Chapter XVI: Lack of an American Programme

Having reviewed the radical differences between the President and myself in regard to the League of Nations and the inclusion of the Covenant in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, it is necessary to revert to the early days of the negotiations at Paris in order to explain the divergence of our views as to the necessity of a definite programme for the American Commission to direct it in its work and to guide its members in their intercourse with the delegates of other countries.

If the President had a programme, other than the general principles and the few territorial settlements included in his Fourteen Points, and the generalities contained in his "subsequent addresses," he did not show a copy of the programme to the Commissioners or advise them of its contents. The natural conclusion was that he had never worked out in detail the application of his announced principles or put into concrete form the specific settlements which he had declared ought to be in the terms of peace. The definition of the principles, the interpretation of the policies, and the detailing of the provisions regarding territorial settlements were not apparently attempted by Mr. Wilson. They were in large measure left uncertain by the phrases in which they were delivered. Without authoritative explanation, interpretation, or application to actual facts they formed incomplete and inadequate instructions to Commissioners who were authorized "to negotiate peace."

An examination of the familiar Fourteen Points uttered by the President in his address of January 8, 1918, will indicate the character of the declarations, which may be, by reason of their thought and expression, termed "Wilsonian" (Appendix IV, p. 314). The first five Points are announcements of principle which should govern the peace negotiations. The succeeding eight Points refer to territorial adjustments, but make no attempt to define actual boundaries, so essential in conducting negotiations regarding territory. The Fourteenth Point relates to the formation of "a general association of the nations for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small nations alike."

It is hardly worth while to say that the Fourteen Points and the four principles declared in the address of February 11, 1918 (Appendix V), do not constitute a sufficient programme for negotiators. Manifestly they are too indefinite in specific application. They were never intended for that purpose when they were proclaimed. They might have formed a general basis for the preparation of instructions for peace commissioners, but they omitted too many of the essentials to be considered actual instructions, while the lack of definite terms to-be included in a treaty further deprived them of that character. Such important and practical subjects as reparations, financial arrangements, the use and control of waterways, and other questions of a like nature, are not even mentioned. As a general statement of the bases of peace the Fourteen Points and subsequent declarations probably served a useful purpose, though some critics would deny it, but as a working programme for the negotiation of a treaty they were inadequate, if not wholly useless.

Believing in the autumn of 1918 that the end of the war was approaching and assuming that the American plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference would have to be furnished with detailed written instructions as to the terms of the treaty to be signed, I prepared on September 21, 1918, a memorandum of my views as to the territorial settlements which would form, not instructions, but a guide in the drafting of instructions for the American Commissioners. At the time I had no intimation that the President purposed to be present in person at the peace table and had not even thought of such a possibility. The memorandum, which follows, was written with the sole purpose of being ready to draft definite instructions which could be submitted to the President when the time came to prepare for the negotiation of the peace. The memorandum follows:

"The present Russian situation, which is unspeakably horrible and
which seems beyond present hope of betterment, presents new problems
to be solved at the peace table.

"The Pan-Germans now have in shattered and impotent Russia the
opportunity to develop an alternative or supplemental scheme to their
'Mittel-Europa' project. German domination over Southern Russia would
offer as advantageous, if not a more advantageous, route to the
Persian Gulf than through the turbulent Balkans and unreliable
Turkey. If both routes, north and south of the Black Sea, could be
controlled, the Pan-Germans would have gained more than they dreamed
of obtaining. I believe, however, that Bulgaria fears the Germans and
will be disposed to resist German domination possibly to the extent
of making a separate peace with the Allies. Nevertheless, if the
Germans could obtain the route north of the Black Sea, they would
with reason consider the war a successful venture because it would
give them the opportunity to rebuild the imperial power and to carry
out the Prussian ambition of world-mastery.

"The treaty of peace must not leave Germany in possession directly or
indirectly of either of these routes to the Orient. There must be
territorial barriers erected to prevent that Empire from ever being
able by political or economic penetration to become dominant in
those regions.

"With this in view I would state the essentials for a stable peace as
follows, though I do so in the most tentative way because conditions
may change materially. These 'essentials' relate to territory and
waters, and do not deal with military protection.

"_First._ The complete abrogation or denouncement of the
Brest-Litovsk Treaty and all treaties relating in any way to Russian
territory or commerce; and also the same action as to the Treaty of
Bucharest. This applies to all treaties made by the German Empire or
Germany's allies.

"_Second._ The Baltic Provinces of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia
should be autonomous states of a Russian Confederation.

"_Third_. Finland raises a different question and it should be
carefully considered whether it should not be an independent state.

"_Fourth_. An independent Poland, composed of Polish provinces of
Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and in possession of the port
of Danzig.

"_Fifth_. An independent state, either single or federal composed of
Bohemia, Slovakia, and Moravia (and possibly a portion of Silesia)
and possessing an international right of way by land or water to a
free port.

"_Sixth_. The Ukraine to be a state of the Russian Confederation, to
which should be annexed that portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
in which the Ruthenians predominate.

"_Seventh_. Roumania, in addition to her former territory, should
ultimately be given sovereignty over Bessarabia, Transylvania, and
the upper portion of the Dobrudja, leaving the central mouth of the
Danube as the boundary of Bulgaria, or else the northern half. (As to
the boundary there is doubt.)

"_Eighth_. The territories in which the Jugo-Slavs predominate,
namely Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, should
be united with Serbia and Montenegro forming a single or a federal
state. The sovereignty over Trieste or some other port should be
later settled in drawing a boundary line between the new state and
Italy. My present view is that there should be a good Jugo-Slav port.

"_Ninth_. Hungary should be separated from Austria and possess rights
of free navigation of the Danube.

"_Tenth_. Restoration to Italy of all the Italian provinces of
Austria. Italy's territory to extend along the northern Adriatic
shore to the Jugo-Slav boundary. Certain ports on the eastern side of
the Adriatic should be considered as possible naval bases of Italy.
(This last is doubtful.)

"_Eleventh._ Reduction of Austria to the ancient boundaries and title
of the Archduchy of Austria. Incorporation of Archduchy in the
Imperial German Confederation. Austrian outlet to the sea would be
like that of Baden and Saxony through German ports on the North Sea
and the Baltic.

"_Twelfth_. The boundaries of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece to follow
in general those established after the First Balkan War, though
Bulgaria should surrender to Greece more of the Aegean coast and
obtain the southern half only of the Dobrudja (or else as far as the
Danube) and the Turkish territory up to the district surrounding
Constantinople, to be subsequently decided upon.

"_Thirteenth_. Albania to be under Italian or Serbian sovereignty or
incorporated in the Jugo-Slav Confederation.

"_Fourteenth._ Greece to obtain more of the Aegean littoral at the
expense of Bulgaria, the Greek-inhabited islands adjacent to Asia
Minor and possibly certain ports and adjoining territory in
Asia Minor.

"_Fifteenth._ The Ottoman Empire to be reduced to Anatolia and have
no possessions in Europe. (This requires consideration.)

"_Sixteenth_. Constantinople to be erected into an international
protectorate surrounded by a land zone to allow for expansion of
population. The form of government to be determined upon by an
international commission or by one Government acting as the mandatory
of the Powers. The commission or mandatory to have the regulation and
control of the navigation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus as
international waterways.

"_Seventeenth._ Armenia and Syria to be erected into protectorates of
such Government or Governments as seems expedient from a domestic as
well as an international point of view; the guaranty being that both
countries will be given self-government as soon as possible and that
an 'Open-Door' policy as to commerce and industrial development will
be rigidly observed.

"_Eighteenth._ Palestine to be an autonomous state under a general
international protectorate or under the protectorate of a Power
designated to act as the mandatory of the Powers.

"_Nineteenth._ Arabia to receive careful consideration as to the full
or partial sovereignty of the state or states established.

"_Twentieth_. Great Britain to have the sovereignty of Egypt, or a
full protectorate over it.

"_Twenty-first._ Persia to be freed from all treaties establishing
spheres of influence. Rigid application of the 'Open-Door' policy in
regard to commercial and industrial development.

"_Twenty-second._ All Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France
without conditions.

"_Twenty-third._ Belgium to be restored to full sovereignty.

"_Twenty-fourth._ A consideration of the union of Luxemburg to
Belgium. (This is open to question.)

"_Twenty-fifth._ The Kiel Canal to be internationalized and an
international zone twenty miles from the Canal on either side to be
erected which should be, with the Canal, under the control and
regulation of Denmark as the mandatory of the Powers. (This last is
doubtful.)

"_Twenty-sixth._ All land north of the Kiel Canal Zone to be ceded to
Denmark.

"_Twenty-seventh._ The fortifications of the Kiel Canal and of
Heligoland to be dismantled. Heligoland to be ceded to Denmark.

"_Twenty-eighth._ The sovereignty of the archipelago of Spitzbergen
to be granted to Norway.

"_Twenty-ninth._ The disposition of the colonial possessions formerly
belonging to Germany to be determined by an international commission
having in mind the interests of the inhabitants and the possibility
of employing these colonies as a means of indemnification for wrongs
done. The 'Open-Door' policy should be guaranteed.

"While the foregoing definitive statement as to territory contains my
views at the present time (September 21, 1918), I feel that no
proposition should be considered unalterable, as further study and
conditions which have not been disclosed may materially change
some of them.

"Three things must constantly be kept in mind, the natural stability
of race, language, and nationality, the necessity of every nation
having an outlet to the sea so that it may maintain its own merchant
marine, and the imperative need of rendering Germany impotent as a
military power."

Later I realized that another factor should be given as important a place in the terms of peace as any of the three, namely, the economic interdependence of adjoining areas and the mutual industrial benefit to their inhabitants by close political affiliation. This factor in the territorial settlements made more and more impression upon me as it was disclosed by a detailed study of the numerous problems which the Peace Conference had to solve.

I made other memoranda on various subjects relating to the general peace for the purpose of crystallizing my ideas, so that I could lay them in concrete form before the President when the time came to draft instructions for the American plenipotentiaries charged with the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace. When the President reached the decision to attend the Conference and to direct in person the negotiations, it became evident that, in place of the instructions customarily issued to negotiators, a more practical and proper form of defining the objects to be sought by the United States would be an outline of a treaty setting forth in detail the features of the peace, or else a memorandum containing definite declarations of policy in regard to the numerous problems presented. Unless there was some framework of this sort on which to build, it would manifestly be very embarrassing for the American Commissioners in their intercourse with their foreign colleagues, as they would be unable to discuss authoritatively or even informally the questions at issue or express opinions upon them without the danger of unwittingly opposing the President's wishes or of contradicting the views which might be expressed by some other of their associates on the American Commission. A definite plan seemed essential if the Americans were to take any part in the personal exchanges of views which are so usual during the progress of negotiations.

Prior to the departure of the American delegation from the United States and for two weeks after their arrival in Paris, it was expected that the President would submit to the Commissioners for their guidance a _projet_ of a treaty or a very complete programme as to policies. Nothing, however, was done, and in the conferences which took place between the President and his American associates he confined his remarks almost exclusively to the League of Nations and to his plan for its organization. It was evident--at least that was the natural inference--that President Wilson was without a programme of any sort or even of a list of subjects suitable as an outline for the preparation of a programme. How he purposed to conduct the negotiations no one seemed to know. It was all very uncertain and unsatisfactory.

In the circumstances, which seemed to be due to the President's failure to appreciate the necessity for a definite programme, I felt that something ought to be done, as the probable result would be that the terms of the Treaty, other than the provisions regarding a League of Nations, would be drafted by foreign delegates and not by the President.

Impressed by the unsatisfactory state of affairs and desirous of remedying it if possible, I asked Dr. James Brown Scott and Mr. David Hunter Miller, the legal advisers of the American Commission, to prepare a skeleton treaty covering the subjects to be dealt with in the negotiations which could be used in working out a complete programme. After several conferences with these advisers concerning the subjects to be included and their arrangement in the Treaty, the work was sufficiently advanced to lay before the Commissioners. Copies were, therefore, furnished to them with the request that they give the document consideration in order that they might make criticisms and suggest changes. I had not sent a copy to the President, intending to await the views of my colleagues before doing so, but during the conference of January 10, to which I have been compelled reluctantly to refer in discussing the Covenant of the League of Nations, I mentioned the fact that our legal advisers had been for some time at work on a "skeleton treaty" and had made a tentative draft. The President at once showed his displeasure and resented the action taken, evidently considering the request that a draft be prepared to be a usurpation of his authority to direct the activities of the Commission. It was this incident which called forth his remark, to which reference was made in