Chapter VIII: The Battle of the Levels

By the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty the United States guaranteed and undertook to maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama. The new republic granted to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of a strip ten miles wide and extending three nautical miles into the sea at either terminal, with all lands lying outside of the zone necessary for the construction of the canal, and with the islands in the Bay of Panama. The cities of Panama and Colon were not embraced in the canal zone, but the United States assumed their sanitation and, in case of need, the maintenance of order therein. All railway and canal property rights belonging to Panama and needed for the canal passed to the United States, including any property of the railway and canal companies in the cities of Panama and Colon. The works, property, and personnel of the canal and railways were exempted from taxation in the cities of Colon and Panama as well as in the actual canal zone. Free immigration of the workers and free importation of supplies for the construction and operation of the canal were granted. Provision was made for the use of military force and the building of fortifications by the United States for the protection of the transit. The United States were to pay $10,000,000 down on exchange of ratifications and an annuity of $250,000, beginning nine years from the same date. It will be noticed that the United States enjoyed in the canal zone all the rights, though not the name and title, of sovereignty.

The treaty was finally ratified on February 26, 1904, and four days later the first Isthmian Canal Commission, consisting of seven members, was appointed by President Roosevelt to arrange for the conduct of the great enterprise. Careful instructions were given to the commission. The Isthmian Canal Commission were authorized and directed:--

First.--To make all needful rules and regulations for the
government of the zone, and for the correct administration
of the military, civil, and judicial affairs of its
possessions until the close of the fifty-eighth session of
Congress. Second.--To establish a civil service for the
government of the strip and construction of the canal,
appointments to which shall be secured as nearly as
practicable by merit system. Third.--To make, or cause to be
made, all needful surveys, borings, designs, plans, and
specifications of the engineering, hydraulic, and sanitary
works required, and to supervise the execution of the same.
Fourth.--To make, and cause to be executed after due
advertisement, all necessary contracts for any and all kinds
of engineering and construction works. Fifth.--To acquire by
purchase or through proper and uniform expropriation
proceedings, to be prescribed by the commission, any private
lands or other real property whose ownership by the United
States is essential to the excavation and completion of the
canal. Sixth.--To make all needful rules and regulations
respecting an economical and correct disbursement and an
accounting for all funds that may be appropriated by
Congress for the construction of the canal, its auxiliary
works, and the government of the canal zone; and to
establish a proper and comprehensive system of bookkeeping
showing the state of the work, the expenditures by classes,
and the amounts still available. Seventh.--To make
requisition on the Secretary of War for funds needed from
time to time in the proper prosecution of the work, and to
designate the disbursing officers authorized to receipt for
the same.

The work of this commission was not wholly satisfactory, and in April 1905 another was appointed, which was ordered to meet at Panama quarterly, the first commission having conducted its operations from Washington.

The first two and a half years of the American occupation were spent mainly in preparing for the great task. One very important question had now to be finally decided. The battle of the routes was over, and now began the battle of the levels. We have seen that the French began with the idea of a tide-level canal. The New Panama Canal Company had changed to the lock or high-level plan, but the French had not advanced in their work to the point when the one or the other scheme must be definitively adopted. The excavation they had carried out was all available for either type of canal. But the Americans had now to come to a decision.

A few more words about the main physical features of the isthmus are necessary for the reader to understand the nature of the problem. The two most important factors in the problem, as we have seen, are, firstly, the river Chagres with its tributaries, the Trinidad, Gatun, and twenty others; and, secondly, the range of low hills on the Pacific side through which any canal from Colon to Panama must pass. The river Chagres is a great mountain torrent which enters the Caribbean Sea a little west of Colon. The canal follows its course inland for about 26 miles, when the river valley turns sharply north-east and the canal continues straight on to the Pacific. The Chagres is not a river to be despised. The rainfall on the isthmus is very heavy, especially on the Atlantic side, where 140 inches per annum have been recorded. The isthmian rivers are all liable to quickly-swelling floods, the Chagres at Gamboa having been known to rise 35-1/2 feet in twenty-four hours. The two different types of canal involve equally different methods of dealing with this formidable stream. It must either be harnessed to the work or firmly and finally shut off from any interference with the canal. De Lesseps, who had chosen the tide-level scheme, proposed to turn the Chagres and other rivers into diversion channels, so that they could get safely to the sea without crossing the line of the canal or having any connection with it. This would have involved a work of excavation and construction scarcely less gigantic than the building of the canal itself.

On the other plan, the Chagres and its tributaries would be made the feeders of the upper reaches of the canal. So far from being politely shown off the premises, the question rather was whether they would be able to supply sufficient water all the year round for the needs of the canal. Then this harnessing of the Chagres meant the taming of its waters in a huge artificial lake, in which the impetuous current would be quenched and through which the dredged channel of the waterway would run. The New Panama Company had recommended the construction of a huge dam for this purpose at Bohio towards the Atlantic end of the canal, and this plan had been adopted by the first American Isthmian Commission, which issued its report in 1901. I may add that the Spooner Act, which authorized the construction of a canal, also contemplated a lock or high-level waterway. As we shall see, Bohio was not in the end adopted as the site of the big dam, but Gatun, where it is now constructed, with its concrete spillway carrying away the overflow waters of the lake down the old Chagres channel to the near Atlantic. I need not say that these were two very different ways of "caring for" the Chagres and its affluents. The tide-level canal would also, of course, be supplied with sea-water, while the high-level will be a fresh-water canal. Colonel Goethals, the chief engineer of the canal, anticipates rather a curious result from this latter circumstance. He thinks the bed of the upper reaches of the canal will in course of time be quite paved with the barnacles washed by the fresh-water from the bottoms of the great ocean-going vessels passing through the canal.

The second physical feature is the hill country or the "Continental Divide" which the canal enters near the point where the Chagres River crosses its course. Here runs the famous Culebra Cut, the nine-mile-long artificial canyon, the biggest excavation in the world. Now the highest elevation of these hills along the centre line of the canal was 312 feet above sea-level. The bottom of the canal at the cutting is 40 feet, so that the vertical depth of the cut on the centre line is 272 feet. The engineers of the tide-level scheme would have had not only to excavate 85 feet deeper--that is, to 45 feet below sea-level--but to make the cutting immensely wider in order to avoid the danger of disastrous landslides. This would have meant an enormous amount of additional work, as well as expense. Nevertheless, the controversy between the two principles was very warmly and equally sustained. It may be mentioned that Mr. Bunau-Varilla was an especially ardent advocate of the tide-level scheme. In fact, he was not for calling the waterway a canal at all; he would have christened it "the Straits of Panama."

However, a decision was necessary, and in 1905 a board of consulting or advisory engineers was appointed, mainly to consider whether the canal should be constructed at high-level or sea-level. Five members were appointed by European governments, and the president was Major-General George W. Davis, formerly of the United States army. The instructions given to this board by President Roosevelt will afford a very clear idea of the problem it had to solve:--

There are two or three considerations which I trust you will
steadily keep before your minds in coming to a conclusion as
to the proper type of canal. I hope that ultimately it will
prove possible to build a sea-level canal. Such a canal
would undoubtedly be best in the end, if feasible; and I
feel that one of the chief advantages of the Panama route
is that ultimately a sea-level canal will be a possibility.
But while paying due heed to the ideal perfectibility of the
scheme from an engineer's standpoint, remember the need of
having a plan which shall provide for the immediate building
of a canal on the safest terms and in the shortest possible
time. If to build a sea-level canal will but slightly
increase the risk, then, of course, it is preferable. But if
to adopt the plan of a sea-level canal means to incur a
hazard, and to insure indefinite delay, then it is not
preferable. If the advantages and disadvantages are closely
balanced, I expect you to say so. I desire also to know
whether, if you recommend a high-level multi-lock canal, it
will be possible, after it is completed, to turn it into or
substitute for it, in time, a sea-level canal without
interrupting the traffic upon it. Two of the prime
considerations to be kept steadily in mind are:

First.--The utmost practicable speed of construction.
Second.--Practical certainty that the plan proposed will be
feasible; that it can be carried out with the minimum risk.

The quantity of work and the amount of work should be
minimized as far as possible.

There may be good reason why the delay incident to the
adoption of a plan for an ideal canal should be incurred;
but if there is not, then I hope to see the canal
constructed on a system which will bring to the nearest
possible date in the future the time when it is practicable
to take the first ship across the isthmus--that is, which
will in the shortest time possible secure a Panama waterway
between the oceans of such a character as to guarantee
permanent and ample communication for the greatest ships of
our navy and for the larger steamers on either the Atlantic
or the Pacific. The delay in transit of the vessels owing to
additional locks would be of small consequence when compared
with shortening the time for the construction of the canal
or diminishing the risks in its construction.

In short, I desire your best judgment on all the various
questions to be considered in choosing among the various
plans for a comparatively high-level multi-lock canal; for a
lower level, with fewer locks; and for a sea-level canal.
Finally, I urge upon you the necessity of as great
expedition in coming to a decision as is compatible with
thoroughness in considering the conditions.

The board went to the isthmus and investigated the subject with great care. In January 1906 they issued three reports. A majority of eight to five pronounced in favour of the sea-level scheme "as the only one giving reasonable assurance of safe and uninterrupted navigation." "Such a canal," it said, "can be constructed in twelve or thirteen years' time; the cost will be less than $250,000,000; it will endure for all time."

The minority were just as confidently in favour of a high-level canal. They concluded:--

In view of the unquestioned fact that the lock canal herein
advocated will cost about $100,000,000 less than the
proposed sea-level canal; believing that it can be built in
much less time; that it will afford a better navigation;
that it will be adequate for all its uses for a longer time,
and can be enlarged, if need should arise, with greater
facility and less cost, we recommend the lock canal at
elevation 85 for adoption by the United States.

The third report was made by the chief engineer, Mr. Stevens, who, quite apart from all considerations of expense, was strongly in favour of the high-level plan.

The three reports were considered by the canal commissioners, a majority of whom ultimately agreed with the minority of the advisory board. They admitted that a sea-level canal was ideally the best, but considered that the cost of making such a canal sufficiently wide would be prohibitive. They declared therefore for a lock canal at an elevation of 85 feet above sea-level. They gave their decision thus:--

It appears that the canal proposed by the minority of the
board of consulting engineers can be built in half the time
and at a little more than half the cost of the canal
proposed by the majority of the board, and that when
completed it will be a better canal, for the following
reasons:

1. It provides greater safety for ships and less danger of
interruption to traffic by reason of its wider and deeper
channels.

2. It provides quicker passage across the isthmus for large
ships or a large traffic.

3. It is in much less danger of damage to itself or of
delays to ships from the flood-waters of the Chagres and
other streams.

4. Its cost of operation and maintenance, including fixed
charges, will be less by some $2,000,000 or more per annum.

5. It can be enlarged hereafter much more easily and cheaply
than can a sea-level canal.

6. Its military defence can be effected with as little or
perhaps less difficulty than the sea-level canal.

7. It is our opinion that the plan proposed by the minority
of the board of consulting engineers is a most satisfactory
solution of an isthmian canal, and therefore we recommend
that the plan of the minority be adopted.

In February 1906 the president referred the question for final decision to Congress. In his message on the subject he spoke thus:--

It must be borne in mind that there is no question of
building what has been picturesquely termed "the Straits of
Panama"--that is, a waterway through which the largest
vessels could go with safety at uninterrupted high speed.
Both the sea-level canal and the proposed lock canal would
be too narrow and shallow to be called with any truthfulness
a strait, or to have any of the properties of a wide, deep
water strip. Both of them would be canals, pure and simple.
Each type has certain disadvantages and certain advantages.
But, in my judgment, the disadvantages are fewer and the
advantages very much greater in the case of a lock canal
substantially as proposed in the papers forwarded herewith;
and a careful study of the reports seems to establish a
strong probability that the following are the facts: The
sea-level canal would be slightly less exposed to damage in
the event of war; the running expenses, apart from the
heavy cost of interest on the amount employed to build it,
would be less; and for small ships the time of transit would
probably be less. On the other hand, the lock canal, at a
level of 80 feet or thereabouts, would not cost much more
than half as much to build, and could be built in about half
the time, while there would be very much less risk connected
with building it, and for large ships the transit would be
quicker; while, taking into account the interest on the
amount saved in building, the actual cost of maintenance
would be less. After being built, it would be easier to
enlarge the lock canal than the sea-level canal.

The law now on our statute books seems to contemplate a lock
canal. In my judgment a lock canal as herein recommended is
advisable. If the Congress directs that a sea-level canal be
constructed, its direction will, of course, be carried out.
Otherwise, the canal will be built on substantially the plan
for a lock canal outlined in the accompanying papers, such
changes being made, of course, as may be found actually
necessary.

In June 1906 Congress finally decided for a high-level canal, and the controversy was officially closed. But the friends of the sea-level scheme were by no means silenced. Whenever any serious difficulty occurred in the construction of the canal on the lock principle their voices were heard again. In fact, the conflict cannot be said to have ended until 1909, and even then it is not certain that the sea-levellers modified their convictions.