Chapter III (3)

And now as to the whole question of God being "existence," "pure being," "most simple," "not compound;" also his "immutability," as set forth in Mr. Van Der Donckt's "philosophical argument." What of it? This of it: Whatever "simplicity," "immutability," or other quality that is ascribed to God, _must be in harmony with what Jesus Christ is_: I meet Mr. V.'s "philosophical argument" as I meet his scriptural argument. I appeal to the being and nature of Jesus Christ, as a refutation of his philosophical conclusions. Is Jesus Christ God? "Yes," must be my friend's answer. Very well, this is my premise. Jesus is God in his own right and person, and he is a revelation of what God the Father is. He is not only a revelation of the _being_ of God, but of the _kind_ of being God is. And now I test Mr. V.'s argument by the revelation of what God is, as revealed in the person and nature of the Son of God. While I am doing so, let it be remembered that Jesus is now and will ever be what he was at the time of his glorious ascension from the midst of his disciples on Mount Olivet--God, possessed of all power in heaven and in earth, a glorious personage of flesh and bone and spirit. And now, is Jesus Christ without form? No; he is in form like man. Is Jesus Christ illimitable? Not as to his glorious body; that has limitations, dimensions, proportions. Is Jesus Christ without parts? Not as to his person; his body is made up of limbs, trunk, head; and parenthetically I may remark, a whole without parts is inconceivable. Then it follows that God's "infinity," so far as it is spoken of in scripture, does not refer to his person, but evidently to the attributes of his mind--to his intelligence, wisdom, power, patience, mercy, and whatsoever other qualities of mind or spirit he may possess. If it is argued that it is illogical and unphilosophical to regard God in his person as finite, but infinite in faculties, that is finite in one respect and infinite in another, my answer is that it is a conception of God made necessary by what the divine wisdom has revealed concerning himself, and it is becoming in man to accept with humility what God has been pleased to reveal concerning his own nature, being assured that in God's infinite knowledge he knows himself, and that which he reveals concerning himself is to be trusted far beyond man's philosophical conception of him.

But to resume our inquiry: Is Jesus Christ immutable, unchangeable? Is he Plato's "that which always is and has no becoming?" or Mr. Van Der Donckt's "necessary Being * * * that cannot change with regard to his existence, nor can he change with regard to his _mode_ of existence," and therefore could never be anything other than he was from eternity? It is inconceivable how any being can be a son and not have a beginning as such. Whatever of eternity may be ascribed to the existence of the Lord Jesus, he must have had a beginning as a son; that term implies a relation, let it be brought about how it may, and that relation must have had a beginning. While there may never have been a time when Jesus was not in respect of his existence as an Intelligence, there must have been a time when he was not as "Son." So that he doubtless became "Son," hence changed his relation from not Son to Son; hence changed in his relations, in his mode of existence. We know there was a time when he was not man, that is, not man of flesh and bone made of the materials of this world; and he became man; another change. There was a time when he was mortal man, by which I mean, man subject to death; and he became, and is now, immortal man; another change. There was a time when all power in heaven and in earth was "_given_" to him; (Matt. 28:18) hence, there must have been a time when he did not possess it; hence another change, a change from the condition of holding _some_ power to that of possessing _all_ power. These facts attested by Holy Writ are against Mr. V.'s doctrine of God's "immutability," so far at least as relates to the impossibility of changing his mode of existence. And if Mr. V.'s doctrine of the "immutability" of God means that God cannot change in his relations, then I put these facts in the career of the Lord Jesus against his argument, and say that not only did Jesus pass through these changes of conditions and relations, but that God the Father could, and very likely did, pass through similar relations and changes. Else of what significance are the following passages?

The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do;
for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise
(St. John 5:19).

The Prophet Joseph Smith quoting the substance of St. John 5:26, also says:

"As the Father hath power in himself, even so hath the Son
power"--to do what? Why, what the Father did. The answer is
obvious--in a manner to lay down his body and take it up again.
"Jesus, what are you going to do?" "To lay down my body as my
Father did, and take it up again." Do you believe it? If you do not
believe it, you do not believe the Bible.[A]

[Footnote A: _Millennial Star_, Vol. 23: p. 247.]

It is the accepted doctrine of the orthodox Christian creeds that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is as the Father is--(Creed of St. Athanasius) that is, of the _same_ nature and essence. Very well, then; as God, the Father, begot Jesus, the Son, may not the Son in time also beget a son or sons? Or, after ascribing to the Son the _same_ nature and the _same power_ as is ascribed to the Father, will our orthodox friends insist upon limiting the Son by denying him productive virtue, and contend that Jesus must endure without the exercise of it? If the existence of the Son was essential to the perfection of God, the Father--and it cannot be thought of in any other light--may it not be, since the Son is of the same nature as the Father, that the fact of fatherhood is necessary to the perfection of the Son? To deny him the power of attaining it would be to limit his power, which may not be done even according to orthodox Christian doctrine. Is it not likely, nay, would it not be so? that the same cause or impulse, or necessity, or what influence or consideration soever it was that led God, the Father, to beget a Son, create a world, and provide for its redemption, would impel the Son, since he is of the same nature as the Father, to do these same things? And where was the beginning of such proceedings? and where will be the end of them?

But now, to resume again our measuring of Mr. V.'s philosophy by Jesus Christ as God.

Is Jesus Christ without passions? No; his deathless love for his friends, so beautifully manifested by word and deed throughout his mortal life, together with his love for mankind, which led him to give his life for the world, as also his explicitly declared hatred of that which is sin and evil, forbid us thinking of him as without passions.[A] As in him dwelt "all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," so in him necessarily are gathered all these qualities, attributes and perfections that go to the making of God. Does possession of these qualities, together with Messiah's mode of existence in the form and person of Jesus Christ, come in conflict with the notion of God's "simplicity," "immutability," and "eternity," as conceived by philosophers? So much the worse, then, for the faulty and merely human conceptions of those qualities, as relating to God. Better mistrust the accuracy of metaphysical reasoning; better throw aside Plato and his philosophy as untrustworthy, than to be moved ever so slightly from the great truth of revelation that Jesus, the Messiah, is God; and that such as he is, God is, as to essence, attributes, existence, and the mode of existence. Jesus Christ, then, once accepted as God, and the manifestation of God to men, is a complete answer to Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical argument for the absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality" or "immutability" of God.

[Footnote A: God is angry with the wicked every day (Ps 7:11.)]

More of Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Philosophy."

I must not neglect Mr. Van Der Donckt's "philosophy" that forbids us believing that "several finite things" can "produce an infinite, or an illimitable, as there would always be a first and last." Also his "finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God." Also, his "many infinite beings are inconceivable; for, if there were several, they would have to differ from each other by some perfection." And his "from the moment one would have a perfection, the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a compound of infinite parts."

Can any one, can Mr. Van Der Donckt himself, be quite sure of all this? Who knows how the infinite is constituted? When men speak of the infinite, are they not treating of that which is beyond the comprehension of the mind of man, at least in his present state of limited intellectual powers; for whatever may be the heights to which the mind of man may rise, when freed from his present earth-bound conditions, here and now he must recognize his intellectual limitations: for, as in Christ's humiliation (i. e. in his earth-life) his judgement was taken away (Acts 8:33), that is, his divine, supreme, intellectual and spiritual powers were veiled--so with man, in this same world of trial and limitations. Whatever his power as an eternal Intelligence may have been, or what it may be hereafter, he is now compelled to admit that he sees but as through a glass darkly, and therefore imperfectly. Men, I hold, though they be philosophers, cannot comprehend the infinite, much less say how it is constituted. But let us reflect a little upon the several propositions Mr. V. submits to us:

1--"_Several finite beings cannot produce the infinite_."

So far as it is possible for the human intellect to conceive the infinite, the material universe is infinite, eternal, without beginning and without end. It is inconceivable that the universe could have had a beginning, could have been produced from nothing. "All the apparent proofs," remarks Herbert Spencer, "that something can come out of nothing, a wider knowledge has one by one cancelled. The comet that is suddenly discovered in the heavens and nightly waxes larger, is proved not to be a newly created body, but a body that was until lately beyond the range of vision. The cloud which in course of a few minutes forms in the sky, consists not of substance that has just begun to be, but of substance that previously existed in a more diffused and transparent form. And similarly with a crystal or precipitate in relation to the fluid depositing it" (First Prin., p. 177.) Mr. Spencer holds it "impossible to think of _nothing_ becoming _something_," for the reason that "nothing" cannot become an object of consciousness (_Ibid_ pp. 161-2.) In like manner, he holds that matter is indestructible, and hence, that the universe cannot be annihilated. "The doctrine that matter is indestructible has become a common-place," he remarks. "The seeming annihilations of matter turn out, on close observation, to be only changes of state. It is found that the evaporated water, though it has become invisible, may be brought by condensations to its original shape." The indestructibility of matter, Mr. Spencer holds to be a datum of consciousness, which he thus illustrates:

Conceive the space before you to be cleared of all bodies save
one. Now imagine the remaining one not to be removed from its
place, but to lapse into nothing while standing in that place. You
fail. The place that was solid you cannot conceive becoming empty,
save by the transfer of that which made it solid * * * However
small the bulk to which we conceive a piece of matter reduced,
it is impossible to conceive it reduced into nothing. While we
can represent to ourselves the parts the matter as approximated,
we cannot represent to ourselves the quantity of matter as made
less. To do this would be to imagine some of the constituent
parts compressed into nothing; which is no more possible than to
imagine compression of the whole into nothing. Our inability to
conceive matter becoming non-existent, is immediately consequent
on the nature of thought. Thought consists in the establishment
of relations. There can be no relation established, and therefore
no thought framed, when one of the related terms is absent from
consciousness. Hence, it is impossible to think of something
becoming nothing, for the same reason that it is impossible to
think of nothing becoming something. (First Prin., p. 181.)

The material universe, then, is eternal, it always existed, and how many changes soever it may pass through, it will never be annihilated. Not one atom can be added to the sum total of its substance, nor one blotted out of existence--it is everywhere existing, and, so far as the mind of man can conceive "infinity," it is infinite. Yet we know that this whole is made up of a great variety of substances and objects which are finite; and our philosophers, for the most part, hold that matter is divisible into ultimate atoms. Not that such a fact has been demonstrated or is demonstrable; but granted the existence of matter, its existence as an aggregation of such ultimate things as atoms seems to be a necessary truth. I say necessary truth, because the mind of man cannot conceive to the contrary, and hence, science assumes matter to be composed of atoms. But atoms are things--material things; and in the mind must necessarily be thought of as having dimensions--an upper and lower part, also a hither and thither side; or if spherical then a circumference and diameter; in other words, atoms are finite, material things, and in the aggregate constitute the material universe, which, so far as the wit of man can conceive, is infinite; and hence, we may say the infinite universe is composed of finite atoms; or, several finite things--Mr. V.'s philosophy to the contrary notwithstanding--produce the infinite.

2--"_Many infinite beings are inconceivable; for if there were several, they would have to differ from each other by some perfection. Now, the moment one would have a perfection the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite_."

That may be true in relation to absolute "infinity." But we have already seen that God cannot be considered as absolutely infinite, because we are taught by the facts of revelation that absolute infinity cannot hold as to God; as a person, God has limitations, and that which has limitations is not absolutely infinite. If God is conceived of as absolutely infinite, in his substance as in his attributes, then all idea of personality respecting him must be given up; for personality implies limitations. If the idea of personality in respect of God be retained, then the idea of absolute infinity regarding him must be abandoned. That "infinite" which does not include all things and all qualities is not absolutely infinite. The only persons who consistently hold to the absolute infinity of God are those who identify God with the universe--regarding God and the universe as one and the same. So long as orthodox Christians regard God as distinct from what they call the "material universe," that long they teach but a modified infinity respecting God. They really mean that God is only infinite "_after his kind_." One of Spinoza's definitions may help us here. He says a thing is _finite_ after its kind "_when it can be limited by another thing or the same nature_," as one body is limited by another (Ethics Def. ii.) is not a thing _infinite_ after its kind, then, when it is _not_ limited by anything of the same nature? Is not this the necessary corollary of Spinoza's definition of the "finite after its kind?" and do not those who regard God as distinct from the universe, and at the same time ascribe infinity to him, mean only that he is infinite "after his kind?" There may be, then, many infinites after their kind; and this view is sustained by the fact that such infinites do exist. Duration or time is infinite after its kind, because not limited by anything of the same nature. Space is infinite after its kind, for the same reason; so, too, are force and matter. If there may be two or four things infinite after their kind, because not limited by anything of the same nature, are many infinites inconceivable? Moreover, when _infinity_ is thus understood--and it can be understood when relating to God in no other way--the difficulty raised by the latter part of Mr. V.'s proposition, __viz__., that, if there were several infinite beings, they would differ from each other by some perfection, and when one would have a perfection that the other lacked, the latter would not be infinite, etc.--disappears; for when beings are infinite after their kind, they are only limited by things of a different nature, and therefore the perfections possessed by those beings of a different nature will constitute no limitation to their infinity.

3--"_If one is infinite nothing can be added to it_."

This maybe true of the absolutely infinite; for that which is absolutely infinite must be the sum total of all existence. To say, therefore, that something existed in addition to this sum total, and could be added to it, would be illogical. But infinity in this conception cannot be ascribed to God; for we have seen that God is only infinite in faculties and power, not in person, hence not absolutely infinite; therefore, this statement in the gentleman's philosophy can have no bearing on the controversy in which we are engaged.

4--"_Finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God_."

When the Son of God, Jesus, took on a human body of flesh and bone, was not that which is finite, his body, added to the infinite in Jesus Christ? Did the finite body, taken on by the spirit of Jesus, communicate its limitations to God? And is Jesus, now in his resurrected, immortal body of flesh and bones, less "infinite" than before his spirit was united to his body? If one accepts Mr. V.'s doctrine of the absolute infinity of God, then one must believe that Jesus "the Word," who "was in the beginning with God," who "was God"--was not "made flesh;" that is, did not take on a body of flesh and bone; for the body of Jesus was finite; it had, in fact, all the limitations of a man's body, and Mr. V.'s doctrine tells us that "_if one is infinite, nothing can be added to it_"--therefore the "Word," who "was God," could not have been made flesh. If, on the other hand, one accepts the fact, so well attested by holy scriptures, _viz_., that Jesus, "the Word," "who was God," _was_ made flesh, _did_ take on a body that was flesh and bones, even though that body was finite, then one must reject the philosophy of Mr. V., which says the infinite may not take on finite parts, for the reason that they would communicate their limitations to the infinite, and thus destroy its infinity.

It is not difficult to see that something is wrong with the philosophy of Mr. Van Der Donckt, which thus constantly brings us in conflict with the revelations of God in the scriptures, and especially in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

In what state do these considerations leave the argument? Mr. Van Der Donckt reaches the conclusion, from the premise that _several finite things cannot produce the infinite_, that God cannot be a compound of finite parts. Yet we have seen that what is called the material universe, so far as it is possible for the mind of man to apprehend infinity, answers to his conception of the infinite; and we know that the universe is made up of finite parts; and that in its last analysis, it is but the aggregation of finite atoms.

From the premise that _many infinite beings are inconceivable_, Mr. V. reaches the conclusion that God cannot be a compound of infinite parts. But upon principles of sound reason, we have seen that things are infinite after their kind when not limited by anything of the same nature; and his premise of a number of infinites being inconceivable is destroyed by the actual existence of a number of infinites after their kind, such as duration, space, matter, spirit, and hence the absolute infinite, if existing at all, must be composed of an aggregation of infinities after their kind.

From the premise that _if one is infinite nothing can be added to it_, the gentleman implies the conclusion that God is infinite and therefore nothing can be added to him. Still, since Jesus was the Word, and the Word was and is God, we have seen that something was added to whatever of infinity there was in God, the Word, _viz_., what orthodox Christians call his "humanity"--that is, the pre-existent, divine spirit of Jesus took on a tabernacle of flesh--something finite was added to the infinite of God, the Word, and that, too, let me say, without communicating any limitations to the infinity possessed of God.

On these several premises, Mr. Van Der Donckt bases his general conclusion:--

Therefore, the infinite Being is not composite, but simple or
spiritual. Therefore, he is not, nor ever was, a man, who is a
composite being.

But since the premises themselves have been shown to be utterly untenable, as relating to God, as revealed in the scriptures, and in the person and nature of Jesus Christ, the conclusions are wrong; and the facts established are that while God in mind, faculties and in power is doubtless infinite, in person he is finite; and as his spirit is united to a body, he is composite, not simple; and as Jesus Christ was God manifested in the flesh, the express image of God the Father's person, the counterpart of his nature, and yet at the same time was a man--it is neither unscriptural, nor unphilosophical to hold that God, even the Father, is also a perfected, exalted man.

III.

MR. VAN DER DONCKT'S CONTRASTS BETWEEN MAN AND GOD.

Of the Intellectual Powers of Man.

Mr. Van Der Donckt insists that man can never become a God, because he "is finite or limited in everything; ever changeable and changing, ever susceptible of improvement." Granting that man is ever susceptible of improvement, ought not the gentleman to proceed with some caution before dogmatically asserting that there are to be limitations to man's enlargement, to his progress, and to his attainments? Given the susceptibility to improve, never ending duration through which the processes of improvement shall continue, and God to direct such processes, who can dogmatize upon the limitations of the Intelligences now known as men? It is not enough to say in reply to this that the "finite can never become infinite;" nor to argue that if God were an exalted man he would possess contradictory attributes, such as being both finite and infinite, compound and simple. We have already seen that when one undertakes to treat of the infinite, he is dealing with the unknown, dealing with terms that stand for the names of things of which the mind can form no adequate or satisfactory conception. But so far as the Father and the Son are concerned--personages held out to us in the scriptures as Gods--we have seen that absolute infinity may not be predicted of them. In person, form and the general nature of their physical being, they have limitations; and whatever of infinity or simplicity is ascribed to them must be ascribed to mind and attributes, not to personality. Seeing then, that the revelation of God in the scriptures, and especially in the revelation of God in the person and character of Jesus Christ, forces upon us a conception of God that represents him as concrete rather than abstract, finite in some respects, and infinite in others; and as compound rather than simple--it follows that urging the apparent absurdity of such characteristics in Deity as these is of no avail against the facts in the revelations God has given of himself. And now, as the limitations found in man, as to his physical person, nature, etc.,--and which are supposed by Mr. V. to forever bar man from attaining divinity--are found also in God the Father and in God the Son, it is quite clear that these physical limitations may not be urged as insuperable obstacles to man attaining divinity. As for the spirit of man--the mind--who can say what its metes and bounds are, much less what they shall be? Who comprehends its powers? Who dare say that it is not potentially infinite? and shall be hereafter actually infinite after its kind? I have already called attention to the fact that it is said of Messiah that in his humiliation, his judgment was taken away, which doubtless means that in his earth-life his intellectual and spiritual powers were somewhat veiled; and with man doubtless it is the same; in his earth-life that intellectual excellence which he enjoyed as a spirit in the mansions of the Father is veiled; but veiled as it is, there is of its manifestations sufficient to inspire one with awe, and make him hesitate ere pronouncing dogmatically upon its nature or its limitations. To illustrate my thought: I am this moment sitting at my desk, and am enclosed by the four walls of my room--limited as to my personal presence to this spot. But by the mere act of my will, I find I have the power to project myself in thought to any part of the world. Instantly I can be in the crowded streets of the world's metropolis. I walk through its well remembered thoroughfares, I hear the rush and roar of its busy multitudes, the rumble of vehicles, the huckster's cries, the cab-man's calls, sharp exclamations and quick retorts in the jostling throngs, the beggar's piping cry, the sailor's song, fragments of conversation, broken strains of music, the blare of trumpets, the neighing of horses, ear-piercing whistles, ringing of bells, shouts, responses, rushing trains and all that mingled din and soul-stirring roar that rises in clamor above the great town's traffic.

At will, I leave all this and stand alone on mountain tops in Syria, India, or overlooking old Nile's valley, wrapped in the awful grandeur of solemn silence. Here I may bid fallen empires rise and pass in grand procession before my mental vision and live again their little lives: fight once more their battles; begin again each petty struggle for place, for power, for control of the world's affairs; revive their customs: live again their loves and hates, and preach once more their religions and their philosophies--all this the mind may do, and that as easily and as quickly as in thought it may leave this room, cross the street to a neighbor's home, and there take note of the familiar objects within his habitation. Nor does this begin to indicate all the power of the mind in these respects. Though the sun is ninety-two millions of miles away, on the instant, in thought, one may stand upon it within its resplendent atmosphere. In the same manner and with equal ease, one may project himself to the Pole Star, though it is so distant that it requires forty years for a ray of light to pass through the intervening space between that star and our earth, and still light travels at the rate of one hundred and eighty-six thousand miles per second! Nor is the end yet. In like manner and with equal ease one may instantly project himself in thought from within the four walls of his room to those more distant constellations of stars known to exist out in the depths of space, whence it would require a ray of light a million years to reach our earth; yet standing there in a world so distant from ours, one would find himself still centered in the universe, and out beyond him, in a straight line from the earth whence he has traveled, would extend other realms in splendor no less magnificent. From the vasty deep of these realms, he could call up other worlds, and people them with creatures of his thought, as one may call up empires to pass in mighty procession before him in the Nile or in the Ganges valley.

Distance, then, to the mind of man, is as nothing. The infinity of extension, and of duration also, is matched by the infiniteness of man's mind, though that mind has a local habitation and a name within a tabernacle of flesh and bone. This is but a glimpse at the infinite powers of the mind of man in one direction, and under circumstances that somewhat veil the splendor of his intellectual and spiritual glory; what those powers may be in all particulars when man shall be made free from the restricting and depressing environment of the present earth-life, no one may say; but enough may be seen from what is here pointed out to establish the firm belief that, as the intellectual powers in man rise to match the infinitudes of extension and duration, as indicated, so, too, in all other respects shall the mind of man, when free, rise to the harmony of all the infinities that make up the universe. And it is not inconceivable (in view of the great spiritual and intellectual powers even now discernible in him) that the time will come when man will not only be able to project himself in thought to any part of the universe, no matter how distant, but in his future immeasurably exalted state he may project both thought and consciousness equally to all points of the universe at once, steadfastly maintain them there, and thus be all-knowing, everywhere present in thought, in consciousness--in spirit in fact--as God now is; and if, as it is reasonable to believe will be the case, his power equals his knowledge; and his freedom of volition equals his knowledge and his power--then, indeed, will man be a spiritual and intellectual force immanent in the universe, both to will and to do, even as God.

Jesus prayed that his disciples might be one with each other even _as_ he and the Father are one (St. John 17:11); that they all might be one; and as the Father was in Christ, and as Christ was in the Father, so also would Messiah have the disciples to be one in him and in the Father, that they might all be one with the Father and the Son, and with each other, even as the Father and the Son are one (St. John 17; 21,22.) But for the disciples to be "one" with the Father and the Son, in the complete sense in which the Messiah here prayed for that "oneness," necessarily means to be "like" the Father, and that "likeness" can rise to the full height of its perfection only when it reaches equality with those with whom the disciples are to be "one" or "like." If man may not rise to the height of divinity, how shall this prayer of the Christ be realized? Or must we believe that the divine wisdom in the Son of God exercised itself in praying for that which is unattainable, that which is not only absurd but impossible? It is unthinkable that the divine nature shall be brought down to be "one" with men; so that if the "oneness" which also involves "likeness," be realized, in fulfilment of Messiah's prayer, it must be by men rising to divinity, Mr. Van Der Donckt's "impossibilities" to the contrary notwithstanding.

"Behold the Man Has Become as One of Us."

To illustrate his contention that man can never rise to the quality of divinity, Mr. Van Der Donckt indulges in comparisons between man and God; and, to emphasize that contrast, challenges well-known men of science to the exercise of creative powers, contrasts the frequent collisions upon our railroads with the order, regularity, and safety of the movements among the planetary systems where never a collision occurs; and then indulges in such folly as this:

They (astronomers) can indeed predict transits and eclipses; but
suppose astronomers from New Zealand, on their way to America
to observe this fall's moon eclipse, meet with an accident in
mid-ocean, would they at once send this wireless telegram to the
United States' stargazers assembled say at Lick Observatory:
"Belated by leak. Please retard eclipse two hours that we may
not miss it." As well might all the telescope men in the world
combined, attempt to fetch down the rings of Saturn for the
construction of a royal race track, as pretend to control movements
of the heavenly bodies.

The gentleman also points out how precarious are the powers of man:

The helpless babe of yesterday may indeed rival Mozart, Haydn, and
Paderewski, but tomorrow he may rise with lame hands and pierced
ear-drums; and millions of worshipers of the shattered idol are
powerless to restore it to the musical world.

This part of the gentleman's argument sinks far below the general high level of his Reply, and is unworthy of his intelligence. I have already pointed out, that Latter-day Saints do not teach that man in his present state and condition is a God. On the contrary, they admit man's narrowness, weakness, imperfections and limitations; and also recognize the great gulf stretching between man in his present state and that dignity of divinity to which somewhere and sometime in the eternities it is within his province and power to attain. Mr. Van Der Donckt's comparisons, therefore, between God and man, in the latter's present condition, are not in point, for the reason that the Latter-day Saints do not claim that man is now a Deity, only as he may be thought potentially one. Taking the highest type of man to start with, consider him as raised from the dead and hence immortal; give him Gods for guides, teachers, and companions, with the universe for the field of his operations, then let Mr. V. or anyone else, say what man's attainments will be one thousand millions of years hence; and that period, let it be remembered, long as it may seem to man's petty methods of computing duration, is but as a moment in the existence of an immortal being. Let Mr. Van Der Donckt institute his comparisons from that point of man's career, instead of from the present point of man's weakness and mortality, and then say if ultimately divinity seems so unattainable as now. If he shall say he is unable to institute his comparisons at the point proposed, because what man will then be is unknown, I shall agree with him; but let him acknowledge, as perforce he must, that man will be immeasurably advanced beyond what he is now; also let him admit the injustice he does our doctrine by insisting upon making his comparisons between God and man as the latter now stands, under the effects of the fall, and in his humiliation and weakness.

After indulging in the aforesaid comparisons, Mr.V. further remarks:

I fear Mr. B. H. Roberts will be inclined to think God jealous
because he gives man no show for comparison with him. This would
certainly be a less blunder of the Utah man, ("I will not give my
glory to another"--Isaiah 42:8) than his contention, which is a
mere echo of Satan's promise in Paradise: "You shall be as Gods."
(Genesis 3:5.)

To which I answer, not so; the contention of the "Utah man" is not the echo of Satan's promise, "ye shall be as Gods." On the contrary, the "Utah man's" contention is bottomed on the august and sure word of God, uttered in Eden, when he said of the man Adam--"_Behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil_" (Genesis 3:22)--a passage which the Reverend gentleman seems to have overlooked.

OF THE UNITY OF GOD.

There remains to be considered the Unity of God.

The Latter-day Saints believe in the unity of the creative and governing force or power of the universe as absolutely as any orthodox Christian sect in the world. One cannot help being profoundly impressed with the great truth that creation, throughout its whole extent, bears evidence of being _one_ system, presents at every point _unity_ of design, and _harmony_ in its government. Nor am I unmindful of the force there is in the deduction usually drawn from these premises, viz., that the Creator and Governor of the universe, must necessarily be _one_. But I am also profoundly impressed by another fact that comes within the experience of man, at least to a limited extent, viz., the possibility of intelligences arriving at perfect agreement, so as to act in absolute unity. We see manifestations of this principle in human governments, and other human associations of various kinds. And this, too, is observable, viz, that the greater and more perfect the intelligence the more perfect can the unity of purpose and of effort become: so that one needs only the existence of perfect intelligences to operate together in order to secure perfect oneness, whence shall come the _one_ system evident in the universe, exhibiting at every point _unity_ of design, and perfect _harmony_ in its government. In other words, "oneness" can be the result of perfect agreement among Many Intelligences as surely as it can be the result of the existence of One Only Intelligence. Also, the decrees and purposes of the perfectly united Many can be as absolute as the decrees and purposes of the One Only Intelligence. One is also confronted with the undeniable fact that inclines him to the latter view as the reasonable explanation of the "Oneness" that is evidently in control of the universe--_the fact that there are in existence many Intelligences, and, endowed as they are with free will, it cannot be denied that they influence, to some extent, the course of events and the conditions that obtain_. Moreover, it will be found, on careful inquiry, that the explanation of the "Oneness" controlling in the universe, on the theory that it results from the perfect agreement or unity of Many Intelligences,[A] is more in harmony with the revelations of God on the subject than the theory that there is but One Only Intelligence that enters into its government. This theory Mr. Van Der Donckt, of course, denies, and this is the issue between us that remains to be tested.

[Footnote A: John Stuart Mill, in his Essay on _Theism_, in speaking of the evident unity in nature, which suggests that nature is governed by _One Being_, comes very near stating the exact truth in an alternative statement to his first remark, viz.: "At least, if a plurality be supposed, it is necessary to assume so complete a concert of action and unity of will among them, that the difference is for most purposes immaterial between such a theory and that of the absolute unity of the Godhead" (_Essays on Religion--Theism_, p. 133).]

The Reverend gentleman affirms that the first chapter of the Bible "reveals the supreme fact that there is but One Only and Living God." This I deny; and affirm the fact that the first chapter of the Bible reveals the existence of a plurality of Gods.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the word translated "God" in the first chapter of our English version of the Bible, in the Hebrew, is _Elohim_--plural of Eloah--and should be rendered "Gods"--so as to read "In the beginning the Gods created the heavens and the earth," etc. * * * The Gods said, "Let there be light." * * * The Gods said "Let us make man," etc., etc. So notorious is the fact that the Hebrew plural, _Elohim_, is used by Moses, that a variety of devices have been employed to make the first chapter of Genesis conform to the "One Only God" idea. Some Jews in explanation of it, and in defense of their belief in _One_ Only God, hold that there are several Hebrew words which have a plural form but singular meaning--of which Elohim is one--and they quote as proof of this the word _maim_, meaning water, _shamaim_, meaning heaven, and _panim_, meaning the face or surface of a person or thing. "But," says a Christian Jewish scholar,[A] "if we examine these words, we shall find that though apparently they may have a singular meaning, yet, in reality, they have a plural or collective one; thus, for instance, '_maim_,' water, means a collection of waters, forming one collective whole; and thus again '_shamaim_,' heaven, is also, in reality as well as form, of the plural number, meaning what we call in a similar way in English, 'the heavens;' comprehending all the various regions which are included under that title."

[Footnote A: This is Rev. R. Highton, M. A., and Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford. I quote from his lecture on "God a Unity and Plurality," published in a Christian Jewish periodical called _The Voice of Israel_, February number, 1844.]

Other Jewish scholars content themselves in accounting for this inconvenient plural in the opening chapter of Genesis, by saying that in the Hebrew, _Elohim_ better represents the idea of "Strong," "Mighty," than the singular form would, and for this reason it was used--a view accepted by not a few Christians. Thus, Dr. Elliott, Professor of Hebrew in Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, says: "The name _Elohim_ (singular Eloah) is the generic name of God, and, being _plural_ in form, is probably a plural of excellence and majesty."[A] Dr. Havernick derives the word _Elohim_ from a Hebrew root now lost, _Coluit_, and thinks that the plural is used merely to indicate the abundance and super-richness contained in the divine Being.[B] Rabbi Jehuda Hallevi (twelfth century) found in the usage of the plural _Elohim_ a protest against idolators, who call each personified power _Eloah_ and all collectively _Elohim_. "He interpreted it as the most general name of the Deity, distinguishing him as manifested in the exhibition of his power without reference to his personality or moral qualities, or any special relations which he bears to man."[C] A number of Christian scholars attempt to account for the use of the plural _Elohim_ by saying that it foreshadows the doctrine of the Christian Trinity, that is, it recognizes the existence of the three persons in one God. "It is expressive of omnipotent power; and by its use here (first chap. Genesis) in the plural form is obscurely taught at the opening of the Bible, a doctrine clearly revealed in other parts of it, viz., that though God is one, there is a plurality of persons in the Godhead--Father, Son and Spirit, who were engaged in the creative work."[D] This view was maintained at length by Rev. H. Highton, in the Christian Jewish periodical, _The Voice of Israel_, before quoted. "But Calvin, Mercer, Dresius and Ballarmine," says Dr. Hackett,[E] of the Theological Institution of Newton, Massachusetts--editor of Smith's Bible Dictionary--"have given the weight of their authority against an explanation so fanciful and arbitrary."

[Footnote A: "Vindication of Mosaic Authorship of Pentateuch," p. 65.]

[Footnote B: See "Kitto's Biblical Literature," Art. "God," Vol. 1, p. 777.]

[Footnote C: Smith's Bible Dict. (Hackett edition), Art. Jehovah, p. 1242.]

[Footnote D: "Critical and Explanatory Commentary" (Jamieson, Faussett and Brown) Gen. 1:1, 2.]

[Footnote E: Smith's Bible Dictionary (Hackett edition), Art. Jehovah, Vol. 2, p. 1242.]

Others explain the use of the plural "we" or "us," by saying that in the first chapter of Genesis Moses represents God as speaking of himself in that manner, in imitation of the custom of kings, who speak of themselves as "we," instead of in the singular, "I." In other words, it is the royal "we," or "us." This theory, however, is answered, as pointed out by Rev. H. Highton, by the fact that the use of what is called the "royal plural" is a modern, not an ancient, custom; and reference to the usage of the kings of the Bible discloses the fact that they always speak of themselves as "I" or "me," not as "we" or "us."[A]

[Footnote A: _Voice of Israel_, p. 95.]

Modern Bible criticism, usually denominated "The Higher Criticism," is to a great extent--so far as criticism of the five books of Moses is concerned--based upon the exclusive use of the plural _Elohim_ in one section, and the use of _Jehovah_, singular, in another. "The Pentateuch, therefore, it is asserted, is composed of two different documents, the one Elohistic, and the other Jehovistic, consequently it cannot be the work of a single author."[A]

[Footnote A: "Vindication of Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch" (Elliott) p. 64.)]

With the various devices for accounting for the use of the plural form _Elohim_ in the first chapter of the Bible, I have nothing to do here. They are simply pointed out as showing the wide recognition that is given to the fact of the use of the plural form _Elohim_ that should be rendered in English "Gods;" and also the perplexity the use of this plural occasions among those whose principles call upon them to harmonize its use with the belief in "One Only God." Mr. Van Der Donckt admits the use of the plural _Elohim_, but undertakes to explain away the force of its use as follows:

Whenever _Elohim_ occurs in the Bible, in sense 1, (meaning
the True God) it is employed with singular verbs and singular
adjectives.

Relative to this, a friend[A] directs my attention to Genesis 1:26: "Let _us_ make man in _our_ image," etc., which in Hebrew is _Maach_--"we will make," first person plural future of the verb _Asah_: _betsalmaun_--_be_ "in;" _tselem_, "image;" _Nu_, "our," possessive adjective, first person plural. So that in Genesis 1:26, we have a case where _Elohim_ is used in connection with a plural verb and also a plural possessive adjective, and Mr. Van Der Donckt will not say that _Elohim_ does not, in Genesis 1:26, refer to true Gods. Again in Genesis 3:22--"Man is become as one of _us_," Mr. Ramseyer suggests that here, again, the pronoun used is in the first person plural. I find this view of both these passages sustained by Rev. H. Highton in the lecture before quoted. First he says:

[Footnote A: Prof. A. Ramseyer, of the Latter-day Saints' University.]

The Hebrew word meaning God, is itself a plural word, implying
thereby, as we contend, a plurality of persons in the Godhead * *
We find the plural word _Elohim_, or God, most usually, _though
not always_, coupled with a singular verb or adjective. * * * but
lest from the constant use of the word _Elohim_ with the singular
number, we should be led to suppose that God is in no sense a
plurality, it has pleased him by the inspiration of his Holy
Spirit, to cause that it should be sometimes used with a plural
verb or adjective. I will mention some of the clearest passages
in which it is so used, that you may be enabled to refer to them
in the Hebrew. You will find it used in a plural verb in Genesis
20:13. "And it came to pass, when God caused me to wander from my
father's house," etc.; and again in Genesis 35:7, "And he built
there an altar, and called the place _El-Bethel_: because their God
appeared unto him." And with a plural adjective in Joshua 34:19,
and again in Deut. 5:26 (in the original Hebrew, 5:23).

But we have not merely the plural use of the word _Elohim_ to
mention in this part of the argument; we have some very distinct
passages, still more directly implying the plurality of persons.
There is a very remarkable place of the kind in Eccle. 12:1, where
it says: "Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth." In
the original Hebrew the word is in the plural, and if translated
literally, would be "Remember now thy Creators," etc. * * * In
connection with this expression of Solomon about man's Creators,
it is a very remarkable circumstance, that in the account of the
creation of man, given by Moses in the book of Genesis, the plural
is also directly used, for it is there recorded, Genesis 1, 26,
"_And God said let us make_" etc., or "_we will make_," etc., so
that Moses as well as Solomon very emphatically declares that the
great Creator of man consists of more than one person; for whom
could God have been addressing when he said, "_Let us make_,"
etc.? I know that in order to escape the obvious conclusion to be
drawn from the passage, it has been asserted that God was here
addressing and taking counsel with the angels but this explanation
cannot in any degree bear the test of an accurate examination of
the passage; for is there the slightest ground for supposing that
the angels took any part in the creation of man, when God said,
"_Let us make_"? or shall we say that man was made in the image and
likeness of the angels, when God said, "_Let us make_" etc., "_in
our image_?" Surely not, for Moses expressly adds, (v. 27) "_So
God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he
him, male and female created he them_." But there are some other
passages which we ought to examine, where God in the same way
speaks of himself in the plural number. Thus in Genesis 3:22, "And
the Lord God said, "Behold the _man is become as one of us_, to
know good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand and take
also of the tree of life, and eat and live forever," etc. There
are no words which I know which could more distinctly assert the
plurality of persons in God than these, where he says "one of us."
M. Leeser, of Philadelphia, the editor of the _Occident_, which
is the American Jewish magazine, in his sermon on the Messiah,
explains this passage as spoken to the angels--"one of us," meaning
himself and the angels;--but never can I believe that the Great
Everlasting Creator could thus put himself on a level with the
created angels, and say "one of us," * * * he would either have
said to the angels, "Behold, man has become as one of you," or else
have said, "Behold, the man has become like me, to know good and
evil."

This view of Genesis 1:26 is also maintained by Prof. W. H. Chamberlin, of Brigham Young College, Logan, Utah, in the _Era_ for November, 1902. He says: That _Elohim_ was used in the plural sense is shown in the twenty-sixth verse, where the _Elohim_, in referring to themselves use the plural suffix _Nu_ "our," twice, and they also use the plural form of the verb _Naaseh_, "let us make." The Professor also adds the illustration of Genesis 11:7: where _Nerdhah_, "let us descend," and _Nabhlah_, "let us confuse," two verbs in the plural, proceed from the mouth of God.[A]

[Footnote A: I commend Professor Chamberlin's whole article to the reader as most worthy of his attention at this point; and personally, I wish to thank the Professor for it as a most timely contribution to the controversy. The whole article is published in Chapter v.]

In the light of these facts, the statement of Mr. V. that whenever _Elohim_ occurs in the Bible, as meaning the true God, it is employed with singular verbs and singular adjectives, seems to have been made without that careful consideration which the importance of the declaration required. The facts adduced in the foregoing stand also against Mr. V.'s contention that whenever the plural "gods" occurs in Holy Writ, it applies only "to false gods and idols;" or "to representatives of God, such as angels, judges, kings." They were not false gods nor representatives of God merely, who said: "Let _us_ make man in _our_ image" (Genesis i:26); nor false gods, or mere representatives of God merely, who said: "The man has become as one of _us_" (Genesis 2:7); and so also with other passages in the quotation from Rev. Highton's lecture.

Here it may be as well to note the remarks of Mr. Van Der Donckt with reference to the "Mormon" Church leaders' knowledge of Hebrew. The Rev. gentleman is of the opinion that,

Had the "Mormon" Church leaders known Hebrew, the original language
of the book of Moses and nearly the whole of the Old Testament,
they would not have been guilty of the outrageous blunders of the
Pearl of Great Price and of the Catechism.