Chapter II: The Logic of the Moral Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

I. THE STAND-POINT OF RATIONALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM . . . . 34

Modern individualism, 34. Distinguished from
scepticism, 36. The individual as the organ of knowledge,
37. Moral individualism as a protest against convention,
39. Duty as the rational ground of action, 40.
Reasonableness a condition of the consciousness of
duty, 41.

II. THE LOGIC OF PRUDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Prudence as elementary, 43. Interest, action, and
goodness, 43. The alleged relativity of goodness, 43.
The conflict of interests solved by conciliation, 48.
The limits of prudence, 49.

III. THE LOGIC OF PREFERENCE AND PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . 50

The adoption of new interests and the problem of
preference, 50. A hypothetical solution of the problem, 51.
Solution in the concrete case through the organization
of a purpose, 53. The principle of the objective validity
of interests, 54. The principle of the quantitative basis
of preference, 55.

IV. THE LOGIC OF IMPARTIALITY AND JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . 57

The private interest, 57. The personal factor negligible
in counting interests, 58. The refutation of egoism.
The first proposition of egoism, 59. The second
proposition of egoism, 61. Impartiality as a part of
justice, 63. Justice as imputing finality to the
individual, 64. The equality of rational beings as organs
of truth, 64. Summary of justice, 66.

V. THE LOGIC OF GOOD-WILL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

All interests are entitled to consideration, 67.
Goodwill and the growth of new interests, 67.

VI. DUTY AND THE IMAGINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

The logical imagination, 69. Rationalism and incentive
to action, 70. Rationalism and faith, 71.