Chapter XI (2)

A public act which inflicts loss, such as war, confiscation, the repudiation of a debt, is wholly different from murder or theft. It is not the act of a private person. It is not a violation of law. [1] It can hardly be motived by private malice or cupidity in the strict sense, and it is not a breach of an established moral order by a being within it and dependent upon it for the organisation and protection of his daily life. It is the act of a supreme power, which has ultimate responsibility for protecting the form of life of which it is the guardian, and which is not itself protected by any scheme of functions or relations, such as prescribes a course for the reconciliation of rights and secures its effectiveness. The means adopted by such a supreme power to discharge its responsibilities as a whole, are of course subject to criticism as respects the conception of good which they {327} imply and their appropriateness to the task of realising it. But it is mere confusion to apply to them names borrowed from analogous acts of individuals within communities, to impute them, as it were, to individuals under dyslogistic predicates and to pass moral judgment upon them in the same sense as on private acts. The nearest approach which we can imagine to public immorality would be when the organs which act for the State, as such, exhibit in their public action, on its behalf, a narrow, selfish or brutal [2] conception of the interest of the State as a whole, in which, so far as can be judged, public opinion at the time agrees. In such a case the State, as such, may really be said to be acting immorally, _i.e._ in contravention of its main duty to sustain the conditions of as much good life as possible. This case must be distinguished, if I am right, from the case in which the individuals, acting as the public authority, are corrupted in their own private interests [3] not shared with the public. For then the case would rather be that the State, the organ of the public good, had not been given a chance to speak, but had simply been defrauded by those who spoke in its name.

[1] An act which violates its own law is not an act of the State. And the State is not subject to the law of any other State.

[2] _e.g._ If, with the knowledge of Parliament, and without a protest from it, a price were offered for the killing of a hostile statesman or general.

[3] _e.g._ Bribed by a foreign potentate, or pursuing Stock Exchange interests.

We do not suggest, then, that the action of States is beyond moral criticism, nor that action of individuals in their interest is above or below morality, except in the sense in which one moral claim has constantly to be postponed to another. But we {328} deny that States can be treated as the actors in private immoralities which their agents permit themselves in the alleged interest of the State; or, again, can be bound by the private honour and conscience of such agents; and we deny, moreover, that the avowed public acts of sovereign powers, which cause loss or injury, can be imputed to individuals under the names of private offences; that someone is guilty of murder when a country carries on war, or of theft when it adopts the policy of repudiation, confiscation, or annexation.

8. It is obvious that the idea of humanity, of the world of intelligent beings on the surface of our earth, conceived as a unity, must hold such a place in any tolerably complete philosophical thinking, as in some way to control the idea of particular States, and to sum up the purposes and possibilities of human life. The idea of humanity is universal, and whatever limits we have tacitly in mind--whatever limits the Greek thinker had in mind while he based his ethics on the distinction between man and beast--yet, when we rely on the idea of man as man, we are committed to treat in some way of the world of mankind.

_(a)_ The first point which forces itself upon our attention is, that the idea which we tacitly entertain when we refer to humanity, is not true of the greater part of mankind. No doubt, we are quite aware of imperfection and inconsistency in the family and the State. But here, in the case of mankind, the problem reaches an acuter form. According to the current ideas of our civilisation, a great part of the lives which {329} are being lived and have been lived by mankind are not lives worth living, in the sense of embodying qualities for which life seems valuable to us. [1] It is true that, in all to whom we give the name of man, we suppose a possibility of such living, in the sense that they have an intelligence distinguishable from that of animals. But it is a possibility which, for the most part, has been very slightly realised, and which involves no conscious connection, so far as we can see, with any realisation. Our idea of man is not formed by simple enumeration, but by framing a law which explains the less perfect and consistent facts with reference to the more perfect and more consistent facts.

[1] This idea is embodied in the doctrine of Salvation confined to the few, and contains perhaps a similar error. But it has a _prima facie_ truth.

_(b)_ This being so, it seems to follow that the object of our ethical idea of humanity is not really mankind as a single community. Putting aside the impossibilities arising from succession in time, we see that no such identical experience can be presupposed in all mankind as is necessary to effective membership of a common society and exercise of a general will. It does not follow from this that there can be no general recognition of the rights arising from the capacities for good life which belong to man as man. Though insufficient, as variously and imperfectly realised, to be the basis of an effective community, they may, as far as realised, be a common element or tissue of connection, running through the more concrete experience on which effective communities {330} rest. Such a relation as that of England and India brings the matter home. Englishmen cannot make one effective self-governed community with the Indian populations. It would be misery and inefficiency to both sides. But our State can recognise the primary rights of humanity as determined in the life of its Indian subjects, and enforce or respect these rights, whether India be a dependency or an independent community. The problem is not unlike that raised by the idea of a universal language. As a substitute for national languages, it would mean a dead level of intelligence unsuited to every actual national mind, the destruction of literature and poetry. As an addition to existing languages, or more simply, if it became customary for every people to be acquainted with the tongues of other nations, there would be a common understanding no less firm, and a vast gain of appreciation and enjoyment, a levelling up instead of levelling down. The recognition of human rights through communities founded on organic unity of experience may be compared in just these terms to the idea of a universal society including the entire human race.

_(c)_ The contrast between humanity and mankind has always uttered itself through a dichotomous mode of expression--Jew and Gentile, Greek [1] and barbarian, Mussulman and infidel, Christian {331} and heathen, white civilisations and the black and yellow races. It will be noted at once that some of these divisions contradict each other, and this fact may suggest the probability that to every people its own life has seemed the crown of things, and the remainder of mankind only the remainder. Such a suggestion may have a real bearing on our problem, and we will return to it. In the meantime, however, it is plain that humanity [2] as an ethical idea is a type or a problem rather than a fact. It means certain qualities, at once realised in what we take to be the crown of the race, and including a sensibility to the claims of the race as such. Sensibility to the claims of the race as such, is least of all qualities common to the race as such. The respect of States and individuals for humanity is then, after all, in its essence, a duty to maintain a type of life, not general, but the best we know, which we call the most human, and in accordance with it to recognise and deal with the rights of alien individuals and communities. This conception is opposed to the treatment of all individual human beings as members of an identical community having identical capacities and rights. It follows our general conviction that not numbers but qualities determine the value of life. But qualities, of course, become self-contradictory if they fail to meet the demands imposed on them by numbers.

And thus we recur to a suggestion noted {332} above. Every people, as a rule, seems to find contentment in its own type of life. This cannot contradict, for us, the imperativeness of our own sense of the best. But it may make us cautious as to the general theory of progress, and ready to admit that one type of humanity cannot cover the whole ground of the possibilities of human nature. Our action must, no doubt, be guided by what we can understand of human needs, and this must depend ultimately on our own type of life. But it makes a difference whether we start from the hypothesis that our civilisation as such stands for the goal of progress, or admit that there is a necessity for covering the whole ground of human nature. And it may be that, as the ground is covered, our States may go the way which others have gone, without, however, leaving things as they are. If the State, moreover, is not ultimate nor above criticism, no more is any given idea of humanity; and reference to “the interests of mankind” only names the problem, which is to find out what those interests are, in terms of human qualities to be realised.

[1] It is remarkable that a limitation of the earth’s surface, raising an idea of unity, has always, I believe, been presupposed. For the Greeks, Delphi was the centre of the earth; for us, the earth being a sphere and returning into itself, gives a certainty that it does not stretch away to infinity, so making unity of its inhabitants inconceivable. The remark, I think, is Kant’s.

[2] “Humanity” = “humaneness.” Scotch “Humanities” = Greek and Latin. Oxford “Literae humaniores” = classics and philosophy. Greek φιλάνθρωπον [philanthropon], a sense of what is due to man, _e.g._ of poetical justice.

_(d)_ Neither the State, however, nor the idea of humanity, nor the interests of mankind, are the last word of theory. And even political theory must so far point ahead as to show that it knows where to look for its continuation. We have taken Society and the State throughout to have their value in the human capacities which they are the means of realising, in which realisation their social aspect is an inevitable condition (for human nature is not complete in solitude), but is not by itself, in its form of multitudes, the end. {333} There is, therefore, no breach of continuity when the immediate participation of numbers, the direct moulding of life by the claims and relations of selves, falls away, and the human mind, consolidated and sustained by society, goes further on its path in removing contradictions and shaping its world and itself into unity. Art, philosophy, and religion, though in a sense the very life-blood of society, are not and could not be directly fashioned to meet the needs and uses of the multitude, and their aim is not _in that sense_ “social.” They should rather be regarded as a continuation, within and founded upon the commonwealth, of the work which the commonwealth begins in realising human nature; as fuller utterances of the same universal self which the “general will” reveals in more precarious forms; and as in the same sense implicit in the consciousness of all, being an inheritance which is theirs so far as they can take possession of it.

We have thus attempted to trace in outline the content of the self, implied, but imperfectly and variously reached, in the actual individual consciousness. It is because of this implication, carrying the sense that something more than we are is imperative upon us, that self-government has a meaning, and that freedom--the non-obstruction of capacities--is to be found in a system which lays burdens on the untamed self and “forces us to be free.” What we feel as mere force cannot as such be freedom; but in our subtle and complex natures the recognition of a force may, as we have tried to explain, sustain, regularise, and reawaken the operation of {334} a consciousness of good, which we rejoice to see maintained, if our intelligence fails of itself to maintain it, against indolence, incompetence, and rebellion, even if they are our own. This is the root of self-government, and true political government is self-government.

INDEX.

A.

Absolutism, Administrative, 63. Actual Will, contrast Real Will, 118. Albion, Launch of, 96 note. Alexander, Prof., 174 n. All and each, as Society and Individual, 81, 180. Will of All dist. General Will, 111. Allness, Judgment of, 112. Altruism in H. Spencer, 24. and Egoism, 47, 81, 83. Amiel, cit, 236 note. Analysis of motive, fallacy of, 291 ff. Anglo-Saxon race, 301. Anthropology in Hegel, 254. Appercipient masses, 165 ff. cpd. social groups, 169. Aristocracy, Monarchy and Democracy, 284. Aristotle, 5 ff., 32, 129 ff., 295 note. on the poor, 319 note. Army, opp. crowd, 160 ff. Art, how far a social good, 333. Artisan or public worker, 313 note. Association, of persons and of ideas, 156 ff. _see_ ORGANISATION. Athens, 115. Attention, 216, _see_ AUTOMATISM, APPERCIPIENT. Austin, theory of Law, 261. Authority of Society over Individual in Mill, 62. Automatism in society, 183, ch. viii. Autonomy, in Greece, 4. moral, in Plato, 253.

B.

Bagehot, _Physics and Politics_, 19. Baldwin, Prof., _Social and Ethical Interpretations_, 44, 253. Baron of Bradwardine, 316. Beauty, reconciliation of Nature and State (Schiller), 237. Beccaria, 56. Bentham, 56 ff., 82, 180. Bequest, power of, 272. Biology and Sociology, 21 ff. double influence on Sociology, 23 ff. Birth, surviving as qualification, 306 note. Boeckh, 33 note. _Bona fides_, in political theory, 192. Bourgeois Society (in Hegel), 27, 269, 273 ff. Boot and Shoe Operatives, Trade Report, 279 note. Bradley, F.H., _Principles of Logic_, 49 note. on Punishment, 222. _Ethical Studies_, 267 note. Büchsenschütz, 33 note. Buckle, 28, Burlamaqui, 132. Butcher, Prof, (on Nature), _Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art_ 131.

C.

Calvin at Geneva, 61. Capacities, social, distinction of, 168, 173. Cash nexus, 276. Causation, physical, in human life, 31. Cause, idea of, in Sociology, 21. Charity Organisers, 318. Christian consciousness, 263. Church of England, offertory, 317. Church and State, 285. Cicero, 10. Citizen of the World, 8. City and town, distinguished in, Rousseau, 92 note. City-State, 36, 116. as a district, 310. Civil condition, in Rousseau, 97, 100. Civil Dispute, 262 note. _Civil Government_ Locke, 101. Civil Liberty, in Rousseau, 97. _Civilisation of Christendom_, 137, 195. Class, 278, 310 ff. derivation, 312. its absence, 315. Classes in community, 7, 30. Clan v. Family, 272. Closed Commercial State, Fichte, 246. Codification, 276 note. Collectivism, uncritical, 70, 181. Commonwealth and Soul, 6. Comparative Politics, 41. Competition and Co-operation, 24 ff. Compulsion ch. viii., in elementary education, 67. Comte, 18 ff., 41. Conditions and purpose, in Greek thinkers, 32. which come close to life, 198. Conditions, man and his, 31. Conscience, morality of, 259. in public acts, 324. Consciousness of Kind, 43. Consent, in Locke, 101. Constituencies, of mere numbers, 309. Constraint and self-assertion, 58. Continuity, idea of, 23. Contract, true province of, 260, _see_ STATUS. _Contrat Social_, _see_ ROUSSEAU. in Kant, 244. in Fichte, 245. in Hegel, 239, 261. Convention, Law treated as, 8. Co-operative Societies, 280 note. Corporation, or Trade Society, 278., Cosmopolitanism, 9. Crawford, Marion, _Corleone_, 226 note. Crime, sociological analysis of, 37. Criminal offence, 262 note. Crowd, 160 ff. mind of a, 43. Culture, 275. Curtius, E., on Peloponnese, 33 note. Czar, the (in 1818), 248.

D.

Dante, 31. Decadence in Rousseau, 85. _Déclassés_ as a class, 317. De Coulanges, _La Cité Antique_, 44. Demarcation between self-regarding and other regarding action, 64, 68, 76. Democracy, _see_ ARISTOCRACY. Democratic principle, 74, 284. true d. passion, 98. De Morgan, Prof., _Budget of Paradoxes_, 20. Despotic Government, 53. Deterrent, _see_ PUNISHMENT. Dicey, _The Peasant State_, 315. Difference and Identity compared with Invention and Imitation, 46. Dijon, Academy of, 85. District, the, as Ethical Idea, 304 ff., Division of Labour, 278. Dress, 8. Dreyfus-Brisac, M., editor of _Contrat Social_, 101. Duncker, 33 note. Duproix, _Kant et Fichte_, 236 ff. Durkheim, E., _Annee Sociologique_, 30 _De la Division du Travail Social_, 34, 37 ff., 43, 220 ff., 227 note, 315. Duty, dist. right and obligation, 208 ff.

E.

Each, _see_ ALL. Economic view of History, 28. facts, pressure of, 30. world, the, 275. Egoism, _see_ ALTRUISM. _Émile_, Rousseau’s, 98 note. _Emma_, Jane Austen’s, 162. End and means in society, 81, 180 ff. of Society and the State, 181. English people, the, 116. Epicureanism, 9. Epiphenomena, 29. Equality and Inequality, natural in Rousseau, 87. Equivalence of punishment and offence, 228. États, 278 note. Eternal Relations, in Montesquieu, 59. Ethical purpose of Philosophy, 50. obligation, paradox of, 55, 139. aspect negative in Spencer and Huxley, 72-3, cp. 124. use and wont, 259. ideas, ch. xi. _Être de raison_, State is not, 95. “Evangel of a _Contrat Social_” 14. Examination in Elementary Education, 67. Extenuating circumstances, 231. External aspect of action, 64, 188 ff.

F.

Family meal, the, 301. Family, monogamous, in Mill, 66, 269 ff., ch. xi. _Faust_, 97 note. Fichte, on Kant, 190 note, ch. ix. Fiction, historical of contract in Rousseau, 91 ff., 98. Force, in relation to end of State, ch. viii. Foreigners Court at Rome, 10. Form and Matter, in life of peoples, 32. Freedom, _see_ ROUSSEAU. Rousseau’s idea of, 237 ff. and thought (Hegel), 240. as understood by Kant and Fichte (Hegel), 247. Freeman, _Comparative Politics_, 42. French Republic, 321 note. Friendly Societies, 280 note. Fries, 249. Frontiers, ideal, 321. Fyffe, _History of Modern Europe_, 248.

G.

Geddes, Prof. Patrick, “Parasitism,” 26. “Regional Survey,” 48 note. General Will, 59, 93, ch. v. “always right,” 121. _see_ SOVEREIGNTY. misunderstanding about (Hegel), 240. Geneva, Calvin at, 61. Geneva and Rousseau, 86. Genevese, Rousseau’s father a, 98. Giddings, Prof., _Principles of Sociology_, 18, 51. Goethe, 41. Götz, 237. Golden Age, the, 129. Good, meaning of, 182. Good Will, _see_ CONSCIENCE, MORALITY. Government Departments, legislation by, 285. Graduation of Punishment, 228. Gravitation, 19. Green, T.H., _Principles of Political Obligation_, 93, 110, 137, 141, 144, 188 ff., 203, 213, 227. principle of State interference, 193. criticism of Hegel, 288 ff. Greeks, poor among, 319. Grotius, 59.

H.

Happiness, Greek idea of, 321. Hardenberg, 248. Hare’s scheme, 310. Hegel, 13, 27, 203, chs. ix. and x. Henrici cit. by Green, 203. Herder, 237. Herodotus, 136. Hesiod, 129. Hindrance of hindrances, in State action, 192 ff., 199. _History of Aesthetic_, 235. Hobbes, 13, 59, 77, 93, 104 ff. Holland, Prof., 56. Homer, 31, 135. Honour, private, in public acts, 324. Household, 271. Housing of poor, 198-9. Howard, “the Philanthropist,” 56. Humanity, and man, 328 ff. compared with idea of universal language, 330. dichotomous appellations for, 330. Huxley, Prof., _Evolution and Ethics_, 26 ff., 73.

I.

Ideal, 274. Ideas, influence of, in economic sphere, 30. and community, 7. Identity, _see_ DIFFERENCE. Imitation and Invention, 43, 211, 252 ff. Immorality, prevention of, by law, 65. Indifference of space, 305. Individual, fuller and narrower meaning of term, 79. independent existence of, 95. Individualism, 70, 79, 80, 181. Individuality, in Mill, 61, cp. 79, 125. limits of, 176. highest point of, 313 ff. Individual Mind, _see_ MIND. Industrial world, the, 275. Inequality, _see_ EQUALITY. Influence, Rousseau’s double, 16. Insanity, as loss of systematic control, 163. Institutions, ch. xi., real nature of, 170 ff. Intention, in theory of State coercion, 188 ff. Interference by State, ch. viii. Irreligion, prevention of, by law, 65. Isonomy, in Greece, 4.

J.

Jacobi, at Geneva, 237. James, Prof. W., 140, 164. Joint-stock company and community compared, 76. Jokai, Maurus, _Die Schöne Michal_, 316. Jurisprudence, 34 ff. Juristic meaning of liberty, 135. Justice, administration of, 276.

K.

Kant, 13, 59, 190, ch. ix., 263. _Klassenkampf_, 275 note. Klinger, _Sturm und Drang_, 237. Kinship and Neighbourhood, struggle of principles, 305. Kotzebue, murder of, 248. Krause cit. by Green, 203.

L.

Labourer, an English, and the State, 292. Law of Nature (and of Nations), 10. Law, sociological analysis of, 37. and sentiment, 38. Law, province of, in Mill, 63. Le Bon G., _Psychologie des Foules_, 43. Legislation, idea of, in Rousseau, 117 ff. Le Play, 28. Letter of the Law, 259, 276. Lévy, Bruhl M., 236 ff. Liberty, ch. vi. in Bentham, 57 ff. Mill’s _Liberty_, 60 ff. “real”, in Mill, 69. in Spencer and Seeley, 71, 133. _see_ NATURAL, CIVIL, MORAL, JURISTIC. “the quality of man,” 99, 118, 126. in Locke, 101. on convicts chains, 142 note. bare and determinate Liberty contrasted, 194 ff. Life, human, some of its elements, 31. Limitation of earth’s surface, Kant on, 330 note. Locality, mind of, 307. Loch, C.S., 142 note. Locke, 13, 101, 104 ff. Logic of social progress, 258. _Lucinde_, Schlegel’s, 271.

M.

Mafia, the, 226. Maine, origin of penal law, 227 note. Majority, will of, 4, 5. “tyranny of,” 75, 240. Marriage, prohibition suggested by Mill, 68, 271. Married Women’s Property, 272. Marx, 28, 29 note. Materialism, 28 ff. Matter and form, in life of peoples, 32. Maximisation, 187. Means, _see_ END. Medical Charities of London, 290 note. _Merrie England_, 129 note. Metternich, 249. Mill, J.S., 60 ff., 82, 118, 190, 194. Mind and body of community, 7. as a structure of systems, 173. as a reflection of society, 174. _see_ ASSOCIATION, ORGANISATION, APPERCIPIENT MASSES. subjective and objective, 254-5. absolute, 255. of Society, 296. Minority, _see_ MAJORITY. Mommsen, 313 note. Monarchy, 284. _see_ ARISTOCRACY. Monasticism, 302. Montesquieu, 13, 40, 59. Moral freedom in Rousseau, 98, 100. Morality, province of, in Mill, 63. of conscience, 259. of State action, 322. _Moralität_, 265.

N.

Napoleon, 294. Nation-State, 3, n, 116, 321 ff. Natural Law, 133 note. Natural Liberty in Rousseau, 97. Natural Right, 10 ff., 59. on biological basis, 70. Nature, 128 ff. in Aristotle, 130 ff. as self-assertion, 27. State of, in Rousseau, 86. in Burlamaqui, 132. Neighbourhood, _see_ KINSHIP, 308. Nettleship, R.L., 79 note, 146. Newman, W.L., edition of Aristotle’s _Politics_, 33 note. New Testament, 10. Newton, Sir Isaac, 20. Nihilism, Administrative, _see_ ABSOLUTISM.

O.

Obligation, ethical and political, 55. enforcement of moral, 67 ff. dist. right, 206. Offer for Sale, a public matter, 278. Organisation of ideas or persons opp. Association, 156 ff., 162. Organism, comparison of society to, in Fichte, 245. Origin of Inequality (Rousseau’s Discourse), 86. “Others,” in Society, 58, 66, 83, 113, 182, 207. _see_ INTERFERENCE.

P.

Parsimony, political, 185. Paternal Government, 270. Pattison, Rev. Mark, on Calvin, 60. Person or Persona in Law and Politics, 12, 93, 104. Phenomenology, 254 note. Philanthropy and public honours, 219 note. Philosopher, ancient, compared with Sociologist, 18. Philosophical Theory described, 1. Philosophy, purpose of, 50. relation to social good, 333. of Right (or Law) of Kant, 243. of Hegel, 247 ff. its position in _Philosophy of Mind_, 522 ff. of Fichte, 244. _Pirate, the_ (Scott), 162. Plato, 5 ff., 20, 27, 32, 55, 74 note, 131, 139, 142, 218 note, 221, 253, 297. Police State, 273. Political Economy, 27, 273. Political Obligation, paradox of, 55. Political Speculation, in 17th century, Politics and Science, relations of, 5. Poor, the, as a class, 316, 320. Poore, G.V., _Rural Hygiene_, 34 note. _Dwelling House_, 233 note. Position in society, dist. Right and Obligation, 205. Property, 260, 302. Proportional systems, Stout on, 165. Protection, mere, as function of the State, 276. of children’s earnings, 272. Protestant consciousness, 263. Psychology, a natural science, 49. two tendencies in, 51. Public or State action, dist. private, 322. Public opinion, 287. Publicity of discussion, 285. Punishment, ch. viii., 37 ff., 220 ff. right of capital, in Rousseau, 90. Purposes and conditions in Greek philosophers, 32. Pyramids, 278.

R.

“Real” Will, ch. v., and Actual, contrasted, 118. Rebellion, duty of, 213-4. Re-establishment of Sciences and Arts (Rousseau’s Discourse), 85. Referendum, 105 note. Reformation of offenders, _see_ PUNISHMENT. Religion and State, 285, 333. Repetition, 44. Representation of the People, 104. Representative Government, 115, 244. Republic of Plato criticised, 274. Republic of San Marino, 106. Retribution, _see_ PUNISHMENT. Return to Nature, 8, 23. Returns in Social Science, 42 note. Revolution, French, 14. Reward, 217 ff. _Richard the Second_, Shakespeare’s, 12. Right, science of, 34 ff. _see_ PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. of first occupant, 99. dist. obligation, 206. unrecognized, 210. Rights, natural, 35 ff. in Bentham and Spencer, 70 ff. in Rousseau, 99. system of, 127, 201 ff. negative basis of, 191. sphere of, 258-9. Ritchie, Prof., _Natural Rights_, 12, 14 note, 88. Rogers, J.D., 17 note. Roman Jurisprudence, 10. Roman Rule, 10. Rousseau, 13 40, 59, 70 note, 74, chs. iv. and v., 142 note. his idea of freedom, 237-8. on force and right, 238 n., 282. Ruskin (quoted) 252 n.

S.

St. Paul, 29. Salamis, 115. Scheme, general, in thought and in society, 162 ff. unconscious operation of, 166. Schiller, _Rauber_ and _Letters on Aesthetic Education_, 237. Scott, Sir Walter, 162. Seamanship, Technical training in, 192 note. Seeley, J., 42 note, 133. Self, the given, 143. Self-assertion and self-restraint, 27, 72. Self-government, ch. iii., 101, 139, 155, 134, 334 Self-improvement as freedom, 144 ff. Self-mastery, Plato’s account of, 139. Self-regarding conduct, 62 ff. Shakespeare, 31. Sidgwick, Prof., 44, 88. Similarities, etc., in social consciousness, 43. _Sittlichkeit_, _see_ _Moralität_. Slavery, 8, 69. Social contract, 59, ch. vi. _see_ “_Contrat Social_“ groups compared with appercipient masses, 169. Logic, 43. observance = ethical use and wont, 259. Physics, 20. Spirit, 40, 122. Science, ch. ii. Socialism, 318. Society as self-restraint, 27, 73. for Greeks implies self-assertion, 73 note. as a psychical whole, 175, 178. and Individual, demarcation between, 62, 64. relation to plurality of individuals, 176. dist. State, 184. as restraint, 27. compared with animal species, 23. compared with individual organism, 24. as viewed by Philosophy, 50. Sociologists, criticism of, 21 ff. Sociology, ch. ii. Socrates, 5 ff., 265. Sophists, 265. Soul and Commonwealth, 6, _see_ MIND. Sources in Sociology, 47. Sovereign, fallacy respecting, in Rousseau, 94 ff. nature of, 103, 108. Sovereignty, as exercise of General Will, 232 ff. of people, 282. Spencer, Herbert, 24 ff., 69 ff., 82, 145. Spinoza, 14 ff. Standard of Life, 30. Stände, 278 note. State, _see_ CITY-STATE AND NATION-STATE. dist. Bourgeois Society, 27, 93, 273. not an abstraction, 95. inclusive notion of, 150 ff. interference by, ch. viii. analysis of, ch. x. dist. Society, 184. v. Nature, 237. actual and ideal, 250. political organism, 269, 280 ff. and Religion, 285. Regulation, 277. Statistics, 42. Status to Contract, Durkheim, 277. Steinthal, 164. Stephen, Mr. Leslie, on cruelty, 326 note. Stoicism, 9, 263. Stout, G.F., _Analytic Psychology_, 49, 162 note, 165 note. Struggle for life, 23. Subjectivity, 274. Successes in social research, not due to Sociology, 22. Suggestion in Society, 45, 183. Super-organic, 26. Supply and Demand, 277 ff. Survival of fittest, _see_ STRUGGLE FOR LIFE. Sutherland, A., _Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct_, 27 note.

T.

Tacitus, _Annals_ and _Germania_, 129. Tarde, G., 43 note, 44 ff. Teleological character of Philosophy, 52. Themistocles, 114. Theories of the first look, 80, 82, 96, 144. Theory, society compared to, 258. Thomson’s _Seasons_, 237. Thring, Life of, 197 note. Thucydides, 218 note. Tithe, the, 318. Trade Societies, 277, 279 ff., 283. Traffic returns, French, 43. Training for Seamanship, 192 note. Transvaal, 315. Truth, meaning of, 182.

U.

Uniqueness of service, 25, 314. United States of America, 284, 321. Units, Delimitation of political, 185. Unity of Social Mind, 177. Universal good and common good, 110. Judgment dist. Judgment of Allness, 112 ff. Self, realised not solely in State, 332 ff. Universe of Discourse, 163. Unlawful Games, Statutes respecting, 66.

V.

Valet, the psychological, 292. Vegetarianism, 8. Vengeance dist. retribution, 227. Vico, _New Science_, 13, 17, 40. Virtue, 268.

W.

Wallace, Prof. W., _Lectures and Essays_, 85.
_Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind_, 249, 265.
War, dist. hunting, 212.
Wartburg, demonstration at, 248.
Water-drinking, 8.
Webb, Mr. and Mrs., 22 note.
_Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre cit_., 273 note.
Will, Real or General, 96, ch. v.
in Hobbes and Locke contrasted, 106.
of All contrasted with General, 111.
Real with Actual, 118.
that wills itself, 146.
implies a whole, 177.
particular, how universalised, 267.
_see_ SOVEREIGNTY, SOCIAL OBSERVANCE.
Wycliffite cry, 12.