Chapter V: Nationalism (3)

Meanwhile, the Allies had occupied Constantinople, to force acceptance of the draft treaty of peace. Naturally, there was no resistance, Constantinople being entirely at the mercy of the Allied fleet. But the silence of the vast throngs gathered to watch the incoming troops filled some Allied observers with disquietude. A French journalist wrote: "The silence of the multitude was more impressive than boisterous protests. Their eyes glowed with sullen hatred. Scattered through this throng of mute, prostrated, hopeless people circulated watchful and sinuous emissaries, who were to carry word of this misfortune to the remotest confines of Islam. In a few hours they would be in Anatolia. A couple of days later the news would have spread to Konia, Angora, and Sivas. In a brief space of time it would be heralded throughout the regions of Bolshevist influence, extending to the Caucasus and beyond. In a few weeks all these centres of agitation will be preparing their counter-attack. Asia and Africa will again cement their union of faith. Intelligent agents will record in the retentive minds of people who do not read, the history of our blunders. These missionaries of insurrection and fanaticism come from every race and class of society. Educated and refined men disguise themselves as beggars and outcasts, in order to spread the news apace and to prepare for bitter vengeance."[187]

Events in Turkey now proceeded precisely as the Italian Premier Nitti had foretold. The Allied masters of Constantinople compelled the Sultan to appoint a "friendly" cabinet which solemnly denounced Mustapha Kemal and his "rebels," and sent a hand-picked delegation to Sèvres, France, where they dutifully "signed on the dotted line" the treaty that the Allies had prepared. The Allies had thus "imposed their will"--on paper. For every sensible man knew that the whole business was a roaring farce; knew that the "friendly" government, from Sultan to meanest clerk, was as nationalist as Mustapha Kemal himself; knew that the real Turkish capital was not Constantinople but Angora, and that the Allies' power was measured by the range of their guns. As for Mustapha Kemal, his comment on the Sèvres Treaty was: "I will fight to the end of the world."

The Allies were thus in a decidedly embarrassing situation, especially since "The Allies" now meant only England and France. Italy was out of the game. As Nitti had warned at San Remo, she would "not send a single soldier nor pay a single lira." With 200,000 soldiers holding down the Arabs, and plenty of trouble elsewhere, neither France nor Britain had the troops to crush Mustapha Kemal--a job which the French staff estimated would take 300,000 men. One weapon, however, they still possessed--Greece. In return for large territorial concessions, Premier Venizelos offered to bring the Turks to reason. His offer was accepted, and 100,000 Greek troops landed at Smyrna. But the Greek campaign was not a success. Even 100,000 men soon wore thin when spread out over the vast Asia Minor plateau. Mustapha Kemal avoided decisive battle, harassing the Greeks by guerilla warfare just as he was harassing the French in Cilicia at the other end of the line. The Greeks "dug in," and a deadlock ensued which threatened to continue indefinitely. This soon caused a new complication. Venizelos might be willing to "carry on" as the Allies' submandatory, but the Greek people were not. Kept virtually on a war-footing since 1912, the Greeks kicked over the traces. In the November elections they repudiated Venizelos by a vote of 990,000 to 10,000, and recalled King Constantine, who had been deposed by the Allies three years before. This meant that Greece, like Italy, was out of the game. To be sure, King Constantine presently started hostilities with the Turks on his own account. This was, however, something very different from Greece's attitude under the Venizelist régime. The Allies' weapon had thus broken in their hands.

Meanwhile Mustapha Kemal was not merely consolidating his authority in Asia Minor but was gaining allies of his own. In the first place, he was establishing close relations with the Arabs. It may appear strange to find such bitter foes become friends; nevertheless, Franco-British policy had achieved even this seeming miracle. The reason was clearly explained by no less a person than Lawrence ("The Soul of the Arab Revolution"), who had returned to civil life and was thus free to speak his mind on the Eastern situation, which he did in no uncertain fashion. In one of several statements given to the British press, Lawrence said: "The Arabs rebelled against the Turks during the war, not because the Turkish Government was notably bad, but because they wanted independence. They did not risk their lives in battle to change masters, to become British subjects or French citizens, but to win a State of their own." The matter was put even more pointedly by an Arab nationalist leader in the columns of a French radical paper opposed to the Syrian adventure. Said this leader: "Both the French and the English should know once for all that the Arabs are joined by a common religion with the Turks, and have been politically identified with them for centuries, and therefore do not wish to separate themselves from their fellow believers and brothers-in-arms merely to submit to the domination of a European nation, no matter what form the latter's suzerainty may assume.... It is no use for M. Millerand to say: 'We have never thought of trespassing in any respect upon the independence of these people.' No one is deceived by such statements as that. The armistice was signed in accordance with the conditions proclaimed by Mr. Wilson, but as soon as Germany and its allies were helpless, the promises of the armistice were trodden underfoot, as well as the Fourteen Points. Such a violation of the promises of complete independence, so prodigally made to the Arabs on so many occasions, has resulted in re-uniting closer than ever the Arabs and the Turks. It has taken but a few months to restore that intimacy.... It is probable that France, by maintaining an army of 150,000 men in Syria, and by spending billions of francs, will be able to subdue the Syrian Arabs. But that will not finish the task. The interior of that country borders upon other lands inhabited by Arabs, Kurds, and Turks, and by the immense desert. In starting a conflict with 4,000,000 Syrians, France will be making enemies of 15,000,000 Arabs in the Levant, most of whom are armed tribes, without including the other Mohammedan peoples, who are speedily acquiring solidarity and organization under the blows that are being dealt them by the Entente. If you believe I am exaggerating, all you have to do is to investigate the facts yourself. But what good will it do to confirm the truth too late, and after floods of blood have flowed?"[188]

In fact, signs of Turco-Arab co-operation became everywhere apparent. To be sure, this co-operation was not openly avowed either by Mustapha Kemal or by the deposed King Feisal who, fleeing to Italy, continued his diplomatic manoeuvres. But Arabs fought beside Turks against the French in Cilicia; Turks and Kurds joined the Syrian Arabs in their continual local risings; while Kemal's hand was clearly apparent in the rebellion against the British in Mesopotamia.

This Arab _entente_ was not the whole of Mustapha Kemal's foreign policy. He was also reaching out north-eastward to the Tartars of Transcaucasia and the Turkomans of Persian Azerbaidjan. The Caucasus was by this time the scene of a highly complicated struggle between Moslem Tartars and Turkomans, Christian Armenians and Georgians, and various Russian factions, which was fast reducing that unhappy region to chaos. Among the Tartar-Turkomans, long leavened by Pan-Turanian propaganda, Mustapha Kemal found enthusiastic adherents; and his efforts were supported by a third ally--Bolshevik Russia. Bolshevik policy, which, as we have already stated, was seeking to stir up trouble against the Western Powers throughout the East, had watched Kemal's rise with great satisfaction. At first the Bolsheviki could do very little for the Turkish nationalists because they were not in direct touch, but the collapse of Wrangel's "White" army in November, 1920, and the consequent overrunning of all south Russia by the Red armies, opened a direct line from Moscow to Angora via the Caucasus, and henceforth Mustapha Kemal was supplied with money, arms, and a few men.

Furthermore, Kemal and the Bolsheviki were starting trouble in Persia. That country was in a most deplorable condition. During the war Persia, despite her technical neutrality, had been a battle-ground between the Anglo-Russians on the one hand and the Turco-Germans on the other. Russia's collapse in 1917 had led to her military withdrawal from Persia, and England, profiting by the situation, had made herself supreme, legalizing her position by the famous "Agreement" "negotiated" with the Shah's government in August, 1919.[189] This treaty, though signed and sealed in due form, was bitterly resented by the Persian people. Here was obviously another ripe field for Bolshevik propaganda. Accordingly, the Bolshevik government renounced all rights in Persia acquired by the Czarist régime and proclaimed themselves the friends of the Persian people against Western imperialism. Naturally the game worked, and Persia soon became honeycombed with militant unrest. In the early summer of 1920 a Bolshevist force actually crossed the Caspian Sea and landed on the Persian shore. They did not penetrate far into the country. They did not need to, for the country simply effervesced in a way which made the British position increasingly untenable. For many months a confused situation ensued. In fact, at this writing the situation is still obscure. But there can be no doubt that Britain's hold on Persia is gravely shaken, and she may soon be compelled to evacuate the country, with the possible exception of the extreme south.

Turning back to the autumn of 1920: the position of England and France in the Near East had become far from bright. Deserted by Italy and Greece, defied by the Turks, harried by the Arabs, worried by the Egyptians and Persians, and everywhere menaced by the subtle workings of Bolshevism, the situation was not a happy one. The burden of empire was proving heavy. In Mesopotamia alone the bill was already 100,000,000 sterling, with no relief in sight.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that in both England and France Near Eastern policies were subjected to a growing flood of criticism. In England especially the tide ran very strong. The Mesopotamian imbroglio was denounced as both a crime and a blunder. For example, Colonel Lawrence stated: "We are to-day not far from disaster. Our government is worse than the old Turkish system. They kept 14,000 local conscripts in the ranks and killed yearly an average of 200 Arabs in maintaining peace. We keep 90,000 men, with aeroplanes, armoured cars, gunboats, and armoured trains. We have killed about 10,000 Arabs in the rising this summer."[190] Influenced by such criticisms and by the general trend of events, the British Government modified its attitude, sending out Sir Percy Cox to negotiate with the Arabs. Sir Percy Cox was a man of the Milner type, with a firm grip on realities and an intimate experience with Eastern affairs. Authorized to discuss large concessions, he met the nationalist leaders frankly and made a good impression upon them. At this writing matters have not been definitely settled, but it looks as though England was planning to limit her direct control to the extreme south of Mesopotamia at the head of the Persian Gulf--practically her old sphere of influence before 1914.

Meanwhile, in Syria, France has thus far succeeded in maintaining relative order by strong-arm methods. But the situation is highly unstable. All classes of the population have been alienated. Even the Catholic Maronites, traditionally pro-French, have begun agitating. General Gouraud promptly squelched the agitation by deporting the leaders to Corsica; nevertheless, the fact remains that France's only real friends in Syria are dissatisfied. Up to the present these things have not changed France's attitude. A short time ago ex-Premier Leygues remarked of Syria, "France will occupy all of it, and always"; while still more recently General Gouraud stated: "France must remain in Syria, both for political and economic reasons. The political consequences of our abandonment of the country would be disastrous. Our prestige and influence in the Levant and the Mediterranean would be doomed. The economic interests of France also compel us to remain there. When fully developed, Syria and Cilicia will have an economic value fully equal to that of Egypt."

However, despite the French Government's firmness, there is an increasing public criticism of the "Syrian adventure," not merely from radical anti-imperialist quarters, but from unimpeachably conservative circles as well. The editor of one of the most conservative French political periodicals has stated: "Jealous of its autonomy, the Arab people, liberated from the Ottoman yoke, do not desire a new foreign domination. To say that Syria demands our protection is a lie. Syria wishes to be entirely independent."[191] And recently Senator Victor Bérard, one of France's recognized authorities on Eastern affairs made a speech in the French Senate strongly criticising the Government's Syrian policy from the very start and declaring that a "free Syria" was "a question of both interest and honour."

Certainly, the French Government, still so unyielding toward the Arabs, has reversed its attitude toward the Turks. Side-stepping the Sèvres Treaty, it has lately agreed on provisional peace terms with the Turkish nationalists, actually agreeing to evacuate Cilicia. In fact, both France and England know that the Sèvres Treaty is unworkable, and that Turkish possession of virtually the whole of Asia Minor will have to be recognized.

In negotiating with Mustapha Kemal, France undoubtedly hopes to get him to throw over the Arabs. But this is scarcely thinkable. The whole trend of events betokens an increasing solidarity of the Near Eastern peoples against Western political control. A most remarkable portent in this direction is the Pan-Islamic conference held at Sivas early in 1921. This conference, called to draw up a definite scheme for effective Moslem co-operation the world over, was attended not merely by the high orthodox Moslem dignitaries and political leaders, but also by heterodox chiefs like the Shiah Emir of Kerbela, the Imam Yahya, and the Zaidite Emir of Yemen--leaders of heretical sects between whom and the orthodox Sunnis co-operation had previously been impossible. Most notable of all, the press reports state that the conference was presided over by no less a personage than El Sennussi. This may well be so, for we have already seen how the Sennussi have always worked for a close union of all Islam against Western domination.

Such is the situation in the Near East--a situation very grave and full of trouble. The most hopeful portent is the apparent awakening of the British Government to the growing perils of the hour, and its consequent modifications of attitude. The labours of men like Lord Milner and Sir Percy Cox, however hampered by purblind influences, can scarcely be wholly barren of results. Such men are the diplomatic descendants of Chatham and of Durham; the upholders of that great political tradition which has steered the British Empire safely through crises that appeared hopeless.

On the other hand, the darkest portent in the Near East is the continued intransigeance of France. Steeped in its old traditions, French policy apparently refuses to face realities. If an explosion comes, as come it must unless France modifies her attitude; if, some dark day, thirty or forty French battalions are caught in a simoom of Arab fury blowing out of the desert and are annihilated in a new Adowa; the regretful verdict of many versed in Eastern affairs can only be: "French policy has deserved it."

Leaving the Near Eastern problem at this critical juncture to the inscrutable solution of the future, let us now turn to the great political problem of the Middle East--the nationalist movement in India.

FOOTNOTES:

[138] For these early stages of the Turkish nationalist movement, see Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_; and his _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_. Also the articles by Léon Cahun in _Lavisse et Rambaud_, previously cited; and L. Rousseau, _L'Effort Ottoman_ (Paris, 1907).

[139] Bérard, _Le Sultan, l'Islam et les Puissances_, p. 16 (Paris, 1907).

[140] Cited by Bérard, p. 19.

[141] Cited by Bérard, p. 20.

[142] _Le Revéil de la Nation arabe_, by Negib Azoury (Paris, 1905).

[143] The semi-legendary founder of the Ottoman Empire.

[144] The texts of both the above documents can be most conveniently found in E. Jung, _Les Puissances devant la Révolte arabe: La Crise mondiale de Demain_, pp. 23-25 (Paris, 1906).

[145] A good analysis of Arab affairs on the eve of the Great War is that of the Moslem publicist "X," "Les Courants politiques dans le Monde arabe," _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1913. Also see G. W. Bury, _Arabia Infelix, or the Turks in Yemen_ (London, 1915).

[146] For Arab affairs during the Great War, see E. Jung, "L'Indépendance arabe et la Révolte actuelle," _La Revue_, 1 August, 1916; I. D. Levine, "Arabs versus Turks," _American Review of Reviews_, November, 1916; A. Musil, _Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien_ (Leipzig, 1918); G. W. Bury, _Pan-Islam_ (London, 1919); S. Mylrea, "The Politico-Religious Situation in Arabia," _The Moslem World_, July, 1919; L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution," _Asia_, April, May, June, 1920.

[147] Georg Schweinfurth, _Die Wiedergeburt Ägyptens im Lichte eines aufgeklärten Islam_ (Berlin, 1895).

[148] Low, _Egypt in Transition_, p. 260 (London, 1914).

[149] _The Asiatic Review_, April, 1914.

[150] "L'Égypte et les Débuts du Protectorat," _Revue des Sciences Politiques_, 15 June, 1915.

[151] Mohammed Farid Bey, "L'Égypte et la Guerre," _Revue Politique Internationale_, May, 1915.

[152] Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, "Die ägyptische Frage," _Asien_, November, 1916.

[153] A good summary of Berber history is H. Weisgerber, _Les Blancs d'Afrique_ (Paris, 1910).

[154] For analyses of differences between Arabs and Berbers, see Caix de Saint-Aymour, _Arabes et Kabyles_ (Paris, 1891); A. Bel, _Coup d'Oeil sur l'Islam en Berbérie_ (Paris, 1917).

[155] For short historical summary, see A. C. Coolidge, "The European Reconquest of North Africa," _American Historical Review_, July, 1912.

[156] For these nationalist movements in French North Africa, see A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_ (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); P. Lapie, _Les Civilisations tunisiennes_ (Paris, 1898); P. Millet, "Les Jeunes-Algériens," _Revue de Paris_, 1 November, 1913.

[157] A good analysis of the pre-revolutionary reformist movements is found in "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse," _Revue du Monde musulman_, June, 1914. See also Vambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_; General Sir T. E. Gordon, "The Reform Movement in Persia," _Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_, 13 March, 1907.

[158] See W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York, 1912). Also, for earlier phase of the revolution, see E. G. Browne, _The Revolution in Persia_ (London, 1910).

[159] E. G. Browne, "The Present Situation in Persia," _Contemporary Review_, November, 1912.

[160] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, pp. 11-12.

[161] For the Tartar revival, see S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia," _The Moslem World_, January, 1911; Févret, "Les Tatars de Crimée," _Revue du Monde musulman_, August, 1907; A. Le Chatelier, "Les Musulmans russes," _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1906; Fr. von Mackay, "Die Erweckung Russlands asiatischen Völkerschaften," _Deutsche Rundschau_, March, 1918; Arminius Vambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_; H. Williams, "The Russian Mohammedans," _Russian Review_, February, 1914; "X," "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme," _Revue du Monde musulman_, March, 1913.

[162] For these activities, see article by "X," quoted above; also Ahmed Emin, _The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press_ (New York, 1914).

[163] For these Pan-Turanian tendencies in Hungary and Bulgaria, see my article "Pan-Turanism," _American Political Science Review_, February, 1917.

[164] See article by "X," quoted above; also his article "Les Courants politiques dans la Turquie contemporaine," _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1912.

[165] Ex-Chief of General Staff (Ottoman) Ernst Paraquin, in the _Berliner Tageblatt_, January 24, 1920. For Turkish nationalist activities and attitudes during the war, see further I. D. 1199--_A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism. Compiled by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty_ (London, 1919); E. F. Benson, _Crescent and Iron Cross_ (London, 1918); M. A. Czaplicka, _The Turks of Central Asia: An Inquiry into the Pan-Turanian Problem_ (Oxford, 1918); H. Morgenthau, _Ambassador Morgenthau's Story_ (New York, 1918); Dr. Harry Stürmer, _Two War-Years in Constantinople_ (New York, 1917); A. Mandelstam, "The Turkish Spirit," _New Europe_, April 22, 1920.

[166] For Pan-Arab developments, see A. Musil, _Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien_ (Leipzig, 1918); M. Pickthall, "Turkey, England, and the Present Crisis," _Asiatic Review_, October 1, 1914; A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_; Sheick Abd-el-Aziz Schauisch, "Das Machtgebiet der arabischen Sprache," _Preussische Jahrbücher_, September, 1916.

[167] Literally "House of Islam." All non-Moslem lands are collectively known as "Dar-ul-Harb" or "House of War."

[168] _I. e._, the organized group of followers of a particular religion.

[169] Mohammed Ali, "Le Mouvement musulman dans l'Inde," _Revue Politique Internationale_, January, 1914. He headed the so-called "Khilafat Delegation" sent by the Indian Moslems to England in 1919 to protest against the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the peace treaties.

[170] A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, p. 181.

[171] For Pan-Islamic nationalism, besides Servier and Mohammed Ali, quoted above, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvième Siècle_ (Paris, 1888); same author, "Politique musulmane," _Revue du Monde Musulman_, September, 1910; Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," _Nineteenth Century and After_, July, 1919; G. Démorgny, _La Question Persane_, pp. 23-31 (Paris, 1916); W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present," _Quarterly Review_, October, 1920.

[172] _Egyptian White Book_: Collection of Official Correspondence of the Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference (Paris, 1919).

[173] G. Civimini, in the _Corriere della Sera_, December 30, 1919.

[174] Madame Jehan d'Ivray, "En Égypte," _Revue de Paris_, September 15, 1920. Madame d'Ivray cites other picturesque incidents of a like character. See also Annexes to _Egyptian White Book_, previously quoted. These Annexes contain numerous depositions, often accompanied by photographs, alleging severities and atrocities by the British troops.

[175] Contained in the press statements previously mentioned.

[176] Sir M. McIlwraith, "Egyptian Nationalism," _Edinburgh Review_, July, 1919. See also Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, "The Future in Egypt," _New Europe_, November 6, 1919.

[177] For unfortunate aspects of this delay, see Sir Valentine Chirol, "Conflicting Policies in the East," _New Europe_, July 1, 1920.

[178] For a good account of Lawrence and his work, see series of articles by L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution," _Asia_, April, May, June, July, 1920.

[179] A notable example is General Maude's proclamation to the Mesopotamian Arabs in March, 1917.

[180] Article xxii.

[181] From a speech delivered September 19, 1919.

[182] For examples of this pre-war imperialist propaganda, see G. Poignant, "Les Intérêts français en Syrie," _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, March 1-16, 1913. Among other interesting facts, the author cites Premier Poincaré's declaration before the Chamber of Deputies, December 21, 1912: "I need not remark that in the Lebanon and Syria particularly we have traditional interests and that we intend to make them respected." See also J. Atalla, "Les Trois Solutions de la Question syrienne," _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, October 16, 1913; L. Le Fur, _Le Protectorat de la France sur les Catholiques d'Orient_ (Paris, 1914).

[183] Quoted by Senator E. Flandrin in his article "Nos Droits en Syrie et en Palestine," _Revue Hebdomadaire_, June 5, 1915. For other examples of French imperialist propaganda, see, besides above article, C. G. Bassim, _La Question du Liban_ (Paris, 1915); H. Baudouin, "La Syrie: Champ de Bataille politique," _La Revue Mondiale_, February 1-15, 1920; Comte Cressaty, _La Syrie française_ (Paris, 1916); F. Laudet, "La France du Levant," _Revue Hebdomadaire_, March 1, 1919.

[184] Baudouin, _supra_. For other violent anti-British comment, see Laudet, _supra_.

[185] For sharp British criticisms of the French attitude in Syria, see Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure," _National Review_, September, 1920; W. Urinowski, "The Arab Cause," _Balkan Review_, September, 1920. Both of these writers were officers in the British forces in the Arab area. See also strong articles by "Taira" in the _Balkan Review_, August and October, 1920.

[186] For accounts of French severities, see articles just quoted.

[187] B. G. Gaulis in _L'Opinion_, April 24, 1920.

[188] _Le Populaire_, February 16, 1920.

[189] For the details of these events, see my article on Persia in _The Century_, January, 1920.

[190] Statement given to the press in August, 1920.

[191] Henri de Chambon, editor of _La Revue Parlementaire_. Quoted by Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure," _National Review_, September, 1920.