Chapter III (2)

[Footnote A: In a discourse in which much of the "Mormon" doctrine concerning the Deity is unfolded by the Prophet Joseph Smith--the King Follett discourse (see chapter 5)--in a passage dealing with the time in which man may attain to some of the contemplated exaltations in the future, he remarks: "When you climb up a ladder, you must begin at the bottom and ascend step by step, until you arrive at the top; and so it is with the principles of the Gospel--you must begin with the first, and go on until you learn all the principles of exaltation. _But it will be a great while after you have passed through the vail [of death] before you will have learned them. It is not all to be comprehended in this world: it will be a great work to learn our salvation and exaltation, even beyond the grave_."]

The same answer applies to the Reverend gentleman's contention based on the passage, "Thou art always the selfsame;" "I am the Lord and change not;" "The Father of lights, with whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration." These passages teach what the Reverend gentleman calls the "immutability of God," which he holds to preclude the idea that God rose from a state of imperfection to that of perfection--since he is always the "selfsame." Before answering at length, I couple with this Mr. Van Der Donckt's final argument on this division of the subject--the scriptural evidences and arguments on the form and nature of God--namely, "The Latter day Saints' theory of the Man-God supposes a past and present with God. The Bible excludes that succession of time," says the Reverend gentleman, "and speaks of God as the everlasting present; 'I Am Who am,' 'From eternity to eternity thou art God.'" Against this argument, based upon God's reputed unchangeableness, and being always as he now is, from all eternity to eternity, I wish to say, first, that the _God-nature_ is doubtless always the same, without reference to those who may attain unto it; and speaking of the God-nature, it is always the "Selfsame," from eternity to eternity; but after that statement, against the Reverend gentleman's argument bottomed on God's immutability and eternity--and, in fact, against all his arguments, from first to last, respecting the form and nature of God, I place Jesus of Nazareth, the Messiah, the revelation of God to man, I place him as my premises, and my argument against all the reverend gentleman has said, or can say, on this division of the subject. I call attention to the fact that neither in my discourse which brought forth Mr. Van Der Donckt's Reply nor in this Rejoinder, have I turned to those numerous passages of the Bible that speak of the face, limbs or organs of God. Not that I mistrust the force of those passages as evidence, but because I have thought it unnecessary to appeal to them, so long as I had in Jesus, the Messiah, a full length and complete representation of God, not only as to the _reality_ of his being, but as to the _kind_ of being God is. And now I ask, as I did in my discourse, _is Jesus God_? Is he a manifestation of God--a revelation of him? If so, there must be in him an end of controversy; for whatever Jesus Christ was and is God must be, or Jesus Christ is no manifestation, no revelation of God. Is Jesus Christ in form like man? Is he possessed of a body of flesh and bone which is eternally united to him--and now an integral part of him? Does he possess body, parts and passions? There can be but one answer to all these questions, and that is, "Yes; he possessed and now possesses all these things." Then God also possesses them; for even according to both Catholic and orthodox Protestant Christian doctrine, Jesus Christ was and is God, and the complete manifestation and revelation of God the Father.

Also the specific points of argument based upon God's unchangeability, and there being no succession of time with God--that, too, is answered in the person and experience of Jesus Christ. According to Catholic teaching, Jesus was a spirit, identical with God the Father in substance, before he became man; but at a certain time he became man, was not that a change? By it, he became something he was not before. His humanity, according to their teaching, was _added_ to the Son of God when he received his tabernacle of flesh and bone; and he was certainly changed from an unembodied state to an embodied one; and there was a "before and after"--in reference to this great event, in the God Jesus' experience. Is it thinkable that this change was a deterioration? Was the Son of God's divinity debased to the human, or was so much of humanity as he took on raised to the divine nature, and henceforth made an integral part of it?

The orthodox doctrine of Christianity is--Catholic and Protestant alike--that Jesus Christ is God; that he always was and is God, according to both orthodox theology and Christian philosophy. Yet it is said of this Jesus that he "_increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man_" (Luke 2:52). Here is certainly a change in condition; here is succession of time with God--a before and after; here is being and becoming; for whereas, he was a spirit, he became man; and in becoming man, he passed through all the phases in life from infancy to manhood. It is significant also that it was not until Jesus had arisen from the tomb and stood in the presence of his disciples, a glorified personage, body and spirit united, that he exclaimed, "_All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth_." If "_given_," there must have been a time when he did not possess all power in heaven and in earth; and hence, a change from possessing some power to the condition of possessing "all power," a fullness of power--"for it pleased the Father that in him should all fullness dwell" (Col. 1:19). But more of this when I come to deal with Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical proofs on the subject, I shall close this part of my rejoinder with the following summary of the facts maintained thus far in my argument:

_First:_--While the scriptures declare that God is a spirit, it does not follow that he is necessarily an unembodied spirit; on the contrary, it is clear that he is an embodied spirit; for Jesus Christ is God, and he, we know, is a spirit and body united; and he is said to be the express image of his Father's person; therefore, the Father of Jesus Christ, or God the Father, must be just what Jesus is--a spirit embodied in a tabernacle of flesh and bone.

_Second:_--Although the Bible says that God is a spirit, and speaks of angels as spirits also, and points out some differences between the nature of men and spirits, it does not follow that spirits are immaterial beings, and therefore without form. On the contrary, the evidence of scripture is to the effect that angels are very substantial personages. One wrestled bodily with Jacob and lamed him; while three others "did eat" of the substantial meal provided by Abraham; and there are many other proofs of angels being substantial, material personages.

_Third:_--It is an assumption absolutely unwarranted by authority of the word of God to say that when spirits, or angels, or Jesus--before his incarnation--showed themselves to men, they merely assumed the material garb for the occasion.

_Fourth:_--Although the Bible in sundry passages speaks of God the Father as "invisible," it does not follow that he is absolutely so, nor invisible from the nature of his being; on the contrary, it is clear from what has been set forth that under certain special conditions, God the Father as well as Jesus--before his incarnation--and certain angels, have been seen; and hence, the invisibility of God the Father, arises from his being invisible to men in their normal condition, unquickened by, and unclothed with, the power of God.

_Fifth:_--The doctrine that all absolutely invisible beings are immaterial is simply untrue, being contradicted by the fact that a number of absolutely invisible things are known to be material, and yet possess some of the properties of grosser matter; and it is reasonable to believe that the same truth holds as to spiritual beings.

_Sixth:_--The Bible distinctly ascribes to God and angels the form, limbs, organs, feelings and passions of men; and the Bible nowhere leads us to believe that this ascription of bodily form and organs and passions to God is simply to "make spiritual things, or certain truths more intelligible to man;" nor does it follow because _some_ passages of the Bible are figurative, and hence not to be taken literally, that _all_ the passages ascribing human form, organs and feelings to God are figurative, and hence not to be taken literally. It is only when anthropomorphic passages and expressions are similarly used as other clearly figurative passages and expressions are, that they are to be adjudged as figurative and _not_ to be taken literally.

_Seventh:_--And lastly, beside all premises and arguments to the effect that God is an unembodied spirit, without form, without limbs, organs, features, human feelings, or passions, such as love, compassion, pity, etc., etc,--beside all this, I place the Lord Jesus, the Image of God the Father's person, the full length representation and revelation of God to men, as an all sufficient answer, and say that whatsoever Jesus Christ was and is, so, too, has been and is God, the Father; for such is the teaching of holy scripture.

II.

MR. VAN DER DONCKT'S "PHILOSOPHICAL PROOFS" OF THE FORM AND NATURE OF GOD.

Mr. Van Der Donckt, at the beginning of his argument under his "philosophical proofs of God's simplicity or spirituality," again exhibits the fact that he misapprehends the doctrines of the Latter-day Saints. He says: "The Latter-day Saints believe that God created the souls of men long before their conception." That is not the belief of the Latter-day Saints; and his misapprehension of what their doctrine is relative to man and God leads the gentleman to make statements, and indulge in lines of argumentation he would not have followed had he apprehended aright the teachings of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Since his philosophical argument has proceeded from a wrong basis, it becomes necessary to state what the "Mormon" doctrine is relative to the subject in hand, and then consider so much of his argument as may apply to the facts.

Latter-day Saints believe that the "soul of man" consists of both his spirit and his body united. "The spirit and the body is the soul of man; and the resurrection from the dead is the redemption of the soul" (Doc. and Cov. sec. 88:15, 16). This, I am aware, is not the usually accepted sense of the word "soul;" for it generally stands for what is regarded as the incorporeal nature of man, or the principle of mental and spiritual life of him. It is used variously in the scriptures. In one place, the Savior uses it in contrast with the body: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. 10:28). But the word as used in the passage above quoted from the Doctrine and Covenants also has warrant of scriptural authority: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7). Here body and "breath of life," the spirit, constitute the soul of man.

Of course, Mr. Van Der Donckt uses the phrase "souls of men" as we perhaps would use the phrase "spirits of men," and evidently makes reference to our doctrine of the pre-existence of spirits, that is, the doctrine of the actual existence of the spirits of men long ages before they tabernacled in the flesh, when he says: "The Latter-day Saints believe that God creates the souls of men long before their conception." But again explanation is necessary, as that statement does not quite meet our belief. Our doctrine is that "Intelligences are begotten spirits," which spirits are in form like men, and are really, substance, that is, matter, but of a more subtle and finer nature than the matter composing man's tabernacle of flesh and bone.[A] Christians believe that "the Word," that is, Jesus Christ, was in the beginning with God; and not only that "the Word" was with God, but also that "the Word was God" (John 1:1, 2), Latter-day Saints not only believe Jesus was in the beginning with God, but it is their doctrine that man was "also in the beginning with the Father, that which is spirit" (Doc. and Cov. sec. 93:23). And again: "Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence, or the light of truth _was not created or made, neither indeed can be._ * * * * Every man whose spirit receiveth not the light is under condemnation _for man is spirit_. The elements are eternal, and spirit and element, inseparably connected, receive a fullness of joy; and when separated, man cannot receive a fullness of joy. The elements are the tabernacle of God; yea man is the tabernacle of God, even temples" (Doc and Cov. sec. 93:29, 32-35). The point to be observed is that intelligences--whence the spirits of men--are not created or made, nor indeed can they be, for they are eternal--eternal as God the Father, and God the Son are. "The mind of man--the immortal spirit--where did it come from?" asks the Prophet Joseph Smith, in a discourse delivered at Nauvoo;[B] and then answers:

[Footnote A: The Prophet Joseph teaches that "all spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure [than the gross matter tangible to our senses] and can only be discerned by purer eyes. We cannot see it, but when our bodies are purified, we shall see that it is all matter." (Doc. and Cov. sec 137.)]

[Footnote B: April 7th, 1844, Mill. Star, vol. xxiii p. 245, et seq.]

All learned men, and doctors of divinity, say that God created
it in the beginning; but it is not so; the very idea lessens man
in my estimation. I do not believe the doctrine. I know better.
Hear it, all ye ends of the world, for God has told me so. If you
don't believe me it will not make the truth without effect. * * *
* We say that God himself is a self-existent being. Who told you
so? It is correct enough, but who told you that man did not exist
in like manner upon the same principle? God made a tabernacle and
put his [man's] spirit into it, and it became a living soul. How
does it read in Hebrew? It does not say in Hebrew that God created
the spirit of man. It says, "God made man out of earth and put in
him Adam's spirit, and so became a living body." The mind, or the
intelligence which man possesses is co-eternal with God himself.
* * * * * I am dwelling on the immortality of the spirit of man.
Is it logical to say that the intelligence of spirits is immortal,
and yet that it had a beginning? The intelligence of spirits had
no beginning, neither will it have an end. That is good logic.
That which has a beginning may have an end. There never was a time
when there were not spirits, for they are co-eternal with our
Father in heaven. I want to reason more on the spirit of man; for
I am dwelling on the body and spirit of man--on the subject of the
dead. I take my ring from my finger and liken it unto the mind
of man--the immortal part, because it has no beginning. Suppose
you cut it in two; then it has a beginning and an end; but join
it again, and it continues one eternal round. So with the spirit
of man. As the Lord liveth, if it has a beginning it will have an
end. All the fools and learned and wise men from the beginning of
creation, who say that the spirit of man had a beginning, prove
that it must have an end: and if that doctrine is true, then the
doctrine of annihilation would be true. But if I am right, I might
with boldness proclaim from the house tops that God never had
the power to create the spirit of man at all, God himself could
not create himself. Intelligence is eternal, and exists upon a
self-existent principle. It is a spirit from age to age, and there
is no creation about it. * * * * The spirit of man is not a created
being; it existed from eternity, and will exist to eternity.
Anything created cannot be eternal: and earth, water, etc., had
their existence in an elementary state, from eternity.

Mr. Van Der Donckt will recognize quite a difference between the doctrine here stated as to the spirits of men, and the one he states for us when he says, "Latter-day Saints believe that God creates the souls of men long before their conception." There is that in man, according to our doctrine, which is not created at all; there is in him an "ego"--a "spirit" uncreated, never made, a self-existent entity, eternal as God himself; and of the same kind of substance or essence with him, and, indeed, part of him, when God is conceived of in the generic sense.

With the doctrine of "Mormonism" relative to man and God thus stated, the question is, what part of Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical argument touches it?

Mr. Van Der Donckt, it must be remembered, bases his philosophical argument upon the absolute "simplicity or spirituality" of God. "I Am Who Am," is the definition of God about which circle all his arguments. God is "the Necessary Being," is his contention; infinite, illimitable; not limited by his own essence, by another, or by himself. From which I understand him to mean, after the philosophers of his school, that God, the very essence of him, is pure being-"Actual being or existence" are his own words. (Page 53).

This his premise; and the part of his argument which affects our doctrine is the following:

If God were an aggregation of parts, these parts would be either
necessary beings or contingent (that do not necessarily exist),
or some would be necessary and some contingent. None of these
suppositions are tenable, therefore God is not an aggregate of
parts. * * * * If the parts of God were necessary beings, there
would be several independent beings, which the infinity of God
precludes. God would not be infinite, if there were even one other
being independent of him, as his power, etc., would not reach that
being.

The infinite being is most simple, or not compound. Were he
compound, his parts would be either all finite, or all infinite, or
one infinite and the others finite. None of these suppositions are
possible, therefore he is not compound.

Several finite things cannot produce an infinite or an illimitable,
as there would always be a first and last.

Many infinite beings are inconceivable, for, if there were several
they would have to differ from each other by some perfection. Now,
from the moment one would have a perfection the other one lacks,
the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a
compound of infinite parts.

If one is infinite, nothing can be added to it. Finite parts could
not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate
their limitations to God.

Therefore, the infinite Being is not composite, but simple or
spiritual. Therefore he is not, nor ever was, a man, who is a
composite being.

Of Mr. Van Der Donckt's Premise.

I have to do first of all with Mr. Van Der Donckt's premise--"the simplicity or spirituality" of God.

So far as it is possible to make language do it, the gentleman teaches that God is "pure being," "most [therefore absolutely] simple--not compound." He is not only infinite, then, but infinity. It follows that he is without quality, other than being--mere existence--"I Am Who Am;" without attributes; not susceptible of division, or of relation; for if he possessed quality or attribute or was susceptible of division or of relation, his absolute simplicity--that tremulously precarious thing on which, according to Mr. V.'s philosophy, his very existence and all his excellence depends--would be destroyed. It was doubtless these considerations that led the Church of England--which, by the way, is at one with the Roman Catholic Church in the doctrine of God--to say of the "one true and living God," that he is _without body, parts or passions_.[A] With which also the Westminster Confession of Faith agrees, by saying: "There is but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, _without body, parts or passions_, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible," etc.[B]

[Footnote A: Bk. Com. Prayer, Articles of Religion, Art. 1.]

[Footnote B: Westminster Confession, Art. 2, Sec. 1.]

The German school of philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which ends in inevitable agnosticism, went but one step further than these creeds; a step made inevitable by the creeds themselves. The creeds postulate God as "pure being"--"existence" "the one who could not _not_ exist," Mr. V.'s interpretation of "I Am Who Am." But "existence," says Fichte, "implies origin," and "God is beyond origin"--i. e. beyond "being," "existence." Schelling reached substantially the same conclusion when, by a pathway but little divergent from that followed by Fichte, he was led to regard God as neither "real or ideal;" "neither thought nor being." While Hegel, by similar subtleties, established the identity of "Being and Non-Being." This German philosophy, which but extends the philosophy of the orthodox creeds to its legitimate conclusion, leaves us with the paradox on our hands of regarding God at once as the most real existence, and as the most absolute non-existence. The conclusions from the premise are just; and Mr. V.'s "most simple," "infinite being," he who is "pure existence itself," vanishes amid the metaphysical subtleties of the learned Germans.[A]

[Footnote A: "Existence itself, that so-called highest category of thought, is only conceivable in the form of existence modified in some particular manner. Strip off its modification, and the apparent paradox of the German philosopher becomes literally true;--_pure being is pure nothing_. We have no conception of existence which is not existence in some particular manner; and if we abstract from the manner, we have nothing left to constitute the existence. Those who, in their horror of what they call anthropomorphism, or anthropopathy, refuse to represent the Deity under symbols borrowed from the limitations of human consciousness, are bound in consistency, to deny that God exists; for the conception of existence is as human and as limited as any other" (Limits of Religious Thought, Mansel, pp. 95, 96).]

Let us examine the effect of this Deity-destroying postulate in England. Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Infinite being," "most simple or not compound," is identical with the "absolute," the "unconditioned;" the "first cause," hence the "uncaused." These terms, it is well known, Mr. Herbert Spencer seized upon, in his volume on "First Principles," and ran them down to logical absurdity, showing them to be "unthinkable," and that ultimate religious ideas (arising from the postulates of orthodox creeds) lead to the "Unknown!" In reaching this conclusion he was wonderfully helped by Henry L. Mansel, some time Dean of St. Paul's, who in his celebrated Bampton Lecture arrives at substantially the same conclusion--with an exception to be noted later.[A] Indeed, so nearly at one are the churchman and the philosopher, in their methods of thought, in their deductions, that the latter reaches his conclusions from the data and reasoning of the former, whom he quotes with approval and at great length. I select from these writers a few typical passages tending to show the absurdity of God's "simplicity," or "spirituality," as held by Mr. Van Der Donckt, reminding the reader that Mr. V.'s "Infinite Being," "most simple or not compound," is identical with the "absolute," "unconditioned," the "first cause," the "uncaused" of both Mr. Mansel and Mr. Spencer.

[Footnote A: Page 109.]

Mr. Spencer, after showing that the First Cause cannot be finite, nor dependent, reaches the conclusion that it must be infinite and independent; and then proceeds:

But to think of the First Cause as totally independent is to think
of it as that which existed in the absence of all other existence;
seeing that if the presence of any other existence is necessary, it
must be partially dependent on that other existence, and so cannot
be the First Cause. Not only, however, must the First Cause be a
form of being which has no necessary relation to any other form of
being, but it can have no necessary relation within itself. There
can be nothing in it which determines change, and yet nothing which
prevents change. For if it contains something which imposes such
necessities or restraints, this something must be a cause higher
than the First Cause, which is absurd. Thus the First Cause must be
in every sense perfect, complete, total; including within itself
all power, and transcending all law. Or to use the established
word, it must be absolute.[A]

[Footnote A: First Principles (Spencer) pp. 29, 30; 1896 edition, D. Appleton & Co., N. Y.]

Thus far the philosopher; and even Mr. Van Der Donckt, I think, could not complain that he has not stated the "simplicity" of the First Cause most clearly. But at this point the philosopher, Mr. Spencer, introduces the churchman, Dean Mansel, to abolish the structure of the "First Cause," the "simple" or "spiritual being," or "God," as held by Mr. V. and all orthodox Christians. I quote Mr. Mansel:

But these three conceptions--the Cause, the Absolute, the
Infinite--all equally indispensable, do they not imply
contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as
attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be
absolute: _the Absolute cannot as such be a cause_. The cause,
as such, exists only in relation to its effect; the effect is an
effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the
Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We
attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction by introducing
the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by
itself, and afterwards becomes a cause. But here we are checked by
the third conception, that of the infinite. How can the infinite
become that which it was not from the first? If Causation is a
possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is
not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its
former limits. * * Supposing the Absolute to be a cause, it will
follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness.
For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite.
If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited
by a superior power: and if necessitated by itself, it has in its
own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation
must therefore be voluntary, and volition is only possible in a
conscious being. But consciousness again is only conceivable as a
relation. There must be a conscious subject and an object of which
he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the object
is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by itself as the
absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by
distinguishing between the absolute as related to another and the
absolute as related to itself. The absolute, it may be said, may
possibly be conscious provided it is only conscious of itself. But
this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive
than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of
the subject's existence or not, is either created in and by the act
of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the
former case the object depends upon the subject, and the subject
alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends
upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or,
if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists
independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only
a pair of relatives; for coexistence, whether in consciousness or
not, is itself a relation.

The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the
absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to
anything else, but it is also incapable of containing, by the
constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within
itself; as a whole, for instance composed of parts, or as a
substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious subject in
antithesis to an object. For, if there is in the absolute any
principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts
or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If,
on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no
absolute at all, but only a plurality of relatives. The almost
unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute
is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason
also, as far as reason has any voice in the matter. But this
absolute unity, as indifferent and containing no attributes, can
neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings
by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in
their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma.
The absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it
be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex,
neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived
by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of
difference: it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can
it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the
beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible.

Let us, however, suppose, for an instance, that these difficulties
are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely
established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded
in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done
nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the
relative--the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal
activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the Absolute,
whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from
a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative
perfection; and, therefore, was not originally perfect. If the
state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the
Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection.
There remains only the supposition that the two states are
equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference.
But this supposition annihilates the unity of the absolute, or
it annihilates itself. If the act of creation is real, and yet
indifferent, we must admit the possibility of two conceptions of
the absolute--the one as productive, the other as non-productive.
If the act is not real, the supposition itself vanishes. * * *

Again, how can the relative be conceived as coming into being? If
it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it must be conceived
as passing from non-existence into existence. But to conceive an
object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for that
which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that
conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all;
but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It
is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and at
another to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in
the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into being, is
to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates itself. * * *

To sum up briefly this portion of my argument:

The conception of the absolute and the infinite, from whatever side
we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions.

There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist,
whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a
contradiction in supposing it not to exist.

There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a
contradiction in conceiving it as many.

There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is
a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal.

It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active, nor,
without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive.

It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it
be conceived as a part only of that sum.[A]

[Footnote A: First Principles (Spencer) pp. 40-44. Limits of Religions Thoughts, lecture II, first American edition, 1875.]

After thus running to absurdity the prevalent conceptions of the "Infinite," the "Absolute," the "Uncaused," Mr. V.'s "Most simple or not compound" "Being," the churchman does what all orthodox Christians do, he commits a violence against all human understanding and good sense--he arbitrarily declares, in the face of his own inexorable logic and its inevitable deductions, that, "_it is our duty to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite_;" that is, it is our duty to think of the infinite as at once limited and unlimited; as finite and infinite--"which," to use a phrase dear to Mr. Van Der Donckt, "is absurd," and therefore not to be entertained. At this point, the philosopher and the churchman reach the parting of the ways, and this is the exception, in the conclusion of the two, noted a few pages back.[A]

[Footnote A: Page 105.]

Some do indeed allege [says Mr. Spencer] that though the Ultimate
Cause of things cannot really be thought of by us as having
specified attributes, it is yet incumbent upon us to assert these
attributes. Though the forms of our consciousness are such that the
Absolute cannot, in any manner or degree, be brought within them,
we are nevertheless told that we must represent the Absolute to
ourselves under these forms! * * * That this is not the conclusion
here adopted, needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the
foregoing arguments, duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny
personality. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to
the established limits of our intelligence, and not perversely to
rebel against them. Let those who can, believe there is eternal
war between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations.
I, for one, admit no such radical vice in the constitution of
things.[A]

[Footnote A: First Principles, p. 110.]

Yet Mr. Mansel, in the inconsistent and illogical course he pursues, is not more inconsistent, illogical, and unphilosophical than all orthodox Christians. The postulates of their creeds concerning the nature of God leads them to affirm what they call his "Spirituality," "Infinite Being," "Simplicity," etc. (which are but the equivalents of the philosopher's "absolute," "infinite," and the "uncaused"); and yet the necessities of their faith in revelation make it imperative that they regard him as existing in some relation to the universe and to man, which destroys his alleged "simplicity." To ascribe to him attributes is to destroy that simplicity[A] which orthodox creeds affirm, and for which Mr. Van Der Donckt so stoutly argues. Nor does it help matters when it is said that these attributes are existences--the attitude of Mr. V., for he says: "Every perfection [goodness, mercy, justice, etc.--attributes of God] is some existence, something that is." If this be granted, then it follows that God must be the sum of all these existences, therefore a compound, not "simple." And not only does orthodox belief in revelation compel those who follow it to concede the existence of attributes in God, but personality also. But if God be conceived as a personality, his "simplicity" or "spirituality," as held by Mr. V., vanishes, because, when recognized as personality, God is no longer "being"--but _a_ being.

[Footnote A: "The rational conception of God is that _he is_, nothing more. To give him an attribute is to make him a relative God. * * * We cannot attribute to him any quality, for qualities are inconceivable apart from matter." "_Origin and Development of Religious Beliefs--Christianity_."--(S. Baring-Gould, p. 112.) It was held by well nigh the whole medieval school of theologians that God was unknowable because "the absolute simplicity of the divine essence was incompatible with the existence of distinctions therein." (See art. "Theism," _Ency. Brit._, and the references there given.)]

Mr. Van Der Donckt himself says: "Something is limited, not because it _is_ [i. e. exists]: but because it is _this or that_; for instance, a stone, a plant, a man"--_or a person_, I suggest. For if God has personality, he is a person, a some-thing, and hence limited, according to Mr. V.'s philosophy; if limited, as he must be when conceived of as _this or that_, as a person, for instance, then of course not infinite being; and thus my friend's doctrine of God's "simplicity" is destroyed the moment he ascribes personality to Deity. Nor does the difficulties of Mr. Van Der Donckt and all orthodox Christians end here. Not only does revelation as they view it demand belief in the personality of God, but it demands the belief that in God are _three persons_--the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. This further complicates the matter, and removes orthodox Christians still further from the postulate of "simplicity" they affirm of God; for if there are three persons in God, by no intellectual contortions whatsoever can this conception of "three" be harmonized with the orthodox Christian postulate of God's "simplicity." For the Son, if he exists at all, must exist in virtue of some distinction from the Father; so also the Holy Ghost must exist in virtue of some distinction from both the Father and the Son. Each must have something distinct from the other; must be what the other is not, in some particular;* and if each one has something the other has not, and each lacks something which the other has, how can it be said that each of these persons is God, and each infinite as he must be in order to be God, under Mr. V.'s doctrine?

[Footnote A: "Distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some form which the other has." Dean Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thoughts."]

If the three be conceived as one God--yet each with that about him which distinguishes him from the other--how can God be regarded as "simple," "not compound?" The orthodox creeds of Christendom, moreover, require us to believe that while the Father is a person, the Son a person, and the Holy Ghost a person, yet there are not three persons, but one person. So with each being eternal and almighty. So with each being God: "The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God: and yet there are not three Gods but one God"[A] No wonder the whole conception is given up as "incomprehensible." "Their mode of subsistence [i. e., the subsistence of the three persons] in the one substance," says the _Commentary on the Confession of Faith_, "_must ever continue to us a profound mystery, as it transcends all analogy_."[B] So the Douay Catechism (Catholic), ch. i:

[Footnote A: See the creed of St. Athanasius, a copy is published in the History of the Church, vol. I, Introduction, p. 87.]

[Footnote B: This Commentary is by Rev. A. A. Hodges, D.D., LL.D., p. 58.]

Q. In what do faith and law of Christ consist? A. In two principal
_mysteries_, namely, _the Unity and Trinity of God_, and the
incarnation and death of our Savior.

"To think that God _is_, as we _think_ him to be, is blasphemy," is the lofty assertion behind which some of the orthodox hide when hard pressed with the inconsistency of their creed; and if I mistake not, "A God understood is a God dethroned," has long been an aphorism of the Church of which Mr. Van Der Donckt is a priest.

But what is the sum of my argument thus far on Mr. Van Der Donckt's premise of God's absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality?" Only this:

First, his premise is proven to be unphilosophical and untenable, when coupled with his creed, which ascribes qualities, attributes and personality to God. Either the gentleman must cease to think of God as "infinite being," "most simple," "not compound," or he must surrender the God of his creed, who is represented by it to be three persons in one substance; and, moreover, persons possessed of attributes and qualities which bring God into relations with men and the universe, a mode of being which destroys "simplicity." Either one or the other of these beliefs must be given up; they cannot consistently be held simultaneously, as they destroy each other. If Mr. V. holds to the God of his creed, what becomes of all his "philosophy?" If he holds to his "philosophy," what becomes of the God of his creed.

Second, as affecting this discussion, the matter at this point stands thus: Since the gentleman's premise of God's absolute simplicity is proved to be illogical and unphilosophical, it affords no sound basis of argument against the Latter-day Saints' views of Deity, wherein they hold him to be something different from absolute "being"--more than a mere, and, I may say, bare and barren "existence," a metaphysical abstraction. Mr. V.'s premise of absolute simplicity affords no consistent basis of argument against our view that God is a person in the sense of being an individual, in form like man, and possessed of attributes which bring him within the nearest and dearest relations to men that it is possible to conceive.

Of the Doctrine of God's "Simplicity" Being of Pagan Rather than of Christian Origin.

The next step in my argument is to prove that this doctrine of God being "most simple," "not compound," "pure being"--without body (i. e., not material), parts or passions--hence, without attributes, is not a doctrine of the Christian scriptures, but comes from the old Pagan philosophies.

Clearly the data for this doctrine of God's absolute "simplicity" did not come from the Old Testament, for that teaches the plainest anthropomorphic ideas respecting God. It ascribes to him a human form, and many qualities and attributes possessed by man, which, in the minds of philosophers of Mr. V.'s school, limit him who must be, to their thinking, without any limit whatsoever; and ascribes relativity to him who must not be relative but absolute.

The data for the doctrine of God's absolute "simplicity"--contended for by Mr. V.--does not come from the New Testament, for the writers of that volume of scripture accept the doctrine of the Old Testament respecting God, and even emphasize its anthropomorphic ideas, by representing that the man Christ Jesus was in the "express image" of God, the Father's, person; was, in fact, God manifest in the flesh (I Tim. 3:16); "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:5); "God, the Word, who was made flesh, and dwelt among men, who beheld his glory" (St. John 1:1-14). Hence Mr. Van Der Donckt's doctrine of God's "simplicity" cannot claim the warrant of New Testament authority.

Plato, in his _Timaeus_, (Jowett's translation, page 530,) incidentally referring to God, in connection with the creation of the universe, says:

We say indeed that "he was," "he is," "he will be;" but the truth
is that "_he is_" alone truly expresses him, and that "was" and
"will be" are only to be spoken of generation in time.

Here, then, is Mr. V.'s "pure being," "most simple," "not compound." Again:

We must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always
the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything
into itself from without, nor itself giving out to any other, but
invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the sight is
granted to intelligence only (Ibid. p. 454).

Here Mr. V. may find his God, "who cannot change with regard to his existence, nor with regard to his mode of existence." Also his God who can only be seen with the "soul's intellectual perception, elevated by a supernatural influx from God." Dr. Mosheim, in his account of Plato's idea of God, says: "He considered the Deity, to whom he gave the supreme governance of the universe, as a being of the highest wisdom and power, and _totally unconnected with any material substance_."[A]

[Footnote A: Mosheim's "Historical Commentaries on the State of Christianity, During the First Three Hundred Years", vol. 1. p. 37.]

To the same effect, also, Justin Martyr (second Christian century) generalizes and accepts as doctrine what may be gathered from the sixth book of Plato's "Republic," with reference to God. To the Jew, Trypho, Justin remarks:

The Deity, father, is not to be viewed by the organs of sight,
like other creatures, but he is to be comprehended by the mind
alone, as Plato declares, and I believe him. * * * * Plato tells
us that the eye of the mind is of such a nature, and was given Us
to such an end, as to enable us to see with it by itself, when
pure, that _Being_ who is the source of whatever is an object of
the mind itself, _who has neither color, nor shape, nor size, nor
anything which the eye can see_, but who is above all essence, who
is ineffable, and undefinable, who is alone beautiful and good, and
who is at once implanted into those souls who are naturally well
born, through their relationship to and desire of seeing him.

Athanasius (third Christian century) quotes the same definition (Contra Gentes, ch. 2), almost _verbatim_. Turning again to the _Timaeus_ of Plato, this question is asked:

What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that
which is always becoming and has never any being? That which is
apprehended by reflection and reason [God] always is; and is the
same; that on the other hand which is conceived by opinion, with
the help of sensation without reason [the material universe], is in
a process of becoming and perishing but never really is. * * * Was
the world [universe], always in existence and without beginning? or
created and having a beginning? Created, I reply.

In this, the orthodox Christians and Mr. V. may find their God of pure "being," that never is "becoming," but _always is_; also the creation of the universe out of nothing. The fact is that orthodox Christian views of God are Pagan rather than Christian.

In his great work on the "History of Christian Doctrine," Mr. William G. T. Shedd says:[A] "The early Fathers, in their defenses of Christianity against their pagan opponents, contend that the better pagan writers themselves agree with the new religion in teaching that their is one Supreme Being. Lactantius (Institutiones, 1, 5), after quoting the Orphic poets, Hesiod, Virgil, and Ovid, in proof that the heathen poets taught the unity of the supreme deity, affirms that the better pagan philosophers agree with them in this. 'Aristotle,' he says, 'although he disagrees with himself, and says many things that are self-contradictory, yet testifies that one supreme mind rules over the world. Plato, who is regarded as the wisest philosopher of them all, plainly and openly defends the doctrine of a divine monarchy, and denominates the supreme being, not ether, nor reason, nor nature, but as he is, _God_; and asserts that by him this perfect and admirable world was made. And Cicero follows Plato, frequently confessing the deity, and calls him the supreme being, in his Treatise on the Laws.'"

[Footnote A: Vol 1, p 56.]

It is conceded by Christian writers that the Christian doctrine of God is not expressed in New Testament terms, but in the terms of Greek and Roman metaphysics, as witness the following from the very able article in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_ on Theism, by the Rev. Dr. Flint, Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh: "The proposition constitutive of the dogma of the Trinity--the propositions in the symbols of Nice, Constantinople and Toledo, relative to the immanent distinctions and relations in the Godhead--were not drawn directly from the New Testament, and could not be expressed in New Testament terms. _They were the product of reason speculating on a revelation to faith_--the New Testament representation of God as a Father, a Redeemer and a Sanctifier--with a view to conserve and vindicate, explain and comprehend it. They were only formed through centuries of effort, _only elaborated by the aid of the conceptions, and formulated in the terms of Greek and Roman metaphysics_." The same authority says: "The massive defense of theism, erected by the Cambridge school of philosophy, against atheism, fatalism, and the denial of moral distinctions, was avowedly built on a Platonic foundation."

In method of thought also, no less than in conclusions, the most influential of the Christian fathers on these subjects followed the Greek philosophers rather than the writers of the New Testament.[A] "Platonism, and Aristotelianism," says the author of the _History of Christian Doctrine_, "exerted more influence upon the intellectual methods of men, taking in the whole time since their appearance, than all other systems combined. They certainly influenced the Greek mind, and Grecian culture, more than all the other philosophical systems. They re-appear in Roman philosophy--so far as Rome had any philosophy. We shall see that Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, exerted more influence than all other philosophical minds united, upon the greatest of the Christian Fathers: upon the greatest of the Schoolmen; and upon the theologians of the Reformation, Calvin and Melanchthon. And if we look at European philosophy as it has been unfolded in England, Germany and France, we shall perceive that all the modern theistic schools have discussed the standing problems of human reason, in very much the same manner in which the reason of Plato and Aristotle discussed them twenty-two centuries ago. Bacon, Des Cartes, Leibniz, and Kant, so far as the first principles of intellectual and moral philosophy are concerned, agree with their Grecian predecessors. A student who has mastered the two systems of the Academy and Lyceum will find in modern philosophy (with the exception of the department of natural science) very little that is true, that may not be, found for substance, and germinally, in the Greek theism."[B]

[Footnote A: Especially compare Plato's methods of arising from the conception of the finite and variable, to the infinite and unchangeable; from the relatively beautiful and good, to the absolutely beautiful and good, in the sixth and seventh books of the "Republic," with St. Augustine's manner of arriving at the conception of "_That which is_"--God.--_Confessions St. Augustine_, book seven.]

[Footnote B: History of Christian Doctrine, by William G. T. Shedd; Vol. I, p. 52.]

It is hoped that enough is said here to establish the fact that the conception of God as "pure being," "immaterial," "without form," "or parts or passions," as held by orthodox Christianity, has its origin in Pagan philosophy, not in Jewish nor Christian revelation.

Of Jesus Christ Being Both Premise and Argument against Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Philosophical Argument."