Chapter I: Preface

The present work is an attempt to express what I take to be the fundamental ideas of a true social philosophy. I have criticised and interpreted the doctrines of certain well-known thinkers only with the view of setting these ideas in the clearest light. This is the whole purpose of the book; and I have intentionally abstained from practical applications, except by way of illustration. It is my conviction, indeed, that a better understanding of fundamental principles would very greatly contribute to the more rational handling of practical problems. But this better understanding is only to be attained, as it seems to me, by a thorough examination of ideas, apart from the associations of practical issues about which a fierce party spirit has been aroused. And, moreover, it is my belief that the influence of the ideas here maintained upon practical discussion, would be, in a certain sense, to detach it from philosophical theory. The principles which I advocate would destroy so many party prejudices, would put the mind in possession of so many clues to fact, that practical “social” issues would in consequence be considered as problems of life and mind, to be treated only with intimate experience, and by methods adequate to their subtlety. The {viii} result would be that such discussions would be regarded, if one may use the expression, more respectfully, and would acquire an independence and completeness worthy of their importance. The work of the social reformer should no more be regarded as a mere appendix to social theory than that of the doctor is regarded as a mere appendix to physiology. Such a division of labour is, of course, no hindrance to the interchange of facts and ideas between theory and practice. On the contrary, it tends to promote such an interchange, by increasing the supply on either side, and improving the intellectual communication between them.

It will occur to philosophical readers that the essence of the theory here presented is to be found not merely in Plato and in Aristotle, but in very many modern writers, more especially in Hegel, T.H. Green, Bradley, [1] and Wallace. [2] And they may be inclined to doubt the justification for a further work on the same lines by one who can hardly expect to improve upon the writings of such predecessors.

[1] See especially the chapter in _Ethical Studies_ entitled “My Station and its Duties.”

[2] See _Lectures and Essays_ by the late Professor Wallace, especially p. 213, “Our Natural Rights,” and p. 427, “The Relation of Fichte and Hegel to Socialism.”

On this point I should like to make a brief explanation. To begin with, it is a truism that every generation needs to be addressed in its own language; and I might even plead that the greatness of a tradition justifies some urgency in calling attention to it. But further, as regards T.H. Green in particular, whom in many points I follow very closely, I had two special reasons for desiring {ix} to express myself independently. One of these is to be found in my attempt to apply the conceptions of recent psychology to the theory of State coercion and of the Real or General Will, and to explain the relation of Social Philosophy to Sociological Psychology. For a short discussion of the Imitation Theory, which the purpose of the present work would not permit me to include in it, I may refer to a paper which will shortly appear in _Mind_.

My other reason lay in the conviction that the time has gone by for the scrupulous caution which Green displayed in estimating the value of the State to its members. I have referred to this subject in the body of my work (ch. x.); but I desire to emphasise my belief that our growing experience of all social “classes” proves the essentials of happiness and character to be the same throughout the social whole. Scepticism on this point is the product, I am convinced, of defective social experience. Indeed, it seems worth while to observe that the attention which is now rightly paid to such disadvantages, affecting the poorer classes of citizens, as it may be possible to remedy, has given rise to a serious confusion. The zeal of the advocate has led him to slander his client. In proving that under such and such conditions it would be no wonder if “the poor” were bad, he forgets to observe that in fact they are generally just as good as other people. The all-important distinction between a poor home and a bad home is neglected. And yet it seems probable that, omitting the definitely criminal quarters, there is no larger proportion of bad homes among the poor than among the rich. Such terms as “den” and “slum” {x} are too freely used, with an affectation of intimacy, for homes in which thousands of respectable citizens reside. Our democratic age will be remarkable to posterity for having dimmed the time-honoured belief in the virtues of the poor. There was cant, no doubt, in the older doctrine, but it was not so far from the fact as the opposite cant of today, and it is time that the truth in it should be revived.

I must repeat that these remarks are not intended to be controversial. There is nothing in them which serious men of all schools may not accept. They are meant to defend my attitude in treating the Real Will, and Freedom in the greater Self, as matters of universal concern, and not merely as hopes and fancies cherished by “educated” persons. Indeed, although it would be churlish for a student to disparage literary education, it must never be forgotten that, as things are today, the citizens who live by handicraft possess a valuable element of brain-culture, which is on the whole denied to the literary class. Whatever, therefore, may be wanting in the following pages, it is not, I think, the relation of their subject-matter to the general life of peoples.

The social student should shun mere optimism; but he should not be afraid to make the most of that which he studies. It is an unfortunate result of the semi-practical aims which naturally influence social philosophers, that they are apt throughout to take up an indifferent, if not a hostile, attitude to their given object. They hardly believe in actual society as a botanist believes in plants, or a biologist believes in vital processes. And hence, social theory comes off badly. No student can really appreciate an object for which he is always apologising. There is a {xi} touch of this attitude in all the principal writers, except Hegel and Bradley, and therefore, as I venture to think, they partly fail to seize the greatness and ideality of life in its commonest actual phases. It is in no spirit of obscurantism, and with no thought of resisting the march of a true social logic, that some take up a different position. They are convinced that an actual living society is an infinitely higher creature than a steam-engine, a plant or an animal; and that the best of their ideas are not too good to be employed in analysing it. Those who cannot be enthusiastic in the study of society as it is, would not be so in the study of a better society if they had it. “Here or nowhere is your America.”

Bernard Bosanquet Caterham, March, 1899.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I

RISE AND CONDITIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE STATE 1-16

1. Meaning of “Philosophical Theory” 1

2. Philosophy and the “State,” 3
a. The Greek City-State 4
b. Type of mind implied in it 5
c. Type of political philosophy suggested by it 5

3. Transition from City-State to Nation-State. Law of Nature 9

4. Rise of Nation-States and of modern political philosophy.
Rousseau 11

CHAPTER II

SOCIOLOGICAL COMPARED WITH PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY 17-52

1. Problems of Social Physics and of Idealism 17

2. Social Theory as influenced by special sciences 19
(i) Mathematics 19
(ii) Biology 21
(iii) Economics 27
(iv) Jurisprudence and the theory of Right 34
_(a)_ Law as “ideal fact” 34
_(b)_ Sociological analysis of Law 36
(v) Idea of the “spirit of laws” or mind of peoples;
Anthropology in widest sense 39
(vi) Psychology 42
(vii) Connection of points of view and kinds of fact 47

3. Comparison of Psychological Sociology and Social Philosophy 48

CHAPTER III

THE PARADOX OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION; SELF-GOVERNMENT 53-78

1. The conception of self-government 53

2. Law and Liberty in Bentham 56

3. Examination of Mill’s “Liberty” 60
(i) Mill’s idea of Individuality 60
(ii) His view of the authority of Society over the Individual 61
(iii) His applications of his principle 66

4. Views of Herbert Spencer 69
(i) Spencer and Bentham on Natural Right 70
(ii) Liberty and restraint in Spencer and Huxley 71

5. Mill’s criticism of Self-Government 73

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION MORE RADICALLY TREATED 79-102

1. Nature of above theories not expressed by term Individualism.
“Theories of the first look” 79

2. Rousseau’s earlier Essays 84

3. Problem of the _Contrat Social_ 87

4. Conflict of ideas in Rousseau’s statement 89

5. Nature of his solution 91

6. Reality of the “Moral Person” and conception of Civil Liberty 94

CHAPTER V.

THE CONCEPTION OF A “REAL” WILL 103-123

1. The Supreme Will in Hobbes and Locke 103

2. Meaning of the General Will for Rousseau 107

3- The General Will contrasted with the Will of All 111

4- The General Will and the work of the Legislator 117

CHAPTER VI

THE CONCEPTION OF LIBERTY AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FOREGOING
SUGGESTIONS 118-154

1. Liberty as the condition of our being ourselves 118

2. Illustrated by the idea of Nature and Natural 128

3. Phases of idea of Liberty 133
_(a)_ Juristic phase = “absence of restraint” 134
_(b)_ Political phase = “rights of citizenship” 135
_(c)_ Positive connection of _(a)_ and _(b)_ 136
_(d)_ Philosophical phase = “being oneself in
fullest sense” 137
_(e)_ Danger and justification of using same term
for _(a)_ and _(d)_ 142

4. Liberty as attribute of the will that wills itself 146

5. This “real” will identified with State 149
_(a)_ State in this sense is social life as a whole 150
_(b)_ How State is force as extension of “individual” mind 152

CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOLOGICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE IDEA OF A REAL OR GENERAL WILL 155-179

1. Object of the Chapter 155

2. Connection between social and mental groupings 156
(1) Analogy between them 156
(i) Associations of persons and of ideas 156
(ii) Organisation of social groups and of ideas 159
(2) Identity of social and mental groupings 170
(i) Social groups as an aspect of mental systems 170
(ii) Individual minds as structures of
appercipient systems 173
(iii) Social whole as a system of mental systems 175