Chapter XXX: Part 30

_On the Nature of Consciousness._ Concluding his series of articles on the nature of human consciousness with an internal analysis of consciousness, the writer remarks, that without having recourse to the testimony of hypnotic experiments or to the phenomenon of so-called "mental suggestion," which so conspicuously demonstrates the reciprocal compenetration of the individual sphere of consciousness, we find a constant, normal, and substantial bond between that which constitutes and conditions the whole accord or harmony of the spiritual life of individual man; because, if from our individual consciousness this vital bond is removed which unites us to other consciousnesses, to the preceding as well as the following ones; if there is removed from our individual consciousness the connection and partnership of all succession, of all that is suggested and suggestible, it will lose both form and contents, and be turned into nothing.... We know that man is the heir of the work of previous races, of their organisation and feeling. All human feelings,—the results of adaptation,—all the instincts and appetites are precisely just as our organs, they are our psycho-physical organisation. Feeling is the original basis of individual consciousness; and thus, in consciousness itself, in our feeling itself,—we are able to disclose several radical, universal elements. We, unaccountably, attribute every reality to particular feelings, and we cannot imagine that these peculiarities depend exclusively upon our subjective individual feeling, on our own eyes and ears. Light, warmth, hardness, sound, colors are naïvely conceived within our consciousness, irrespective of the objective properties of the things themselves. Usually we suppose that the sun shines, the sea roars, flowers are fragrant simply through our personal presumption. We do not understand that our own feelings experience certain sensations in the presence of the given phenomena.... If we now conceive that all sensation presupposes something that is sentient; it is clear that feeling, as conditioning the perception of the material world, cannot be merely subjective. Recognising the objective reality of the material world, we presuppose anthropomorphically a general feeling. The elements of which the external world consists correspond to the fundamental aspects of sensation and to the elements of sense. A sensual universe, in so far as we recognise its objectivity, presupposes a universal sense, with which our own individual sensation must be connected. In reference to the analysis of moral consciousness the writer refers the reader to the works of Kant. If there is a solidarity of myself with all things, then it is clear that I am bound to live up to it. As in a general way I am conscious of the existence and reality of other beings, so I likewise feel an ideal, moral necessity of a common altruism, of a common and perfect love toward all. This general love is distinguished from natural inclination, and is contrary to it; this constitutes my bounden _duty_ in my relation to all, and is a general ethical law. One cannot maintain that man knew this law _a priori_, because he was moral before and he knew it not. Still, it is less possible, that man knew this general and unconditional verity _a posteriori_—that he knew good without goodness, morals without morality. But, when man attains to a certain degree of self-knowledge, when he has detached himself from the omnipotent tyranny of prejudices, and of all traditional principles of congenital morals, then he grows conscious of this law, and finds it in himself. This law is not anything external to us, but it is deposited within us. In just the same proportion as we recognise the law of causality, we shall also recognise the moral law. _Reason_ itself is compelled to arouse in us conscience,—theoretical consciousness awakens ethical consciousness.

The law of causality is a formal law, that does not impart to us any real cognition; it is, precisely, the form of our knowledge. The ethical law, the law of the general solidarity of ethical aims, does not presuppose this form without contents, but presupposes an ideal content, the true essence of a common _general_ consciousness, as something that unconditionally must be. Its sanction is not in the formal agreement of individual beings, but in their being in a necessary, ideal union.

Man is conscious of the fact that he cannot attain the ethical ideal through himself only. He must seek for it in perfect love. Only a perfect and all-comprehensive love can atone and justify man. But this love is not a natural instinct of man, but a grace, independent of man, which is acquired by faith. This faith itself is already a fact of love, and by those who believe, it is conceived as a manifestation of grace.

_Letters on Tolstoï's book "Of Life."_ The writer of these letters on Count Tolstoï's book "Of Life" undertakes an analysis of the peculiar philosophical truths and errors which it contains. He points out the _method_ employed by Tolstoï and the causes of his contradictions and errors. By so doing he hopes in conclusion to formulate the theory of the philosophical system to which belongs the work itself.

The writer first calls his correspondent's attention to Tolstoï's positive statement to the effect, that "the world is subordinated to the law of reason—in the heavenly bodies, in animals and plants. This law, without our own interference, prevails throughout all creation, and within ourselves we know this law, and are obliged to fulfil the same." Yet how does Count Tolstoï know that the whole world is subject to the law of reason? By virtue of the principle of cognition that was mooted in the writer's previous letter, we can know it with a degree of certitude only concerning ourselves. Tolstoï himself maintains, that "much less are we able to know anything about the external, material world which is subject to the laws of space and time." In other words, Tolstoï contradicts his own theory. As regards his other statement, his estimate of "true and false life," the two can only be reconciled by admitting certain other hypotheses that are manifestly contradictory to constant human experience, such as the gratuitous hypothesis that men who follow "the teaching of this world" and not that of wise men "do not live," they "exist" only. Tolstoï's theory, expressing a definition of life, would oblige us to turn our attention only to a few facts of immediate consciousness, but to ignore many others that are not subject to doubt. But, setting aside Tolstoï's peculiar theory of consciousness and cognition, the writer turns to the problem of the Ego, as the most important for the solution of the points involved in the present discussion.

In reply to this letter the writer regrets that he himself, having but little taste for deep philosophical discussion, finds it exceedingly difficult to defend Count Tolstoï's views against attacks such as those of Mr. Kozlov. Still, it seems to him that Mr. Kozlov in his whole analysis of Tolstoï's book seeks to evade the main question; namely, Can we call a human life a life so long as men tear each other to pieces like wild beasts?

Tolstoï's critic in conclusion asks, what, precisely, ought to be understood by life? In his reply, after investigating the nature of the Ego, Mr. Kozlov concludes: Man, according to Tolstoï, is only a collective term. It is no more than a name for groups of a few special objects, in their arbitrary relation to a totality. These collective objects are purely _entia rationis_, as the names forest, river, army, crowd, etc. This collective subject is called man. Matter, in Tolstoï's metaphysics, represents the only element, the reality and substantiality of which is not subject to the least doubt. Matter is uncreated and indestructible, it remains identical with itself, constantly through motion combining itself into different aggregates called bodies. In the formation of the living body, matter serves as the basis, on which exist other subjects, that also constitute man, by Tolstoï called "animal personalities." This subject, in its functions and manifestations answers to that which is usually called man, and with Tolstoï it has a doubtful substantiality. Thus, although man is indefinitely continued, preserved through reproduction, and constantly renewed in fresh specimens, still this subject might disappear, be destroyed, for example, by a catastrophe happening to the terrestrial globe. On the other hand, this subject arose in time. At all events, all that is individual, existing in the separate specimens of the human race, disappears, is destroyed at the physical death of the individual, animal body. Consciousness belongs to this animal personality; it exists in time, and is subject to the laws of time. On the soil and foundation of this animal individuality there arises a third existence that enters into the composition of man, namely—reason or rational consciousness. This element displays the character of substance in a much higher degree than animal personality. Like matter it is uncreated, indestructible, and eternal. But eternity of reason is distinguished from eternity of matter in this, that reason is not subject to the laws of time and space, to which matter is subject notwithstanding its eternity. Yet here we have an unavoidable combination of two conceptions of eternity,—the one as endless time, the other as absence of time, which means that the idea of time should not be attributed to it at all. Reason, according to Tolstoï, is not particular and individual, but purely universal and common. It does not possess a detached or transcendental being. (Moscow, March, 1891.)

γλν.

TRANSCRIBER'S CORRECTIONS

page original text correction
12 in correllation with in correlation with
27 one hundred cubic millemetres one hundred cubic millimetres
41 by the maintainance of by the maintenance of
67 by the concept of of the _I_ by the concept of the _I_
82 often used as synomyms, often used as synonyms,
89 annointed with oil and soot, anointed with oil and soot,
133 and such mistatements as and such misstatements as
173 that of Arided (α Cycni), that of Arided (α Cygni),
208 in the seventeeth chapter in the seventeenth chapter
225 employd some decades ago employed some decades ago
265 dispute it acumen dispute its acumen
301 world-conception or are ligion world-conception or a religion
315 seats in both ears. seats in both ears."
425 border on imbecilty, border on imbecility,
467 ANALYSES ET COMTES RENDUS. ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.
477 There trenscendentalists There transcendentalists
559 her life ends in insaniyt. her life ends in insanity.
566 the German poets critiicise the German poets criticise
574 an historial point of view an historical point of view
585 (Sankrit) _mânas_ (Sanskrit) _mânas_
590 Weil et Maurice, Pub. Weill et Maurice, Pub.
624 Nr. Nichols's final conclusion Mr. Nichols's final conclusion
631 affords some difficulty. affords some difficulty."

End of Project Gutenberg's The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891, by Various