Chapter XVIII: To Sum Up (5)

Variation supplies the raw material upon which Natural Selection is supposed to work. When we turn to examine the process by which its results should be produced, we find, quite apart from the above difficulties, a crop of others still more formidable.

It must be remembered, that the variations on which Natural Selection must work are in each instance extremely minute, well-nigh infinitesimal. Mr. Darwin was as strongly opposed to the idea of Nature making sudden bounds, as to that of a predetermined course of development. But, he argued, an extra chance of living, however slight, must necessarily tell in the long run, the theory of probabilities giving results as certain as any others in mathematics, and, according to these, we may confidently say that, given sufficient time, the favoured individuals would infallibly distance their competitors.

The impressiveness of such an argument depends upon its seemingly mathematical character, which is however wholly fallacious, for the probabilities are all the other way. It is perfectly true that a beneficial variation however slight will confer on its happy possessor a corresponding advantage in the struggle for life, as compared with each _individual_ of the non-favoured herd, but, as to that herd collectively, the chances would, on the contrary, ensure that _some_ of its members should outlive the favoured one. Let us even imagine the advantage of the latter to be very great, great enough to double his chances, so that the odds on his surviving each of his fellows will be two to one. Yet if there be a dozen of them to contend with, the odds will be six to one _against_ his surviving the lot. And what of the actual case of minutest benefits conferred by variation? In order to give them even an equal chance of survival, the numbers of those possessing such advantages must be large in proportion as the advantages themselves are small. Thus, if a variation increases the chance of life by one-thousandth part, so that the odds on its possessor are 1001, against 1000 on each non-possessor, yet unless the number of possessors be to that of non-possessors as 1,000 to 1,001, their collective chances will not even be equal. As it is quite absurd to suppose that casual variations could ever occur in such wholesale fashion, how can it be supposed that, were Natural Selection the only factor operating, minute advantages could be accumulated by variation even in the simplest cases?

But it is also hard to suppose that in any actual case is the matter so simple as it appears to our limited comprehension. To take for instance the above example of the giraffe. It is very well to have a neck that will reach high-branches of a tree,--but this is not everything. For the mere prolongation of life, much else is required, fleet limbs to distance lions, and keen senses, sight, hearing, and smell, to give warning of the approach of human or other hunters, to say nothing of the extra strengthening of muscles and bones which increased size and weight demands. Unless, however, improvements in all these respects happened casually to concur in the same individual, which could scarcely happen, it is clear that each would militate against the others, for the survival of an individual beneficially developed in one respect, would tend to the extinction of other beneficial developments, possessed by individuals whom he overcame in the struggle for life.

Even the case of the insular insects is by no means so plain as might at first sight appear. There can be no doubt that wings are of _some_ advantage, or on no system could they be supposed to exist. Nor do their advantages cease because disadvantages outweigh them. If some insects are blown out to sea when flying, others will doubtless perish in one way or another because they cannot fly. It may even be that those which can fly _best_ will survive, as being able to make head against a breeze which overpowers others. Natural Selection will thus have many arrows in its quiver, some of which must reach the wrong objects.

Still more clearly does this appear in the case of complex structures in which, if they were produced as Mr. Darwin supposes, variation must have hit simultaneously upon independent contrivances, without each of which all the others would be useless and confer no benefit at all. In the eye, for example, to mention but one or two of innumerable similar points, it would be of no avail to have a retina, even such as has been described, without a lens to throw an image upon it, set just at the proper distance, and provided with muscles to alter its shape according to the distance of the object. How can Natural Selection be even conceived to have set to work on such a task as this?

It is still more fundamental to observe that, according to Mr. Darwin's own showing, Natural Selection is purely negative in its action. "If it does select, it selects for death and not for life."[197] It can originate nothing, but only destroy. All that it does for favoured races is to spare them while it sweeps away others, and the sole benefit they derive from it is to have more ample resources upon which to draw. But as for anything they possess in the way of structure or character, they must derive it entirely from themselves--Natural Selection can no more confer it, than the labourer who weeds a garden bed makes the flowers that grow there. Let it be imagined that the first human beings on earth, any number of thousand years ago, planted a garden, and determined to produce a rose, by eliminating every plant that did not show some promise of progress rose-wards. Let the gardeners have been endowed with acumen sufficient to detect every symptom of such a tendency, and let their operations have been carried on without interruption to this day,--it is obvious that if roses had resulted, it could only be because among the plants they allowed to remain there existed a rose-making quality of some kind, to which, and not to anything done by human art or skill, the result was due. It would likewise have to be supposed that there were infinite other potentialities latent in the original plants, as of evolving thistles, shamrocks, or leeks--all equally awaiting their opportunity. Selective action could effectually put such competitors out of the way; but in the way of developing a race it could but leave it entirely to itself. Precisely similar is the part played by Natural Selection, except that it must needs play it immensely more slowly,--and if no one can fancy that human agency could by any possibility grow roses unless from some stock predetermined to grow into a rose and nothing else, what grounds have we that can be called scientific for attributing to a blind struggle for life an incomparably greater potency? Nor does it avail to quote the immense extent of time which may be supposed to have been available. No more than Natural Selection has time by itself any creative power. We know on the contrary by experience, that when things are not controlled by some principle of order, the lapse of time serves only to make confusion worse confounded.

Another consideration of prime importance is too frequently ignored. On Darwinian principles, each step in any development can be made, not because it leads to an advantageous result in the future, but only because it is itself advantageous. At each stage favoured individuals survive others because they are favoured here and now, not because, when the development they promote shall be completed, their remote descendants will be favoured. Hence it must, for instance, be possible to suppose, that all the intermediate forms between two extremes, whereof one is supposed to have originated the other, were, each in its day, so beneficial as to preserve their possessors at the expense of non-possessors. But can this possibly be even imagined?

To take one example. We have heard, speaking of embryology, that the feet of lizards and the wings and feet of birds arise from the same fundamental form of limb, whence it is argued that birds and lizards are alike descended from a common sauroid, or lizard-like, ancestor, whose limbs in the case of the former class have developed into wings and into feet of a totally new type,--while scales were developing into feathers, and innumerable alterations of internal structure were simultaneously in progress. But if so, to confine our attention to one particular, it must be true that each of the innumerable minute gradations between the fore-limb of a lizard and the wing of a bird, was in its turn the best kind of member for a creature to possess, giving him a distinct advantage in the struggle for existence. Nothing, however, appears plainer than that this could not possibly have been the case. The limb shaping towards a wing would be a very clumsy and inefficient leg long before it got to the point at which it became of the slightest use for purposes of flight, that is to say before its alteration was accompanied by any utility whatever. We can neither imagine that creatures furnished with limbs of such intermediate forms could have been otherwise than hopelessly handicapped by them, nor do we find anywhere in the rocks any trace whatever of the innumerable series of modifications which would be needed to link by imperceptible gradations legs and wings together.

It only serves to make the matter less intelligible, that there _are_ found in Secondary strata some few relics of birds with decidedly saurian characteristics,[198] as the _Hesperornis_ and _Ichthyornis_ in the Chalk, and the _Archæopteryx_, most ancient of fowls, lower still, in the Oolite. All these creatures have lizard-like heads and teeth; the _Archæopteryx_ in addition has decidedly reptilian characters connected with its wings and tail. But none of them throw the slightest light upon the point we are now considering. In the case of all, the problem of flight has been completely solved. Their wings are no rudimentary structures half way between legs and wings, but as finished productions as those of to-day. As Professor Huxley acknowledges, if the skeletons of _Hesperornis_ and _Icthyornis_ had been found without their skulls, they would probably have been classed without more ado amongst existing birds. The latter "has, [he tells us,] strong wings, and no doubt possessed corresponding powers of flight." The wings of _Hesperornis_, he says, resemble those of our divers and grebes, and were probably used, like theirs, chiefly for swimming.[199] As for the _Archæopteryx_, its reptilian features notwithstanding, it is a perfectly-appointed bird. As Sir Richard Owen testifies,[200] its wing, despite the peculiarities mentioned, is completely developed as to all essentials. Nor does even this member furnish the creature with its most bird-like characteristics,--but the keeled breast-bone, so intimately connected with the requirements of flight,--and, still more markedly, the feet. Professor Huxley writes: "The feet are not only altogether bird-like, but have the special character of the feet of perching birds; while the body had a clothing of true feathers."

Thus, to whatever these Saurian birds may testify,--and the extreme importance of their evidence none will question--they no more serve to bridge the gulf between reptiles and birds, than a group of volcanic islets like the Azores bridges the Atlantic, for they supply no vestige of a continuous way from one term to the other. Rather, they do but enhance the mystery of the transformation, to the manner of which, despite their composite features, they furnish no clue.

All such difficulties are enormously aggravated by a consideration which, obvious as it is, seems seldom to be considered. The arguments we commonly hear appear to imply that _one_ parent is sufficient to secure the transmission of a beneficial variation to the next generation. But, of course, the parent requires a mate, and unless this mate has chanced to hit on the same line of variation, it cannot be supposed that it will be transmitted. Seeing, however, the exceeding minuteness of these variations in each instance, they can avail nothing to bring together the right mates to perpetuate them. Two reptiles, for instance, are not the more likely to pair because their fore limbs have taken the first faint and distant step towards becoming wings, while in the vegetable kingdom, notwithstanding Erasmus Darwin's _Loves of the Plants_, the idea of any choice of partners is still more grotesque. The allotment of mates must therefore be left to Chance; and the results will follow the ordinary laws of probability. Accordingly, if we suppose so large a proportion as five per cent., or one in twenty, of any species to possess an advantageous variation,--only one in twenty of the individuals thus favoured will secure a similarly favoured mate,--for each will have nineteen wrong selections offered to him or her, for one right one. Only one pair in four hundred will therefore transmit the variation to five per cent. of _their_ offspring, or one in eight thousand of the species, and of these only one pair in a-hundred-and-sixty-thousand will make an advantageous match. Such is the inevitable consequence of leaving any definite result to Chance: and here it is that Natural Selection is found to betray the most fatal of all its deficiencies; for, whatever its advocates may say, it is Chance and Chance alone upon which it relies. Just because man can and does select the proper mates, is he able to produce by breeding the results to which Mr. Darwin appeals as evidence, that Nature having no such power of selection, must be able to produce results of which man cannot even dream.[201]

Natural Selection is in truth no selection at all, that is just its weak point, which the title conferred upon it serves to hide. What are called its products owe no more to it than Wellington owed his generalship to the bullets which did not hit him at Seringapatam. If they are not determined to a particular development they can attain it only by Chance.

Of Chance, enough has already been said. It is, however, worth our while to observe how constantly to the last Mr. Darwin was haunted by the consciousness that this was in reality the factor upon which his system must depend, and that it could not possibly account for much that he came across in nature. If, as he confessed, the sight of a peacock's tail-feather made him sick, it was just because its elaborate beauty, to which no commensurate advantage can be supposed to attach, forbade the notion that his theory could account for it. So, of another still more marvellous instance in which Nature exhibits artistic power, namely the ball-and-socket ornament on the wings of the Argus pheasant, he writes:[202]

No one, I presume, will attribute this shading, which has excited
the admiration of many experienced artists, to chance--to the
fortuitous concourse of atoms of colouring matter. That these
ornaments should have been formed through the selection of many
successive variations, not one of which was originally intended to
produce the ball-and-socket effect, seems as incredible as that one
of Raphael's Madonnas should have been formed by the selection of
chance daubs of paints made by a long succession of young artists,
not one of whom intended at first to draw the human figure.

1. Basal portion of secondary wing-feather; nearest body, shewing first rudiment of "ocelli."

2. Portion of secondary wing-feather near body, shewing "elliptic" ornaments.

3. Part of secondary wing-feather, shewing developed "ocelli."

Feathers from wing of Argus Pheasant, from Darwin's _Descent of Man_.]

Nevertheless, Mr. Darwin proceeds to argue at considerable length that an explanation consistent with his theory is favoured by the occurrence on the same wings of designs exhibiting every stage of gradation from a mere spot to the finished ball-and-socket _ocellus_; in the same way as the tail feathers of a peacock advance from a mere sketch to the completed design. It is not easy, however, to understand in what way this is supposed to solve the difficulty and not vastly to increase it. That a finished artistic effect should be fortuitously produced at all would be incredible enough. That it should be worked up by Chance through a series of processes, each doing something towards its completion, is surely not less, but far more inconceivable.

In such a mode of explanation, however, is exemplified a feature which must not be forgotten in discussing Darwinism,--namely the fatal facility with which seeming arguments can be procured on its behalf. As Mr. Mivart well remarks:[203] "The Darwinian theory has the great advantage of only needing for its support the suggestion of some possible utility, actual or ancestral, in each case--no difficult task for an ingenious, patient, and accomplished thinker." And our _North British_ Reviewer makes a similar comment: "The believer who is at liberty to invent any imaginary circumstances, will very generally be able to conceive some series of transmutations answering his wants."

Or if, as in the above instance of the Argus' eyes, a series is actually found, it is even less difficult to take for granted that it can have but one significance; while such assumptions are too frequently accepted without hesitation or demur, although it would be no easy task to show that they rest upon any solid grounds. When, in addition, either Mr. Darwin himself or some of his leading partisans has declared that some unverified process has undoubtedly occurred, or that they see no reason to doubt its occurrence, or that nothing which we know precludes its possibility,--it appears to be widely supposed that something substantial is thereby added to the scientific evidence, and that the suppositions thus sanctioned may even rank as facts. But however such a method may avail to secure acceptance for a doctrine, it does nothing for its scientific value. Such a style, as Mr. Mivart says,[204] is calculated to impress only minds too easily dominated, and not prepared by special studies accurately to weigh the evidence put before them.

Illustrations of this strange method of procedure are furnished in connexion with various points already mentioned. Thus, as we have seen, Mr. Darwin attempts to explain the origin of rational speech, by the conscious utterance of a significant sound by an unusually wise ape-like creature. In favour of this very large suggestion, Mr. Darwin has nothing more substantial to say[205] than that "it does not appear altogether incredible," which does not appear to take us very far.[206] Yet I have seen this described as an "idyllic scene" shedding an entirely new light on the subject. So again in regard of the evolution of the eye.[207] Having summarily enumerated the various stages of development exhibited by this organ as actually existing in various animals, Mr. Darwin goes on to say that when we remember how small the number of living forms must be in comparison with extinct, and the other gradations that may consequently have existed, "the difficulty ceases to be very great" in believing that Natural Selection has connected the most rudimentary with the perfect structure. Similarly, as to the cell-making instinct of the bee,[208] having postulated four several suppositions for which evidence is not forthcoming, he concludes: "By such modification of instincts ... I believe that the hive bee has acquired, through natural selection, her inimitable architectural powers."[209] Similar examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

Not unfrequently the tone of such utterances is more imperious. Thus, of the descent of Man from some animal ancestor Mr. Darwin pronounces[210] "The grounds upon which this conclusion rests will never be shaken," and again[211] "the possession of exalted mental powers is no insuperable objection to this conclusion" ... "It is only [p. 32] our natural prejudice which leads us to demur to this conclusion." He even goes so far as to declare that his view is forced upon every man who is not content to assume the mental attitude of a savage.[212]

Argumentation of this character, which he finds common with Darwin to other Evolutionists, is judged by de Quatrefages to be one of the weakest and most misleading features of their systems.

Personal conviction [he writes],[213] mere possibility, are offered
as proofs, or at least as arguments in favour of the theory. Can we
admit their validity? Obviously not. The human mind can conceive
many things: is that a reason for accepting them all?... Obviously
more serious proofs are needed. After all, save where a
contradiction is involved, everything is _possible_.... If
adopting, under the shadow of Oken's great name, his principle of
the repetition of phenomena, a naturalist should maintain that each
of the planets has its own Europe, its England, and its Darwin
expounding to the Jovians and Saturnians the origin of species, I
do not quite see how one would set about showing him that he was
wrong. Unquestionably the thing is _possible_. Are we to draw the
conclusion that it is a fact?

Again,[214] the same distinguished naturalist, having quoted Darwin's
very elaborate explanation of a difficulty, remarks:
We see how with Darwin, as with his precursors, one hypothesis
necessitates another. But can he, at least, by means of these
subsidiary theories, these comparisons, these metaphors, account
for all the facts? No, he himself honestly confesses more than once
that he cannot. It is true that he adds "I am convinced that the
objections have little weight, and the difficulties are not
insoluble." But is this conviction of his a proof, or even an
argument?

M. Blanchard likewise comments vigorously on this mode of argumentation. Speaking of the Mole and Darwin's explanation of its blindness, namely that having taken to living under-ground it lost its eyes through disuse--which he considers a most preposterous supposition,--M Blanchard continues:[215]

The realms of fancy are boundless; but the observer who is
concerned with realities can only have recourse to the facts of
science. Fossil remains discovered in very ancient strata show that
the underground animal of present times does not differ from his
geological counterpart. The Mole belongs to a very peculiar type,
and has no nearer European relatives than the Hedgehog and the
Shrew. Can we imagine a common ancestor of Shrews, Hedgehogs, and
Moles? On this point Mr. Darwin expresses no opinion,--which should
not be, for when confronted by forms clearly differentiated, he is
wont to extricate himself from difficulties with matchless
facility. The intermediate links, he will say, were doubtless less
fitted to live than were the others, and so have disappeared. After
_that_ the Evolutionists consider any one quite out of date who
does not consider himself entirely satisfied with so felicitous an
explanation.

M. de Quatrefages denounces another fatal defect often observable in the method of proof.

Mr. Darwin frequently complains that our actual knowledge is
incomplete. But instead of discovering in our lack of precise and
extensive information a motive for caution, he appears to derive
from it only greater daring. Doctrines based on the instability of
species have often been combated by geologists and palæontologists.
In reply to their objections Darwin devotes a whole chapter to
shewing the imperfection of the geological record. "For my part,"
he concludes, "I look at the geological record as a history of the
world imperfectly kept and written in a changing dialect; of this
history we possess the last volume alone, relating only to two or
three countries. Of this volume, only here and there a short
chapter has been preserved; and of each page, only here and there a
few lines. Each word of the slowly-changing language, more or less
different in the successive chapters, may represent the forms of
life, which are entombed in our consecutive formations, and which
falsely appear to have been abruptly introduced. On this view, the
difficulties above discussed are greatly diminished, or even
disappear."

On my part [continues M. de Quatrefages] I will ask whether such a
conclusion is the correct one. No doubt, Darwin is right in
refusing to certain naturalists the right to dogmatize on the
strength of uncompleted studies, or scanty and isolated
observations. Is he therefore entitled to allege as proofs on his
own behalf the very gaps of science, appealing to the lost volumes
and leaves of Nature's chronicle? Clearly not. But the slightest
reflection suffices to recognize that this appeal to the unknown,
so frankly evidenced in the above passage, lies at the root of all
argumentation analogous to that which I have tried to
describe--that of Maillet, Lamarck, and Geoffroy,[216] as well as
Darwin. Only the unknown, in sooth, can open the boundless region
of speculation, where the possible replaces the actual, and where,
despite the widest knowledge and the soundest intelligence, one
comes as by a fatality to find a conclusive proof on one's own
side, precisely in that of which we profess to know nothing.

So again, speaking of a certain conclusion of Professor Haeckel's concerning the embryology of lemurs, which MM. Grandidier and Alphonse Edwards afterwards proved experimentally to be altogether erroneous, de Quatrefages writes:[217]

Haeckel will perhaps answer that the publication of his book
preceded the observation of the French savants. But such a plea
itself discloses a method of procedure which is common to the
majority of evolutionists, and of which, it must be added, Darwin
set the example. When confronted by a question about which nobody
knows anything, they appeal precisely to this want of knowledge,
and draw arguments from their very ignorance.

In like manner speaks the Reviewer already cited more than once. Thus:[218]

The peculiarities of geographical distribution seem very difficult
of explanation on any theory. Darwin calls in alternately winds,
tides, birds, beasts, all animated nature, as the diffusers of
species, and then a good many of the same agencies as impenetrable
barriers.... With these facilities of hypothesis there seems to be
no particular reason why many theories should not be true. However
an animal may have been produced, it must have been produced
somewhere, and it must either have spread very widely or not have
spread, and Darwin can give good reasons for both results.

And again:[219]

We are asked to believe all these maybes happening on an enormous
scale, in order that we may believe the final Darwinian "maybe" as
to the origin of species. The general form of his argument is as
follows:--"All these things may have been, therefore my theory is
possible, and since my theory is a possible one, all those
hypotheses which it requires are rendered probable." There is
little direct evidence that any of these maybes actually _have
been_.

In no respect, moreover, have Darwin's followers more closely imitated their master than in the construction of such hypotheses, which would appear to constitute in the eyes of many the most important work of Science. Attention has very largely been diverted from Nature as actually existing, which seems to be studied more for the light it can be supposed to throw upon evolutionary history, than simply for itself, and it seems to be thought that to imagine the mode of an evolutionary process is equivalent to establishing the facts which that process supposes. By this method lengthy and learned papers are written concerning the transformation of one species into another, which in reality do no more than describe in minute detail all the changes which must have taken place, _if_ the said transformation really occurred. That Science is thus benefited, is not the opinion of some at least who are well entitled to speak on her behalf, for as the President of the Linnean Society recently observed,[220] as one grows older, it becomes more and more apparent that facts alone are of any serious interest, and that speculations however ingenious and attractive are best left to the constructive and destructive energies of the young. So too, a few years ago, the President of the Microscopical Society complained that interest in living creatures is largely supplanted by dead ones.[221]

We read much [he said] of the animal's organs: we see plates
showing that its bristles have been counted, and its muscular
fibres traced to the last thread; we have the structure of its
tissues analyzed to their very elements; we have long discussions
on its title to rank with this group or that; and sometimes even
disquisitions on the probable form and habits of some extremely
remote, but quite hypothetical, ancestor, who is made to degrade in
this way, or to advance in that, or who is credited with one organ
or deprived of another, just as the ever-varying necessities of a
desperate hypothesis require....

There is another aspect of the question which must by no means be overlooked. It has to be assumed that Natural Selection, or the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence, necessarily tends to the benefit of the _race_ and moreover to its farther development on the upward grade, towards a more perfect and more specialized organization;--in Mr. Herbert Spencer's words, to progression from a relatively indefinite incoherent homogeneity, to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity. But here many questions occur.

In the first place, a consideration presents itself, which appears to furnish the most formidable of all difficulties in the way of Mr. Darwin's hypothesis. How can this struggle for existence be supposed to have any tendency to promote organic development to ever higher and more perfect types, in the orderly sequence which has in fact occurred? The "Survival of the fittest" means only the survival _of the fittest to survive_,--of such as can find means of living where others cannot. Unless it can be shown that increased complexity of organization necessarily brings with it such increased vitality, Natural Selection can do nothing for organic development. If the mere power of living be the only factor in the process, as on Mr. Darwin's showing it is, a man is only a more complicated and delicate machine for securing the same object which can equally well, or better, be attained by a mole, a cockroach, or a microbe. And who will say that, so far as this particular end is concerned, he is better equipped than creatures which all the resources of civilization are powerless to exterminate?

That practical advantage in the struggle for existence must necessarily accompany increased specialization of organs, and thus produce a "higher" organization, was a prime point of Mr. Darwin's argument, though at the same time he found himself compelled to encumber it with qualifications which go very far to neutralize its force; for he had to explain the obvious fact that so many creatures which represent the lowest and least specialized forms of life, have survived down to our own time. Thus he writes:[222]

The degree of differentiation and specialization of the parts in
organic beings, when arrived at maturity, is the best standard, as
yet suggested, of their degree of perfection or highness. As the
specialization of parts is an advantage to each being, so natural
selection will tend to render the organization of each being more
specialized and perfect, and in this sense higher; not but that it
may leave many creatures with simple and unimproved structures
fitted for simple conditions of life, and in some cases will even
degrade or simplify the organization, yet leaving such degraded
beings better fitted for their new walks of life.

By this fundamental test of victory in the battle of life, as well
as by the standard of the specialization of organs, modern forms
ought, on the theory of Natural Selection, to stand higher than
ancient forms. Is this the case? A large number of palæontologists
would answer in the affirmative; and it seems that this answer must
be admitted as true, though difficult of proof.

That is to say, Natural Selection is just as ready to degrade as to elevate a creature, according to the actual requirements of the circumstances in which it is placed, and how far progress has been the rule, rather than stability or retrogression, is a question for geological history to determine. This we shall have to consider in our next chapter.

It is likewise obvious that so far as the mere struggle for existence is concerned, a species each of whose individual members is but poorly furnished, may nevertheless flourish unimpaired on the mere strength of its fecundity. It is thus, says M. Blanchard,[223] that the lower forms of life continue to hold their own despite the enormous ravages to which they are subject. The herring, for example, affords food to all the fowls of the air and fish of the sea, over and above the myriads annually requisitioned by man. Yet its hosts show no sign of being exterminated or even reduced. Much the same is the case of the cod; but a tribe one individual of which has been known to produce nine million eggs does not require much in the way of coherent heterogeneity to ensure its survival.

Thus it appears that of itself Darwinism affords no explanation whatever of the regular progression of life forms from lower to higher, to which the records of Nature bear witness, and which is the one solid fact suggesting the idea of Evolution.

Such are some of the reasons which, on purely rational grounds, appear amply to justify those who decline to pledge their faith to Darwinism, in spite of the popularity it enjoys. But what is to be said of the phenomena cited as furnishing positive and unimpeachable evidence in its favour, which were mentioned above in our sketch of its main features?

First as to the rudimentary, fragmentary, or vestigial organs so common in Nature. These, it is said, being of no possible advantage to their possessors, and often a serious disadvantage, can be explained only by supposing that they were serviceable in the past to the ancestral race whence these possessors are derived, and have since been superseded by other modifications of structure, so as to dwindle away by disuse. This, no doubt, seems a very plausible explanation, but it does not follow that we ought immediately to adopt it as a certainty, instead of setting ourselves to examine how it accords with all the facts. Nothing is more dangerous and less scientific than to be in a hurry to conclude that everything is certain which seems to ourselves probable, especially if it suits a theory of our own. Unfortunately, this law is too frequently more honoured in the breach than the observance. In the present instance, Professor Haeckel himself furnishes an example. He is quite sure that the rudimentary structures can have but one significance, and that they are fatal to the idea of purpose in Nature, the object of his special aversion, and so he has proposed a new term, "Dysteleology," to embody this idea, of which he says,[224]

_Dysteleology, or the theory of purposelessness_ [is] the name I
have given to the science of rudimentary organs, of suppressed and
degenerated, aimless and inactive, parts of the body; one of the
most important and most interesting branches of comparative
anatomy, which, when rightly estimated, is alone sufficient to
refute the fundamental error of the teleological and dualistic
conception of Nature, and to serve as the foundation of the
mechanical and monistic conception of the universe.

It will be sufficient to quote Professor Huxley's remarks upon this passage, taken from the very laudatory review he wrote of the work in which it occurs.[225]

Professor Haeckel has invented a new and convenient name,
"Dysteleology," for the study of the "purposelessnesses" which are
observable in living organisms--such as the multitudinous cases of
rudimentary and apparently useless structures. I confess, however,
that it has often appeared to me that the facts of Dysteleology cut
two ways. If we are to assume, as evolutionists in general do, that
useless organs atrophy, such cases as the existence of lateral
rudiments of toes in the foot of a horse place us in a dilemma.
For, either these rudiments are of no use to the animal, in which
case, considering that the horse has existed in its present form
since the Pliocene epoch, they surely ought to have disappeared; or
they are of some use to the animal, in which case they are of no
use as arguments against Teleology. A similar, but stronger
argument may be based upon the existence of teats, and even
functional mammary glands in male mammals.... There can be little
doubt that the mammary gland was as apparently useless in the
remotest male mammalian ancestor of man as in living men, and yet
it has not disappeared. Is it then still profitable to the male
organism to retain it? Possibly; but in that case its
dysteleological value is gone.

In later editions Professor Huxley further observed: "The recent discovery of the important part played by the Thyroid gland should be a warning to all speculators about useless organs."[226]

It seems, therefore, the wiser part to refrain from basing any vital conclusions upon these organs until we can assure ourselves that our knowledge warrants our so doing. As the same Professor Huxley intimated, it might be well for palæontologists, and doubtless for biologists likewise,[227] "To learn a little more carefully that scientific '_ars artium_,' the art of saying 'I don't know.'"

So again as to the phenomena of embryology. No doubt they are very striking and impressive. That the most highly developed creatures, and man himself, should in the first stages of existence exhibit the characteristics of lower forms, is an exemplification of development no less signal than the succession of ascending types witnessed to by the rocks. It is not easy to see, however, why it should be taken for granted that this can only signify genetic descent from all such forms, and that these embryo animals are engaged in climbing up their genealogical trees. Yet this is usually assumed as a matter of course, and any one who ventures to question the validity of such an inference, must be prepared to find himself accused of dogmatizing.

And yet, after all, upon what grounds does the assumption rest? That such a recapitulation of racial experiences forms no essential feature of Evolution is sufficiently evident from the case of the vegetable world,--for plants do not climb _their_ genealogical trees, or pass in the seed through a series of botanical phases. And as to animals, since through all varieties of form, each always arrives at the required term, it is obvious that, apart from any archaic associations, and on Darwinian principles themselves, these forms must be the best for the purpose at each respective stage,--perhaps the only ones by which the term could be reached. It is therefore, to say the least, quite conceivable, that we have here the whole explanation and need go no further.

In certain instances this obvious consideration is strikingly illustrated. Thus the salamander, an Amphibian of the newt family, brings forth its young in adult condition without gills.[228] But previously to birth they have gills relatively large. The experiment having been tried of bringing some of them forth by artificial means before their time, and placing them in water, the first thing they did was to cast off these big gills, which were speedily replaced by new ones of much smaller size, and evidently better suited for the work required, as they lasted as long as a fortnight.

Here, in the first place, it is quite impossible to suppose that the large gills would continue to appear unless they were of advantage during the period of gestation. It is equally evident that it is not from a previous aquatic condition that they are inherited, for in such a condition they are useless. Finally, as Mr. Mivart observes, the new gills, suitable for unwonted conditions, were developed "not in a struggle for existence against rivals, but directly and spontaneously from the innate nature of the animal."

This view of the matter commended itself on mature consideration to so ardent an evolutionist as Carl Vogt, with whom we may couple M. de Quatrefages, who cites his words with approval as follows:[229]

It has been laid down as a fundamental law of biogenesis that
ontogeny (the development of the individual) and phylogeny (that of
the race) must exactly correspond.... This law which I long held as
well founded is absolutely and radically false. Attentive study of
embryology shows us, in fact, that embryos have their own
conditions suitable to themselves, very different from those of
adults.

"In a word," M. de Quatrefages continues, "the learned Genevan professor rightly considers that, 'The ontogenesis of all organic beings without exception, is the normal result of all the various influences which operate upon such beings.'"

But it must, moreover, be noted that the story which embryology can be made to tell is by no means so plain as we might easily be led to suppose.

Thus, although snakes are held to be descended from lizards, and some of them have rudimentary legs even in the adult stage, others have no trace of limbs even in the egg, while they _have_ vestiges of gills, and thus would seem to be visibly linked to ancient water-dwelling ancestors, and not to far more recent land-dwellers. Again;[230] Amphibians (frogs, newts and the like) agree in some respects, as to the development of the germ, with mammals, differing in the same respects from reptiles and birds. But reptiles and birds are supposed to be a more recent development than Amphibia, and therefore should intervene between them and mammals on the genealogical tree. Moreover the eggs of one group of Amphibians are found to exhibit some remarkable resemblances to those of reptiles and birds, from which it would thus appear to have derived them, although on other grounds it is declared to be of an older stock than theirs. Most frogs, toads, and newts come out of the egg as tadpoles, furnished with gills and so breathing in water. This should signify that these creatures are descended from fish or fishlike ancestors. But one frog (_Rana opisthodon_) is never a tadpole even in the egg, from which he gets out by means of a special opener on his snout which he has somehow acquired. On the other hand certain newts[231] breed as tadpoles instead of in their mature form, which looks like an attempt to climb down the tree instead of up.

It will be remembered that the latter phrase was that used by Professor Milnes Marshall. Yet even he expressed himself strongly concerning the exaggerations of Professor Haeckel on this subject. In his review of Haeckel's _Anthropogenie_,[232] after observing that many descriptions of human embryology have been based on observations of dogs, pigs, rabbits, or even chickens and dogfish, he thus continued regarding the book before him:

A student who relied on Professor Haeckel's description, would
obtain an entirely erroneous idea of the development of the human
embryo.... It is a matter for great regret that a book of 900
pages, bearing such a title, should be allowed to appear, in which
the account of the actual development of the human embryo is so
inadequate or even erroneous.

Far more fundamental, however, is a remark of Mr. Mivart's, that if, as Darwinians say, the development of the individual is an epitome of that of the species, the latter must like the former be due to the action of definite innate laws unconsciously carrying out definite preordained ends and purposes. For although cells or embryos may be indistinguishable from one another, and may appear to us identical in constitution, their differences are absolute. Each is determined to be one sort of animal and no other, and can live at all only on condition of developing towards the prescribed form.--Therefore, whatever evidence the embryonic forms may be supposed to afford in support of Evolution, they have nothing in common with the haphazard process of Natural Selection.

And here again Professor Huxley found himself obliged to enter his _caveat_, and to intimate his opinion that some of his friends were inclined to build too confidently upon this foundation. As his biographer Professor Weldon writes in the _Dictionary of National Biography_:

Darwin had suggested an interpretation of the facts of embryology
which led to the hope that a fuller knowledge of development might
reveal the history of all the great groups of animals at least in
its main outlines. This hope was of service as a stimulus to
research, but the attempt to interpret the phenomena observed led
to speculations which were often fanciful and always incapable of
verification. Huxley was keenly sensible of the danger attending
the use of a hypothetical explanation, leading to conclusions which
cannot be experimentally tested, and he carefully avoided it.... In
the preface to the _Manual of the Comparative Anatomy of
Invertebrated Animals_, he says: "I have abstained from discussing
questions of ætiology,[233] not because I underestimate their
importance, or am insensible to the interest of the great problem
of Evolution, but because, to my mind, the growing tendency to mix
up ætiological speculations with morphological generalizations
will, if unchecked, throw Biology into confusion."

Accordingly, Huxley himself based his faith in Evolution on palæontological evidence, and attempted to decide the precise course it had followed only "in the few cases where the evidence seemed to him sufficiently complete." This line of enquiry we have still to pursue, but meanwhile, it is evident that the phenomena we have been considering, failing to meet the approval of so thorough-going an Evolutionist as he undoubtedly was, cannot be said to furnish convincing scientific evidence in favour of Darwinism.

It will be asked how it comes to pass, if the Darwinian system really lies open to so many objections, that it occupies so large a place in scientific estimation. To this we must reply that, in spite of its great name, its success has throughout been popular rather than truly scientific, and that as time went on it has lost ground among the class of men best qualified to judge. Evolutionists there are in plenty,--but very few genuine Darwinists, and amongst these can by no means be reckoned all who adopt the title, for not a few of them--as Romanes and Weismann--profess doctrines which cannot be reconciled with those of Darwin himself. Meanwhile, an increasing volume of scientific opinion sets definitely against Darwinism as an adequate explanation of the philosophy of life, and falls into the view expressed long ago by Charles Robin[234] who, as a freethinker, had no antecedent objections against it, "Darwinism is a fiction, a poetical accumulation of probabilities without proof, and of attractive explanations without demonstration."

It would be tedious to cite testimonies at length, but, in addition to M. de Quatrefages who has made a full and careful study of the whole question, [_Charles Darwin et ses précurseurs Français_, and _Les Emules de Darwin_] may be mentioned such continental scholars as Blanchard [_La vie des êtres animés_], Wigand [_Der Darwinismus und die Naturforschung_, etc.], Wolff [_Beiträge zur Kritik der darwinschen Lehre_], Hamann [_Entwicklungslehre und Darwinismus_], Pauly [_Wahres und Falsches an Darwins Lehre_], Driesch [_Biologisches Zentralblatt_, 1896 and 1902], Plate [_Bedeutung und Tragweite des Darwinschen Selektionsprincip_], Hertwig [_Address to Naturalist Congress_, _Aachen_, 1900], Heer [_Urwelt der Schweiz_], Kölliker [_Ueber die darwin'sche Schöpfungstheorie_], Eimer [_Entstehung der Arten_], Von Hartmann [_Wahrheit und Irrthum im Darwinismus_], Schilde [_Antidarwinistisches im Ausland_], Du Bois-Reymond [_Conference_, August 2, 1881, etc.], Virchow [_Freiheit der Wissenschaft_, etc.], Nägeli [_Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre_], Schaafhausen [_Ueber die anthropologischen Fragen_], Fechner [_Ideen zur Schöpfungs-und Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen_], Jakob [_Der Mensch_, etc.], Diebolder [_Darwins Grundprinzip_, etc.], Huber [_Die Lehre Darwins kritisch betrachtet_], Joseph Ranke, and Von Bauer,--all of whom either reject Darwinism altogether, or admit it only with fatal reservations.

Special weight must attach to the adverse verdict of M. Fabre, styled by Darwin himself "that inimitable observer," who declares that he cannot reconcile the theory with the facts he encounters.[235]

It must be sufficient to quote one or two of our own countrymen, whose utterances will enable us to form an opinion as to the true scientific status of the doctrine.

We may begin with Huxley, the great popular champion of Darwinism, who did more than any other man to spread the new doctrine. Yet, strange to say, he seems never to have really accepted its fundamental tenet himself, always appearing very shy of Natural Selection, and carefully abstaining from committing himself to any responsibility for it. Thus in his treatise on _Man's Place in Nature_, he thus explains his position in its regard:

Mr. Darwin's hypothesis is not, so far as I am aware, inconsistent
with any biological fact; on the contrary, if admitted, the facts
of Development, of Comparative Anatomy, of Geographical
Distribution, and of Palæontology, become connected together, and
exhibit a meaning such as they never possessed before; and I, for
one, am firmly convinced, that if not precisely true, that
hypothesis is as near an approximation to the truth as, for
example, the Copernican hypothesis was to the true theory of the
planetary motions. But for all this, our acceptance of the
Darwinian hypothesis must be provisional so long as one link in the
chain of evidence is wanting; and so long as all the animals and
plants certainly produced by selective breeding from a common stock
are fertile with one another, the link will be wanting. For, so
long, selective breeding will not be proved to be competent to do
all that is required of it to produce natural species.

This missing link, like various others, has never been supplied, and in consequence Professor Huxley never abandoned his attitude of reserve. On the contrary, when, in 1880, he delivered an address to celebrate "the Coming of Age of the _Origin of Species_" he discharged the task without once mentioning Natural Selection, which is to that work as the Prince of Denmark is to _Hamlet_.

But there is one passage in the said address, which deserves to be specially remembered:

History warns us that it is the customary fate of new truths to
begin as heresies and to end as superstitions; and, as matters now
stand, it is hardly rash to anticipate that, in another twenty
years, the new generation, educated under the influences of the
present day, will be in danger of accepting the main doctrines of
the _Origin of Species_, with as little reflection, and it may be
with as little justification, as so many of our contemporaries,
twenty years ago, rejected them.

In 1886, Professor Romanes pronounced as follows:[236]

"At present it would be impossible to find any working naturalist who supposes that survival of the fittest is competent to explain all the phenomena of species-formation."

As to the actual position now occupied in Scientific opinion by Mr. Darwin's hypotheses, we may content ourselves with the declaration of Professor S. H. Vines in his Presidential address to the Linnean Society, May 24, 1902.

1. It is established that Natural Selection, though it may have
perpetuated species, cannot have originated any.

2. It is still a mystery why Evolution should tend from the lower
to the higher, from simple to complex organisms.

3. The facts seem to admit of no other interpretation than that
variation is not [as Darwin supposed] indeterminate, but that there
is in living matter an inherent determination in favour of
variation in the higher direction.

That is to say, Darwin's _Origin of Species_ does not explain the Origin of Species; and as to the laws which govern Evolution we can be sure only that they are not those which he assigned.

In like manner, Sir Oliver Lodge pronounces:[237]

Take the origin of species by the persistence of favourable
variations; how is the appearance of these same favourable
variations accounted for? Except by artificial selection not at
all. Given their appearance, their development by struggle and
inheritance and survival can be explained; but that they arose
spontaneously, by random changes without purpose, is an assertion
which cannot be made.

We are thus in a position to form our own judgment as to the claim made on behalf of Mr. Darwin, with which we started this chapter--namely, that he has eliminated all mystery from the organic world by the discovery of natural mechanical laws by which all its operations are governed. It is, indeed, difficult to understand how Darwinists themselves can suppose their system to make any such claim, for, as M. Paul Vignon truly observes,[238] "La science darwinnienne s'imaginait avoir triomphé du Sphinx, alors qu'elle avait simplement décomposé le problème dans une monnaie d'énigmes moins rébarbatives en apparence." As has been said, it is far more on account of the vast consequences professedly based upon it, as a sure foundation stone, than for its own sake, that it has seemed advisable to devote so much attention to the study of Darwinism, quite apart from which the whole question of organic Evolution still demands consideration.

It seems far more just to conclude with M. Fabre:[239]

Let us acknowledge that in truth we know nothing about anything, so
far as ultimate truths are concerned. Scientifically considered
nature is a riddle to which human curiosity can find no answer.
Hypothesis follows hypothesis, the ruins of theories are piled one
on another, but truth ever escapes us. To learn how to remain in
ignorance may well be the final lesson of wisdom.[240]

XVI

THE FACTS OF EVOLUTION