought is, or ought to be; what are some of the forms which the feeling it rouses takes; what are some of its special relations to social morality; and what practical means may be suggested under modern conditions for the cultivation of it. The view of the world most characteristic of the time in which we live, has laid the foundation for an entirely new attitude of mind towards the cosmos at large. The world is now known to be an organic whole. This organism is the invisible background which is presupposed in the partial glimpses of it which we call common perception and the special sciences. If we look _inwards_ we have the _human conscience_ as the symbol of a microcosm of moral relations between the different parts of our nature on the one hand and the different members of human society on the other. The cosmic principle clothing itself in the twofold garb of which we know it, is the ultimate object of the emotion described as the inner life. This brings with it that which lies at the root of all religion—the sense of dependence, by which is meant, the feeling that we are born into and supported by a world which our individual wills did not make. This at first produces a vague sense of fear in the presence of forces other and mightier than ourselves. But generally it has passed in us into a higher form, a sense of fearless faith in truth and right, which are the laws of nature. The faculty of relating ourselves to the world in its widest, which is also its deepest, aspects, with its appropriate feeling invests our everyday duties with a new meaning, and gives them a wider range by connecting them with the general life of the world. Morality is thus raised to a higher power; it passes from "mere morality" into "morality touched with emotion," and thus becomes a species of religion. Among other means of cultivating the inner life are the attending the _services_ of the churches, although faith has been lost in their dogmas; the reading of the books, whether belonging to Christian literature or not, which are in the best sense religious; the study of philosophy. We are on the right lines if we cling to the great watchwords of our own time,—Evolution, Progress, Organic Order.

_Moral Theory and Practice._ Moral theory is the analytic perception of the conditions and relations in hand in a given act,—it is the action in idea. It is the construction of the act in thought against its outward construction. It is, therefore, the doing,—the act itself, in its emerging. So far are we from any divorce of moral theory and practice, that theory is the ideal act, and conduct is the executed insight. Moral conduct is absolutely individualised, and it is precisely that which realises an idea, a conception. The breadth of action is measured by the insight of the agent. Just so far as the question, What are the conditions which require action and what the action they demand, is raised and answered, is action moral and not merely instinctive or sentimental. This is a work of analysis, which requires the possession of certain working tools. What we call moral rules are precisely such tools of analysis. The Golden Rule is a marvellous tool of analysis but it gives no knowledge, of itself, of what we should do. As a tool of analysis the moral rule is an idea. A philosophic theory of ethics is a similar idea to the Golden Rule, but one of deeper grasp, and therefore wider hold. It bears much the same relation to the particular rule as this to the special case. It is a tool for the analysis of its meaning, and thereby a tool for giving it greater effect. At the back of the Golden Rule are other larger ideas which have realised themselves, and been so buried in the common consciousness of men, that they have become integrated with the content of the Golden Rule which itself has become a vast idea, or working tool, of practice. Every philosophic theory of ethics performs in its degree this same service. A man's duty is, not to obey rules, but to respond to the nature of the actual demands which he finds made upon him. The rule is merely an aid toward discriminating what the nature of these relations and demands is. A man has not to do Justice, and Love, and Truth; he has to do justly and truly and lovingly. The relative distinction between the "is" and the "ought," is that the "ought" is the "is" of _action_. The difference between a practical and a theoretical consciousness is that the former is consciousness of _something to be done_. And this consciousness of something to be done is the consciousness of duty. Theory is the cross-section made by intelligence of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be; practice is the realisation of the idea thus gained: it is theory in action.

_Morals in History._ A glance at the history of morals reveals independence and changeableness always and everywhere side by side. So far as we are acquainted with man in social community, the will of the community speaks to the individual concerning his practical conduct with authority; and as an inner appropriation of that will, "the authority of conscience, of practical reason, which naturally exists only in the individual, but through friction with the community becomes filled with a universally valid content." The origin of the common will is lost in the mysterious darkness of primitive times, or of divine revelation. It is science which first extends the individual's circle of experience. Morality is a product of evolution, and is in a state of continual transformation. The sum of the ethical principles or ideals which at any time are current in any nation, presents nothing else than the conception of all that is reciprocally required in a practical direction of its members, for the advantage and profit of the community and the individual persons in it. The requirements of social adaptation are raised into the consciousness of the community. Thus full harmony between the practical needs of a time and its ethics can only be a transitory one. The conditions which evoke the individual will to carry out its own ideals over against the current ones, are none other than those upon which the formation of new organs in general is dependent. The new principles must be of assistance to felt needs; they must be founded in the vital relations of the social body. In answer to the question whether there is progress in morality, it must be said that the circle is becoming continually greater of those over whom the strict import of the conception of humanity is extended. And this is accompanied by an increasing tenderness towards individuals within the limits unchangeably set by the needs of the community. The means by which we strive to actualise our ideals are becoming more rational, and "the consciousness is continually becoming clearer, with which all moral principles and judgments are referred to what they signify for the welfare of the race and for its capacity to develop." But do men become better? Probably, on the whole, the inner relations of morality remain unchanged, although quite important shifting may take place at special times and in special stages. It may be that "considered from the highest historical point of view, subjective morality—that is, the conformity of individuals to the standard—relatively declines as the higher elaboration of the moral ideals advances." But this need by no means be the last word of historical development. Intelligence carries illumination into unknown paths which no one as yet has traversed, making the surrounding darkness blacker. But the will finds the means of achieving what is clearly conceived. We have no occasion to be distrustful of the energies of our race. We must not overlook the increasing influence which our scientific knowledge must exercise, not only upon the industrial but also upon the social instinct. The conviction is making rapid strides that even the widest lordship of man over nature must ultimately be a curse to the ruler himself, unless he succeeds in establishing the more beautiful and important supremacy over man; that is, over the natural forces in his own breast—the brutality of passion, the hardness of egoism, and the crudity of moral ignorance. But this can be the work only of scientific knowledge and of its increasing application to social ethical problems.

_The Ethics of Doubt—Cardinal Newman._ There was an ethical trend in the character and spirit of Cardinal Newman, which lifted him above any one sect or creed and made him a power to all classes of serious minds. The especial influence now excited upon us by his thought, comes from his very antagonism to what is the conspicuous feature in the intellectual life of our century,—the prevalence of doubt, and the growth of rationalism. Goethe sounded the note of warning as to the chief menace that would come to our age through rationalism; that there are few who have a great mind and at the same time are disposed to action; intellect broadens the thought, but tends to weaken the will. Newman has brought it home to us that there is a certain kind of rationalism which is dangerous to character, and we may be forced to consider whether we shall not soon be required in the sphere of ethics to discourage somewhat the universal tendency of doubt and distrust with reference to elemental convictions. There is no question that for many minds the first doubt as to whether a certain class of acts is wrong was the first step in moral decline. A principle of external authority in ethics is required, although not such an authority as that of the state or an absolute church. What we are in need of is that strength of conviction which would make us willing to die for a belief with reference to the _human_ world. If we were more and more given to recognising the value of this other external authority,—that is, the consensus of all the past voices of history when they speak to us on the moral life,—we might find, more and more, that enthusiasm coming back and firing once more the hearts of the great men of the age, just as the other kind of authority gave hope, fire, and enthusiasm to the purpose of Newman. Notwithstanding the contrast between Newman, the apostle of faith, and Emerson who has been called the apostle of scepticism or of individualism, they had the same intensity of feeling and appalling sincerity, and both had a like expression of spiritual repose. A mediocre follower of either of them can never be a satisfactory character. An ultra-individualism in everything enfeebles the will, just as the complete abnegation of the freedom of thought dwarfs the intellect. In order to have a perfect solution of the difficulty, we need to draw both from Emerson and Newman.

_The Ethics of Socialism._ The question may be raised whether the philosophical ground of ethical truth does not afford philosophical standing to some sort of socialism. This view of the problem has evidently pervaded the thinking of Professor Paulsen in his "System der Ethik mit einem Umriss der Staats- und Gesellschaftslehre," and it is prominent in the "Allgemeine Ethik" of D. H. Steinthal. The first question that ought to be raised in regard to socialism is the sociological question, whether society is a product of that universal evolution which brought man himself into existence and conditions all his thought and doings. If so, we may be sure that there are certain general principles, or laws, to which social evolution has conformed in the past, and to which it will go on conforming in the future. The ethical problems involved in the socialistic propositions now before the public may be reduced to two. _First_, if not all men are converted in thought and feeling to socialism, can a majority have any ethical right to compel a minority to surrender individual initiative and submit to dictation of occupation? _Secondly_ what is an ethical distribution of product among the workers that create it? Plato and Aristotle alone laid the foundation for a rationalistic argument from purely ethical premises, showing that majorities may rightfully do more than enforce contracts and keep the peace, but the modern restatement and completion of that argument remains to be made. As to the second problem, a strong argument could be made in support of the proposition that an ethical distribution of wealth would be one that should afford equality of satisfaction throughout society, of the desires that are ethically commendable. When the clever literary people hypnotised by Mr. Bellamy's dazzling vision begin to resume their intellectual self-direction, they will discover that equality of income and equality of satisfaction, of legitimate desires, are two different things.

_Ethical and Kindred Societies in Great Britain._ Speaking broadly the attitude of the societies towards theology and its exponents may be described as one of non-interference or neutrality. They desire to be rather constructive than destructive in their action, for they believe that desirable changes can only be effected by the slow processes of organic growth. With one exception they have none of the characteristics of a church, and they may be described as lecturing and debating societies with or without the addition of what is commonly known as "practical work." They do not retain the services of a single lecturer, but prefer to have speakers who are independent of each other. (Philadelphia: _International Journal of Ethics_, 1602 Chestnut St.)

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. February, 1891. No. 182.

CONTENTS:

REALISME ET IDEALISME. By _Paul Janet_.

L'ART ET LA LOGIQUE. (1st Art.) By _G. Tarde_.

MORALE ET MÉTAPHYSIQUE. By _J. J. Gourd_.

ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.

REVUE DES PERIODIQUES ETRANGERS.

SOCIÉTÉ DE PSYCHOLOGIE PHYSIOLOGIQUE.

M. Janet remarks, in his article on _Realism and Idealism_, that since Kant philosophy has concentrated all its efforts on the problem of the objectivity of knowledge. The agreement of reality and thought is a truth of which no one doubts, although many centuries were necessary for its observation. Not only is there agreement between nature and mind, but there is analogy, resemblance, affinity, between these two terms. Not only does nature obey the laws of our mind, implying that there is in it a logical and rational element, but it seems to act with the art which intelligence would employ, if it wished to create the products of nature. How is this union of nature and the mind to be explained? Two solutions present themselves: in which thought can be explained by nature, or nature by thought. The first of these solutions is that called _realism_; the second is _idealism_. Each of these systems has strong reasons in its favor. As to the first, thought and nature are not commensurate and opposed. Thought makes itself part of nature, and the only thought we know directly is our own. For human intelligence is bound to the organisation, and appears to follow all its vicissitudes. The basis of idealism is not less firm. External things exist for us only on the condition of passing through our consciousness. Further, the psychological and physiological analysis of sensations reclaims them all as being only states of the ego. But there are serious objections to both hypotheses. Realism is susceptible of two forms. If thought, considered in relation to the origin of ideas, is explained by sensation, it becomes empiricism; if considered in relation to the substratum of thought, this is explained by organisation, it becomes materialism. As against empiricism, may be objected with Kant that sensation does not explain the necessity and universality of scientific judgments. Against materialism, Fichte showed that a thing which is only a thing could never attain to thought. Thus empiricism is overthrown by the impossibility of explaining science; materialism by the impossibility of explaining thought. In order to meet the objection of Kant, and to explain the appearance of _a priori_, the new empiricists have invoked: (1) the principle of inseparable associations; (2) the principle of hereditary associations. On the other side, the new defenders of materialism in order to explain the transformation of motion into thought, have invoked the great principle of the correlation and transformation of forces in nature. But as to inseparable associations, it may be said, that they give us rather a necessity of fact, than a necessity of law. What science requires is absolute and not relative necessity. The same may be said of the principle of hereditary associations, which merely prolong the chain of experiences. But, further, association itself requires explanation, which shows that it cannot account for the principle of causality. As to the use of the principle of transformation of forces to explain the passage of motion into thought, if the objective and physical cause of our sensations is meant, there is merely transformation of motion into motion. If it is said that sensations are only transformed motions, this affirms what is in question, how motion can transform itself into thought. There are no less serious objections against idealism. The principal one is: all our reasonings about nature are established only on condition that we take nature as our basis. We thus reach the double conclusion: neither nature has produced thought, nor thought has produced nature. The ego is, however, in nature, and nature is a representation of the ego, but, while admitting the reciprocal penetration of the two principles, we are obliged to recognise their mutual independence. There is harmony, not identity. But is there not some being in which the real of nature and the real of thought coexist, and who, according to the formula of Schelling, is the absolute subject-object? Idealism, to be consequent, ought to go as far as the absolute consciousness, to the union of the subjective and objective thought. If the two inferior terms are identified in the absolute mind, this will find in nature and in the mind a double expression of itself. Nothing prevents us then, says our author, from understanding nature, with Schelling, as the drowsy mind seeking to arouse itself, and the ego on the contrary as a nature which awakens itself.

M. Tarde in _Art and Logic_ remarks that the word art has two senses. In its wide conception, it includes all the exercises of the imagination and of human ingenuity, invention in a thousand forms. But in another sense of the word, it answers to the æsthetic needs of society. If we had regard only to the art of the most advanced epochs, we should perhaps say that it serves to satisfy the need of inventive expression or of expressive invention. It seems then, in effect, to be before all expressive or inventive, and the second of these traits appears the most essential. The property of art and also of morality is to seek and to believe to find a divine end in life, a great end worthy of individual sacrifice. When art presents itself separated from morality, when it is an agent not of harmony but of social dissolution, it is a sign that it is imported from abroad. Art is then immoral and dissolvent. In all ages truly logical art has been only the translator and the illuminator of morality.

The work of art is not like a product of industry, an artificial organ added to the individual, it is an artificial, imaginary mistress. The privilege of art is to arouse in us sentiments which play in the social life and logic, precisely the rôle of love in the individual life and logic. The sentiment of art is a _collective love_ and rejoices to be such. Art is social joy, as love is individual joy.